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Juha I. Uitto is a leading thinker and practitioner in environmental evaluation. 
Since 2014, he has been director of the Independent Evaluation Office of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF). Prior to coming to his current position, he 
worked for more than two decades on evaluation and research on environment and 
development, most recently in the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office.
This book provides novel and in-depth perspectives on evaluating environment and 
sustainability issues in developing countries.
Evaluating Environment in International Development focuses on the approaches and 
experiences of leading international organizations, not-for-profits, and multilat-
eral and bilateral aid agencies to illustrate how systematic evaluation is an essential 
tool for providing evidence for decision-makers. Moving beyond projects and pro-
grammes, it explores normative work on the environment as well as environmental 
consequences of economic and social development efforts. This new edition reflects 
on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable Development 
Goals and considers how they have influenced efforts in a wide range of countries 
and what the implications are for evaluation. It also explores ways in which Big Data 
and geospatial approaches might be utilized.
Significantly updated throughout to reflect recent developments in climate 
change research, and on the implications of the 2020 pandemic, this volume will be 
of great interest to students and scholars of environmental studies, development stud-
ies, international relations, sustainable development and evaluation, as well as practi-
tioners in international organizations and development and environmental NGOs.
EVALUATING ENVIRONMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
“This updated edition builds on the key message put forward by its editor, Juha 
I. Uitto: ‘Evaluation must up its game.’ This makes the book a great contribu-
tion to long-term and current events thinking on evaluation, environment and 
development.”
—Jean-Marc Coicaud, Rutgers School of Law, State University of New Jersey, USA
“This second edition addresses the challenges of identifying the intended and 
unintended consequences of development interventions on the environment, 
particularly those driven by the search of growth. It calls for a truly systemic 
view of the interaction between natural and human systems. It provides inno-
vative interpretative frameworks and examples of evaluations that contribute to 
environmentally sound sustainable development. A must-read as countries 
redouble efforts to recover from the COVID-19 crisis with the aim of building 
forward better.”
—Oscar A. Garcia, Director, Independent Evaluation Office, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)
“For thinkers and practitioners alike, this volume brings together state-of-the-
art thinking in evaluation related to environment, while combining it with 
real-world experiences and lessons on the ground. The scholarship and wisdom 
of this volume is illustrated by the range of topics it covers in environmental 
evaluation that cover, for instance, the challenges of examining trans-boundary 
problems on the one hand and precisely defined disaster risk reduction on the 
other. I recommend this collection highly.”
—Jyotsna Puri, Director of the Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion 






Edited by Juha I. Uitto
Second edition published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 selection and editorial matter, Juha I. Uitto; individual chapters, the 
contributors
The right of Juha I. Uitto to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and 
of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with 
sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com,  
has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non 
Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered 
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to 
infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2014
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Uitto, Juha I., editor. 
Title: Evaluating environment in international development / edited by Juha I. Uitto. 
Description: 2. | Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 
2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. 
Identifiers: LCCN 2020044247 (print) | LCCN 2020044248 (ebook) 
Subjects: LCSH: Sustainable development. | Sustainable 
development–International cooperation. | Climatic changes. | Climatic 
changes–International cooperation. 
Classification: LCC HC79.E5 E849 2021 (print) | LCC HC79.E5 (ebook) | DDC 
338.9/27–dc23 
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020044247





by SPi Global, India
CONTENTS
List of figures viii
List of tables x
Foreword by Michael Quinn Patton xii
Preface by Juha I. Uitto xv
List of contributors xvii
PART I
Introduction and conceptual background 1
 1 Evaluating environment in international development:  
an introduction 3
Juha I. Uitto
 2 A global public goods perspective on environment and poverty 25
Rob D. van den Berg
 3 Evaluation at the nexus: evaluating sustainable development in 
the 2020s 46
Andy Rowe
 4 Poverty, climate change and disaster risk reduction: too complex 
to evaluate? 61
Hazel Todd and David Todd
vi Contents
PART II
Approaches and challenges in evaluating environment 
and sustainable development 77
 5 Using big data and geospatial approaches in evaluating 
environmental interventions 79
Anupam Anand and Geeta Batra
 6 Multiple actors and confounding factors: evaluating impact 
in complex social-ecological systems 93
Aaron E. Zazueta and Jeneen R. Garcia
 7 Assessing progress towards impacts in environmental 
programmes using the field review of outcomes 
to impacts methodology  111
David Todd and Rob Craig
 8 Meta-analysis of climate mitigation evaluations 137
Christine Wörlen
 9 A programme theory approach to evaluating normative 
environmental interventions 156
Segbedzi Norgbey and Michael Spilsbury
 10 From evaluation of joint programmes to joint evaluation of 
SDGs-ready interventions: lessons from the joint GEF-UNDP 
evaluation of the Small Grants Programme 180
Carlo Carugi and Heather Bryant
 11 Evaluating the poverty–environment nexus in Africa 197
Michael Stocking
 12 Small grants, big impacts: aggregation challenges 219
Sulan Chen and Juha I. Uitto
 13 Green economy performance of environmental initiatives in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 237
Ronal Gainza and Simon Lobach




 15 Disaster risk management in the SDG era 278
Vijayalakshmi Vadivelu
 16 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 





2.1 Evaluation Criteria 38
4.1 Potential Effects of Climate Change on Poverty Reduction 63
4.2 Some Major Disasters in Asia-Pacific 1970–2016 66
4.3 Initial Theory of Change for DiMSOG 70
4.4 Overlaps Between Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate 
Change Adaptation 70
5.1 Globally Distributed GEF-Supported Protected Areas were Overlaid 
with Sites of Conservation Importance 82
5.2 Geocoded Location Information for GEF Project Implementation Areas 83
5.3 Data Used in the Uganda Case Study 84
5.4 Trends and Comparison 86
5.5 Study Area Map of the 12 PAs within Kenya Included in the Analysis 88
5.6 Land Cover Classifications for the Reserve 89
7.1 The Relationship between the Key Elements in a Project Theory of 
Change 112
7.2 Steps in the Field-Based Review of Outcomes to Impacts Assessment 
Process 113
7.3 Steps in Conducting a Field Review of Outcomes to Impacts Analysis 
with Group or Individual Key Informants 114
7.4 Theory of Change for Intermediate State 3 122
Figures ix
7.5 Theory of Change for Intermediate State 1 127
7.6 Theory of Change for Intermediate State 2 129
7.7 Overall Review of Outcomes to Impacts Assessment of SEYMEMP 
Progress towards Impacts 132
7.8 Overall SEYMEMP Theory of Change 135
8.1 Evaluation Framework of Tokle and Uitto (2009) 142
8.2 Evaluation Framework of Tokle and Uitto (2009) with Stakeholder 
Groups 143
8.3 Example for Mapping the Barriers in the Barrier Circle Diagram 150
8.4 The Intervention Circle 151
8.5 Barrier Circle and Intervention Circle Diagram 152
9.1 A Set of Generic Results Chains, which can also be Termed ‘Causal 
Pathways’, ‘Impact Pathways’ or a ‘Theory of Change’ 161
9.2 A Schematic Single ‘Impact Pathway’ Showing Intermediate States, 
Assumptions and Impact Drivers 162
9.3 ‘Synergies Decisions’ Theory of Change (Shown in Part) 166
9.4 Theory of Change – Joint Geophysical Imaging Methodology for 
Geothermal Reservoir Assessment 169
9.5 A Generalized Representation of Impact Pathways Relating the Centre 
for International Forestry Research Criteria and Indicators Project 171
9.6 Major Impact Pathways through Forest Stewardship Council 
Certification Processes 172
9.7 Theory of Change – Common Problems in Capturing Performance at 
the Programme Level 175
12.1 SGP Management Diagram 223
TABLES
3.1 Observations from CES Sustainability-Ready Stocktaking 50
4.1 Some Estimated Impacts of Disasters in the Region 67
4.2 Common Types and Methods of Evaluation at Various Levels of 
Intervention 71
4.3 The Use of “Nested Theories of Change” to Help Evaluate Different 
Types of Issue 74
7.1 Definitions of Theory of Change Elements in the Outcomes–Impacts 
Pathways 112
7.2 Field Review of Outcomes to Impacts Rating System 115
7.3 Global Environmental Benefits (to Biodiversity) for the SEYMEMP 
Project 118
7.4 The SEYMEMP Outcomes–Impacts Theory of Change 120
7.5 Outcomes–Impacts Assessment Findings for Intermediate State 3 123
7.6 Available Information on Global Environmental Benefit Status 130
8.1 Example for Barrier Removal Strategies 147
12.1 SGP Portfolio by Focal Area 221
13.1 Grading System to Assess the ‘Green’ Level of Performance of 
Environmental 241
13.2 Modalities of Compensation in the PES, Costa Rica 242
13.3 Cumulative Contributions to FONAFIFO from 1998 to June 2011 243
Tables xi
13.4 Contributions to FONAG by Constituents and Donors 245
13.5 Estimated Payback Periods for Domestic Solar Water Heaters, Barbados 246
13.6 Type of Funding by Initiative and Phase 250
13.7 Green Performance of the Initiatives 253
13.8 Strengths, Weaknesses, Challenges, Opportunities Matrix 256
FOREWORD
To understand and appreciate the importance of this book, I will offer readers my 
perspective on two things: (1) the significant contributions to evaluation found 
herein and (2) the global context within which those contributions occur. Let me 
begin with the global context.
The first edition of the book came out in 2014 before the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) had been adopted but when it was clear that the 
Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015) would not be met. We are now a 
third of the way through the SDG commitments (2015–2030) in which the tra-
jectory towards attainment of those goals is dismal. Nowhere is this trend towards 
failure starker than on climate. As I write this in June 2020, global temperatures in 
May were the warmest on record: 0.63°C warmer than the 1981–2020 average for 
May; warmer by 0.05°C than May 2016, the previous warmest May; and warmer 
by 0.09°C than May 2017, the third warmest May. Earth’s carbon dioxide levels 
hit record high, despite a coronavirus-related emissions drop. There is more carbon 
dioxide in the air now than at any time in 3 million years. The Scripps Institution 
of Oceanography and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) reported that the amount of CO2 in the air in May 2020 hit an average of 
slightly greater than 417 parts per million (ppm). This is the highest monthly aver-
age value ever recorded and is up from 414.7 ppm in May of 2019.
Such specific data are usually avoided in a book because they will be out-of-date 
by the time of publication and subsequently whenever readers come to the book. 
I have included these data as an invitation to readers to update the trendlines to 
provide an immediate and timely context for the critical importance of evaluating 
environment in international development–and, in so doing, affirm that we are in 
the midst of a deepening global emergency.
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Global emergency
Each year the Oxford Dictionary editors select a word of the year. The word for 2019 
was “climate emergency.”
Climate emergency is defined as “a situation in which urgent action is required 
to reduce or halt climate change and avoid potentially irreversible environmen-
tal damage resulting from it.”
This year, heightened public awareness of climate science and the myriad 
implications for communities around the world has generated enormous dis-
cussion of what the UN Secretary-General has called ‘the defining issue of 
our time’….
Usage of the phrase climate emergency increased steeply over the course of 
2019, and by September it was more than 100 times as common as it had been 
the previous year….
This data is significant because it indicates a growing shift in people’s lan-
guage choice in 2019, a conscious intensification that challenges accepted 
language use to reframe discussion of ‘the defining issue of our time’ with a 
new gravity and greater immediacy.
(Oxford Languages, 2019)
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has warned that 2030 is likely to 
be a point of no return on climate change. But the global emergency involves more 
than climate, as this books makes clear.
Beyond climate
In mid-June, coronavirus infections worldwide exceeded 9.1 million with nearly 
one-half million deaths. Worldwide economic depression looms from the pandemic. 
The global pandemic has given rise to another new word, infodemic, meaning an 
overwhelming amount of information about a problem including wide and rapid 
spread of misinformation. Also part of the global context as this is being written are 
worldwide protests against racism and injustice sparked by the murder in May, 2020, 
of George Floyd, an unarmed African-American man killed by a white police offi-
cer in Minneapolis. These global patterns are deeply interconnected: the growing 
climate emergency, the global pandemic, the exacerbating worldwide infodemic, 
and protests in cities around the world against systemic and structural injustices.
Beyond just evaluating environment: a nexus perspective
I have provided this context to emphasize and highlight the significant perspective 
offered in this book. This book is about much more than evaluating environment. 
It is about environment at the nexus of humanity’s future. Evaluating sustainability 
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includes ecosystem health, more just and equitable societies, and evidence-based 
decision-making. The sustainability framework offered here integrates social, eco-
nomic, and environmental goals and criteria. This holistic approach requires upgrad-
ing and enhancing environmental evaluation, but not as an isolated function. The 
fundamental framework offered here is one of nexus:
 • the nexus of social, economic, and environmental interventions.
 • the nexus of environment and development.
 • the nexus of development and sustainability.
 • the nexus of human and natural systems.
 • the nexus of environmental degradation and poverty.
 • the nexus of evidence and decision-making.
 • the nexus of local and global initiatives;
 • the nexus of projects, programmes, and larger-scale initiatives;
 • the nexus of multi-stakeholder governance; and
 • the nexus of evaluation and action.
In essence, this second updated edition of the book, Evaluating Environment in 
International Development, demonstrates that a sustainable environment is at the cen-
tre of humanity’s future. Everything is ultimately connected to the environment. 
The book, then, is about evaluating those interconnections not environment as a 
stand-alone, isolated, or siloed focus.
Juha I. Uitto, the book’s editor, as director of the Independent Evaluation Office 
of the GEF, and Rob van den Berg, president of the International Development 
Evaluation Association (IDEAS) in 2019, gave voice and leadership to this perspec-
tive in crafting with others a Declaration on Evaluation for Transformational Change 
adopted by participants at the 2019 IDEAS conference in Prague. One of the ten 
items in that Declaration asserts:
Focus on sustainability. In all our evaluations, we commit to evaluating for 
social, environmental and economic sustainability and transformation, includ-
ing by assessing contextual factors and systemic changes. We commit to assess-
ing and highlighting, in all evaluations, unintended negative social, economic 
and environmental effects.
That is the perspective of this book. It is a breakthrough perspective for evalua-
tion going forward in the context of interconnected global emergencies of climate, 
pandemic, infodemic, economic turbulence, and massive inequalities and injustices. 
Evaluating environmental sustainability is the thread that can intersect with, illumi-
nate, and connect these global challenges and guide humanity’s responses. Time is of 
the essence. The point of no return looms large.
Michael Quinn Patton
Author of Blue Marble Evaluation: Premises and Principles
PREFACE
Most of the time change is incremental and it is difficult to detect while one lives 
through it. Therefore, it is heartening to note that there has actually been quite 
much progress in the international environmental domain since the first edition of 
Evaluating Environment in International Development came out in 2014. The following 
year, the United Nations member States agreed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, which promises to transform the world for people, planet, and pros-
perity. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) linked to the Agenda have been 
subscribed to by 193 countries all around the world. The SDGs stand on three 
equally important pillars: the social, economic, and environmental.
In that same year, another UN initiative, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015–2030 was created. In 2016, the Paris Agreement was signed by the 
parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, promising to keep 
global warming well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, while pursuing efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing 
that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. There 
has been unprecedented support to these international agreements aimed at keep-
ing the world safe from increasing environmental and climate-related hazards. It is 
unlikely, however, that most of these goals and the associated targets will be reached 
in time, so there is a growing need for adapting to climate change. Recognizing this 
need, another major international initiative was launched, the Global Commission 
on Adaptation.
Not all developments have been positive either. At the end of 2019, a novel 
coronavirus spilled over to humans in China and quickly spread across populations 
creating a global pandemic of magnitude not experienced by recent generations. 
The pandemic has its root causes in human–nature interactions. The continued 
expansion of human activities—and abuse—deeper into the natural domains puts 
us in closer touch with non-human animals that increases the risk of spill-over of 
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pathogens to humans. It is clear already at the time of this writing that the corona 
virus epidemic is going to lead to a worldwide recession and will further jeopardize 
the achievement of many if not most of the SDGs.
Evaluation has emerged as a field that has a lot to offer as humankind searches for 
sustainable solutions to deal with pressing global problems, such as those represented 
by climate change, ecosystem degradation, deforestation, unmanaged urbanization 
and expansion of agriculture, and indeed pandemics. The field of evaluation itself is 
evolving rapidly—and it must continue to evolve in order for evaluation to remain 
relevant to the increasingly complex world where human and natural systems inter-
twine in a myriad ways. The Second Edition of the book has been significantly 
updated to reflect all of these developments in the international development and 
environment arena, as well as the evaluation profession. A few chapters have been 
dropped. Most chapters have been significantly updated and three entirely new ones 
have been added.
One of the chapters, however, remains the same as in the first edition. Its author, 
Prof. Michael Stocking passed away in the spring of 2018 after a brief illness. Michael 
was primarily a researcher and a development practitioner, rather than an evaluator. 
But as he would often remind me, the distinction is quite meaningless, as evaluation 
must be based on solid research and good development research has practical impli-
cations on the ground. Michael’s research was good and it was influential in inform-
ing natural resources management on the ground in Africa and other developing 
regions of the world. His work also lives on through his many dedicated students. 
I had the pleasure of knowing Michael and working with him on many occasions 
over a quarter century, and enjoying every moment of it.
I sincerely hope that this collection of essays will contribute to the discipline and 
practice of evaluation and, more so, to the discourse at the nexus of environment 
and development. It is my conviction that evaluation can make an important con-
tribution by providing evidence-based lessons for more environmentally sustainable 
and socially just world. To achieve this, evaluation itself must shed its focus on indi-
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The year 2020 was defined by a pandemic that started in China sometime in late 
2019. The pandemic, dubbed COVID-19, quickly spread across the world, sparing 
no continent and virtually no country. By mid-2020, some 8 million people around 
the globe had been infected. The fatality rates for the pandemic were not as dra-
matic as in the case of earlier zoonotic viruses, such as Ebola, which kills about half 
of those infected and up to 90% of the victims in some areas. SARS, the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome, closely related to the 2020 pandemic—COVID-19 is caused 
by a virus called SARS-CoV-2—also had a fatality rate of 14–15%,1 but its spread 
was contained and it infected less than 10,000 people. COVID-19, in contrast, had 
by mid-2020 killed some half a million people worldwide—about a quarter of them 
in the United States—due to its rapid spread.
At the face of it, the pandemic has been seen primarily as a health crisis, lead-
ing to severe economic and societal disruptions. The World Bank estimates that 
COVID-19 may push an additional 71–100 million people into extreme poverty.2 
Most of these people will be in countries that already struggle with poverty: almost 
a half in South Asia and a third in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Fundamentally, however, COVID-19 is an environmental crisis. It has provided 
a very concrete example of how human health and ecosystem health are closely 
intertwined—and how human systems are dependent on natural systems.
Zoonotic viruses, like SARS-CoV-2 originate in animals and spill over to 
humans. The frequency of such spill-overs and subsequent epidemics has increased 
in the past couple of decades because of how we interact with the natural environ-
ment (Vidal 2020; Quammen 2012). It is a direct function of increased contact 
humans have with other animals, both wild and domesticated. COVID-19 may 
have started at a wet market in the city of Wuhan in China where many kinds of live 
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animals were for sale—for food or for traditional Chinese medicine (TCM)—kept 
and slaughtered in crowded and unhygienic conditions. The likely origins of the 
virus are in bats but there may have been an intermediary host (perhaps pangolin, 
which is used for TCM). It is also possible that a farmer collecting bat guano for 
fertiliser was directly infected. Irrespective of the transmission mechanism, which 
we may never determine with certainty, the root causes of the pandemic—as well 
as those before it and those yet to come—are known. In fact, such a pandemic was 
widely predicted by scientists before it happened (Osterholm and Olshaker, 2020).
The root causes lie in the fact that human impact has been constantly expanding 
deeper into the natural world, as we make more space to accommodate and feed 
the increasing number of people and seek raw materials for continued economic 
growth. Cities and suburbs, transport networks, agriculture, logging and mining all 
penetrate deeper into hitherto undisturbed ecosystems thus bringing people into 
closer contact with new species—and their pathogens. At the same time, ecological 
balance is disturbed. As large predators (like wolves or big cats) are killed off, the 
animals that benefit are those that thrive alongside humans: rats, bats, racoons and 
the like. They are also the ones whose viruses are most susceptible to jump over to 
humans. In Africa, hunting bush meat for human nutrition includes primate species 
whose genome is very similar to that of humans, making spill-over all that easier.
It is obvious that in order to prevent future pandemics, we need a better way 
of interacting with the natural environment. This is not true only for pandemics, 
although it is a concrete matter that has finally caught the attention of policymakers 
and the wider populace as well. Healthy ecosystems and biodiversity are essential 
for the well-being of humankind in a myriad ways providing ecosystem services 
from clean air and water to climate regulation and protection against floods and 
storms. Yet, anthropogenic climate change caused by the burning of fossil fuels for 
energy and transportation, deforestation and cattle ranching, and the destruction of 
natural habitats pose constantly increasing threats to global sustainability. There are 
indications that these unsustainable developments already threaten the very drivers 
of these developments: wanton drive for economic growth, the continued increase 
in human numbers and wealth. Global excess mortality caused by air pollution has 
been estimated at 8.8 million people annually (Lelieveld et al. 2020).
The pandemic has also brought to the forefront drastic inequalities in societies all 
over the world that pose hindrances to sustainable development. An analysis of CDC 
(Centres for Disease Control) data in the United States found that the crude death 
rates from COVID-19 for Blacks was twice that for whites, and that for Hispanics/
Latinos about the same as for whites. However, given that these populations have 
much younger age structures than whites, a huge gap emerges: the age-adjusted 
death rate for Black people was 3.6 times and for Hispanic/Latino people 2.5 times 
for whites (Ford, Reber and Reeves 2020). The factors behind these differences 
reflect endemic and entrenched inequalities that have left especially Black residents 
impoverished, with fewer jobs, and in poor health (Eldeib et al. 2020). Many minor-
ity people also work in occupations, such as services and transport, which do not 
allow for distance work. In Singapore, which saw a rapid rise in infections following 
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a highly successful curtailment, 90% of the infections were among migrant workers. 
In Mexico, despite rapid measures taken by the government, people in the informal 
sector, including street vendors many of whom are women, were not able to stop 
working and thus suffered disproportionately from the pandemic. These examples 
reveal the close relationship between economic, social, environmental and political 
issues that determine the outcome of what on the surface is simply a health crisis.
The potential of evaluation
Evaluation as a discipline and practice has the potential to contribute to finding 
solutions to these problems. However, to do so—for it to continue to be relevant—
evaluation must up its game. Evaluation must change to become part of the solu-
tion, rather than part of the problem (Patton 2020). Evaluation has the specific 
role of bringing forth knowledge and understanding of what works, under what 
circumstances and for whom based on past experiences. At a basic level, this is look-
ing at past programmes and projects: What strategies worked, where and why? What 
helped interventions adjust successfully to changing conditions—including sudden 
crises—so that they could continue supporting the people on the ground?
Traditionally, evaluation looks at the past to inform future. This has become an 
increasingly challenging endeavour as global situations change and as past develop-
ment efforts—especially the most ‘successful’ ones—are the ones that have got us 
into this situation. Identifying and replicating what is often called ‘best practices’ 
thus no longer makes sense (if it ever did). Such thinking is based on the notion of 
continuous improvement, defined as progress, inherent in Western thinking since 
Enlightenment, irrespective of political ideology (Mishra 2017: 39). The imperative 
of growth—both economic and population—epitomises this (Uitto 2020). Such 
linear thinking is no longer possible. Environmental destruction and climate change 
have introduced uncertainty and unknown discontinuities into the global system.
On the social side, the prevalent development model has resulted in huge 
inequalities that in themselves threaten stability and sustainability. Evaluation as a 
discipline and practice has a longer history dealing with social issues. Therefore, 
they tend to be better covered than environmental matters. For instance, the United 
Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) has provided guidance on integrating gender 
and human rights in evaluations, as well as evaluating institutional gender main-
streaming, which are widely applied in the UN system (UNEG 2014, 2018). Such 
guidance on the environmental side is still under preparation.
Furthermore, what has proved challenging is operating in the coupled human 
and natural systems (CHANS), which requires a broad understanding of both. This 
limitation holds true for evaluation, as well as programming more generally, and 
stems from both the complexities involved as well as the different cultures that pre-
vail in social and natural sciences (Rowe 2019a)
If evaluation is to learn from the past, it must start looking more broadly 
beyond assessing whether individual interventions have achieved their stated 
goals and instead analyse how such interventions—as well as broader policies and 
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strategies—contribute to or hamper sustainability. Evaluation must shed its project 
mentality.
It is imperative for evaluation to look systematically for unintended consequences 
of any intervention, including notably the consequences on the natural environment. 
It is safe to assume that all interventions irrespective of their focus will have an 
impact on the environment.
At a higher level, evaluation must be able to provide evidence of how actions in 
the development domain affect the environment and vice versa. We must be able 
to demonstrate the close interlinkages between social and economic development 
and the environment in light of evidence from the real world. In this task evaluators 
must base their work on scientific knowledge as well as analysis of concrete exam-
ples from the field. This is not an approach that comes easily to all evaluators who 
have been used to looking at discrete interventions in isolation through their inter-
nal logic. Instead, we now need to place these interventions in the broader landscape 
and analyse how they interact with the larger natural and human systems. We need 
to be on the lookout for unanticipated results and unintended consequences, not 
just those foreseen in the project or programme’s own theory of change.
This second updated edition of the book, Evaluating Environment in International 
Development, sheds light on how evaluation can contribute to environmentally 
sound sustainable development in the international cooperation context. It focuses 
on approaches and experiences from the field with leading international organisa-
tions, non-profits and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. Understanding context 
is important, as programmes work differently in varying situations through different 
change mechanisms (Pawson and Tilley 1997). To fully achieve these objectives, 
evaluation must move beyond assessing individual interventions in isolation and 
contribute to the understanding of how environmental concerns can be incorpo-
rated into development efforts in the national, regional and global contexts.
The book will familiarise readers with approaches, challenges, choices and tools 
that focus on environmental results in international development. It provides novel 
and in-depth perspectives on evaluating environment and sustainable development 
mostly in the global South. Moving beyond projects and programmes, it also 
considers aspects such as evaluating normative environmental work. It makes a 
strong case for considering the wider environmental and sustainability consequences 
of development efforts, including both intended and unintended impacts as well as 
trade-offs between them. The book emphasises praxis and brings together leading 
international thinkers and practitioners who have decades of experience working in 
the field. The book offers both conceptualisations and practical examples based on 
lessons from the field regarding evaluation and environment.
Sustainable development and the environment
In 2015, world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and 
the attendant Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under the auspices of the 
United Nations (UN). To date, 193 countries have signed on to the agenda, which 
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is intended as a universal set of principles to move humanity towards a sustainable 
future. The 2030 Agenda3 preamble starts with the following:
This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. It also seeks to 
strengthen universal peace in larger freedom. We recognise that eradicating pov-
erty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest 
global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development.
The three Ps—people, planet and prosperity—reflect the interlinkages between 
human and natural systems. The 17 SDGs are all construed as standing on three 
pillars: social, economic and environmental. While each of the SDGs approaches 
development from its unique entry point, the three pillars or dimensions are present 
in every goal in different ways. The achievement of all of the goals depends on every 
one of the three pillars to remain solid. In fact, it has been suggested convincingly 
that a better analogy than a stool resting on three legs, would be a cake with three 
layers (Rockström and Sukhdev 2016). The bottom layer of the cake consists of the 
biosphere goals on which the social and economic layers rest.4 If the bottom layer 
collapses, the layers upon it will by necessity collapse too.
In practice, however, the attention that the pillars—or layers—have received is far 
from equal. Most attention has gone to the economic goals and unabated growth 
in gross domestic product (GDP) remains the main focus of most governments and 
the predominant way in which development is measured. Some progress has been 
made in the social domains and discussions about distribution of the proceeds of the 
economic growth, as well as gender equality, have made headway in some fora, albeit 
tentatively. The environmental dimension for its part is almost entirely relegated 
to a subservient role (Reid et al. 2017). Deforestation and destruction of ecosys-
tems continue unabated, as does loss of biological diversity (Caballos. Ehrlich and 
Dirzo 2017). When the environment is mentioned, it is usually only with reference 
to climate change, while other important aspects—biodiversity loss, overfishing of 
oceans, persistent organic pollutants, air pollution and others—are forgotten.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has issued dire warnings that 
we are moving fast towards irreversible and severe consequences for both the planet 
and people in terms of disturbances to weather patterns and sea-level rise lest we 
limit anthropogenic global warming to less than 2oC as compared to pre-industrial 
levels (IPCC 2018). The Paris Agreement that went into effect in 2016 with 195 sig-
natories under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
has the stated aim to do just that. However, there is meagre chance that this will 
materialise under the current regime. The Paris Agreement is based on voluntary, 
intended nationally determined contributions, which even if fully implemented 
would not add up to sufficient reductions in greenhouse gas emission reductions to 
reach the goal. Marred by a free-rider problem, the agreement is unlikely to reach 
even the nationally determined commitments (Nordhaus 2020).
In addition to setting insufficiently ambitious goals for emission reduction and 
not following through with them, countries continue to promote practices that are 
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directly harmful to the climate and the environment. It is estimated that the G20 
countries have provided at least US$77 billion in public subsidies to oil, gas and 
coal projects annually since the establishment of the Paris Agreement (Oil Change 
International and Friends of the Earth 2020).
The consequences of climate change are already being felt and bear a true and 
measurable cost to society. They are not limited to poor countries, as clearly demon-
strated by the wildfires caused by extended drought in Australia in 2019 and California 
the year after. While it is impossible to attribute any specific hurricane or typhoon to 
climate change, scientists are able to calculate likelihoods of such storms happening 
and linking these likelihoods to trends in global climate. In 2020, two strong tropical 
storms—Arthur and Bertha—formed in the Atlantic already before the season offi-
cially started in June. The massive Cyclone Amphan slammed into India in the Bay of 
Bengal causing heavy damage in May 2020, also un-seasonally early.
Sea-level rise that is caused by melting icecaps at the poles and thermal expan-
sion of seawater with warming temperatures will inundate low-lying islands and 
coasts. Small island developing states (SIDS), such as the Marshall Islands and the 
Maldives, bear the brunt of the onslaught of the sea, risking disappearance under 
the waves. Sadly, the SIDS are among those countries least responsible for climate 
change (Uitto, Kohlitz and Todd 2017). Sea-level rise also threatens major urban 
conglomerations from Miami and New York to Tokyo and Shanghai. These cities 
are also the drivers of the global economy so damage done to them will be felt 
across the world in terms of significant economic disruptions. The reinsurance giant 
Swiss Re estimates that claims due to natural disasters in 2017 amounted to US$144 
billion.5 With advancing climate impacts, such claims will only increase.
As it becomes increasingly evident that efforts to mitigate climate change will 
not be sufficient, attention has turned to adaptation and to increasing societal resil-
ience to impacts of changing climate. The Global Commission on Adaptation, a 
high-level body bringing together public and private interests, released its landmark 
report in 2019 (Global Commission on Adaptation 2019).
More broadly, it has been argued that the achievement of the SDGs in general is 
threatened by the pandemic (Naidoo and Fisher 2020). The 2030 Agenda, alongside 
other ambitious global accords like the Paris Agreement and the Sendai Plan of 
Action for Disaster Reduction, were adopted by countries at the height of globali-
sation when both economic growth and international cooperation were seen with 
significant optimism. All of this started to change already before COVID-19 but 
the pandemic has certainly made things more dire. Governments will have urgent 
priorities to rebuild their national economies after the immediate shock.
Evaluation can play a more important role than ever in feeding in lessons from 
development efforts and helping to ensure building back better, with sustainability 
principles, benefiting both the people and the planet.
Valuing natural capital
The lack of attention to the environmental dimensions reflects broadly societal 
values. As we only measure changes to the GDP and make decisions based on it, 
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financial and economic capital get the lion’s share of appreciation. Social capital 
receives attention to the extent that it gets measured in quantitative ways. Natural 
capital, despite the fact that it provides almost all raw materials for economic growth 
(from timber to minerals to medicines) as well as a variety of essential ecosystem 
services, usually does not get valued at all. Its depreciation is only seen as an exter-
nality. We focus on economic capital and less on social capital. Natural capital is just 
simply ignored.
Over the past years, environmental economics has emerged as an important field 
of inquiry (Heal 2007). Much of it is based on economic valuation of ecosystem 
services. In standard economics, most environmental factors are considered to be 
externalities, and as such do not feature in economic calculations. This is a root 
cause of much environmental destruction. Companies and governments do not 
factor in the costs of pollution into their cost–benefit analyses, largely because pol-
lution’s effects are not seen as directly bearing on individual operations. The costs 
are often long term and shared by many actors and the society as a whole—a classic 
case of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). Climate change provides an 
extreme example of this, as the emission of greenhouse gases from energy genera-
tion, transportation, industry and agriculture will result in widespread and devas-
tatingly costly impacts on regional and global scales—the brunt of which will be 
disproportionately borne by the poorer countries and the poor people, rather than 
the polluters themselves.
In recent years, there have been some signs of hope, as companies are sometimes 
moving faster than governments to curb the environmental damage their opera-
tions are causing. Partly this is because their leaders realise the risks associated with 
climate change and other environmental (and social) disturbances to their business 
models. Partly it is because of genuine concern for the environment. The private 
sector is huge and spans a vast range of different types of companies. It has been 
calculated that three agricultural commodities—palm oil, soya beans and beef—
account for almost 80% of tropical deforestation (Brack et al. 2016). Markets of 
these daily commodities are dominated by a handful of multinational firms, some 
of which have taken sustainability at heart. At the same time, they depend on thou-
sands of smallholders for their supply chains and are not able to control their envi-
ronmental practices.
There are also specific challenges to environmental economics stemming from 
uncertainties. Pindyck (2007: 47–48) has identified three factors that are crucial to 
policy design and evaluation:
 1. Environmental cost and benefit functions tend to be highly non-linear (i.e. the 
likely damage from environmental pollution may increase exponentially, and 
there is uncertainty about the existence and/or position of a ‘tipping point’, 
which has policy implications and emphasises the importance of the ‘precau-
tionary principle’);
 2. Environmental policies usually involve important irreversibilities that often 
interact with uncertainty in complex manners; and
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 3. Environmental problems tend to involve very long time horizons, which exac-
erbate the uncertainties inherent to policy costs and benefits.
Conservation of biological diversity often relies on the proper valuation of ecosys-
tem services (Braat and de Groot 2012). For example, adding the value of different 
products and services from a forest, including that of the forest as a carbon sink 
offsetting climate change, may make it more economical to leave it standing than to 
clear cut it for timber or new agricultural land. The concept of payments for eco-
system services has emerged to signify that the beneficiaries of ecosystem services 
(be it clean water or recreational uses) pay others for adopting resource use models 
that preserve the ecosystem (Ruijs, Dellink and Bromley 2008).
However, there are limits to how one can—and whether one should—put a 
monetary value on everything. From a practical point of view, how do you calculate 
the value of, say, a rhinoceros horn? Is it the price it gets on the black market in 
Hong Kong or Bangkok? If so, shouldn’t there then be a legal market that would 
reduce the price and to make rhinoceros’ horns more abundant on the market? At 
the same time, incentive and disincentive structures should be built to make trade in 
rhinoceros horns less lucrative. That way, poaching and illegal trade could be regu-
lated and, perhaps, rhinoceros populations stabilised at a sustainable level.
Nadeau (2008) provides a penetrating critique of environmental economics 
based on the fact that the sub-discipline is grounded in mainstream economic the-
ory, which itself is based on assumptions that do not stand up to any scientific scru-
tiny. Environmental economists assume that the relative price of an environmental 
good, service or amenity reveals its ‘real marginal values’. Environmental economists 
then use cost–benefit analyses to place a value on environmental externalities—or 
environmental goods and services that are ‘external’ to market system. The problem 
is that the damage done to the natural environment cannot be valued in simple 
monetary terms in comparison with the direct economic benefit arising from the 
damaging activity. Therefore, environmental economists employ methods to esti-
mate the ‘use-value’ of the environmental resources. The results are often absurd. 
Citing a number of studies, Nadeau shows results that suggest that, based on survey 
results regarding household willingness to pay to preserve or use natural resources, 
the marginal cost of air pollution is just US$26 per year or that preserving the spe-
cies of bald eagle (which apart from its ecosystem value holds high symbolic value 
to Americans) is indeed only US$11 per year.
There is an argument that the valuation of ecosystems and species should con-
sider other aspects, including, in the example above, the aesthetic value of rhinocer-
oses and their niche in the ecosystem. There is an intrinsic value to species diversity, 
which goes beyond its instrumental value to humans (Washington et al. 2017). 
Relying only on economic valuation of species and ecosystems risks undervalu-
ing this intrinsic, existence value. Furthermore, calculating the current economic 
value will not take into account the precautionary principle, that is, the possible and 
unknown key role of a species or ecosystem, the loss of which may trigger unex-
pected, even irreversible consequences.
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Still, in a world that seems largely unmoved by the loss of unique species or eco-
systems, and where many people are willing—or indeed compelled due to poverty 
and deprivation—trade environmental amenities to immediate economic benefits, 
the economic value of natural capital cannot be ignored. When there are many 
competing priorities for a limited amount of money—and in the post-pandemic 
world these demands are even more severe—it is important for environmental 
evaluators to be able to back their claims about the importance of environmental 
conservation, ecosystem services and tackling climate change with concrete dol-
lar figures. The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), for instance, has pioneered methodologies for calculating the value 
for money of investments into biodiversity conservation, sustainable forest manage-
ment and land degradation (GEF IEO 2018, 2019). These studies demonstrate that 
GEF projects have had global net positive impacts on both forest cover and vegeta-
tion productivity with measurable positive economic valuations in terms of carbon 
sequestrations and soil retention.
Evidence also supports the conclusion that political, social and economic 
 inequalities tend to translate into environmental damage, and that addressing 
 disparities in power and wealth is a necessary, although not sufficient,  precondition for 
sustainability. Boyce advances two hypotheses regarding this case: (i)  environmental 
harm is not randomly distributed across the population, but instead reflects the 
 distribution of wealth and power, and (ii) the total magnitude of environmental 
harm depends on the extent of inequality (Boyce 2008: 274–275). Citing a number 
of empirical studies in the United States and at international levels, Boyce is able to 
find strong evidence that inequality is bad for the environment. He concludes that 
‘rectifying the market failures and governance failures that lead to  environmental 
harm requires repairing the disparities of wealth and power that enable these 
failures’ (ibid: 284). Along the same lines, COVID-19 has shown how even the 
impact of a pandemic is not randomly distributed. In the United States, a highly 
 disproportionate share of the infected persons and fatalities has been among African 
Americans.
All of this shows how environmental, social and economic sustainability are 
intertwined in complex ways. Business as usual, simply pursuing economic growth 
at any cost will have detrimental outcomes for all three. Instead of eternal growth 
as an objective, we should aim for a steady-state economy that will operate within 
the natural limits (Hickel 2018; Czech 2020). We need to focus on creating an 
economy that is regenerative, where resources are reused and recycled, and redis-
tributive, so that those still living in poverty can be lifted out of their situation, 
while we ensure that we do not overshoot the ecological boundaries of the planet 
(Raworth 2017).
There are a number of efforts to develop measurements to value the non-mon-
etary (or at least not directly monetised) aspects of life. The suggestion of expand-
ing measurement of human well-being beyond GDP has gained strength. One of 
the earliest and most successful efforts has been the Human Development Index 
launched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990, 
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which defined human development as a ‘process of enlarging people’s choices’ 
(UNDP 1990). It further elaborated that the most critical and wide-ranging choices 
are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources 
needed for a decent standard of living. UNDP later introduced the concept of 
sustainable human development in order to integrate environmental concerns into 
human development measurements (UNDP 1992). Another innovative concept is 
the Gross National Happiness that the small Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan uses to 
measure its development (Centre for Bhutan Studies and GNH Research 2016). As 
reported by the Guardian newspaper in May 2020, the majority of Britons would 
like quality of life indicators to take priority over economic indicators.
Evaluating the environment beyond projects
Evaluation suffers from the same lack of attention to the environmental foundations 
of sustainable development. Evaluation as a profession and practice has its roots 
firmly in social sciences, either through social inquiry into the determinants of 
social outcomes (notably in the fields of education and health) or through econo-
metric impact evaluation using experimental and quasi-experimental designs to 
determine correlations between policy and programmatic actions and outcomes. 
Both approaches have tended to be narrowly focused on the direct outcomes of a 
well-defined intervention. While the former may often use a variety of methods, 
including participatory approaches, the latter tend towards a mechanistic explora-
tion of correlations in specific situations (Donaldson, Christie and Mark 2009). 
In recent years, there has been a trend in evaluation theory towards acknowledg-
ing the importance of taking account of complex systems (Bamberger, Vaessen and 
Raimondo 2015). Networks such as the UN Evaluation Group6 have also developed 
solid approaches to evaluating social aspects, such as human rights and gender, in 
all interventions irrespective of the field in which they take place. Such approaches 
focusing on the environmental effects are missing.
The close interlinkages between environment and development pose specific 
challenges to the evaluation community. Some of these pertain to particular char-
acteristics of environmental issues, as well as the programmes and projects designed 
to address them. Birnbaum and Mickwitz (2009: 3–4) categorise them as follows:
 1. Differing and frequently long time horizons;
 2. Disparities in scaling;
 3. Data quality and credibility issues; and
 4. The problem of research designs for assessing attribution in environmental 
policies and programmes.
The different time horizons for observing changes in natural and social systems 
and the often short policy and programme cycles are challenging for evaluating 
environmental programmes. Similarly, the spatial scales of environmental problems 
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(e.g. pollution or climate change often do not match the scales of political jurisdic-
tions, migratory species move across national boundaries), which makes evaluation 
at appropriate scales challenging. To address these issues, Rowe (2012) has proposed 
a two-system evaluand approach that takes into account the different temporal and 
spatial frames of the human and natural systems.
As for issues pertaining to data availability and research designs, environmental 
programmes are often not amenable to be evaluated using experimental designs. 
Still, evaluation rigour can be significantly enhanced by formulating complex theo-
ries of change (e.g. by including causal hypotheses with explicit assumptions or 
by making observations regarding baselines and key indicators) (Vaessen and Todd 
2008; Ferraro 2009). Focusing specifically on evaluation of environmental conserva-
tion programmes, a Foundations of Success team makes a case for rigorous design 
alternatives using qualitative, non-experimental approaches (Margoluis et al. 2009). 
They emphasise the context in the conservation situation, purpose of the evalua-
tion, programme structure and circumstances, resources and capacity in selecting the 
most appropriate design option.
Climate change poses additional challenges to evaluation—notably a greater 
focus on risk, uncertainty and complexity. It also implies shifts in the objects of 
evaluation (e.g. new metrics and more emphasis on the policy dimensions of rich 
countries’ engagement with poor countries) and a judicious evaluation of gover-
nance arrangements (Picciotto 2009).
Efforts to mitigate climate change and to adapt to its impacts are closely related 
to economic development, particularly in developing countries. Evaluating climate 
change-related initiatives requires different approaches (van den Berg and Feinstein 
2009). Evaluation can help keep an eye on the big picture, both in development 
and environment, and consider relevance, effectiveness, impact and long-term 
sustainability.
For the above reasons, evaluating at the nexus of environment and develop-
ment is challenging, as it requires operating comfortably in the coupled human 
and natural systems. Few individual evaluators have competencies in both and, as 
noted above, the cultures and methodologies of social and natural sciences also differ 
considerably making collaboration hard (Rowe 2019a). Most evaluators have their 
background in social sciences, based either in social inquiry or in quantitative eco-
nomics favouring experimental and quasi-experimental research designs.
On the other side of the divide, a lot of research is carried out that relates to 
the effectiveness of strategies and efforts towards environmental conservation, cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation, energy transitions, management of harmful 
chemicals and so forth. Most often, this is not framed in terms of evaluation, which 
in itself reflects the divide in language used. Similar needs have been recognised by 
natural scientists. Bennett et al. (2016) identify four types of barriers to mainstream-
ing social sciences into conservation science: ideological, institutional, knowledge 
and capacity. They call for more inclusive and integrative conservation science that 
will enable more ecologically effective and socially just conservation.
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Apart from the particular challenges of evaluating environmental programmes 
and projects, there is a strong argument for moving beyond evaluating only indi-
vidual interventions. Environmental concerns, which should feature in all national 
development strategies to render them sustainable, must be evaluated. First of all, 
there is a need to move beyond focusing on development cooperation projects 
into a broader vision of sustainable development (with and without development 
cooperation).
The implication to be drawn from both the evaluation and environmental research 
traditions is that evaluating at the nexus will most often require  collaboration and 
multidisciplinary teams using multiple mixed methods (Uitto 2019; Patton 2020)
Picciotto (2007) has argued that the main unit of account for evaluation should 
shift from the project level to the country level, making development evaluation a 
country-based and country-owned process instead of a donor imposition. The coun-
try focus is also built into the evaluation of the SDGs (Uitto 2016). The downside of 
this approach is that aggregating all county-level results will not add up to a global 
picture. This is particularly true given the fact that the SDGs have lent themselves to 
a menu of options from which countries can choose to prioritise some over others.
In the climate change arena, the nationally determined contributions are simi-
larly not readily rolled up to a global level in a meaningful way. Evaluation must 
also address the issue that though many individual interventions seem to succeed 
in reaching their objectives, there is little to show by way of solving the broader 
national- or global-level problems.
Another powerful option to using the country as the unit of analysis is evaluat-
ing portfolios of interventions addressing related problems (Patton 2020: 115–116). 
This approach has been taken by many agencies (such as the World Bank, UNDP, 
Climate Investment Funds and the GEF) that have portfolios of similar projects or 
programmes implemented either globally or regionally. Such portfolio-level eval-
uations can be particularly useful for extracting lessons for future programming 
strategies.
When it comes to approaches and methods, it is time for evaluators to put 
aside battles about ‘gold standards’ and the superiority of certain types of methods. 
Evaluating at the nexus of environment and development requires a broad range of 
methods that capture the complex interlinkages between natural and human sys-
tems. This mixed methods approach should be based on the selection of those most 
suited to answer specific evaluation questions. Too often, it seems, it is vice versa: the 
methods choice is determined by the preferences and abilities of the evaluator, and 
it in turn determines what kinds of questions are asked. Context matters in evalu-
ations and there is a huge variety of situations that demand a variety of approaches. 
Patton (2020: 101–103) has called for eclecticism—a bricolage methods principle—in 
choosing among a wide range of tools, both quantitative and qualitative, to answer 
the right questions. In environmental evaluation, such methods include geospatial 
tools, which can be used in combination with other more traditionally utilised 
approaches, including household surveys and participatory approaches (Lech et al. 
2018; Sidman, Fuhrig and Batra 2020; Runfola et al. 2020).
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Themes
This book is organised into two sections. The first section consists of chapters that 
address conceptual issues related to evaluating international cooperation around 
environment and development. Following this introduction, in Chapter 2, Rob 
van den Berg traces the historical shift in development cooperation towards a sus-
tainable development perspective that considers global public goods at its centre. 
The chapter emphasises the need to consider risk when evaluating sustainability. 
Climate change has added new elements of unpredictability that pose the need to 
turn sustainability into an adaptation issue to be considered when evaluating how 
to best address global public goods. The chapter places the discussion in the context 
of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs as well as the Paris Climate Agreement, tracking 
the new thinking on sustainable development and how this relates to managing and 
evaluating global public goods.
In Chapter 3, Andy Rowe discusses the poverty–environment nexus, analysing 
factors such as connectivity and scale, differing worldviews and a weak intellec-
tual infrastructure for evaluating natural resource interventions. He considers how 
evaluation needs to adapt to enable it to contribute to sustainable development for 
which the urgent deployment of the full phalanx of evaluation methods and capaci-
ties is needed. The chapter reflects the changing landscape following the adoption 
of the SDGs and experiences in the field applying the principles and approaches for 
sustainability-ready evaluation.
In Chapter 4, Hazel and David Todd explore the increasingly damaging effects of 
climate change on the global environment and observe that it is the poor, who are 
most severely challenged by it. Weather-related events are increasing in frequency 
and severity, and in regions such as Asia-Pacific and the Caribbean disaster risk is 
outpacing resilience, posing severe limitations on poverty reduction. They observe 
that many international interventions attempt to address the overlaps between 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction within a poverty reduction 
framework. Evaluation among international agencies has struggled to assess the 
progress and results of these efforts, given their exceptional complexity. While 
theory-based evaluation approaches have proved useful, they have often failed to 
find a suitable level of theory, which can provide clear findings and actionable 
lessons and recommendations. The chapter recommends an approach in which 
different levels of theory, from project through to the global environment, can be 
‘nested’ within each other, so that each addresses a specific aspect, while contributing 
towards evaluation of higher levels of social and environmental change.
The second section of the book focuses on approaches and challenges to 
evaluating environment in development programmes bringing together cases 
from actual evaluations in the field. In Chapter 5, Anupam Anand and Geeta 
Batra suggest that remote sensing and geospatial methods are useful, innovative 
tools for measuring environmental impact. They provide reliable and cost-effective 
baseline information, help detect changes over time and track progress towards 
the achievement of environmental and other development targets. Given scarce 
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resources and time constraints, remote sensing and geospatial data and tools are 
valuable in complementing other qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods. 
Using data on interventions implemented by the GEF, they present the application 
of geospatial approaches in addressing relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of 
interventions on forest cover, habitat quality and carbon sequestration.
Impact evaluation has gained importance as a way of analysing whether 
programmes and projects make a change in people’s lives. However, the use of impact 
evaluations in international cooperation around environment and development 
is challenging, because such programmes are seldom amenable to counterfactual 
analysis that forms the basis of experimental evaluations. A rare exception from a 
large-scale programme is the impact evaluation of the GEF’s support to the South 
China Sea, the object of Aaron Zazueta and Jeneen Garcia’s chapter (Chapter 6). The 
evaluation sought to assess the progress towards impact in this large and complex 
setting by establishing causal linkages between the programme’s interventions and 
the changes observed in the field, and by identifying GEF interventions’ specific 
contributions in relation to other actors and confounding factors. The chapter 
looks at the extent to which the assumptions of the GEF-supported interventions 
and the evaluation’s theory of change have remained valid over the ten years since 
the evaluation took place. Taking a longer time perspective, the chapter reflects on 
how contextual developments in the South China Sea have affected the long-term 
objectives and outcomes of the interventions under evaluation.
In Chapter 7, David Todd and Rob Craig present an approach to gauge progress 
towards impacts in environmental programmes utilising a theory of change 
methodological approach. This field-based Review of Outcomes to Impacts 
(ROtI) takes into account the lengthy time span of environmental change and the 
complexity of impact pathways, which complicate evaluation of environmental 
programmes. The approach has benefited from practical application in the GEF 
impact evaluation programme. The revised chapter introduces the application of 
the ROtI methodology in the climate change arena, beyond the original focus on 
biodiversity and natural resources management, drawing upon a concrete example 
from Jamaica.
In evaluating climate change mitigation interventions, many questions revolve 
around the impacts on the emissions themselves (e.g. Did the intervention actually 
produce emission reductions? Who can claim credit for the reductions?), even 
though the interventions themselves are often systematic, and the impact of specific 
intervention aspects on greenhouse gas emissions is hard to identify and attribute. 
Assessing various aspects’ relative contributions requires a clear understanding of 
the reasons why (and in what context) more sustainable technologies are used and 
what hampered the use of the technologies prior to the intervention. In Chapter 8, 
Christine Wörlen develops a programme theory for climate mitigation interventions 
that does not rely on outcome-based positive contributions to poorly tangible 
intermediate project objectives, but on an assessment of the situation in which a 
market for sustainable energy products or services does not exist. By representing 
a full programme theory for market development, the ‘theory of no change’ is able 
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to assess whether or not an intervention contributed to a more favourable framework 
for the market for a sustainable energy technology. It can be transferred with small 
modifications to other types of behaviour or systems change. The framework is able 
to integrate the context of a project into the assessment and can help optimise the 
match between interventions, barriers and change (or the lack thereof).
Not all international cooperation takes place through projects and programmes 
in the field. An important field of work pertains to developing global governance 
frameworks and to influencing international and national policy-making processes. 
Evaluation of such normative work has received even less attention than the 
evaluation of projects and programmes. In Chapter 9, Segbedzi Norgbey and 
Michael Spilsbury argue that there are no major differences between methods to 
evaluate normative work in the environment and methods to evaluate operational 
activities. Their ideas are informed by the evaluation work conducted in the 
UN Environment Programme (UNEP), a major actor in global environmental 
governance.
In Chapter 10, Carlo Carugi and Heather Bryant discuss the opportunities and 
challenges of conducting joint evaluations in the SDG era. The integrated nature 
of the SDGs calls for greater synergy, harmonisation and complementarity in 
development work, which is increasingly being reflected in evaluation. While the 
SDGs have brought the social, the economic and the environmental closer to each 
other in discourse, development practice and evaluation are often carried out with 
a focus on the human or the natural system, rather than both, which does not 
bode well for sustainability. Carugi and Bryant argue that one way to address the 
integrated nature of the SDGs is through joint evaluation where diverse institutions 
bring together their corporate skills, data, technical knowledge, expertise and 
experience to the assessment of the social, economic and environmental dimensions 
of development initiatives. The chapter describes how, despite challenges, joint 
evaluations offer significant advantages that can lead to important institutional and 
strategic changes with a view to strengthening development results in both the 
human and environmental spheres.
In Chapter 11, Michael Stocking examines the theoretical and practical issues 
faced by evaluators in Africa. After reflecting on the scope and approach of the 
Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Environmental Management for Poverty 
Reduction and challenges of evaluating such a complex, cross-cutting topic, he 
highlights the evaluation’s overall findings and what they mean for organisations 
attempting to integrate poverty and environment in their programming.
Launched in 1991, the GEF Small Grants Programme (SGP) helps developing 
countries to protect the global environment and contribute to sustainable develop-
ment through mostly community-based small projects. Since its inception, SGP has 
funded some 24,000 small projects in over 120 countries. In Chapter 12, Sulan Chen 
and Juha Uitto highlight issues related to the relationship between global environ-
mental objectives and national and local development results within the context of 
SGP. The authors question the assumptions behind evaluating the programme on 
the grounds of aggregating its direct environmental impacts—whether with regard 
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to protecting fragile ecosystems or promoting development that reduces greenhouse 
gas emissions—from thousands of small projects to the global level. Instead, they 
argue for taking a broader approach to defining SGP results to include national-level 
effects on policy and institutional development and on advocacy and inclusiveness.
An important element of sustainable development and the transition to a green 
economy is knowing how to assess the implicit trade-offs among economic growth, 
environmental sustainability and social equity. Efforts merely perceived as ‘green 
economy’ may not deliver other promised social and economic outcomes. In 
Chapter 13, Ronal Gainza and Simon Lobach demonstrate how evaluation requires 
a thorough understanding of the outcomes and measurement framework that helps 
to assess the magnitudes of such trade-offs. Using four case studies, their chapter 
presents a framework for such measurements and provides examples from Latin 
America and the Caribbean of how the framework may be used in international 
and national decision-making.
A significant amount of the world’s freshwater resources is located under-
ground. The urgency of better aquifer management is widely recognised, espe-
cially as more regions become acutely water stressed. Efforts have been underway 
over the last two decades to focus greater attention on the wise management of 
aquifers, and to forge greater cooperation among nations sharing transbound-
ary aquifer resources. The GEF has been an important funding source for this 
work, sponsoring projects focused on improved aquifer management. These proj-
ects aim to better understand the boundaries, volume, extraction rates and pol-
lution risks to aquifers, and forge agreements among nations to better manage 
their shared resources. In Chapter 14, Alan Fox draws important lessons from the 
evaluations of GEF-sponsored aquifer projects, emphasising the challenges to bet-
ter stewardship of these vital resources. While some progress has been made in 
groundwater modelling and mapping, in the development of methodologies for 
aquifer protection and replenishment, and the establishment of a few cross-border 
institutional frameworks, the overall picture is negative. There remain wide gaps 
in understanding about groundwater systems, and effective governance and insti-
tutional frameworks are scarce.
Natural disasters have a disproportionate impact on the poor because the risks 
and human costs are strongly associated with poverty. The SDGs and the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction have provided a renewed impetus by 
recognising disaster risk as one of the key constraints in reducing economic 
loss, sustaining development gains and reducing poverty. The extent to which 
international agreements resulted in national policies that promote integrated 
approaches to development, to reduce disaster risk and enable climate change 
adaptation is evolving. In the area of climate-related disasters including slow-
onset disasters, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation have simi-
lar goals, which calls for more coordinated programming at the national level. 
There has been increasing financing for climate change adaptation through vari-
ous funding mechanisms further strengthened by Paris Agreement in 2016, while 
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there remain resource challenges for similar goals in the area of slow-onset disas-
ters. This highlights the importance of combined efforts in the area of adaptation 
and climate-related disaster risk reduction efforts, specifically integrating such 
efforts as part of key development strategies rather than as stand-alone efforts. 
Facilitating humanitarian and development nexus to enable linkages between 
disaster response and long-term development has been on the agenda of the 
national and international agencies for over a decade. Drawing on evaluations of 
the UNDP, in Chapter 15, Vijayalakshmi Vadivelu revisits the disaster risk reduc-
tion efforts at the national level and at UNDP since the adoption of the SDGs 
and Sendai Framework. The chapter examines the extent to which disaster man-
agement and adaptation and their intersecting dimensions are integrated into 
development efforts.
In Chapter 16, Roberto La Rovere outlines the approach to the evaluation of 
climate change, environment and natural resource management in the context of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Evaluating 
the impact of research activities poses specific challenges that differ from evaluat-
ing development programmes or normative work. Given the nature of the work 
of the CGIAR system, it is important to take a systematic and common approach 
to evaluation that covers the network’s various dimensions—including its environ-
mental, social and economic dimensions. Over the last decade the relative impor-
tance, urgency and share of the CGIAR investments in climate change research in 
agriculture has grown dramatically, together with the gearing up of the Research 
Programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) and its 
various evaluations.
Conclusion
Environment and development are intrinsically interlinked. Even in the post-indus-
trial societies in the global North, economic development rests on a healthy natural 
resource base. This relationship is even more pronounced in poorer communities 
and among poor people who eke out a living from agriculture, fisheries, forestry 
and extractive industries—people whose livelihoods depend directly on ecosystem 
health. We also know that gender considerations are at the centre of sustainable 
development. Women form the majority of small farmers in developing countries 
responsible for cultivating land and feeding their families. Indigenous peoples in 
many parts of the world often live close to the nature. Their worldviews also often 
reflect a holistic perspective that sees humankind as part of the natural world (Rowe 
2019b).
There is an environment–poverty nexus that is often neglected in development 
endeavours that aim for economic growth and/or poverty reduction. Too often 
activities that aim for economic development end up destroying the very environ-
mental and natural resource base on which the people and, ultimately, the economy 
depend.
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More than three decades ago, the World Commission on Sustainable Development7 
introduced the concept of sustainable development to our vocabulary, calling for 
making ‘development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ 
(United Nations 1987). Their work clearly recognised the linkages between envi-
ronment and development and the importance of preserving the natural resources 
that sustain the Earth and its people. Still today, no country has fully adopted these 
principles. On the contrary, destruction of the natural environment and rampant 
pollution continue unabated. Many people in both the global North and South 
believe that there is a necessary trade-off between economic progress and preserv-
ing natural resources, despite evidence to the contrary—especially when taking a 
long-term view. The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a brutal warning of what 
hardships ignoring the natural environment inevitably brings.
The environment is a global public good that gets short shrift as the world 
pursues economic growth, as in the short term it is seen as an externality. Natural 
capital is routinely ignored in economic calculations. There is a tendency that 
development projects ignore the environment, whereas environmental projects 
operate in isolation and, consequently, fail to instigate larger, meaningful change 
that broadly benefits people. There is a need to be better able to demonstrate the 
economic value of the environment and natural resources, while not losing sight 
of the intrinsic value of nature that cannot be measured in monetary terms. Such 
valuations must also take into account the non-linearity and uncertainty associated 
with environmental change and unknown tipping points.
Evaluation must contribute to a better understanding of how environment 
and development interact and to identifying win–win solutions and approaches 
to the problems. Evaluation must also consider the big picture, the larger impacts 
that all of our projects, programmes, strategies and policies aim to contribute to. 
Although providing accountability for results and resources used at the level of 
individual interventions continues to be needed, it is important to ensure that these 
interventions effectively contribute to the overall goal of a more sustainable and just 
future. Evaluation should not be seen as a control function, but as an essential tool 
among others to improving the design and implementation of development efforts.
To remain relevant in the increasingly complex and interconnected world, it 
is absolutely essential for evaluation as a profession and as a practice to engage in 
the discourse at the nexus of human and natural systems. That is where we as a 
community can contribute, with our practical knowledge anchored in research, to a 
transformation towards a more sustainable development path. As evaluators, we must 
play a role in ensuring that, after a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, we build 
back better towards a society that is environmentally more sustainable and socially, 
economically and politically more just.
It is my hope that the chapters in this collection will make a useful and interest-
ing contribution to how to better utilise evaluation for achieving development that 
is more sustainable for people, the planet and prosperity.
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Notes
 1 https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2003/05/estimates-sars-death- 
rates-revised-upward.
 2 https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/projected-poverty-impacts-of-
COVID-19 (accessed on 20 June 2020).
 3 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.
 4 Biosphere goals: 6 – clean water and sanitation, 13 – climate action, 14 – life below water, 
15 – life on land; Society goals: 1 – no poverty, 2 – zero hunger, 3 – good health and 
well-being, 4 – quality education, 5 – gender equality, 7 – affordable and clean energy, 11 
– sustainable cities and communities, 16 – peace, justice and strong institutions; Economy 
goals: 8 – decent work and economic growth, 9 – industry, innovation and infrastructure, 
10 – reduced inequalities, 12 – responsible consumption and production. Note: Goal 17 
– global partnerships is cross-cutting to all.
 5 https://www.swissre.com/media/news-releases/2018/nr20180410_sigma_global_
insured_loses_highest_ever.html  (accessed on 17 January 2021).
 6 http://unevaluation.org/.
 7 The so-called Brundtland Commission, named after its chair, the former Norwegian 
prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.
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2
A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 
PERSPECTIVE ON ENVIRONMENT 
AND POVERTY
Rob D. van den Berg
Redefining international cooperation
In international cooperation it seemed for a while that a perspective of public goods 
and costs became dominant. Partly, this was due to redefining international coop-
eration in changing circumstances: a world in which North and South and East and 
West are no longer the clear categories they were during the Cold War. Partly, it was 
due to the prevailing dominance of an economic vision of the world, rather than a 
sociocultural, religious or ethnic one. We live in a world in which many problems 
and challenges demonstrate the limits of a neoclassical economic world-view, and 
this is increasingly recognized. A new perspective on international cooperation is of 
prime importance; given the limits of natural resources on our planet, it increasingly 
needs to be a sustainable development perspective.
This has not always been the case. The first major effort in international coop-
eration, development aid, started after the Second World War, even before many 
countries achieved independence. Aid was couched in terms of historical obligation, 
mutual benefits and ethical norms and standards. The rich, developed countries felt 
castigated for their history of colonialism, imperialism and unbridled capitalism and 
were urged to help and support the newly independent developing countries to 
develop their economies, improve their institutions, ensure health and prosperity for 
their citizens and to fight absolute and relative poverty.
However much feelings of guilt and responsibility legitimized international sup-
port, the early conceptualization of aid was economic and politic in nature. Two 
competing paradigms influenced early international cooperation: one of economic 
development and mutual benefit, the other of self-reliance and socialist or social-
democratic economic and social arrangements. The economist paradigm was preva-
lent in the West and the socialist paradigm in the East. The South, the developing 
world, was the arena in which the fight between the two paradigms would turn 
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warm or hot from time to time. The link between the development of poor nations 
and the Cold War between capitalism and communism was evident at the time, as 
reflected, for example, in one of the famous tracts on economic development: W.W. 
Rostow’s (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.
For the developed world to spend funds on international cooperation was thus 
an ethical obligation, an economic investment and a geopolitical move. Policy 
papers often mentioned both economic and national interests – public goods did 
not play a substantive role. One could argue that the concept of public goods was 
developed in parallel with development cooperation: the economist Paul Samuelson 
(1954) is often credited with the first discussion of public goods. As is typical of new 
concepts, they were at first more or less ignored in mainstream discussions. When 
Rostow presented his vision of economic development in 1960, public goods did 
not come into the argument. He presented economic development as a series of 
technical steps that countries had to go through in order to achieve the economic 
heaven of a “mature” economy which would offer “mass-consumption” to its citi-
zens. Aid could help remove obstacles on the way to this state of bliss.
However, economic and geopolitical motives were gradually accompanied by 
new motives and new modalities. Humanitarian crises (e.g. the Bihar famine of 1966 
in India) led to proposals for humanitarian aid to help and support countries that 
went through natural or man-made disasters and whose populations needed food, 
shelter and emergency care. The 1983–1985 famine in Ethiopia led to increased 
international recognition for the need to provide aid and assistance. Humanitarian 
aid is mostly funded on ethical arguments and appeals to humanity’s better nature to 
help and care for those in need. Other arguments have also supported humanitarian 
aid (e.g. security considerations, where a natural or man-made disaster may destabilize 
a region or a country). Economic reasons have also been put forward: focusing on 
the need to quickly rebuild an economy to ensure that more permanent solutions 
can be found for resolving humanitarian crises. Nonetheless, ethical and normative 
arguments tend to form the core of the justification of humanitarian aid.
The United Nations (UN) has been involved in a third line of international 
cooperation, one that predates its birth. In fact, the specialized agencies that predate 
the UN have been instrumental in their respective fields to formulate and reach 
agreement on international norms and standards, such as on meteorology, postal 
arrangements, food and many other issues. This normative work of the UN became 
more dominant over time. The UN remains the first and foremost institution in the 
world in which the global community can reach agreement on issues of common 
interest. Arguments for normative work have often been couched in terms of the 
necessity to reach agreement on how states should interact and how international 
conventions should be implemented.
Thus, the UN’s three major domains of work (normative, humanitarian  and 
development) are often addressed in terms of ethical behaviour and mutually 
 beneficial agreements on common standards and approaches. However, when the 
Cold War ended, the inextricably intertwined geopolitical and economic self- 
interest arguments that supported the funding of international cooperation fell 
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largely away. The concept of public goods, as introduced by Samuelson (1954), 
could provide a new rationale for international cooperation. Dr. Inge Kaul, then 
Director of Development Studies for the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), made a significant contribution in this direction, formulating the need for 
action from a global public goods perspective.
In the decade up to 2015, global public goods increasingly became central to 
discussions on the role of public finance for global problems. Several bilateral donors 
were redefining their aid programmes from a public goods perspective. In interna-
tional efforts to address environmental problems, the public goods nature of these 
efforts has always been taken more or less as granted. What was new is that the UN 
and other international actors were increasingly framing their activities in terms of 
public goods. The challenge is to see whether a common framework for analysis, 
action and evaluation can be derived to address environmental issues on the one 
hand and development and poverty reduction on the other.
With the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Agenda 
2030 and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change1 in 2015, an integrated, holistic 
agenda was presented with the aim of “transforming our world.” The UN resolution 
which proclaims this lofty goal mentions public goods in one paragraph, number 
41, as an important objective of public financing, without any further definition or 
explanation.2 The Sustainable Development Report 2019, published by an inde-
pendent group of experts and providing detailed information and data on progress 
towards the SDGs, does not contain the term “public good” anywhere in the docu-
ment and it may seem the concept has left the arena of international development 
and has been retired to a bygone age (Sachs et al. 2019).
Yet at the same time we see an emerging paradigm fight in economics where 
public goods and related concepts (such as public value) are becoming increasingly 
important. Kate Raworth’s efforts to integrate sustainability perspectives in eco-
nomic theory are peppered with public good aims throughout the new paradigm 
she proposes (Raworth 2017). The value of public sector investments and efforts is 
central to the work of Mariana Mazzucato, who focuses on the role of the public 
sector in innovation (Mazzucato 2019 – see especially chapter 8 “Undervaluing 
the public sector”). Both institutional economics and evolutionary economics tend 
to include public good perspectives, so even while the term has receded into the 
background in recent years, it is good to define what we mean by public goods and 
what role they play in tackling and solving the global crises we face. The larger chal-
lenge we face is to integrate a public good perspective into sustainable development 
approaches that will ensure that environmental services for future generations (e.g. 
clean air, water and healthy food) simultaneously alleviate poverty, in line with the 
SDGs and the Paris climate agreement of 2015.
Defining public goods
At first sight, it may seem that there is a strong connection between the relatively 
new arguments regarding public goods and public value and the normative functions 
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of the UN. One could argue that it is a public good to have internationally accepted 
norms and standards on many issues, because without them communication, trade, 
travel and many other interactions between nations and peoples would become 
difficult and likely much more dangerous. However, to say that global public goods 
are identified by the norms and standards of the UN does not solve the problem. 
How are these norms and standards identified? When are these norms and standards 
really needed, and when should the global community leave things to markets or 
to bi- and multilateral actions among states? When can the global community hold 
differing opinions and when should it agree? Thus, defining public goods through 
global norms and standards leads to a discussion of the public goods status of norms 
and standards – which returns to the question of what public goods are.
In general, public goods tend to be defined by what they are not: anything that 
markets fail to effectively and efficiently produce. Leaving public goods to markets 
thus leads to market failure and to negative externalities – in other words – to public 
bads (Feinstein 2019: 21). In economics, this “negative” definition is most clear; most 
often public goods are defined by what they are not, as non-rival and non-excludable. 
Non-rival means that whatever you take of a resource does not significantly reduce 
others’ ability to take the resource (e.g. the quantity of air that you breathe does 
not significantly diminish the quantity of air that can be breathed by others). Non-
excludable means that access to the product cannot be limited to a group of people 
(e.g. paying customers). Air again serves as an example: one cannot sell air to a 
customer if air is otherwise freely available. The example of air can be expanded to 
illustrate the ongoing debate about public goods and the role of governments and 
markets. With the advent of air-conditioners, cool air has become something that 
can be sold, for example, to companies that want to ensure that their employees are 
working in productive conditions or to citizens who prefer to sleep in a cool bed-
room during the summer. What once was completely non-rival and non-excludable 
becomes marketable if the quality of it can be influenced in a closed space. In open 
space, it affects markets in a reverse way: housing in areas of high pollution is gener-
ally cheaper than housing in areas with clean air.
For positive definitions of what constitute public goods, one would need to 
examine other sciences and political debates: there, public goods may be identified 
as issues that should be dealt with by the government, by the public or through 
shared cultural and societal norms. Certainly the latter seems directly connected to 
the UN’s normative work. A positive identification of public goods could define 
them as at least anything that the UN provides norms and standards on, but we 
have noted that this may turn into a tautology, as these norms and standards may 
have been identified from a public goods perspective in the first place. Furthermore, 
such a definition would clash with the economist’s perspective on public goods, as 
economists could argue that some of the normative work of the UN could be bet-
ter left to markets and market forces – and poverty alleviation could be one of them.
Addressing poverty is perceived in the UN as both a normative and a develop-
ment issue. UNDP, which is arguably the anti-poverty programme of the UN, is 
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seen as a development agency rather than a normative one. Development issues 
tend to be argued in economic terms, even if social and normative issues play an 
important role. Thus, the starting point for action on public goods issues tends to be 
to focus on market failure.
Public action on public goods
Market failures often manifest themselves through externalities – external costs (or 
public bads) that are created by the market and that are additional and external to 
the product that was produced for and bought on the market. Meeting these costs, 
or preventing them, is a public good, because they will not be met privately (i.e. 
through the market). In general, governments have three ways to address market 
failures and ensure public goods. They can use their judicial powers to criminalize 
behaviours that lead to external costs (e.g. environmental pollution); they can use 
their regulatory powers to change behaviours to such an extent that external costs 
no longer appear (e.g. promote sorted collection of household waste); and they 
can use their taxation powers to recover costs and shift externalities back into the 
market (e.g. taxing pollution or greenhouse gas emissions). Some argue that public 
goods and bads are the foundation of taxation and public spending. It could also be 
argued that perceiving both poverty and environmental degradation as market fail-
ures provides an economic justification to address both through normative measures 
and through public spending.
Just as Rostow (1960), through his theory of the stages of economic growth, pro-
vided a technical perspective on how to develop countries and end poverty, another 
influential publication threw light on the role of governments and the public sector: 
John Kenneth Galbraith’s 1973 publication of Economics and the Public Purpose led 
to a discussion in economics and politics on whether markets should be curtailed 
in order to serve the public purpose or whether markets should be improved to 
solve problems in society. Over time, the neoclassical perspective gained ascendancy, 
which led to the perception of market regulation and taxation as distortions that 
prevent markets from becoming fully efficient.
The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated to many that governments need to 
regulate markets. However, many Republicans in the United States continue to 
claim that it was actually government interference with the markets that caused the 
subprime lending crisis, signalling that the debate is far from over.
One lesson to be learned from a historical perspective on public goods is that 
though the concept may be timeless, the actual application is not. There is a dynamic 
in what constitutes a public good or cost. For example, before streetlights were 
introduced, the public good of a well-lighted street at night did not exist. When 
streetlights became more ubiquitous, their costs became evident on municipalities 
and transport authorities’ budgets. Public costs regarding the environment started 
to soar to previously unseen heights when population pressure and use of natural 
resources reached levels that brought the limits of environmental services in sight.
30 Rob D. van den Berg
Ending poverty: a global public good?
Whether public funding should be made available to alleviate poverty is an issue 
that has been vociferously debated. Neoclassical economists tend to take the posi-
tion that government should create an environment in which the poor can fend for 
themselves. Support to the poor has failed – and will always fail – they claim. This 
was most aptly phrased by Ronald Reagan in his 1988 state of the union address: 
“the Federal Government declared war on poverty, and poverty won.”3 In this per-
spective, direct aid will actually make it more difficult for the poor to escape poverty. 
Many (if not most) other political perspectives on the government’s role disagree 
with this perspective and perceive poverty as an issue where government should 
play an important role, both to help people out of poverty and to prevent people 
from spiralling down into poverty. However, if on a national-level poverty is not 
unanimously seen as a public issue, what can the public goods perspective contrib-
ute to the idea of helping other countries to alleviate poverty? Would the concept 
of global public goods be helpful to support aid for poverty reduction?
The international discussion of global public goods was actively promoted and 
supported by UNDP through the groundbreaking work of Dr. Inge Kaul. Together 
with colleagues and researchers, she was the first to propose a definition of global 
public goods as goods whose benefits extend to all countries, people and genera-
tions (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999). Together with Ronald Mendoza she devel-
oped a perspective on how global (as opposed to local or regional) goods should be 
supported through public funding: “local public goods should be provided locally, 
national public goods at the level of the central government, and global public 
goods at the international level” (Kaul amd Mendoza 1999: 91). This division of 
labour seems reasonable, but it also seems to marginalize poverty as a global issue. 
Poverty itself is, after all, localized and thus seems to be largely the domain of 
national governments.
Although Inge Kaul does not mention poverty as the most obvious global public 
good, she does include the eradication of poverty from a human rights perspective, 
and thus identifies poverty as a global bad that the global community needs to 
address. Also, indirect linkages to global issues could be explored: migration caused 
by poverty can create havoc in other countries. Political movements aimed at 
reducing poverty may become revolutionary or may lead to violent action and 
destabilize countries and regions. States may descend into chaos and may lead to 
considerable economic loss (e.g. pirates from Somalia were a regional problem for 
international shipping, with a global impact, from circa 2000 to 2015). To prevent 
this from happening, a public goods perspective may justify regional and even global 
action.
The gist of this is that no universal agreement exists as to whether poverty 
is a public issue and whether poverty alleviation should be funded from public 
means. An underlying reason for the lack of agreement is whether poverty is glob-
ally significant. Some perceive poverty as a local problem for which local (market- 
oriented) solutions may be found. However, poverty can be perceived of as globally 
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significant, and thus the eradication of poverty can be seen as a global public good. 
This could be argued from human rights, normative and ethical perspectives. It 
could also be argued from an economic perspective, as Paul Collier (2007, 2010) 
has done in both The Bottom Billion and in Plundered Planet. Collier approaches 
both poverty and the environment from a utilitarian perspective and sees it as the 
imperative of an economist to strive for the greatest good for the greatest number 
of people. Furthermore, he approaches poverty and the environment from a mar-
ket failure perspective, which requires government intervention, including interna-
tional intervention to support countries to break out of what he has termed “traps.”
For the environment, Collier focuses on the tragedy of the commons. Collier and 
Kaul recognize global environmental public goods as expressing the tragedy of the 
global commons. However, the environmental community uses a slightly different 
definition of global public goods. A global environmental benefit, as defined  by 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), is a good that has global significance. In other 
words, it can be very local in nature, but if it has global significance it can be termed 
a global good. There are good reasons for this perspective. Many unique species have 
global significance: if they are lost, they are not just lost to the area where they live, 
but they are also lost to the world.
Furthermore, the multilateral environmental agreements for which the GEF is 
a financial mechanism have identified the division of labour regarding funding of 
global goods that are localized in countries. In principle, countries should fund 
local issues, even if they have global significance, but only up to the level that 
they can afford given their level of development. They should be supported by the 
international community for additional efforts that are needed to safeguard the 
global good. Furthermore, given the developed world’s historic responsibility for 
creating environmental problems (demonstrated most clearly through the history of 
greenhouse gas emissions, which for a long time were dominated by industrialized 
countries), developed countries should make available the requisite additional and 
incremental funding needed to safeguard global goods.
Ensuring environmental services: a global public good
The environment provides a range of services: clean air and water, soil for crops 
to grow on and weather that supports the agriculture and stability in housing 
and infrastructure. These environmental services have been conceptualized in the 
so-called ecosystem approach and have been formulated most consistently in the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). In mainstream economic theory, these 
environmental services are recognized as externalities (costs and benefits that are 
public rather than private in nature).4 Of these externalities, the benefits usually do 
not pose a problem – the costs are of increasing concern, as climate change discus-
sions are demonstrating.
Many economists tend to speak of external costs in terms of market failures, and 
Nicholas Stern, a former Chief Economist of the World Bank, has done so most 
dramatically. In the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, a report to the 
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UK government on the costs of climate change, both on mitigating it and adapting 
to its consequences, he noted that climate change is a result of “the greatest market 
failure the world has seen.” His conclusion was that “those who damage others by 
emitting greenhouse gases generally do not pay.”5 There is controversy over whether 
Stern and his team correctly calculated the damages and the costs of preventing 
them, but the point he raised concerning market failure was not disputed.6
The global public good nature of environmental issues is perhaps most persuasively 
illustrated through the ozone layer. This stratospheric layer in the atmosphere 
absorbs approximately 97–99% of the sun’s ultraviolet light, which would otherwise 
cause severe genetic damage. It thus provides a service to all life on earth: protection 
against a possible annihilating force. In 1985, it was discovered that the ozone layer 
showed a decrease in density of 4% per decade and was exhibiting growing holes 
in the polar regions. Further analysis uncovered that chlorofluorocarbons were the 
main cause for the reduction of ozone. These chemicals were introduced in the 
1920s and 1930s and had been mainly used in air conditioning and refrigerators. 
Along with other chemicals that were later identified, they became known as 
ozone-depleting substances.
Research established that these substances – and these substances only – were 
responsible for the gradual destruction of the ozone layer. When they were introduced 
to industrial production, their destructive consequences were unknown. Given the 
ozone layer’s crucial role in protecting life on earth from harmful rays, international 
action started immediately: in the year of discovery the Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer was designed. It entered into force in 1988, 
when a sufficient number of countries ratified the convention. It has been ratified 
by 196 states. Action against the production and consumption of ozone-depleting 
substances was initiated through the Montreal Protocol, which was opened for 
signature in 1987 and was ratified by a sufficient number of countries in 1989 to 
become active. To date it has been signed by 197 countries and is often considered 
the most effective international agreement. Research and evaluations have shown 
the Montreal Protocol on track to rescue the ozone layer, which should be restored 
to its former full strength by 2050.
It was clear that in this case only one option was open to the international 
community: forbid the production and use of ozone-depleting substances. The 
ozone layer cannot be privatized and regulated to ensure that market forces would 
keep it healthy. It benefits all life on earth equally. Environmental problems can be 
seen on two dimensions: one dimension ranges from uncontested public goods 
to private and marketable ones (i.e. from the ozone layer through climate change 
to biodiversity loss, pollution issues, marketable commodities such as organic food 
and areas of outstanding natural beauty), and a second dimension from global to 
local (e.g. from the ozone layer through climate change to biodiversity loss, to 
pollution, land degradation and local instances of environmental degradation). How 
these environmental problems are linked to development and poverty is thus also 
reflected in a wide range of different relationships.
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Linkages between poverty and the environment
In general, the linkages between poverty and the environment can be seen as a 
specific case of the general linkages between development and the environment. 
The concept of sustainable development aims to integrate environmental issues 
into development notions. As defined by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, sus-
tainable development is “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The report 
of the Commission, Our Common Future (UN World Commission on Environment 
and Development 1987), emphasized the needs of the poor and proposed that pov-
erty alleviation (as well as gender equity and wealth distribution) is a crucial strat-
egy for environmental conservation. Recognition of the links among environment, 
development and poverty can be found in Agenda 21 of the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, as well as in the texts of the con-
ventions on climate change and biodiversity that were initiated at the Conference.
However, merely recognizing that linkages exist does not identify easy ways 
forward. The Brundtland Commission focused on population, food security, loss 
of biodiversity, energy, industry and human settlements and concluded that all of 
these were connected and “cannot be treated in isolation one from another” (UN 
World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 27). However, action 
in the real world is by necessity often unconnected, as well-focused interventions 
tend to be much more effective than comprehensive, holistic programmes. It is thus 
no surprise that since 1992 (when actions to prevent climate change and loss of 
biodiversity began to take shape), many evaluations have highlighted the successes 
of isolated rather than holistic actions. For example, after a decade of activities to 
promote protected areas in order to provide wild species a refuge of at least 10% of 
the earth’s surface (as agreed on in the Convention on Biological Diversity), critics 
increasingly voiced concerns that environmentalists aimed to achieve this by focus-
ing on conservation only; banning humanity, and especially poor local communities 
and indigenous people, from protected areas. The goal of reaching 10% of the earth’s 
surface as protected areas has been achieved; however, many protected areas in the 
world have not yet solved the puzzle of how local people can help maintain the area 
and benefit through higher incomes and better livelihood opportunities. Yet a strong 
involvement of local communities and indigenous people is now conceptually inte-
grated into more recent perspectives on how protected areas should be managed.
In development policies and interventions, the linkages among the social, 
economic and environmental domains were mainly recognized through lip service. 
For example, although most countries and donors started policies and programmes 
on renewable energy (e.g. by promoting solar, wind and other forms of clean energy), 
their other policies and programmes often did not take into account how “regular” 
development investments would undermine gains made in the environmentally 
oriented programmes. In international discussions, recipient countries often voiced 
concerns that developed countries had depleted their own natural resources in 
order to achieve development and poverty reduction, and that developing countries 
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had no choice but to go the same route – unless they could receive access to the 
latest technology, free of charge, or, as was stated at the 1992 Earth Summit, on 
“concessional terms.”
One can conclude that though the linkages between the environment and pov-
erty have been long recognized, the international community has been unable to 
sufficiently mainstream environmental issues into development and poverty alle-
viation policies and programmes. International organizations’ evaluation units have 
published briefing documents that confirm this conclusion from many independent 
evaluations of these organizations. The first briefing document focuses on main-
streaming efforts to stop biodiversity loss (ECG 2010). It provides evaluative evi-
dence that although efforts and interventions to sustain biodiversity are working 
and have had impacts, they do not yet reach the scale that would change overall 
trends. It states that development banks and United Nations institutions have not 
sufficiently integrated biodiversity issues into their development and poverty reduc-
tion strategies. The second briefing note (ECG 2011) pointed to a lack of integrat-
ing a climate change perspective into the support that development banks had given 
to the traditional energy sector in developing countries.
The concept of sustainable development with three foundational pillars – soci-
etal, economic and environmental – has received much recognition in speeches and 
statements, but not in implementation. UNDP, the main UN programme active 
on poverty reduction, and the GEF, the main global fund active on environmental 
protection, provide interesting examples in this regard. Both recognize the linkages 
between poverty and the environment in principle. However, both encountered 
difficulties to translate words into action. UNDP’s evaluation of the poverty– 
environment nexus concluded that there is “substantial recognition” in UNDP of 
the linkages, but that “cooperation across sectors” has not materialized (UNDP 
2010). Similarly, the GEF has focused on the achievements of global environmental 
benefits without paying too much attention to development or poverty at first. 
The evaluation of the role of local benefits in achieving global environmental ben-
efits noted that GEF-funded projects tended to focus on the global benefits in the 
expectation that other funders (e.g. governments, other donors) would take care 
of the local benefits. Lack of coordination and integration then led to interven-
tions that were less effective on both local and global benefits (GEF EO 2006: 7). 
Both evaluations led the way in putting the linkage between development, poverty 
reduction and the environment back on the organizations’ agendas. What general 
lessons can be learned from these evaluations on linkages between environment 
and poverty? An important issue to explore is the geographical scope of the public 
nature of alleviating poverty and ensuring environmental services, from local to 
national, to regional and global.
Local, national, regional and global public goods
Much of the discourse on public goods, the role of governments and the efficiency 
of markets considers what should happen within one country.7 However, many 
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market externalities are of a transboundary nature. For example, greenhouse gases 
transcend political boundaries and will influence the global climate, not a local 
microclimate. Similarly, benefits from local reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
will accrue globally. The globalization of the world, and especially its economy, is of 
course a thoroughly discussed phenomenon and opinions differ wildly on whether 
or not it is beneficial. However, the transboundary costs of markets are a fact, and 
many local actions have global consequences, just as global action has local conse-
quences. The linkage between environment and poverty in terms of public goods 
can be seen to range from global environmental issues to local poverty issues: global 
issues such as climate change can have its worst impact on the poor, who barely have 
the resources to adapt to changed circumstances, whereas local actions that deplete 
scarce resources may have global implications. A wide range of possible linkages 
between nations, regions, local and national issues can also be discerned.
The lack of mainstreaming noted in the previous section has also affected how 
geographical scale was addressed. This has been uncovered most clearly in GEF 
policies and interventions. Recognizing that developing nations did not have the 
financial resources to adopt alternative or modern technologies, the Earth Summit 
mandated that GEF provide funding for “agreed incremental costs” – the additional 
costs associated with transforming a project with local or national benefits into a 
project with global environmental benefits. The oft-used example is an investment 
in a power plant. A country considers whether to invest US$750 million in a new 
coal power plant or $800 million in a geothermal plant. The $50 million difference 
is the incremental costs that the country would incur to change its plans and adopt 
the more expensive alternative. This alternative, which would emit considerably 
lower greenhouse gases, would have huge global environmental benefits in terms 
of climate change mitigation and substantial local and regional benefits in terms of 
lower pollution, transportation and infrastructure costs (and as noted earlier, these 
apparently localized benefits can also extend to the global scale in terms of regional 
stability and prosperity).
Furthermore, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
also recognizes the differentiated responsibilities of groups of countries. This 
refers to developed countries’ history of greenhouse gas emissions. This historic 
responsibility for starting the build-up of CO2 in the atmosphere also calls for 
support from developed to developing countries in order to enable them to adopt 
more environmentally friendly technologies.
This focus on incremental cost funding led to GEF treating local and global 
benefits separately. Because incremental costs are related to global benefits, local 
benefits tended to be left to others. Depending on the project, these others could 
be local governments, executing agencies or consultancy firms. GEF wanted to be 
sure that the global benefits were generated, and even in projects where local ben-
efits were recognized as an essential means to achieve global benefits, the focus in 
management and reporting tended to be on the global issues, as noted in the major 
evaluation undertaken by the GEF Evaluation Office: The Role of Local Benefits 
in Global Environmental Programs (GEF EO 2006). The evaluation started from the 
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perspective that local benefits included “outcomes that, directly or indirectly, have 
positive impacts upon people and ecosystems within or adjacent to project areas 
and that provide gains, present and future, in the livelihoods of communities and to 
the integrity of ecosystems.” It noted that GEF partners recognized the importance 
of these benefits in principle, but tended to leave them to co-funders and national 
and local authorities and organizations so that the GEF partners could concentrate 
on achieving the global benefits. One can see the repeat in a different form (noted 
in the evaluation’s section on mainstreaming) of the lack of a holistic approach 
and the focus on a more pragmatic ambition to get something done which would 
more directly achieve global benefits. As a consequence, trade-offs between local 
and global benefits were often not incorporated into project design and manage-
ment, which led to lower achievements on both local and global benefits.
From trade-offs to win–win options
The Role of Local Benefits noted that many GEF projects were approached from a 
firm belief in win–win options and that often trade-offs between poverty/local 
development and the environment had to be negotiated – but projects did not 
accommodate these trade-offs, because they were supposed to support win–win 
solutions. The study found that there are winners and losers in almost all inter-
ventions and that solutions promoting sustainable environmental trends had to be 
negotiated in the majority of cases. This would involve compromises – in which 
some lower local benefits would achieve some higher global benefits (or alternatively, 
some lower global benefits would ensure higher local benefits) – that would sustain 
these benefits. Interventions that aimed for higher global benefits at the detriment 
of lower local benefits tended to be unsustainable over the long term. In contrast, 
interventions that accepted lower global benefits but achieved higher local benefits 
tended to ensure their sustainability.
This can perhaps best be illustrated with findings from the support of the GEF 
for protected areas (see GEF EO 2006: 61–63). The majority of protected areas are 
located in rural and isolated areas with low levels of development and high mar-
ginalization and often have a higher incidence of indigenous peoples. The resources 
from protected areas often provide a safety net for the poor, and the poor (and 
more specifically the indigenous communities) often have the knowledge about 
natural resource access and use in the protected area concerned. This understanding 
of the linkage between poverty issues and conservation is pertinent to the design 
and implementation of support for protected areas. Socio-economic studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated that the poor bear most of the direct local costs of access 
restrictions stemming from newly created protected areas (or areas where protec-
tions were increased). However, The Role of Local Benefits (GEF EO 2006) found that 
in 27 GEF projects supporting protected areas, the poor and poverty issues were not 
addressed consistently and were not effectively incorporated.
One strategy to ensure higher incomes for local communities was to focus on 
opportunities for ecotourism. Theoretically, this would create tourism income and 
provide local communities with a strong incentive to maintain an ecosystem that 
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would attract ecotourists – if there is no biodiversity hot spot to observe, ecotour-
ism will fail. However, The Role of Local Benefits (GEF EO 2006) found that eco-
tourism tended to fail in countries that lacked a generalized tourism infrastructure, 
where entering the country was bureaucratic and costly, and where hotels, roads and 
transportation did not encourage tourists to visit the country. In these countries, 
ecotourism also raised insufficient interest from the potential clientele in developed 
and neighbouring countries. But even in countries where ecotourism was success-
ful, it often did not lead to increased income for local or indigenous communities, 
as it turned out to be difficult to involve them in income-generating tourist activi-
ties. One often noted problem was the lack of language capacities, which entailed a 
reliance on interpreters to ensure communication between local guides and tourists.
Most importantly, when the anticipated win–win solution of higher income 
and better management of the protected area did not materialize, many projects did 
not include mechanisms to negotiate a trade-off (e.g. such trade-offs could have 
included direct compensation to local communities for reduced natural resource 
use). As a result, short-term achievements in global environmental benefits were 
undermined in the long term because impoverished communities returned to 
increased natural resource use to survive.
However, the negative spiral of increased natural resource use observed in many 
poor and overpopulated areas can increase the possibility for win–win solutions. 
Increasingly, communities are reaching the limits of their local natural resources. In 
Samoa, for example, fishing was becoming less rewarding because destructive fish-
ing techniques (which also destroyed the habitat in which fish stock could restore) 
have resulted in fewer adult fish and fewer varieties as well. Through the GEF Small 
Grants Programme, local communities were supported in preserving the coral reefs. 
A community would adopt a specific area of the reef as a marine protected area. 
This area would then regenerate and start producing ample fish again, leading to fish 
migrating to neighbouring areas that were open for fishing. The catches sold well at 
the local market, leading to interest from other communities – and in time adoption 
of similar restrictions. In a relatively short time, sustainability, catches and income 
increased. When the GEF Evaluation Office evaluated the GEF support in Samoa 
in 2007, 50 communities had adopted these new practices (GEF EO 2008a: 5). This 
kind of win–win intervention is increasingly becoming possible as local environ-
ments become further degraded and stop providing essential eco-services to local 
communities. Where such eco-services are of global significance, there is a strong 
positive linkage between local and global benefits and between global and local 
public goods. This interconnectedness has been incorporated in the Sustainable 
Development Goals and should thus be taken up in evaluations that are done from 
the perspective of the SDGs.
Conclusions for evaluators
How can evaluators help identify the linkages between poverty and the environ-
ment in a way that will bring forward pragmatic solutions to local and global prob-
lems? Evaluators can conclude that the fragmented, often isolated and pragmatically 
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focused nature of international organizations’ and national governments’ strategies, 
policies and interventions calls for a broader contextualization, which has been 
reinforced through the call for such a broader contextualization in the SDGs. 
Environmental evaluations need to take social and economic contexts into account 
in order to ensure that they achieve better understanding of the sustainability of 
environmental gains. Evaluations of social and economic programmes need to bet-
ter include the environmental context and identify how eco-services are supporting 
(or undermining) achievements in social and economic development. This is par-
ticularly important for the situation of the poor, of gender issues and of the position 
and role of indigenous people.
Further, within these contexts environmental evaluators need to pay attention to 
local and national public goods that would support rather than deplete environmen-
tal goods. Social and economic evaluators need to identify environmental issues of 
global significance. This may involve a geographic scope (from local to national to 
regional to global), and/or a time scope (from an immediate significance to a time 
horizon of decades).
These call for further strengthening two directions in evaluation. First, evalua-
tions need to look beyond the narrow context of the intervention, programme or 
policy being evaluated. Second, both the time horizon and the geographical scope 
of evaluations need to be enlarged. No new evaluation criteria are needed – what is 
called for is a shift in how some of these criteria are placed in a logframe, theory of 
change or logic of interventions perspective. Evaluation criteria such as relevance, 
efficiency and effectiveness describe relationships: relationships between inputs and 
outputs (efficiency), between outputs and outcomes (effectiveness) and between 
outcomes and longer term impact (relevance; see Figure 2.1). Elsewhere I have 
argued for a shift of some of these criteria to later stages in the theory of change 
(van den Berg 2011), and I present an overview of the positioning of these criteria 
FIGURE 2.1 Evaluation Criteria
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as they make most sense in the current challenges that we face. Furthermore, I relate 
these proposals to the revised version of the evaluation criteria as published by the 
OECD in December 2019 (OECD/DAC 2019). These issues are further explored 
in the following sections.
From ex ante to ex post “relevance”
Relevance was defined in the 2002 version of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) glossary of evaluation terms as “the extent to which the objectives of a 
development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries” requirements, coun-
try needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies (OECD/DAC 2002: 
32). As I have argued elsewhere,8 this is a retrospective ex ante assessment, because 
it focuses on the objectives of the intervention rather than the outcomes or the 
impact. My plea was to shift the relevance criterion to an ex post analysis. I also 
noted that this was in line with a growing share of evaluation practice (van den Berg 
2011). The revised OECD criterion on relevance recognizes an ex post perspective 
and is thus a move in the right direction (OECD 2019: 7).
This move towards judging ex post relevance is especially important in cases 
where contextual factors are paramount and where the aim is for longer term 
impact. For example,9 a single mother in a remote village in Western Africa received 
training to make soap bars that she could then sell at the local market so that she 
earns sufficient money to take care of herself and her child. She also received a small 
loan to get started. Five years later, an evaluator comes to the village. The evalua-
tor concludes that the intervention was relevant, because it addressed the woman’s 
livelihood. The evaluator also concludes that the intervention was effective, because 
the woman succeeded in making and selling soap bars. On impact, she notes that 
the woman now is independent and can take care of herself, whereas a comparable 
woman in a neighbouring village who did not receive the training has become 
dependent on her family.
In a relatively stable environment, this may be sufficient. In a more dynamic 
environment, it may not. For example, assume that the country is going through a 
process of transformation, that a new middle class is emerging and that recently the 
first supermarket opened its doors in the village. Suddenly, the simple bars of soap 
that our heroine offers on the local market are not that attractive anymore. She may 
have the advantage of regular customers, and she may be able to offer cheaper soaps 
than the more glamorous brands in the supermarket. However, in the end she will 
not be able to compete against cheap, mass-produced bars of soap – her livelihood is 
in danger. An evaluator returning to the village after 10 years may conclude that the 
intervention was not so relevant after all as the solution to the woman’s livelihood 
turned out to be temporary.
Furthermore, the value of money may change as well. Ravi Kanbur (2001) called 
attention to the purchasing power of money and the potentially dramatic conse-
quences for the poor. If they have a slight increase in earnings, but food and essentials 
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become more expensive, they may have an increased income but be unable to buy 
sufficient food. If the emergence of a new middle class sees a parallel increase in 
inflation, our soap-making woman may continue to sell in her niche of the market 
but she may find buying essentials for her family increasingly problematic – her 
income will not rise in accordance with the prices of other goods.
If these contextual factors are taken into account, our evaluator may conclude 
that the project was very effective, but that its impact is in danger of disappearing, 
not so much because the intervention did not work, but because the intervention is 
no longer as relevant. With the benefit of the hindsight, the evaluator may conclude 
that it would have been more relevant to teach the woman how to become a 
successful entrepreneur, rather than a producer of soap bars.
Consider a poverty-focused intervention that takes the environment into 
account.10 In Kenya, a smallholder farmer and his wife manage to feed their fam-
ily but lack the necessary monies to send their children to school. Agricultural 
researchers arrive at their farm and provide a diagnosis: their farm is biodiversity 
poor and will probably not be productive in the long run. They offer recommen-
dations on how to make the farm more sustainable by introducing more variety 
and improved farming practices. The researchers have a proposal: they will provide 
– free of charge – new varieties of plants and fruit trees and will advise on farming 
practices such as intercropping and water catchments, provided that the husband 
and wife test these new varieties and practices on the farm. They agree, and in just a 
few years, they manage to improve both the quantity and the quality of their crops. 
Some plants worked out and some did not. Some practices were beneficial; others 
did not work out as expected. In three years, they manage to treble their income 
and are now able to send their children to school.
Five years later, an evaluator arrives and finds that the intervention was very 
relevant in its objectives, because the poverty was alleviated through increased 
income that was based on improving farm practices. Further, the environment was 
served as well: biodiversity at the farm level was increased and the farm is more 
sustainable, less susceptible to diseases and crop failure. Both economically and 
environmentally, the farm had become sustainable. The evaluator leaves satisfied, 
observing a tangible win–win situation in which poverty was significantly reduced 
and the environment was improved.
However, if the evaluator took the broader context into account, the picture 
would perhaps not be so rosy. The variety of mango introduced on the farm was 
very successful: easy to grow, better tasting and more resistant to drought. This has 
not escaped the attention of some entrepreneurial farmers. Several farmers with 
larger farms have introduced the same variety on a larger scale. After a while, the 
new mangoes are not only coming from our farmer husband/wife team, but also 
from the larger farms. These larger farms may aim for larger markets and distribute 
their mangoes to nearby cities. But some of their mangoes will compete with the 
mangoes of the husband/wife team, may thus reduce their income and may stop 
them trying to compete – and thus reduce biodiversity on their farm as well. The 
larger farms may eventually start exporting their mangoes to Europe (provided they 
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can demonstrate that the mangos are disease free). If so, many smallholders may be 
bought out of their farms to create new, large-scale farms. Ultimately, the success 
of the larger farms may lead to uprooting of smallholders for an uncertain life in 
the city or as farm hands, more mono-cropping in the region and may ultimately 
reduce overall biodiversity.
These possible developments may undermine the very positive early assessment 
of the intervention. In themselves, they do not need to be bad. For example, exports 
may provide much-needed foreign exchange that will support the country’s eco-
nomic development, or reductions in biodiversity in areas that are better suited 
to monoculture farming and investments may be offset by gains in biodiversity in 
other areas. Increasing economic activities in cities may provide former smallholders 
with new opportunities for increased incomes and longer-term security. However, 
it is clear that the original intervention of providing some well-intentioned advice 
to smallholders could not take all of this into account at the start.
If the linkage between poverty and the environment is taken seriously, and if 
an intervention aims to address both through win–win solutions – or a reasonable 
trade-off that is agreed with stakeholders – relevance needs to become an ex post 
criterion in addition to an ex ante criterion. Evaluators should look at outcomes 
and impacts and assess whether the outcomes are relevant to the impacts that are 
meant to be achieved or whether that relevance is endangered through contextual 
factors or a dynamic in the social, economic or environmental domains.
The revised OECD criteria also take contextual factors into account in a new 
criterion: coherence, which focuses on “the compatibility of the intervention with 
other interventions in a country, sector or institution” (OECD 2019: 8). While 
this is certainly important and needs to be included in evaluations, this does not 
cover the developments that I just sketched: supermarkets reaching remote villages 
and offering competing products to local production, or a new variety of fruit 
being taken over by agro-industries and out-competing smallholder production. 
The focus of the DAC is very much on coherence of interventions, and while 
the strategies of a supermarket chain and an agro-industry could be described as 
“intervention” or at least “interventionist,” they are not part of efforts of a society 
or economy to “harmonise” and “co-ordinate” efforts, but rather of competition on 
markets and market development. A full ex post assessment of relevance will take 
these into account, whereas an assessment of coherence may or may not capture it.
From impact as relationship to impact as final goal
The Development Assistance Committee glossary of key terms in evaluation and 
results-based management defined impacts as “positive and negative, primary and 
secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or 
indirectly, intended or unintended” (OECD/DAC 2002). This is not defined as a 
relationship, but as a kind of final state or a snapshot of effects a long time after the 
intervention terminated. However, in much of the current debate on aid effective-
ness, “impact” is used to denote a scientific proof of a causal relationship between 
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input, output and outcomes. This is evaluated in so-called impact evaluations, which 
seek to assess the changes brought about by an intervention (the impacts) by com-
paring the observed result with a “counterfactual” (the result likely to have been 
observed without the intervention). If the counterfactual is carefully specified and 
empirically grounded, then the difference between results observed and the coun-
terfactual can reasonably be attributed to the intervention itself, and not to extrane-
ous factors. Ideally, this counterfactual should be built into the design of the project 
and observed during its implementation. This kind of evaluation and what it studies 
could be referred to as “direct impact” evaluations.
If evaluations need to address the complex interrelationships between poverty 
and the environment over a longer period after the project has ended, they will need 
to focus on the broad processes of change in which the intervention was one of 
many factors. These evaluations tend to focus on contribution analysis rather than 
counterfactual analysis and are ideally undertaken several years after the interven-
tion has stopped in order to assess whether the processes of change that the inter-
vention started have been replicated, scaled up or have catalysed trends in society or 
the economy. Provided that the intervention’s contributions can be demonstrated, 
these evaluations tend to provide crucial information on the intervention’s rel-
evance, that is, if they really lead to longer-term processes of change or trends that 
are solving the problems. The focus of these evaluations could be referred to as “final 
or ultimate impact.”
In my speech to the International Development Evaluation Association in 2010 
(van den Berg 2011), I proposed to make a clear distinction between “direct” and 
“final” impact issues, because both practices bring us benefits and the relevance of 
interventions for solving problems in society, the economy and the environment 
needs to be found at the final or ultimate impact level. We need to be able to refer to 
“impact” at the highest level in our results chain, also because this conforms to ordi-
nary usage of the term (e.g. in public debates about whether “aid had any impact on 
Africa”). It would help us take into account the time horizon that is necessary for 
a sustainable interaction between the social, economic and environmental domains.
The revised OECD criteria follow my argumentation to a large extent, by focus-
ing on “The extent to which the intervention has generated or is expected to gen-
erate significant positive or negative, intended or unintended, higher-level effects” 
(OECD: 11). The OECD does not see the need for a recognition of direct impact, 
as I argued, as they note that “valid attribution is embedded in all criteria”. While 
I applaud this perspective, it is a battle with the impact evaluation community that 
is not yet won.
From sustainability to adaptability
As an evaluation criterion, sustainability can be a frustrating concept. DAC defined 
it as “the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major 
development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-
term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time” (OECD/
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DAC 2002: 8). This definition includes two approaches that would allow us to say a 
bit more about sustainability: assessing the probability that benefits would continue 
and assessing the risks to continued benefits. The revised OECD criterion on sus-
tainability strengthens this perspective and places this within a systems perspective 
as an improved and transformed balance between “financial, economic, social, envi-
ronmental and institutional capacities of the systems needed to sustain net benefits 
over time” (OECD 2019: 12). While I applaud the direction this takes, I continue to 
argue that we need to explore this further in terms of probabilities and risks.
A thoughtful example of a well-developed approach to the probability of sus-
tainability can be found in the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA) evaluation manual Looking Back, Moving Forward. The manual 
describes factors that may influence sustainability and presents key questions that 
could be asked to ascertain whether the benefits of the intervention under evalua-
tion have the “potential” to be sustained in future (SIDA 2004: 35–37). Key ques-
tions include a focus on whether the intervention is in line with local priorities, 
culture and social conditions; whether there is institutional and financial continuity; 
and whether the intervention is compatible with a sustained use of natural resources. 
It points out that each evaluation of sustainability of an intervention would have its 
own set of questions, specific to the context of the intervention.
GEF follows the risk approach to sustainability. In its guidelines for terminal 
evaluations of GEF-funded projects, it identifies five areas of risk that need to be 
explored: financial risks, socio-political risks, risks to the institutional framework and 
governance risks and last – but not least – environmental risks (GEF EO 2008b). 
In principle, these risks should cover long-term developments in all three pillars of 
sustainable development. This risk approach can help us identify what is of local or 
global significance, where a public good perspective is needed to reduce risks and 
what can be done to ensure longer-term sustainability.
However, climate change is making it increasingly difficult to correctly iden-
tify environmental risks. Concurrently with the ongoing assault of climate change 
(leading to, among other things, higher temperatures, greater variability in weather 
and more extreme events), predictability has become elusive. Reduced local pre-
dictability leads to higher levels of risk, as temperatures fluctuate more than before, 
water availability becomes more seasonable and extreme weather events become 
more severe and frequent. These risks need to be taken into account and have led to 
calls for climate change adaptation.
The best current approaches to climate change adaptation, both in specific 
interventions focused on adaptation itself and in regular mainstream development 
or in poverty alleviation strategies, are risk-based and aim to reduce the risks to 
society and economies from climate change. This risk reduction is very similar to 
the risk approach to sustainability assessments. My contention is that this kind of 
risk approach is appropriate for sustainable development, including a public goods 
approach to poverty and the environment.
It also recognizes the unpredictability of the future. Achieving a sustainable bal-
ance among civil society, the economy and the environment will require constant 
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adaptation to the three pillars’ specific requirements. Adaptation calls for adaptive 
management, and in the final analysis, for adaptive evaluation: one that recognizes 
the sudden shifts in the different domains and uses those as a basis to formulate 
sustainability issues, rather than relying on the goals and perspectives that existed at 
the outset of a strategy or intervention, whether it targeted poverty or the environ-
ment. Finally, when we turn sustainability into an adaptation issue, we are able to 
take the public goods perspective into account when looking at what can be solved 
by markets and private initiatives versus a perspective in which governments and 
international organizations are essential to ensuring a sustainable future.
Notes
 1 Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
drafted in December 2015 in Paris and signed on 22 April 2016 in New York, USA.
 2 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 
September 2015, A/Res/70/1.
 3 State of the Union address, 1988, available at http://janda.org/politxts/State%20of%20
Union%20Addresses/1981-1988%20Reagan/rwr88.html.
 4 This section is based on van den Berg (2011).
 5 Interview with Nicholas Stern in The Guardian, Thursday, 29 November 2007, available 
at guardian.co.uk.
 6 And when confronted with criticism of his calculations, Stern corrected them – upwards. 
See D. Adam, ‘I underestimated the threat, says Stern’, The Guardian (London), 18 April 
2008, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/apr/18/climatechange.carbo-
nemissions, accessed 13 August 2020.
 7 This section is adapted from van den Berg (2011).
 8 Speech to the IDEAS conference in Amman, Jordan, in April 2011. Speech available at 
https://player.vimeo.com/video/22901848.
 9 This example is derived from a rural development IFAD project I visited in 2001.
 10 This example is derived from a 2007 visit to Kenya to a UNEP-implemented GEF-
funded project.
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3
EVALUATION AT THE NEXUS
Evaluating sustainable development in the 2020s
Andy Rowe
Sustainability-ready evaluation
In the earlier chapter, sustainable development was described as a mode of devel-
opment in which present needs are met without compromising future genera-
tions’ ability to meet their own needs (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987). Sustainable development depends on recognising and incor-
porating into development strategies the connectivity and mutual interdependence 
of natural, economic, political and cultural systems. There is tension in balancing 
contributions from – and returns to – human and natural systems. However, when 
appropriately balanced, these positions form the nexus where there is the possibility 
that the needs of the present can be met without compromising the future of either 
human or natural systems. Unfortunately, human and natural system interests too 
often stand opposed to each other (or outright ignore each other), a situation that is 
detrimental to programming and evaluation. There also seems to be an opportunis-
tic approach to incorporating sustainability into evaluation where climate and sus-
tainability are recognised as central issues, but this is translated into arguments why 
a sector or population segment that is strongly affected requires additional priority 
and resources. In fact the interventions are likely to face diminishing resources and 
pressures to address public policy goals (Williams 2019) as well as the necessity of 
adapting their approaches to reduce the environmental footprint.
I posit that evaluation of sustainability and of natural resource interventions nec-
essarily occurs where human and natural systems connect, which I have character-
ised as a two-system evaluand (Rowe 2012) and which Juha Uitto terms the nexus 
(United Nations Development Programme - Evaluation 2010). The call All Hands 
on Deck – Everyone to the Nexus adopts Uitto’s approach pointing to the nexus 
where both human and natural systems are present, which, for sustainable develop-
ment is everywhere. Mainstreaming sustainability means that all interventions are 
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nexus interventions, and thus all evaluations are potentially addressing a two-system 
evaluand. Learning and adapting from practice is an important feature of evalua-
tion, and especially for development evaluation, meaning that evaluation will learn 
from efforts to mainstream sustainability at the nexus and evaluation capacity will 
move towards the visions of CHANS (Ostrom 1990; Liu 2007) and Sustainability 
Science (Clark and Dickson 2003; Kates 2011) to more fully understand and evalu-
ate sustainability.
Theory of Change for sustainability-ready evaluation
While evaluation has been very slow to recognise and respond to extinction it has 
begun to do so largely, I suggest, because the messages from the broader context 
are reaching evaluators and raising questions of the relevance of the field, as well as 
providing new opportunities. This is the core of the underlying mechanisms in the 
Theory of Change2 for sustainability-ready evaluation – evaluation will be open 
to everyone and incorporate sustainability. Members of the constituent elements 
in the field of evaluation – commissioners, practitioners, researchers and evaluation 
organisations, stakeholder and beneficiary groups – are daily receiving the message 
of the urgency for humans to adapt, reduce our footprint and transform our rela-
tionship to the natural system. This also expands present opportunities for evalua-
tion. This barrage of messaging and recognition of reality will bring evaluation to 
nexus, much more than evaluation writing, conceptual development or conference 
presentations, and is the initiating mechanism of change bringing evaluation to sustain-
ability. Moreover, the urgency of the task and the fact that evaluation is predomi-
nantly a practice-based undertaking means that rapid and practical change is needed 
to effectively mainstream evaluation. That means that in addition to external (to 
evaluation) messages and knowledge precipitating and demanding change, evalua-
tion practice and reflection from practice is the key operational mechanism of change 
that will bring the field to effectively mainstream sustainability and start to use-
fully contribute to slowing the pace of extinction through learning and improving 
interventions that focus on both systems by operating at the nexus and beyond that 
towards CHANS (Basurto 2009).
Between the initiating mechanisms for mainstreaming sustainability provided by 
external messages and the operational mechanism of practice-based experimentation 
and learning lies the capacities of evaluation practice and of practitioners and the 
capacities of the essential co-generators of the knowledges required for sustain-
ability-ready evaluation coming from other sciences. A recent stocktaking by the 
Canadian Evaluation Society (CES) of the readiness of evaluation to mainstream 
sustainability and address the nexus reveals a significant gap in our practice and 
intellectual resources. Thus between the two key mechanisms of change towards 
sustainability mainstreaming where external forces and knowledge are the initiat-
ing mechanism generating pressure to mainstream sustainability, and the operational 
mechanism of evaluation practice and learning in commissioning and executing 
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evaluations at the nexus lies the question whether we can do it – can evaluation as 
a field actually mainstream sustainability?
I have argued elsewhere that the challenges in evaluating at the nexus are not 
technical, but political and socially determined by the worldviews of evaluation, 
programmes and organisations (Rowe 2019). Sufficient technical capacities and use-
encouraging approaches to evaluate at the nexus can be found in existing evalua-
tion, social science and biophysical science and evaluations of interventions applying 
biophysical sciences. This is illustrated by the use of mixed methods for evaluating at 
the nexus (Garcia and Zazueta 2015) experimental designs to evaluate natural sys-
tem matters such as conservation (Ferraro 2006; Mascia 2017), Systematic Reviews 
for natural resources and conservation (Pullin and Stewart 2006) and efforts to link 
conservation monitoring and assessment to evaluation (Mascia et al. 2014). And the 
testimonies of Canadian evaluators who work internationally collected as part of 
the CES Stocktaking suggest that development evaluation could be point of more 
consistently addressing both human and natural systems in evaluation.
And very importantly evaluation is awakening to Indigenous approaches to eval-
uative thinking and assessment that are already at nexus and often realise CHANS 
(Bowman-Farrell 2018; Gilio-Whitaker 2019).
There can be little doubt that the external evidence from reports such as produced 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International 
Resource Panel (IRP) and the obvious reality of increasing frequency and inten-
sity of storms, drought, terrestrial and marine temperature rise, flooding and other 
climatic events and their obvious impacts for development contributed to moving 
from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). As did sustainability-linked convenings such as the Conference of the 
Parties (COPs), reality from UN member states, pressures and evidence mobilisa-
tion from NGOs and Indigenous organisations and other contributors. However 
as is frequently the case the early celebration of the SDGs reflected relief that the 
various mandates of UN organisations were “reauthorised” and structured in such a 
way as to enable continued siloed approaches through a large number of individual 
SDGs that need not be connected, and without requirement to connect to natural 
system SDGs (Reid et al. 2017). This has changed and discourse and practices are 
now much closer to or already at the nexus (GEF Scientific and Technical Advisory 
Panel 2018). While this is affirming of the influencing mechanism in the ToC for 
sustainability-ready evaluation, it raises the matter of the feasibility of the operational 
mechanism of change. And here emerging practice also confirms that addressing this 
is a political rather than a technical challenge. As the influencing mechanism gains 
strength – as organisations, programmes and evaluation functions recognise and 
incorporate sustainability – they are finding that the necessary capacities and intel-
lectual infrastructure do indeed already exist though not just in evaluation. A mix 
of methods and sciences will enable evaluation to function reasonably well at the 
nexus. One important observation from the CES stocktaking is that nexus evalua-
tion requires teams that include relevant knowledge of each system and capacities 
to work together (Field 2019).
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Is evaluation ready for sustainability?
To understand how it can address sustainability as one of three thematic principles 
for evaluation in its Strategic Plan, the CES undertook a stocktaking of the readiness 
of evaluation in Canada to mainstream sustainability – the operational mechanism 
of change.3 The underlying premise of the stocktaking is that evaluation has strong 
capacity and activity for the human system, and that for nexus capacity and actions 
are needed for both systems. Thus the focus was on nexus and evaluation of natu-
ral systems. The stocktaking was conducted by four leading Canadian evaluation 
firms4 and is indicative rather than definitive. However it should be noted that the 
CES is the oldest of national evaluation associations, that evaluation is a systematic 
aspect of governance at the federal level in Canada with the National Evaluation 
Policy and evaluation units in every department, that CES likely has the highest per 
capital membership of any evaluation association and that it has actively supported 
the development of evaluation globally such as through being the organisational 
home to the International Organization for Cooperation in Evolution (IOCE). 
Considering the strength of evaluation in Canada the sustainability stocktaking 
might be indicative of evaluation in general. The CES stocktaking covered federal 
evaluations, philanthropic/non-governmental/First Nations evaluations, Canada-
based international evaluators and the intellectual infrastructure.
These results of the CES sustainability stocktaking are consistent with observa-
tions included in the first version of this chapter (Rowe 2014) and reinforce the 
observation that evaluation only rarely considers the natural system or sustainability 
in practice and in writing and training.
Some implications of ignoring sustainability and the natural system
One of the few evaluation publications addressing sustainability was the recent 
issue of New  Directions in Evaluation published by the American Evaluation 
Association (Julnes, 2019). Using the illustration of an infrastructure project I illus-
trated how evaluation systematically ignores the natural system, and that, as a result, 
evaluation has a systematic positive bias, with the effect of reinforcing existing silos 
that separate the human and natural systems and that are very intervention-centric 
unconnected to the wider human (Chelimsky, 2012) or as the CES stocktaking dem-
onstrates to the natural world. I further argued that any knowledge undertaking that 
systematically favours organisations that commission the inquiry through excluding 
considerations that would reflect less positively on the intervention (thereby creating 
positive bias and reinforcing silos) cannot be regarded as credible. Moreover continu-
ing to ignore sustainability and natural systems at a time when these are obviously 
central to everyone everywhere does not auger well for evaluation being regarded as 
relevant. And things that are not relevant or credible generally have short shelf lives. 
This means that while evaluation does not itself have the necessary intellectual infra-
structure to work at the nexus, it can do so by engaging other relevant knowledges, 
and has strong incentives to do this since to not do it threatens sustainability of the 
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evaluation field itself. This fails to recognise that absolute limits are being reached. 
To illustrate, recent work by the International Resources Panel (www.resourcepanel.
org) has demonstrated that the planet does not have the material resources (such as 
aggregate and land for food production) to meet urban populations forecasted for 
2050 with continued population increases and rates of urbanisation (Swilling, 2018). 
TABLE 3.1 Observations from CES Sustainability-Ready Stocktaking
Federal Evaluations in Canada (2018):
 - Sustainability and natural resource impacts 
are largely ignored in Canadian federal 
evaluations
Intellectual infrastructure – North America 
2017–19
 - Sustainability and natural resources do not 
have a presence in the North American 
evaluation intellectual infrastructure
 - Sustainability is not addressed in a 
systematic or standardised way in 
federal evaluations in Canada.
 - Little guidance on how to evaluate 
sustainability.
 - Departments that are expected 
to contribute to environmental 
sustainability mostly do not consider 
natural system impacts.
 - Only Global Affairs Canada addresses 
sustainability as a cross cutting issue in 
programming and evaluations.
 - Only 4% of the articles in the four 
leading North American evaluation 
journals addressed natural resources or 
sustainability.
 - Roughly the same proportion of 
conference sessions (workshops, 
presentations and plenaries) addressed 
natural resources or sustainability.
 - Evaluation has little presence in schools 
of natural resources; natural resources and 
sustainability do not have a presence in 
evaluation programmes or departments in 
North America.
Philanthropic, NGO and First Nation 
evaluation
 - Evaluations largely single system, emerging 
Indigenous evaluation focuses on nexus
Canada-based international evaluators 
working in nexus interventions – 10 of 60 
invited evaluators participated
 - Employ mix of methods, choice influenced by 
institutional setting
 - Conservation is primary focus for 
ENGOs, a few approach nexus, some 
apply evaluation or econometric 
methods to assess conservation impacts.
 - Philanthropic organisations with natural 
system portfolios evaluate within the 
programmatic area (e.g. conservation, 
climate, fisheries, protected areas), 
where the focus was human (e.g. fish 
harvesters) the focus is human system.
 - Emerging field of Indigenous evaluation 
is grounded in values that acknowledge 
and honour the interconnectedness of 
human and natural systems and there 
are nexus examples (e.g. in Canada, 
the Indigenous Circle of Experts and 
Indigenous Guardian programmes).
 - Participants from varied backgrounds 
(engineering, political science, economics, 
biology, and project management) work 
with international organisations in 
private and non-profit sectors.
 - Some projects directly related to 
environmental programming (e.g. clean 
energy, promotion of sustainability), 
others focused on the ecological 
footprint of programming.
 - Use a mix of methods: Non-profit sector 
places a strong emphasis on participatory 
methods, understanding local context and 
constraints, the private sector respondents 
identified the need for better and more 
in-depth analysis of big data.
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This suggests that development evaluation that mainstreams sustainability would 
expect interventions to address and achieve concrete reductions in urban migration 
and assess their performance against these expectations.
This brings us to a further question – why are we like this? Why is our inter-
est and capacity so impoverished for evaluating at the nexus, for including natural 
systems in evaluation? And based on that, the final question for this chapter is what 
do we have to do going forward to evaluate at the nexus which based on cur-
rent accepted and emerging knowledge including Covid-19, considers what are the 
most important underlying elements of evaluation that need to change.
Key elements of evaluation at the nexus
Evaluation must change immediately and systematically to be able to work at the 
nexus and contribute to slowing extinction. The two top priorities are:
 1. Value the natural system
 2. Attend to critically important characteristics of the natural system and evalua-
tion: connectivity, scales, and evaluation use
These are briefly described here. Value is used in the more general sense of merit, 
worth, value and significance and is the most fundamental change that faces 
evaluation in addressing sustainability. Addressing these in evaluation practice 
and thought will have challenges. Two important initiatives are underway to pro-
vide the necessary framing and guidance, Blue Marble Evaluation5 and Footprint 
Evaluation.6
Value the natural system
Evaluation is not unique in according zero value to the natural system, this is 
endemic in considerable human decision making, especially those with European 
origins, and traceable to already held positions articulated in the Christian bible 
and is captured by the concept of dominion (Rowe 2018: pp. 28,40). Neoclassical 
economics firmly embraces dominion (Nadeau 2007). It is of course not universal, 
Indigenous concepts of stewardship differ totally and can be expressed as regarding 
the world as single system comprised of “humans and our non-human relatives”7 
with humans having stewardship responsibilities as one has towards relatives, instead 
of extraction privileges conveyed through ownership or access rights.
Industrialised nations began to value some elements of the natural system from 
self-interest when the connection between the natural and human systems was 
indisputably recognised as potentially harming humans such as the effect of pollu-
tion or pesticides (Carson 1962). This is the basis of the broad environmental regula-
tory framework around air and water, chemicals, and other contaminants.
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Value is multi-dimensional: Economic, social, cultural, spiritual, 
traditional and above all political
Control or access to the natural system is at the core of much political struggle (The 
EU-UN Partnership on Land, Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention 2020), 
whether diamonds, fossil fuels, water, land and trees; the political dimension is also 
where differing positions on economic, social, traditional and cultural dimension 
are asserted.
At its core the economic dimension rests on access to essential aspects of the 
natural system through ownership or rights, and on the division of returns along 
the value chain. The prevailing position is that the economic should not be fettered, 
pursuit of the economic benefits benefit society broadly and economic growth is 
the priority thereby enabling improving social benefits. The extinction crisis clearly 
demonstrates the shortcomings of that argument.
 - Some elements of the natural system have high status for their ascribed cultural 
attributes: certain reef species are harvested for important ceremonies and cel-
ebrations, rhino horn and elephant tusks, shark fins and seal penises are ascribed 
high values for perceived attributes such as aphrodisiacs. The value of ground 
rhinoceros horn in eastern medicinal markets is higher than world prices for 
gold, diamonds or cocaine (Menda 2011). Also the relative indifference of 
many tribal cultures to wild and wild-interbred-with-hatchery salmon reflect-
ing stewardship responsibilities for all non-human relatives, compared to the 
adamant preference for wild salmon by (largely European origin) recreational 
anglers.
 - Spiritual values are another important dimension. Allen Putney (Putney 2008) 
provides a useful description of the spiritual values of landscapes. Bears pro-
vide a good example of conflicting spiritual and cultural values: some male 
human populations value bear gall bladders highly as an aphrodisiac, some 
North American tribal and aboriginal nations consider bears to have great 
spiritual significance. And some people enjoy killing bears and pay significant 
amounts for access and assistance while others are dedicated to protecting them 
as important members of ecosystems and invest in their protection.8
 - Traditional values are very important. Gilio-Whitaker (2019) has solidly dem-
onstrated the environmental justice issue that the forced separation of North 
American Indigenous people from traditional lands has directly and measurably 
impaired physical and mental health.
Concepts and methods for valuing elements of the natural system are available with 
a solid underlying knowledge base and direct relationships from the one system to 
the other, for example with toxic materials in landfills near or on which children 
play or work extracting materials. The connection between exposure to the toxic 
materials of human populations and human health can be determined without 
much difficulty and connects directly to health knowledge of the likelihood of 
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adverse health outcomes. Interactions that harm humans are accorded priority and 
can be investigated using the solid knowledge base.
Emerging threats such as current and recent pandemics also arise from the con-
nections between human and natural systems where the connections are being 
intensified with deeper and deeper exploitation of the natural system by humans. 
These connections are less well known and are currently challenging to consider in 
an evaluation of say, road and settlement expansion enabling satisfaction of human 
preferences for traditional foods or improved access to wildmeat for subsistence. 
However evaluation using theory-based evaluation approaches can incorporate risks 
such as these into assessments of interventions that involved expanded penetration 
into landscapes and thereby correct the positive bias and silo-reinforcing contribu-
tions of evaluation.
When the causal and harmful pathways move in the opposite direction, efforts 
to assess effects have a weak knowledge base and operate in a contested politi-
cal and cultural environment. For example, the impact of deforestation on climate 
through lost sequestration is now being incorporated into evaluations. However 
forest sciences are now able to provide a defensible but hard to grasp understanding 
of forests as systems involving importantly trees and fungi as well as other resident 
flora and fauna (Wohlleben 2016). The recent discovery of the largest organism on 
earth and its role in nutrition and communications in a hardwood forest is fasci-
nating and instructive (Casselman 2007). As is understanding that trees function 
as sustainability-focused mutual assistance collectives. These contributions reflect a 
growing knowledge in the science of forests (and other natural domains) that shows 
interspecies connectivity and the collective interdependence of a forest as an ecosys-
tem rather than as a collection of trees that can be individually cut without regard 
to the whole. It is illustrative of the scope that an evaluation involving forests (such 
as for roads or settlements or to create plantation agriculture) requires assessing the 
range of adverse impacts from cutting and the counterfactual benefit of preserving 
natural functioning forests from the perspective of carbon sequestration, water qual-
ity and flow management, cooling, integrated forest-farm smallholder production 
and so on. Such nature-based approaches to mitigating extinction are essential and 
reduce the need for generally less systematically effective human engineered solu-
tions (Raymond 2017). And perhaps surprisingly what is catastrophic for one system 
can be beneficial for the other; human efforts to reduce the spread of Covid-19 have 
directly, promptly and strongly contributed to the environment (Uitto 2020).
To address sustainability evaluation must value natural systems from these differ-
ent perspectives even if we cannot place a monetary value on them. This is akin to 
a list of non-monetised prioritised benefits in a cost–benefit analysis. This will prove 
messy and problematic to those seeking a single metric, such as return on invest-
ment that they can use to compare across different interventions. It will necessarily 
involve a struggle with extractive interests including those within the evaluation 
expanded economic extraction. However, not including the messy natural system 
values means that evaluation itself will continue to be a source of bias favouring the 
human system and extractive interests, reinforcing silos and advancing extinction.
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Attend to core technical differences
There are critically important differences between natural and human systems that 
evaluation must embrace, requiring adaptation in commissioning and methods. 
Three of these are essential for evaluating sustainability:
 - Evaluating sustainability requires recognition of the different temporal and spa-
tial scales in natural and human systems, and in the units of account.
 - Evaluating sustainability requires recognition of the connectivity within and 
between the two systems as well as the connectivity of interventions to public 
interest goals for the two systems.
 - Incorporating sustainability in evaluation will be a radical change requiring 
enhanced attention by the evaluation to promote use.
Scales and units of account
There is not a lot of variation in human temporal scales which are importantly set 
by our relevant lifespans, electoral and programme and policy cycles. Evaluation 
is undertaken within human scales (e.g. under the National Evaluation Policy in 
Canada all programmes and policies must be evaluated at least once every five 
years). While human temporal scales can be complicated they are largely known 
and less wide ranging than found in the natural system where temporal scales range 
from centuries (e.g. trees, sea turtles, Greenland shark) to what seems to us as a few 
moments (e.g. Mayfly live for five minutes to one day, Cicada one day). To put this 
in perspective evaluation clearly recognises the importance of life stages of humans 
(e.g. infants, adolescents, adults and elders) but generally applies a binary temporal 
frame to the natural system (not yet ready or ready for harvest). Reproductive fre-
quency is important in both systems, for example top masting bamboo reproduce 
every hundred years or so, important to both humans and animals such as giant 
panda whereas some insects flutter by at a pace closer to the blink of a human eye. 
Both masting bamboo and small short-lived insects are essential for the ecosystems 
within which they exist. Evaluation at the nexus needs to accommodate temporal 
scales that are relevant and sufficient for the species involved.
Spatial scales also differ. Human system structures and constructs, such as own-
ership or management and control conventions (e.g. fisheries management areas), 
spatially define human systems. In contrast, the spatial logic of natural systems is an 
ecosystem or connected ecosystems. Thus, for example, the natural range of a wolf 
crosses many different human-contrived natural resource management areas and 
structures, communities and often cultures. Sometimes, management structures are 
at odds with each other, such as protecting wolves and their habitat, on one hand, 
and managing grasslands leased to ranchers for cattle grazing, on the other. A signifi-
cant portion of marine life is mobile and crosses regulatory and national boundaries, 
and with changing climatic conditions is now on the move (e.g. many fish stocks are 
moving towards the Poles due to ocean warming). Air and water might be regulated 
within human regulatory boundaries but their movements are not affected by these 
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boundaries. In these and almost all ways the spatial boundaries of the human and 
natural system differ. It is akin to a multi-site evaluation where the specificities of 
each site need to be incorporated into the advance thinking about and commission-
ing, design, implementation and analysis (King and Lawrenz 2011).
Units of account. Humans are but one of a huge number of species. To understand 
the human system we consider one species with important traits (e.g. race, gender). 
Evaluation in the natural system at the nexus has multiple often highly connected 
species. Full consideration of natural system units of account likely exceeds current 
evaluation and social and natural sciences and is something that evaluation will need 
to “learn its way to” as we gain capacity to work closer to CHANS. However evalu-
ating sustainability now requires us to start by mapping the affected and contribut-
ing units of account (species) and incorporate these into the evaluation as best we 
can. To briefly illustrate, reintroduction of wolves into northwestern US landscapes 
has had direct ecosystem side effects and has affected most fauna and considerable 
flora in multiple ecosystems.
Connect to natural and broader human systems
The problem of siloed or partitioned9 programmes has been well documented and 
is widely accepted as problematic. Consider a fisheries development programme to 
improve food security and livelihoods designed without regard to sustainable levels, 
places and methods of extraction, or to the connectivity of the targeted populations 
to other marine life. The main development issues for fisheries in both industrialised 
and developing nations have been who gets access and who captures most from the 
value chain.
With partitioned governance we often lose the connectivity that binds and coor-
dinates efforts in pursuit of large goals such as poverty reduction, biodiversity and 
ultimately sustainable development. To an ecologist, this sounds like a loss of landscape 
connectivity creating fragmented populations and resulting in an overall reduction in 
ecosystem function. Even if all the contributors to sustainable development are suc-
cessful, including communities, individuals, different levels of government, multilateral 
agencies and non-governmental organisations, there is no assurance that such efforts 
will result in development that is sustainable. Partitions fragment the public policy 
agenda and constrain pursuit of the larger and more important goals (Rowe 2013).
Fragmentation presents a challenge for evaluation of sustainable development 
because programming tends to focus either one of the systems. Understandably, pro-
gramme managers will resist efforts by evaluators to pursue the connections from 
the partitioned intervention they are evaluating to the other system. It is not uncom-
mon for evaluators themselves to adopt a view that interventions should be evalu-
ated against their intended and stated goals, with due regard for unintended effects; 
indeed, it is a near-official position enshrined in the programme evaluation stan-
dards adopted by many professional evaluation organisations (Yarbourough, Shulha, 
Hopkins and Caruthers 2011). But if sustainable development is to encompass both 
the natural and human systems per the Brundtland definition, then evaluation of 
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sustainable development initiatives must always have an eye on both of the systems 
involved, that is, on both poverty reduction and environment. And where interven-
tions ignore important connections to the other system or in their own system, it 
falls to the sustainable development evaluator to assess the implications for both 
human and natural system populations. This is an important way that evaluation can 
contribute to improving sustainable development interventions. Theories of change 
are the essential vehicle for articulating connectivity. Every evaluation should begin 
with an open exercise to develop a Theory of Change that is not bound by the 
formal limits of the reach of the programme and its accountability and maps and 
incorporates all that the intervention draws upon from both systems and all that it 
effects in both systems (Rowe 2018: 26–29).
Emphasise use
Far better an approximate answer to the right question, which is often vague, than 
the exact answer to the wrong question, which can always be made precise (Tukey 
1962).
The importance of use and influence in evaluation has received considerable 
research attention and is the subject of a copious amount of evaluation writing 
(Henry and Mark 2003; Patton 2008; Johnson et al. 2009). Sustainable develop-
ment, involving both natural and human systems, adds an additional element. This is 
because each system has a distinct knowledge domain – social sciences for human 
systems and natural and physical sciences for natural systems.
Often, the two applied knowledge domains are unfamiliar with and suspicious of 
each other’s methods and practices. Managers from the natural sciences often find 
some social science methods in the evaluator’s portfolio troubling. Likewise, social 
scientists are often frustrated by the unwillingness of natural scientists to address 
attribution and the extended and expensive natural science primary data collec-
tion methods. Inevitably, evaluation of sustainable development at the nexus will 
bring social and natural sciences together. For evaluation, these different knowledge 
domains mean there are likely to be differences deciding which questions are salient 
and agreeing on standards for legitimate and credible knowledge. The importance 
of multiple knowledge domains should be understood in the context that agree-
ment on salience, legitimacy and credibility is a critical factor that affects prospects 
for the uses of science knowledge (Clark, Mitchell and Cash 2006).
Fortunately, there is solid practice and theory knowledge on collaborative deci-
sion making (Field 2019) and on use-inspired science research that aligns very well 
with the evaluation literature on use and influence. The key to both is focus on the 
knowledge process, not the knowledge product (evaluation report). Engaging deci-
sion makers and stakeholders in the evaluation process greatly enhances prospects 
that the evaluation will be more salient, legitimate and credible, thereby promoting 
use (Rowe and Lee 2013).
Use and influence are the vehicles by which evaluation contributes to improv-
ing interventions such as sustainable development. Engaging decision makers and 
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stakeholders as well as other relevant sciences in the evaluation is how we can 
achieve use and influence. It also facilitates progress on the tricky attribution issue 
to achieve comparisons or other approaches to identifying the incremental contri-
bution of the intervention.
Summary
Evaluation is finally starting to recognise that humans and our goals for human 
development, rights and security rest on our extraction from the natural system. 
Indeed sentient humans everywhere are increasingly aware of and concerned about 
the looming threat of extinction. Evaluators are sentient but have until recently 
ignored the natural system. This has created a systematic positive and silo reinforcing 
bias in evaluation and risks rendering evaluation irrelevant for the major issues of 
the day – extinction and the climate crisis.
As evaluation recognises and addresses its responsibilities to contribute to 
forestalling extinction it will need to mainstream sustainability meaning that all 
evaluation will need to start from the nexus with connected human and natural 
systems. This requires an evaluation capacity and functions that are ready for 
sustainability. Clearly, as described with the stocktaking of the CES, evaluation 
is not sustainability-ready. The pathway to evaluation that is sustainability-ready 
requires that all evaluation undertakings value the natural system and immediately 
recognise and address important differences between human and natural systems, 
scale, units of account and connectivity. The knowledge and methods exist in 
evaluation, social and biophysical sciences, the challenge is therefore not technical 
but political. It is political because the origins of evaluation and the social sciences 
on which evaluation rests are in the values and structures that are strongly founded 
on a claim that humans have dominion over all other things and that all value rests 
upon human effort. This claim of dominion extends to other, that is, non-European, 
humans and underpins colonialism and racism.
Mainstreaming sustainability will prove challenging and for evaluation to progress 
it will have to elevate the importance of pursuit of use.
The premise of this chapter is that evaluation has an important role in assisting 
sustainable development efforts get closer to a sustainable and productive nexus 
where we can make gains in poverty reduction and improve the environment in the 
present, thereby contributing to a sustainable and better future.
Notes
 1 The importance of language and messaging is described in an article by Kate Yoder 
describing an inquiry by SPARK Neuro into responses to the terms “global warming” 
and “climate change” (Yoder 2019).
 2 In the sense articulated by Carol Weiss as the mechanisms that mediate between the 
delivery (and receipt) of the programme and the emergence of the outcomes of inter-
est. The operative mechanism of change isn’t the programme activities per se but the 
response that the activities generate (Weiss 1998).
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 3 The work was undertaken by the CES Sustainability Working Group and included valu-
able material and metrics for greening organisations and conferences led by Andrealisa 
Belzer https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hp9Gks1Idd8h_9mmHQdLDbf3ftnB
_8D9JWwR1DTJzNM/edit#heading=h.lim26mvuuo6g and implementation of this 
for the 2021 conference https://c2020.evaluationcanada.ca/about-the-conference/
sustainability/.
 4 Baastel www.baastel.com, Goss Gilroy www.ggi.ca, Prairie Research Associates www.
pra.ca, Universalia www.universalia.com.
 5 See bluemarbleeval.org.
 6 Footprint evaluation was initiated by Patricia Rogers, Jane Davidson, Dugan Fraser and 
the author to provide guidance materials and capacity building to assist evaluators in 
mainstreaming sustainability in all evaluations. https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/
themes/footprint_evaluation
 7 I acknowledge and value the assistance of Nicky Bowman and others in learning of this 
valuable framing. Nicky uses the concept all things Creator made are our relatives.
 8 It is instructive that the Coast Funds (https://coastfunds.ca/ ) created from an endow-
ment as part of the Great Bear Rainforest and addressing economic development of First 
Nations in the Great Bear Rainforest and in Haida Gwaii have two evaluation functions: 
for donors and managers a traditional accountability function and a second function 
developed by and for First Nations that uses storytelling, songs and other traditional com-
munity processes.
 9 I use the term partitioned to describe functionally separated but logically connected units, 
and suggest that it results in fragmented public policy agendas. Silos infer an impenetrable 
separation, whereas the reality is that many programmes or interventions are located 
within the same policy agenda but are partitioned into smaller units that are designed to 
better fit contemporary performance and accountability structures. Thus, whereas organ-
isational charts and logic models provide the appearance of a linked approach to the 
broader policy goal, the organisational reality is that the units are partitioned and their 
connectivity to each other and the larger goal is impaired.
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POVERTY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
Too complex to evaluate?
Hazel Todd and David Todd
Climate change and poverty
This chapter explores the increasingly damaging effects of climate change on the 
global environment and observes that it is the poor, who are most severely chal-
lenged by this trend. “Weather-related events” are increasing in frequency and sever-
ity under Climate Change and in regions such as Asia-Pacific and the Caribbean 
disaster risk is outpacing resilience, posing severe limitations on poverty reduction. 
Many international interventions attempt to address the overlaps between climate 
change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction within a poverty reduction 
framework. Evaluation among international agencies has struggled to assess the 
progress and results of these efforts, given their exceptional complexity. While the-
ory-based evaluation approaches have proved useful, they have often failed to find a 
suitable level of theory, which can provide clear findings and actionable lessons and 
recommendations. This chapter recommends an approach in which different levels 
of theory, from project through to the global environment, can be “nested” within 
each other, so that each addresses a specific aspect, while contributing towards eval-
uation of higher levels of social and environmental change.
Background
In the last two decades, substantial progress has been reported in addressing global 
poverty. This progress was catalysed by the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), which were adopted by leaders of some 189 countries at the United 
Nations Millennium Summit in 2000.
By 2011, all developing regions, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa, had 
achieved the target of halving the number of people living in extreme poverty. 
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The most populous countries in the world – China and India – played a major 
role in the worldwide reduction of poverty. The remarkable progress in China 
led to reduction in extreme poverty in Eastern Asia from 61 percent to 4 
percent between 1990 and 2015. Southern Asia’s progress has also been 
impressive, with a decline from 52 to 17 percent within the same time period, 
but with accelerated reduction since 2008.1
According to the most recent estimates, in 2013, 10.7 percent of the world’s 
population lived at or below $1.90 a day. That’s down from 35 percent in 1990 
and 44 percent in 1981. This means that ending extreme poverty is within our 
reach. In April 2013, the World Bank set a new goal to end extreme poverty in 
a generation. The new target is to have no more than 3 percent of the world’s 
population living on just $1.90 a day by 2030.2
The MDGs were superseded by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which 
were adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015. At the heart of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are 17 SDGs, which are an urgent call 
for action by all countries – developed and developing – in a global partnership. 
These recognise that ending poverty and other deprivations depends on implemen-
tation of strategies that improve health and education, reduce inequality, and spur 
economic growth – while tackling climate change and working to preserve oceans 
and forests.
Climate change was to some extent embedded in the MDGs, through MDG 7: 
“It is critical that the natural resources base and ecosystems are managed sustain-
ably.” This focus was made more explicit and operational under the SDGs, with 
SDG 13 requiring countries to “Take urgent action to combat climate change 
and its impact.” Annual reporting on progress towards the goal is provided on the 
SDG website.3 However, this has largely focused on countries meeting process 
steps, such as communicating on Nationally Determined Contributions and on 
fund flows, rather than on progress towards the target of sustainable manage-
ment. There is also some reporting on disasters and their potential relationship 
to climate change. However, this tends to be of a generic nature and does not 
permit exploration of the empirical interconnections between these phenom-
ena, or between them and poverty. For example, it is reported that,4 “during 
the period 1998–2017, direct economic losses from disasters were estimated at 
almost $3 trillion. Climate-related and geophysical disasters claimed an estimated 
1.3 million lives”.
While there has been substantial progress globally with regard to poverty reduc-
tion (although with variable performance across regions), achievements with regard 
to climate change mitigation have been challenged by the apparently weak com-
mitment of some major polluting countries to sign up to, still less meet, targets 
necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although substantial and increasing 
funds have become available for adaptation efforts, the effects of these have been 
hampered by inadequate implementation capacity at country level and relatively 
slow release of committed resources by funding bodies.
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In the light of these complex phenomena and interactions between them at all 
levels, from global to local, a critical emerging question is: Will climate change be a 
“killer blow” for poverty reduction? It is evident that, if mitigation measures are not 
effective, climate change will have major damaging effects on the global environ-
ment. These will be cumulative and probably irreversible. At national level, envi-
ronmental damage will affect all aspects of society. The poor will be most severely 
impacted, since they are often directly dependent on natural resources for livelihood 
or live in the most fragile locations. Attempts to strengthen resilience through adap-
tation measures will have varying levels of effectiveness and are likely to be geo-
graphically dispersed, with many communities unsupported; while major challenges 
will be posed for the sustainability of adaptation gains, since these will often require 
continuing resource support, which will overstretch the resources of countries and 
international partners.
Given these factors, there is high potential for the progress, which has been made 
against poverty to be reduced or even reversed. If poverty reduction continues in a 
“business as usual” mode, the impacts of climate change are highly likely to increase, 
with particularly strong effects on the poor. The costs of delivering intended devel-
opment pathways will substantially increase. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Poverty–climate interactions
Climate effects, although ubiquitous and continuous, are most directly experienced 
through “weather-related events”, such as hurricanes, tropical storms and typhoons.
In urban areas, low-income communities are most affected by these events, 
because of such factors as inappropriate location (for example through susceptibility 
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to such forces as flooding and strong winds, poor drainage, sloping land), fragile 
housing quality and poor roads. In such areas houses and small-scale businesses are 
frequently damaged or destroyed, roads are washed away and schools and clinics 
closed down as extreme events strike. When this occurs, the poor have no income 
reserves and low access to credit to enable them to renovate or rebuild their homes 
and/or to recommence small-scale income generation activities.
In contrast, although affected by adverse events, non-poor households have more 
resilient houses, better access to services, insurance coverage and credit worthiness 
to recover. This being so, weather-related events increase inequalities in urban areas, 
including through effects on housing, income, education, employment and health-
care; and often have disproportionate effects on women and children.
Poverty effects of weather-related events in rural areas are often even more severe 
than in urban centres. Overall, rural housing stock is often less robust than that of 
urban areas and is prone to severe damage or destruction, while possessions, animals 
and crops are all likely to be lost. Increased rural poverty promotes migration to 
urban areas, which weakens rural communities and economies, as well as contribut-
ing to urban inequality and challenging the provision of infrastructure and services 
in these areas.
Whether in urban or rural locations, two types of settlement are particularly 
affected by extreme weather events:
 • Coastal communities, which are subject to sea surges, winds and heavy rain on 
often inadequately drained surfaces.
 • Hillside/mountain communities, built on unstable land are subject to landslides 
and flash floods (which often cause fatalities), road collapse and resultant inac-
cessibility, which may last for some time. Such areas often cannot be reached by 
vehicles bringing rehabilitation equipment and supplies for some time and are 
also cut off from markets to obtain necessary supplies or sell products to restore 
their income.
Responding to climate change
Climate change mitigation activities are intended to protect the global environment 
by slowing down or eliminating negative climate change effects. While environ-
mental benefits gained from reduced GHG emissions are often envisaged at the 
macro level and in the long term, interventions have been targeted at all levels, 
ranging from global agreements and funds, through national policies and strategies 
to local level activities.
Although climate change mitigation efforts may reduce aggregate climate change 
effects (assuming they are at a consistently high level and well-targeted), disasters 
will continue to occur, so disaster risk reduction must play a critical role, particularly 
for the poor.
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Disaster risk reduction
Disaster risk reduction and the SDGs
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) must take account of the shifting risks associated 
with climate change and ensure that its measures do not accidentally increase 
vulnerability towards them. For example, hazard analysis has traditionally been based 
on historical data. This approach is no longer sufficient, since hazard characteristics 
are worsening as a result of climate change.
The principle of disaster resilience is central to the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda. 
As indicated under Goal 1, during the period 1998–2017, direct economic losses 
from disasters were estimated at almost $3 trillion. Climate-related and geophysical 
disasters claimed an estimated 1.3 million lives. The Sustainable Development Goals 
are to be achieved through a comprehensive global framework of six separate but 
interrelated agreements, one of which is The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015–2030.
The Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction 2015–2030
The stated outcome of the Sendai Framework is: “The substantial reduction of 
disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, 
social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and 
countries”. A major Goal contributing to attainment of this outcome is as follows:
Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of 
integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, edu-
cational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that 
prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase pre-
paredness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience.
The Sendai Framework lists climate change as “one of the drivers of disaster 
risk” Accordingly, in order to reduce disaster risk, it will be necessary to reduce the 
effects of climate change. While mitigation will play a critical long-term role in this 
process, for many communities around the world and particularly in the Asia-Pacific 
region adaptation measures will be essential in the short to medium term.
Climate change and disaster risk reduction across regions
The first section of this chapter has outlined the interconnections between climate 
change and poverty to date and how these may be expected to evolve in future. The 
connections are complex and operate at various social and economic levels. The 
poor are particularly vulnerable to climate change effects. Many of these effects are 
experienced as disasters; although others are long-term changes adversely affecting 
livelihoods of the poor over time, through such trends as increasing land aridity or 
salinity, which reduces the crop yields of marginal farmers on poor quality or vul-
nerable land. (These are sometimes brought into the disaster arena as “slow onset 
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disasters”.) This section takes a brief look at some interactions between climate 
change and disasters in different regions and sub-regions and shows that, although 
each has its specific characteristics and may be affected by specific types of weather-
related events, there are also common factors emerging across them.
Disasters in the Asia-Pacific region
Recent events such as floods across South Asia and typhoons in East Asia con-
tinued a series of catastrophes in the region, which is one of the most vulnerable 
in the world to natural disasters. According to the Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 
2017, disaster risk is outpacing resilience in the region. It estimates that an aver-
age national disaster in the region leads to a 0.13 increase in the country’s Gini 
coefficient.5 Figure  4.2 illustrates some of the major events in the region in 
the last 50 years. Although earthquakes have had a major destructive impact, 
weather-related events, such as cyclones, typhoons and floods have also played 
a major part in reducing the economic and social potential of the region. Some 
estimates of the possible cost and numbers affected by such events are shown in 
Table 4.1.6
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The Asia-Pacific Disaster Report (2017) suggests that in future the region could 
account for 40% of global economic losses resulting from disasters. Average annual 
GDP losses may be 4% for its Small Island Developing States and 2.5% for its Least 
Developed Countries.
Climate change has magnified the risk of disasters and increased their costs. As 
the climate system has warmed, the number of weather-related hazards globally has 
tripled, while the number of people living in flood-prone areas and cyclone-exposed 
coastlines has doubled – and these trends will increase. The impact of climate change 
will be felt particularly through periodic weather events such as monsoon rainfall and 
El Niño – as well as through heat waves, sandstorms, floods, cyclones and droughts.
South Asia
In South Asia, weather-related disasters present a major challenge, which is exacer-
bated both by climate change and by rapid population growth. “The entire popula-
tion is vulnerable to change in climate and extreme events because of the low level 
of institutional capabilities, economic vulnerability, and great dependence on cli-
mate sensitive resources.”8 A broad range of DRR activities may substantially over-
lap with CCA measures, including “those related to hydrometeorological events 
such as drought-proofing, flood protection, cyclone warning and shelters, malaria 
eradication, resistant agriculture, mangrove conservation, saline embankment, and 
alternative livelihood development”.9
As with the East Asia and Pacific region discussed in Section “Disasters in the 
Asia-Pacific region” above, losses incurred from weather-related events are devastat-
ing: between 2005 and 2014, disasters were calculated to be responsible for 1.2 mil-
lion deaths in southwestern and southern Asia, accounting for over 20% of all global 
deaths and led to economic losses of some $80 billion in 2005 value.10
In the region, although climate change and disasters are clearly interlinked and 
overlapping, the institutional structures, legislative provisions and national and 
regional policies dealing with them have largely developed as independent strands. 
The implication of this trend has been well explored by Mall et al.11 Their analy-
sis shows that that there is a lack of coordination and awareness among the nodal 
TABLE 4.1 Some Estimated Impacts of Disasters in the Region
Disaster impacts in Asia and the Pacific, 2016
Lives lost People affected Cost of estimated damage ($ million current)
Floods 3,250 13,787,307 35,846
Storms 880 6,345,793 11,409
Droughts – 13,381,000 3,000
Extreme Temperature 336 158,100 1,727
Earthquakes 198 613,022 24,407
Other 323 240,480 835
Total 4,987 34,523,702 77,223
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agencies, which critically limits their proper functioning. In most cases, stand-alone 
adaptation and disaster reduction policies were found to exist and DRR including 
climate change adaptation policies seemed extremely challenging due to the involve-
ment of multiple institutions within similar kinds of projects. In certain cases, dupli-
cation or even triplication in the execution of similar projects was identified, which 
often hindered the pace of effective execution in terms of both economy and benefit 
to the people. A lack of coordination also implies an excessive budgetary burden in 
executing similar types of projects and plans by different institutions and agencies.12
The Caribbean region
The Caribbean Development Bank (CBD) plays a major role in advising and 
supporting its Borrowing Member Countries (BMCs) in their efforts to combat 
poverty. Disasters, often in the form of weather-related events, are increasing in 
intensity and frequency in the region and often challenge these efforts. There are 
no agreed estimates of the economic impact of climate change on Caribbean 
countries13 in a “no adaptation scenario”. Such estimates are difficult because of 
rapid changes in global climate change projections as well as because of the lim-
ited climate model projections at suitable spatial scales available for the Caribbean, 
and the limited inventory of the Region’s environmental resources and assets. 
Various studies have estimated annual impact at anywhere between 5% and 30% 
of GDP. Even taken at the low end of this range, the impact of climate change 
on CDB’s BMCs is expected to be devastating to their long-term growth and 
development.14
As far back as 1998, CDB implemented a Natural Disaster Management Strategy 
and Operational Guidelines (NDMSOG), under which some 11.37% of the Bank’s 
total lending and technical assistance was expended in the period up to 2008. 
This was replaced by an updated Disaster Management Strategy and Operational 
Guidelines (DiMSOG) in 2009. The DiMSOG is intended to support and inform 
the following areas of CDB intervention15:
 a) Proactive assistance to BMCs to reduce risk through institutional strengthen-
ing, knowledge management, risk reduction measures and enhanced commu-
nity resilience
 b) Post-disaster response
 c) Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management into CDB’s grants and loans
 d) Effective collaboration by CDB with regional and national DRM partners.
The CDB Climate Resilience Strategy16 was approved in 2012. It seeks to develop 
and operationalise a robust environmental sustainability risk framework that explic-
itly considers climate resilience in CDB’s operations and assists BMCs and regional 
institutions to mobilise financing, and design and implement policies, strategies and 
investment programmes to address climate resilience and deliver on their sustain-
able development objectives. It notes that Disaster Risk Reduction is a priority for 
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the Bank and is acknowledged as a critical short-term response to climate change 
adaptation. The Bank will continue to provide assistance for post disaster rehabilita-
tion and for mitigation interventions (under its DiMSOG); but will place greater 
emphasis on identifying/developing innovative risk transfer instruments and initia-
tives and building community resilience. Under the CRS, CDB intends to support 
BMCs to design and mainstream climate risk management strategies in regional, 
national and sectoral policies.
Although funding under the DiMSOG has intended to support countries to 
develop disaster risk reduction approaches, take up of funds for this purpose has 
been slight. To a limited extent, post disaster-response funding has incorporated 
an element of “building back better”, which may contribute to future DRR, but 
overall, countries have proved reluctant to borrow money to reduce disaster risks. 
Furthermore, in most of the countries concerned, active approaches to DRR are 
not strongly incorporated in national policies and strategies, so there is little impetus 
to borrow money in this area.
To some extent, the growing fundability of climate resilience and adaptation 
interventions appears to offer potential support to effective disaster resilience pro-
grammes. Many CDB activities funded under climate resilience are expected to 
raise the resilience and preparedness of countries for disasters, thereby reducing the 
need for separate disaster-specific funding. However, an evaluation by the Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) found no evidence that the theoretical con-
nections between the two strategies have yet been systematically realised. Projects in 
one area rarely specify the effects they will produce in the other, so that overall ben-
efits are not maximised and the potential for duplication remains. Given the increas-
ing intention to mainstream DRM, including on infrastructure projects, the use of 
Climate Risk Assessment as an input into project design will be an essential aspect 
of “building back better”, although the cost implications of responding to such 
assessments will need to be monitored. Such Assessment is one potential method 
to specify the overlap between climate and disaster related effects of investments.17
The IEO evaluation of the DiMSOG developed (retrospectively) a theory of 
change to help analyse the extent to which the strategy (in association with CCA 
approaches) has assisted Borrowing Member Countries to move towards poverty 
reduction. This is presented as Figure 4.3.
Overview of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction
As shown by a brief overview of these issues in three regions, the overlaps between 
disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation have not been well recognised 
or incorporated into international, regional and national approaches to either of 
the two phenomena. Attempts to address both issues simultaneously are also rare. 
This partly reflects a “silo” approach emanating from the different institutional and 
funding streams through which climate change and disasters are addressed. The silo 
approach is ineffective since there are substantial issues, which could be more effec-
tively addressed through collaboration, as shown in Figure 4.4.
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In terms of national and international development funding, common types of 
intervention, which call for effective collaboration between planners and imple-
menters in the fields of CCA and DRR, include:
 • Improved design, construction and maintenance of roads and bridges
 • Housing standards and quality





assist BMCs in their
economic, social and
environmental recovery.



























CDB’s DRM and CCA
interventions harmonized

































FIGURE 4.4 Overlaps Between Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation
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 • Quality of buildings and systems for continuous service provision: especially 
schools and clinics
 • Design resilience of electricity, water supply, drainage and communications 
systems.
In terms of poverty reduction, it can be seen that most activities, which are currently 
addressed within approaches to DRR or CCA would previously have been funded 
as poverty-focused development interventions.
Evaluation challenges of interventions in overlapping areas
The evaluation repertoire
It has been demonstrated above that poverty, climate change and disaster risks are 
inextricably bound in complex and dynamic ways. These linkages operate at all 
institutional levels:
 • global development and environment institutions
 • regional environment and development institutions
 • national policies and institutions
 • governments, NGOs, CBOs, traditional institutions
 • communities.
International development and environment support are provided by numerous 
agencies, many of which focus largely on one of the three elements – poverty, 
climate or disasters. Evaluation follows funding and largely targets individual ele-
ments rather than their interconnections. Most evaluations commissioned by inter-
national or national agencies draw on a set of relatively standard methods, which 
are combined differently according to the type and level of intervention, as shown 
in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2 Common Types and Methods of  Evaluation at  Various Levels of Intervention
Level Types of Evaluation Predominant Methods
Global/Cross-cutting Overall Performance Meta analysis, statistical analysis, big data, 
secondary data, case studies
Sectoral/Cross-cutting Thematic Programme Meta analysis,statistical analysis, 
secondary data, big data, field 
missions, case studies
Annual Cross-cutting Annual Performance 
Report
Meta analysis, statistical analysis, 
secondary data
Country Portfolios Country Office
Country Portfolio
Field missions, case studies, document 
review, surveys, secondary data
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Evaluation among international agencies
Can evaluation adequately address the increasing complexity posed 
by climate change and disasters?
The common types and methods of evaluation presented in Table 4.2 are conven-
tionally framed under the umbrella of the “DAC Criteria” of relevance, efficiency, 
effectiveness and sustainability. A fifth DAC criterion, impact, is often left out of 
Terms of Reference for evaluations in view of its perceived complexity and long 
duration; or else it is intended to be addressed under sustainability, with which it is 
assumed to be related. The DAC criteria are in the process of review by the OECD.
While the DAC Criteria have played an important role in bringing a level of con-
sistency across evaluations in the context of international development, they have 
not been found ideal for interventions targeting complex, multi-layered changes 
with a medium to long time-span: which characteristics include most interventions 
targeting poverty reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation and disaster 
risk reduction.
In the extremely challenging global development context, those commissioning 
evaluations are increasingly focused on the urgent need to learn lessons, which can 
be applied to future interventions; rather than dwelling too much on accountability 
issues, which have traditionally been central to evaluations conducted within the 
framework of the DAC criteria. Since even the largest development interventions are 
in themselves a small contribution to the challenges facing the global environment 
and the societies, which depend upon it, the most important evaluation lessons for 
future interventions revolve around the issues of sustainability and impact. Given 
that an activity has been evaluated as (more or less) relevant, efficient and effective 
how will its approaches and results be sustained over time and scaled up to a more 
significant level?
The answer to this fundamental question is often the weakest link in completed 
evaluations for all levels of intervention. Indeed, it is common for evaluations to 
simply state that it is “too early” to make any assessment on these dimensions or 
to give speculative scenarios based on largely unsupported assertions of increased 
government resources and commitment. Intrinsic to this weakness is the possibility 
and temptation to treat each of the DAC criteria as an isolated box for evidence 
and interpretation, without considering the inter-relationships between them and, 
more specifically, the contribution the activity under evaluation is likely to make in 
the future. This critical gap in analysis often rests on the failure to answer a simple 
question during the evaluation inception phase, namely, how was this intervention 
intended to generate a lasting and scalable contribution to the issue it addresses? In 
fact, in many (possibly most) original project documents presented to evaluators, 
this is not at all clear.
The nearest most project document sets get to such a consideration provided 
by a Logical Framework document, which could potentially provide key inputs to 
understanding how the activity is expected to “work” in the long run. Unfortunately, 
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over time Log Frames became primarily a progress tracking tool, focused almost 
entirely on what could be counted with inadequate attention to where these “deliv-
erables” were leading. Most of the essential information on how the intervention 
might contribute to intended long-term change was “parked” in a peripheral col-
umn of assumptions/risks, subjected to only the most cursory analysis.
Partly in response to the challenges and frustrations of evaluating the cumulative 
contribution of development interventions (including those related to environment 
and disasters) based on analysis using the DAC Criteria and information organised 
around a Log Frame approach, theory-based approaches emerged as a new platform 
for complex evaluations. These attempt to outline and assess the interconnections 
among the activities of an intervention and its environment, which will be necessary 
to generate the desired contribution to change, taking into account such factors as 
timescales and sequencing.
Refining theory-based approaches
Although theory-based approaches rapidly gained traction across the evaluation 
community, they also soon ran into practical challenges and often appeared to 
promote confusion among different types and levels of development practitioners. 
Some symptoms of these challenges included:
 • Theories generated at institution-wide or portfolio-wide level proved too all-
encompassing to be evaluated
 • Decision-makers became frustrated at the failure of theories to deliver concrete 
performance information
 • Different levels and types of theory are needed for use by policy makers and for 
portfolio, programme and project managers
 • Evaluators need the most detailed theories of all, to enable them to explore 
cause and effect of progress along intended “impact pathways”.
Responding to such challenges, evaluators and practitioners moved towards an 
approach in which different levels of theory could be developed for empirical inves-
tigation and placed within an (eventually) over-arching theory of change for an 
intervention or set of interventions. This approach became identified as the use of 
“nested theories of change”, as illustrated in Table 4.3.
When approaching the evaluation of any complex intervention, whether at pol-
icy, strategy, programme or project level it is therefore critical to first focus on one 
main “level” of theory of change, appropriate to the key issues being addressed. For 
example, the evaluation may be of a programmatic intervention, with the theory 
of change primarily addressing this level. However, the “environment” surround-
ing the programme is also likely to influence the achievement of its objectives. 
Such “environmental” influences on the programme may come from a “higher” 
level, (such as the Global Development Architecture), from a thematic level (such as 
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gender mainstreaming) or from a “lower” level, such as individual projects, which 
derive from or are supported by the programme. In addition to its detailed examina-
tion of progress along expected development pathways of its main theory of change, 
in this case for the programme, the evaluation should therefore also consider at a 
less detailed level the inputs and influences on it from other levels of the nested 
TOCs. For example, was an expected piece of legislation delayed or abandoned, 
with adverse effects on the programme? It should also consider the outcomes and 
influences from the focus programme into other levels of the nested theories. For 
example, has the programme influenced gender mainstreaming in the area targeted; 
such as CCA, DRR or poverty reduction? Has it enabled new projects to be con-
ceived and implemented, based on its achievements?
By using this “nested theory” approach, evaluators can avoid the temptation to 
develop “mega-theories” of such scope and complexity that they can scarcely be 
conceived, still less evaluated. Such approaches hinder the production of usable 
evaluation conclusions and recommendations and make the derivation of lessons 
for the future extremely difficult. In turn this can lower the perceived “value added” 
of evaluation for practitioners operating in complex development fields. Given the 
increasing understanding of the interactions between poverty, climate change and 
disasters, the use of a “nested theories” approach offers evaluators a valuable tool to 
explore the different levels and types of issues, which have contributed to achieve-
ments and progress.
Notes
 1 https://www.mdgmonitor.org/, accessed 24th October 2019.
 2 https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/poverty/, accessed 24th October 2019.
 3 See, for example, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg13, accessed 24th October 
2019.
 4 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg13, accessed 24th October 2019.
TABLE 4.3 The Use of  “Nested Theories of Change” to Help Evaluate Different Types of Issue
Level for “nested ToC” Type of Issues Covered
Global ToC Linkages poverty, CC and disasters in Global 
Development Architecture
Institutional/Corporate ToC Policies, objectives, strategies, resource allocation, overall 
performance
Thematic ToC Gender mainstreaming, social safeguards, capacity 
development
Sectoral/Focal Area ToC Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Mitigation, Climate 
Change Adaptation
Programme/Portfolio ToC Specific Funds (e.g. Special Climate Change Fund), 
Country Programmes
Project ToC Individual projects within or across countries
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Disaster Report 2017. P. v. United Nations ESCAP, Bangkok.
 6 Source: Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2017, Table 1-1, P3.
 7 Source: Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2017, Figure 1-1, P4.
 8 “Disaster Risk Reduction Including Climate Change Adaptation Over South Asia: 
Challenges and Ways Forward”, in International Journal of Disaster Risk Science (2019) 
10:14-27. Rajesh K. Mall, Ravindra K. Srivastava, Tirthankar Banerjee, Om Prakash 
Mishra, Diva Bhatt, Geetika Sonkar.
 9 Mall et al, P15.
 10 “Disasters without borders—Regional resilience for sustainable development”. Asia-
Pacific disaster report 2015. UNESCAP Bangkok 2016.
 11 Mall et al., op.cit.
 12 Mall et al., P21.
 13 Climate Resilience Strategy, P1, Caribbean Development Bank, 2012.
 14 Evaluation of The Caribbean Development Bank’s 2009 Disaster Management Strategy 
and Operational Guidelines. Final Report. Office of Independent Evaluation, July 2018. 
P12.
 15 CDB. Op.cit. P13.
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USING BIG DATA AND GEOSPATIAL 
APPROACHES IN EVALUATING 
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENTIONS
Anupam Anand and Geeta Batra
Introduction and background
Big data is commonly distinguished by volume, velocity, and variety (Goodchild 
2013). A large portion of these data is georeferenced and therefore carries spatial 
information. This subset of spatial data is referred to as “big (geo) data.” Geospatial 
data and methods, in particular the application of satellite remote sensing, have 
been used in the monitoring and assessment of environmental processes for the past 
four decades, based on its ability to provide synoptic, time-series data for various 
earth system processes (Spitzer 1986; Melesse et al. 2007; Awange and Kyalo Kiema 
2013). However, its application in the field of evaluation to assess the relevance 
and performance of environmental programs has gained traction in the last two 
decades. Evaluators typically used GIS mainly for visualization during early appli-
cations in evaluation. Renger et al. (2002) describe how GIS data and analysis are 
used for visualization, change detection, and in conjunction with other evaluation 
data. Evaluators have also discussed the usefulness of spatial data for measuring base-
lines, outputs, and in observing the results of interventions over time (Azzam 2013; 
Azzam and Robinson 2013). Quasi-experimental designs (Ferraro and Pattanayak 
2006; Andam et al. 2008; Buchanan et al. 2018) leveraging geospatial data were used 
to conduct impact evaluations in forestry and biodiversity interventions. Recently, 
geospatial analysis has also been used in randomized control trials (Jayachandran 
et al. 2017).
Further, the role of geospatial science is increasingly being recognized by several 
major environmental and development policy conventions and institutions as coun-
tries move toward more evidence-based policy decisions and practice. For exam-
ple, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) has 
endorsed the use of indicators obtained from remote sensing to monitor progress 
toward reversing and halting the degradation and desertification of land (Minelli 
80 Anupam Anand and Geeta Batra
et al., 2017). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) also endorse the 
use of objective indicators, many of which are derived through geospatial methods.
Three main factors have influenced the uptake of geospatial data, and the “new 
data revolution.” First, there has been a remarkable increase in the availability of geo-
spatial data. Currently, there are more than 1950 operating satellites in space (World 
Economic Forum 2019), of which 382 were launched in 2018 (UNOOSA). Private 
investments in space technology have also increased substantially and such invest-
ment increased from US$0.5 billion in 2011 to US$5.8 Billion in 2019, making 
2019 the most significant year on record for investment in space (Space Investment 
Quarterly: Q4 2019).
Second, the availability and accessibility to high-performance computational 
power have made such complex data sets efficient and affordable to process. Cloud-
based platforms such as Google Earth Engine, the Sentinel Hub, ESRI, Amazon 
Web Services, etc. have made the processing and analysis of “big” data possible at a 
planetary scale (Lech et al. 2018). Moreover, recent developments in statistics and 
data science have led to novel algorithms based on the principles of machine learn-
ing and artificial intelligence that are “data-hungry” and therefore work efficiently 
with high volume and complex data structures.
The third factor is the growing demand for reliable and transparent data for various 
purposes – for business intelligence, environmental management, infrastructure 
planning, navigation, disaster risk management, etc. Global initiatives such as SDGs 
with a proposed list of about 230 indicators have further provided opportunities to 
seek data that is globally consistent and locally relevant.
Geospatial data and methods can help address common methodological 
challenges observed in evaluation, such as the lack of baseline data, sampling bias, 
difficulties in selecting appropriate counterfactuals, and account for the impact 
of multiple scales and contexts on processes and interventions. These new data 
and methods can complement other commonly used quantitative and qualitative 
evaluation approaches. Therefore, the timing is right for us to leverage the availability 
of such data, which can potentially change the way we collect evaluative evidence 
on environmental and other development interventions.
In the next section of this chapter, we illustrate the usefulness of geospatial 
data in evaluation through examples of specific applications to assess the rel-
evance and impact of environmental interventions by the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF).
Applications of geospatial analysis in environmental evaluation
The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the GEF is responsible for assess-
ing the performance and effectiveness of GEF interventions. The IEO has applied 
geospatial methods to complement other evaluation methods to answer pertinent 
evaluation questions on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of 
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GEF interventions, in three focal areas: biodiversity, land degradation, and climate 
change. We present a few examples which demonstrate the application of remote 
sensing and geospatial approach in these thematic areas to answer questions based 
on standard evaluation criteria.
Case 1.  Geospatial analysis to assess the relevance of GEF support 
to protected areas
Support to protected areas is a core component in strategies for biodiversity con-
servation (DeFries et al. 2005). The Aichi Targets and the associated Target 11 aspire 
to effectively and equitably manage 17% of terrestrial and inland water, and 10% of 
coastal and marine areas by 2020, thereby signifying the importance of protected 
areas in biodiversity conservation and management of ecosystem services. As the 
financial mechanism for the UN CBD, the GEF’s Strategy is consistent with the 
CBD’s Strategic Plan and is reflected in its support to protected areas over the past 
26 years. Between 1991 and 2015, the GEF provided $3.4 billion in grants to 618 
projects, matched by $12.0 billion in co-financing, to help protect almost 2.8 mil-
lion km2 of the world’s non-marine ecosystems (GEF IEO 2016a).
Setting area-based targets for conservation through the establishment and man-
agement of protected areas is crucial. However, to maximize the return from conser-
vation investments, interventions should be designed for ecologically representative 
biodiversity-rich sites with high biodiversity values. This is not always the case; for 
example, 49% of Important Bird Areas and 51% of Alliance for Zero Extinction 
sites for biodiversity conservation remain unprotected. However, the GEF biodi-
versity strategy prioritizes the conservation of protected areas based on significant 
and endemic biodiversity. Hence, in the evaluation of GEF Support to Protected 
Areas and Protected Area Systems (GEF IEO 2016a), conducted in collaboration 
with the IEO of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), we used 
geospatial analysis to assess the relevance of GEF interventions at global, country, 
and site levels. This impact evaluation also assessed the conservation outcomes as 
well as other co-benefits.
We carried out a spatial overlay analysis to determine the biodiversity signifi-
cance of GEF-supported protected areas. The analysis involved a feature overlay 
of the GEF-supported protected areas with the areas of significant biodiversity 
presence and conservation importance such as Key Biodiversity Areas (KBAs) and 
Ramsar sites. The analysis demonstrated that 58% of GEF-supported protected areas 
were located in KBAs; 31% met other conservation designations such as a Ramsar 
site, a WWF priority area, a Conservation International biodiversity hotspot, an 
Alliance for Zero Extinction site, or a U.N. heritage site; 11% of GEF-supported 
protected areas were significant at the local or national level from a country per-
spective (Figure 5.1). The overall results from this study provided evidence that the 
GEF was allocating its resources into globally significant sites with high biological 
diversity or “hot spots.”
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Case 2.  Geospatial analysis to assess socio-economic co-benefits 
of GEF-supported interventions
Despite extensive research over the past few decades, evidence on the socio-economic 
impacts of initiatives designed to influence environmental outcomes remain lim-
ited and inconsistent (Spitzer 1986; Melesse et al. 2007; Awange and Kyalo Kiema 
2013). Studies that have tried to address this gap have various limitations, such as 
the varying nature of co-benefits attributable to environmental initiatives and the 
data and approaches used to assess co-benefits. The difference in methodological 
approaches and in temporal and spatial scales also presents a challenge in draw-
ing general conclusions from these assessments (Naidoo et al. 2019; Alpízar and 
Ferraro 2020).
More recently, studies utilizing geospatial analysis have demonstrated how 
satellite-based data sources can be leveraged for assessing environmental and socio-
economic outcomes. In the case of the GEF, the socio-economic co-benefits of its 
environmental interventions had never been evaluated before. Building on recent 
development in research and impact evaluation, the IEO conducted an evaluation 
to estimate the global and local level socio-economic co-benefits of GEF initiatives 
to support the environment.
We used a geospatial approach to determine the socio-economic benefits associ-
ated with GEF-supported interventions in Sustainable Forest Management (SFM). 
Since its establishment in 1992, the GEF has provided support to improve the sus-
tainability of forestry resources to increase environmental benefits and deliver socio-
economic co-benefits; yet these co-benefits had never been measured. Through this 
evaluation, we assessed the impacts of GEF-supported SFM interventions on bio-
physical and ecological variables, co-benefits measured in terms of socio-economic 
indicators, and the estimated monetary values of ecosystem services applying the 
principle of natural capital accounting.
FIGURE 5.1 Globally Distributed Gef-Supported Protected Areas were Overlaid with 
Sites of Conservation Importance
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Data used included the geographic locations of GEF SFM projects and measure-
ments on environmental outcomes based on indicators suggested by the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD, 2016) and the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD, 2015). To examine the socio-economic effects 
of GEF interventions, we used both a portfolio-wide approach (Figure 5.1) (based 
on night light activity1), as well as a single-country case study. The case study was in 
Uganda, where data from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey 
(LSMS) provided in-country household survey information.
A causal tree approach helped us understand the factors which have a significant 
effect on deforestation, vegetation density, and nighttime lights and to estimate the 
above-ground carbon sequestration attributable to each GEF SFM project location. 
Air temperature, precipitation, population, road networks, etc. were some of the 
variables included in the causal tree, several of which were significantly associated 
with the outcomes. The evaluation approach then compared geospatial regions with 
GEF projects with those regions with no GEF projects based on a set of similar 
attributes, and the differences in outcome were used to estimate the impact of the 
GEF intervention. Details of this approach can be found in Annex of the report 
(GEF IEO 2019a), as well as in the value for money analysis of land degradation 
projects of the GEF (GEF IEO 2016b).
The portfolio level global-scope analysis suggested a small, positive impact on 
socio-economic benefits indicated by nighttime light intensity. We found evidence 
that projects implemented since 2010 demonstrated a positive effect on nighttime 
lights (+0.24), a proxy for economic development, and which was not discernible 
in preceding periods. In the absence of precise geographic information, these find-
ings may represent an under-estimate of the actual impacts across the GEF SFM 
portfolio since locations without any recorded high precision geographic data in 
FIGURE 5.2 Geocoded Location Information for GEF Project Implementation Areas
Inset Map 1 (Bottom) Illustrates a zoomed-in representation of Colombia
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project descriptions were not included in our analysis. We realized that the results 
from the nighttime lights at the portfolio level were not clear, suggesting the need 
for local-level data and analysis. Nighttime lights limit accuracy in measurement in 
areas with very low light intensity such as forest environments which represent the 
areas where GEF supports SFM initiatives.
We conducted a local-scale analysis in Uganda using survey data to fill the gap in 
the portfolio-level analysis and to explore further the impact of GEF SFM projects 
on socio-economic outcomes, by assessing the correlation between household assets 
and the presence of GEF interventions. We divided Uganda into an area-based grid 
consisting of smaller multiple units 10 square kilometers each, for which all satel-
lite and survey information was generalized for analysis (Figure 5.3). For every 10 
square kilometers, as seen in Figure 5.3, the distance to the nearest GEF SFM proj-
ect was calculated. Further, total household assets in 2009 and 2011 were calculated 
using the LSMS data to detect the impact of GEF projects on proximate (within 
50 km) households. The local analysis helped limit the interpretation to areas with 
significant degrees of change that are unlikely to be attributable to error. Further 
details of this approach are in the original evaluation report (GEF IEO 2019a).
The results showed that GEF SFM projects are associated with an increase in 
household assets. By matching LSMS locations proximate to GEF interventions 
to those further away from GEF interventions, we found that GEF SFM projects 
FIGURE 5.3 Data Used in the Uganda Case Study.  The Light Gray Shade Indicates Areas 
with No LSMS Data, Hashed Areas Indicate GEF SFM Projects, and Square Grids with 
Black Boundaries Indicate Areas where LSMS Data was Available
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are associated with an increase in household assets between $163 and $353 (within 
40–60 km respectively). The study showed that households proximate to a GEF 
implementation site tended to have, on average, an increase in assets approximately 
$310 (within 50 km) higher than those not proximate to a GEF implementation site.
Case 3.  Geospatial analysis in measuring the sustainability 
of environmental outcomes in the Ba Be protected area
Donors are increasingly interested in the long-term sustainability of project out-
comes, and not just in the attainment of outcomes. An IEO evaluation found that 
the outcomes of several GEF projects are sustained during the post-completion 
period, and a higher percentage of projects achieve environmental stress reduction 
than had been determined at completion (GEF IEO 2019b). Assessing the sustain-
ability of outcomes continues to be a challenge since sustainability at project closure 
is assessed as a “likelihood of sustainability” and is seldom re-evaluated during the 
post-completion period using primary data sources. It takes time to achieve sus-
tainability of outcomes, and it takes significant resources to measure sustainability 
at post completion. Geospatial methods are useful in evaluating post completion 
sustainability efficiently. In an IEO study, using geospatial tools, we assessed the 
long-term sustainability of environmental outcomes of a GEF-supported protected 
area in Vietnam, for biodiversity conservation – “Promotion of Sustainable Forest 
and Land Management in the Vietnam Uplands.”
One of the main sites of the project was the Ba Be/Na Hang Conservation 
Complex in the hilly Bac Kan Province in north-eastern Vietnam rich in biodiversity. 
The park supports the population of several nationally and globally threatened 
species. It also supports the only significant natural mountain lake in Viet Nam – a 
RAMSAR site – which is the most important wetland in the country’s protected 
area system. Agriculture, forestry, and livestock production are the primary sources 
of income and sustenance. The main threat to the biodiversity in the area is the 
fragmentation of habitat, conversion of forest land for large-scale infrastructure and 
agriculture, livestock grazing, illegal hunting, and overuse for non-timber forest 
products. The project focused on working with rural upland communities for 
better management of land and forests: interventions included improved systems 
for animal husbandry and conservation of sloping areas, bio-energy applications; a 
voluntary payment for ecosystem services and small-scale private tourism enterprise 
development, participatory approaches to forest land allocation and protection; and, 
support for the implementation of protected area management plans.
We primarily used satellite-based data to assess the sustainability of environmen-
tal outcomes. Our analysis focused on the trends in the change of forest cover and 
vegetation productivity in Ba Be National Park (Figure 5.4). We compared the loss 
in forest cover for different periods (before, during, and after the post-project) to 
those in areas outside the protected area, as well as with the overall national trends 
in forest cover loss. Remote sensing was used to regenerate the baselines as well as 
measure environmental outcomes.
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FIGURE 5.4 Trends and Comparison: Forest Loss Did Not Increase Despite an 
Unprecedented Increase in the Buffer and at Country Level
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The findings from the remote sensing analysis showed that forest cover in Ba Be 
forest was maintained for several years after project completion. The forest loss in 
Ba-Be did not increase despite an unprecedented increase in forest loss in the adja-
cent area and more broadly at the country level. The post-project loss for the pro-
tected area was 0.1% compared to 0.55% in the buffer area and 2% at the national 
level in 2016, three years after project completion. Interviews with project staff and 
some beneficiaries indicated that project outcomes were sustained by community 
participation in project design and implementation including buy-in from local 
communities, attention to income generation activities, and continued support from 
provincial governments.
Case 4. Geospatial analysis in ecological forecasting in Kenya
An important decision for any multilateral institution such as the GEF is where 
to allocate scarce resources with the objective of maximizing overall environmen-
tal benefits. We partnered with the NASA DEVELOP team housed at Goddard 
Space Flight Center) to first measure land cover changes in GEF-supported pro-
tected areas in Kenya, and then developed a forecasting framework to estimate the 
future changes in land cover and carbon sequestration benefits, as returns on GEF 
investments.
GEF supported protected areas in Kenya
In Kenya, GEF projects have supported activities in approximately nineteen pro-
tected areas. These projects were accurately identified through the review of project 
documents. The protected areas spread over an area of 5,035 km2 with a broad 
range of land cover types and designations, including montane forests, coastal man-
grove forests, deserts, grasslands, and shrubs. We examined twelve of the terrestrial 
protected areas (Figure 5.5) comprising two national parks, one marine national 
reserve, five forest reserves, three national reserves, and a community conservancy. 
The largest protected areas is Mount Kenya NP (2,714.5 km2), and the smallest is 
Mrima Forest Reserve (3.9 km2). The study timeframe covered two time periods 
representing the past and the future: 1995–2016 and 2020–2030.
Deforestation is a major environmental issue that is detrimental to biodiversity 
conservation and increases the threat to the number of endangered species facing 
extinction (Brooks et al. 2006). Kenya loses an average of 12,000 hectares (ha) of 
forest and 33,500 ha of open woodland per year, equivalent to an annual loss of 2 
million metric tons of carbon, with agriculture, and public or private development 
projects causing the most deforestation (KFS 2010).
We used NASA Earth observations for the remote sensing analysis to assess the 
effectiveness of PAs throughout Kenya for the study period of 1995–2016. Landsat 5 
TM, Landsat 7 ETM+, and Landsat 8 OLI Level 1 products were acquired through 
Google Earth Engine (GEE). This is a cloud computing system that is open for 
non-commercial use. We used Landsat images because of their extensive historical 
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archive, open access, and suitable spatial resolution to analyze both large and small 
protected areas. We used Google Earth Engine for data acquisition and analysis. 
Freely available ancillary data sets were used for data on variables including temper-
ature and precipitation, roads and waterways, human and livestock density estimates, 
and digital elevation, to project future land cover changes.
Carbon stock estimation tools are used for measuring the carbon balance and 
for estimating the likely greenhouse gas mitigation benefits as a result of project 
interventions. The most widely used carbon stock estimation tool is EX-ACT 
(EX-ante Appraisal Carbon-balance), a land-based accounting system developed 
by FAO. EX-ACT is a useful, cost-effective tool to measure carbon stocks and 
stock changes per unit of land and requires minimum data inputs. It is used for 
ex-ante assessments of the impact of agriculture and forestry interventions on 
carbon-balance. The tool helps to estimate economic and climate change mitigation 
benefits and thereby assists in prioritizing project activities.
Although tools such as EX-ACT are valuable for ex-ante measurements and 
analysis, and are easy to learn and deploy, these tools have certain limitations. They 
are not spatially explicit, their use is limited in identifying areas for interventions, 
and they do not account for contextual factors driving land use and land cover 
change. The primary input for these tabular models is area and type of land cover 
pre-intervention mainly derived from official records or information from pro-
cessed satellite imagery. The main output of the tool is limited to carbon balance 
(GHGs) expressed in terms of tCO2e/ha and year resulting from project activities.
Spatially explicit ecological forecasting models address the limitations of, and 
complement appraisal systems such as Ex-ACT. The primary inputs for such models 
FIGURE 5.5 Study Area Map of the 12 PAs within Kenya Included in the Analysis
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are land cover maps that are often produced within the same suite of tools that 
take raw satellite data or readily available classified land cover data. The land cover 
data generated can also serve as baseline data for other simple carbon balance tools. 
This approach also provides the capability to model and estimate future land cover 
change, based on the factors driving the change.
For our study, we used land-use change analysis, ecological forecasting, and 
ecosystem service estimation in terms of carbon stocks. Carbon stock was calculated 
using the national and regional coefficient as per the IPCC guidelines. Additionally, 
a mixed-methods approach combining remote sensing with field validation visits 
to project sites around Mount Kenya provided us with an in-depth review of the 
GEF-funded projects at multiple spatial and temporal scales.
At the Kakamega Forest Reserve site, our results showed that vegetated land 
cover had increased between 1999 and 2015 (Figure 5.6). The annual average 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI – middle panel, Figure 5.6) illus-
trates the increasing reflectance of near-infrared light, consistent with increasing 
“greenness” of the vegetated surfaces. We found that within Kakamega, areas that 
were previously mainly agricultural have been transitioning back to forest. Our 
results also found that forested areas have noticeably expanded, particularly in the 
southern half of the forest reserve, further confirmed through the visit to the site. 
Shrub has also expanded into previously non-vegetated areas along the western 
edge of the forest. As reforestation occurs, more plant biomass is accumulated in the 
above-ground stocks. The above-ground carbon estimates in the Kakamega Forest 
Reserve increased throughout the study period and in the projections for 2020 
and 2030 as well. This carbon sequestration (bottom panel, Figure 5.6) reflects the 
additional co-benefits from the biodiversity project.
FIGURE 5.6 Land Cover Classifications for the Reserve Were Produced Using Landsat 
Imagery and Show the Progression of Vegetation for 1999, 2010, and 2015. The Forest 
Reserve Experienced Revegetation Following GEF-Funded Projects
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Conclusion
The cases presented in this chapter demonstrate the broad applications and advan-
tages in using recent big data sets, methodologies, and computing platforms in evalu-
ating the outcomes of environmental interventions. In the protected area evaluation 
presented in case study 1, we utilized Google’s cloud computing platform using 
forest cover data (Hansen et al. 2013), which reduced the processing time signifi-
cantly. In assessing the socio-economic co-benefits of GEF-supported interventions 
in SFM, we applied machine learning algorithms driven by geospatial data and 
econometric analysis, which allowed us to work with a high volume of data, and also 
provided us with insights into the factors associated with the outcomes. To evaluate 
the outcome sustainability of GEF interventions around Ba Be, we used decades of 
dense time-series data to assess the results and their sustainability. The IEO experi-
ence is based on evaluations conducted on environmental interventions; however, 
the approaches discussed here are applicable across a broad range of evaluation topics 
including disaster risk management, infrastructure and urban development.
Geospatial tools have greatly enhanced our ability to evaluate efficiently and 
cost-effectively at project, national, global, and ecologically meaningful scales. Big 
data from satellites are capable of revealing patterns that are not otherwise appar-
ent. The results of our analysis are reproducible and have generated an objective 
evidence base while complementing other evaluation methods. We have also used 
geospatial tools in disseminating evaluation results through both static and interac-
tive dynamic maps and visualizations. These innovative approaches to presenting 
and communicating evaluation results has made a significant difference in convey-
ing complex information in a more lucid and efficient way.
With the increase in the type, volume, and availability of data, geospatial tools 
have presented new opportunities to access quantitative information on environ-
ment and development interventions and analyze their impacts. Technical skills, 
high computing capacity, and multidisciplinary expertise are needed to analyze and 
interpret data and results. The accuracy and reliability of contextual variables often 
vary widely across countries and sites, so geospatial approaches need to be comple-
mented by field verification and other appropriate methods to interpret the data 
and to be able to provide qualitative insights to answer the “how” and “why.” Some 
of the data and resource constraints in using geospatial approaches may be addressed 
through collaborations with institutions that have access to big data and the required 
infrastructure for use.
As the field of big geodata continues to advance, evaluators will need to explore 
innovative technologies such as blockchain, artificial intelligence, deep learning, the 
Internet of Things and computational social science, alongside traditional evaluation 
methods. Geospatial data and analysis offer an efficient and complementary approach 
to monitoring and evaluating new and increasingly complex evaluative topics and 
questions. The potential for mixed-method and multi-method approaches drawing 
upon different disciplines is immense, and we in the evaluation community have 
just embarked on this exciting journey.
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MULTIPLE ACTORS AND 
CONFOUNDING FACTORS
Evaluating impact in complex 
social-ecological systems
Aaron E. Zazueta and Jeneen R. Garcia
The GEF and its support in the South China Sea1
The GEF is a financial mechanism that provides grant and concessional funds to 
183 participant countries for projects and activities that help the countries fulfil 
their commitments to global environmental conventions.2 From its inception in 
1992 to the time the evaluation began in 2010, GEF support for coastal and marine-
related concerns in the South China Sea was delivered through 34 GEF projects 
($112 million) and 150 small grants ($3 million). This support was provided to seven 
littoral countries that were eligible for GEF funding – Cambodia, China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam. The projects were implemented 
at different times by various GEF partner agencies, which include the Asian 
Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, UN Environment 
(formerly UN Environmental Programme) and the World Bank.
The main objective of the impact evaluation was to assess the extent to which 
GEF support contributed to, or is likely to lead to, changes in policies, technol-
ogy, management practices or other behaviours that will address the priority trans-
boundary environmental concerns.3
The geographical focus of the evaluation included the Gulf of Tonkin and Gulf 
of Thailand as part of the South China Sea. The marine area covered by the eval-
uation stretches in a south-west to north-east direction with a southern border 
between South Sumatra and Kalimantan (Karimata Strait), and a northern border 
at the Strait of Taiwan between the northern tip of Taiwan and the Fujian coast of 
mainland China.
The South China Sea – as is the case with other, large marine ecosystems – is 
characterized as a complex social-ecological system due to its inextricably linked 
and constantly interacting natural and human systems (Anderies 2004; Liu et al. 
2007; Ostrom 2009). As a complex system, any interventions in the South China Sea 
94 Aaron E. Zazueta and Jeneen R. Garcia
are subject to non-linear processes that often make prediction of outcomes difficult 
(Holling 2001; Taleb 2007).
First, the time scale at which interventions take place (typically five to seven 
years) is often disproportionate to the time scale at which the ecosystem responds. 
Ecosystem responses may be immediate or may span one to several decades. Second, 
the geographical scale at which interventions take place (typically a local site, munic-
ipality or country) is likewise often disproportionate to the geographical scale of 
the ecosystem boundaries, or the boundaries within which the environmental con-
cern being addressed originates and extends its impact. Ecosystem boundaries often 
transcend municipal or country boundaries, while environmental concerns may cut 
across economic and social system boundaries. Interventions implemented at a local 
scale may be affected by events and other factors interacting at the national, regional 
or global scales, such as market forces.4 Third, the factors and actors at play influence 
each other and therefore make it difficult to trace the chains of causality from the 
observed change back to the intervention being assessed. Even if changes can be 
ascertained, and links between any given intervention and an observed change can 
be made, multiple actors and other confounding factors make it difficult to attribute 
causality to any specific intervention (Sanderson 2000; Davies 2004; Mee, Dublin 
and Eberhard 2006).
Thus, impact evaluation in complex systems requires close attention to the ways 
in which an intervention interacts with other elements of the system to influence 
the observed changes. To understand the impact of GEF support in the South China 
Sea, the evaluation drew on scientific literature on complex systems to guide the 
lines of inquiry that would (1) help assess the extent of change in environmental 
conditions, (2) establish causal links between interventions and the observed changes 
and (3) identify the specific contributions of GEF support to these observed changes 
within the context of other actors’ contributions, and the influences of confounding 
factors.
Assessing direct impact
Determining the extent of change
Determining the extent of change that took place since GEF support began was 
in some instances straightforward. In the case of the Livestock Waste Management 
Project in China, Thailand and Viet Nam (GEF ID 2138) that demonstrated new 
pollution control technologies, end-of-pipeline measurements before and after the 
introduction of the technology provided reliable measurements of nutrient loads 
prevented by the intervention. Other indicators of change were improvements in 
the smell in pig farms and reductions in incidents of red-eye disease among farmers 
in all three visited demonstration sites. In Ha Tay, Viet Nam, evidence of pollution 
reduction was that the wastewater could be used for agriculture – wastewater 
released into rice paddies no longer killed the plants.
In the case of mangrove ecosystem management interventions, one impor-
tant indicator was change in mangrove cover. Changes in mangrove cover were 
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determined from before-and-after data presented in terminal evaluations and annual 
project reports. Data were verified through field visits that included visual assess-
ments of mangrove forest conditions and interviews with stakeholders on the extent 
to which changes had taken place. To fill in information gaps and triangulate evi-
dence from these information sources, the evaluation team carried out remote sens-
ing analysis to compare mangrove cover at the sites across different years. Evidence 
confirmed that in most sites where the GEF had provided support, mangrove cover 
had increased over a period of about five years.
Given the nature of the concerns that GEF-supported interventions address, 
time lags of such magnitude (i.e. five years) or greater are necessary before changes 
in environmental status become evident. The higher the scale5 of the system being 
addressed, the more slowly it tends to respond and, consequently, the longer it takes 
to begin shifting to an improved social and environmental state (Gunderson and 
Holling 2002). Further, several interventions may need to take place before a tip-
ping point is reached, triggering a cascade of effects in the social-ecological system 
(Gladwell 2000; Kinzig et al. 2006). These unpredictable time lags between inter-
ventions and responses in the social-ecological system require that impact evalua-
tion not only focus on changes that are directly observable in the social-ecological 
system (i.e. income of the local population or pollution levels) but also on indicators 
or markers of future change that allow an assessment of the extent to which inter-
ventions are likely to lead to the desired impact.
For example, numerous studies have shown that coral reef ecosystems may take 
decades to centuries before the effects of overfishing are observed (Jackson et al. 
2001; Folke et al. 2004; Dulvy, Freckleton and Polunin 2004; Babcock et al. 2010). 
The evaluation found that while coral cover had been maintained or was slightly 
increasing in GEF-supported marine protected areas (often referred to as MPAs) 
over the course of at least five years, larger fish species and giant clam abundance 
had decreased in the Con Dao and Phu Quoc marine protected areas in Viet Nam. 
Although evidence indicates that marine protected area initiatives have positive 
results for hard corals, scientific research shows that declining fish populations may 
soon be followed by coral reef decline at the ecosystem level (Pandolfi et al. 2005). 
Thus, to better assess the likelihood of an intervention’s impact on coral reef eco-
systems, indicators tracking fish and benthic organisms (bottom-dwellers) must be 
measured. On this basis, the evaluation concluded that though GEF projects had 
often been able to protect coral cover from physical destruction, impact has been 
limited and insufficient to prevent the degradation of coral reefs targeted by these 
projects.
Establishing a chain of causality
In cases in which interventions were highly targeted and change could be measured 
immediately and in a straightforward manner, such as in the reduction of nutrient 
pollution, causality is easy to establish. However, interventions more commonly 
do not have a one-to-one or linear relationship with a desired effect (Stern et al. 
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2012). In cases where interventions were implemented at higher scales (e.g. national 
and regional) and sought to address non-linear processes, causal links between inter-
ventions and observed changes were often more difficult to establish.
A critical starting point for impact evaluation in such cases is to develop 
a sound understanding of the human and natural dynamics inherent to each of 
these interacting systems. This understanding enables the evaluation to identify the 
geographical boundaries of the specific system in which the intervention needs to 
create an impact; the system’s inherent characteristics defining the extent of change 
that can take place, and the types of interventions that are most likely to result in 
change, given the patterns of causality in the specific system.
Mismatches between the scale at which the intervention is implemented and 
the scale at which the environmental concern manifests are common when the 
system’s geographical boundaries are not well understood. This has often resulted 
in  administrative or management boundaries not being aligned with ecosystem 
boundaries (Folke et al. 1997, 2002; Cash et al. 2006). For example, migratory fish 
stocks typically transcend national boundaries, requiring the countries concerned 
to agree on and create management boundaries that better approximate that of the 
fish stocks.
In the South China Sea, the evaluation found that while countries were aware 
of this, they historically have tended to not enter into binding multilateral agree-
ments, especially when it came to environmental concerns. Of the 27 multilateral 
and bilateral regional instruments pertaining to coastal management in force in the 
South China Sea, only four bilateral agreements were legally binding. A comparative 
assessment of regional mechanisms in similar large marine ecosystems around the 
world also showed that even after more than 20 years, most regional mechanisms 
still relied heavily on external donors when low- to middle-income countries com-
prised the majority of the membership.6
Considering the countries’ unwillingness to enter into binding regional envi-
ronmental agreements, the relatively short time frame and the wide differences 
in country incomes, GEF support in the South China Sea region could not be 
expected to facilitate the ratification of a regional convention such as those present 
in other regional seas.
Evidence from scholarly research, however, indicates that in systems in which no 
single central actor disproportionately influences the behaviour of others (such as 
the South China Sea region), collaborative adaptive behaviour among independent 
actors tends to be more prevalent where good communication exists, especially 
when collaborative behaviour is expected across multiple administrative or ecologi-
cal scales (Brondizio, Ostrom and Young 2009; Ostrom 2010). Therefore, one way 
to measure GEF’s contribution towards regional environmental governance was to 
assess the extent to which GEF support fostered better communication, and the 
extent to which indicators of cooperative behaviour among countries could be 
linked to GEF support.
GEF-supported regional interventions included multidisciplinary workshops, 
steering committee meetings, task forces and expert networks that provided 
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many new opportunities for interaction across the region among countries, local 
governments, regional organizations, civil society (including academic and research 
institutions) and the private sector. These activities allowed information exchange, 
joint fact-finding and regional priority setting and planning. Social network 
analyses of regional environmental actors carried out by the evaluation team based 
on available reports, online surveys and key informant interviews revealed that GEF 
support helped increase the connectivity between national and regional actors.
Furthermore, the evaluation team used interviews and document analyses to 
establish that new collaborative agreements were adopted as a direct result of GEF 
projects. This finding further strengthened evidence of causal links between GEF-
supported communication-related activities and collaborative adaptive behaviour 
among independent actors, which in the case of the South China Sea is the most 
critical outcome given the region’s inherent characteristics. Among these collabora-
tive agreements are the memorandum of agreement between the provinces of Kien 
Giang (Viet Nam) and Kampot (Cambodia) signed in 2008 to jointly manage trans-
boundary seagrass beds; the engagement of all littoral countries, including China, in 
the elaboration and approval of a Strategic Action Programme for the South China 
Sea; the Gulf of Thailand Joint Statement and Framework Programme for Joint Oil 
Spill Preparedness and Response, signed by Cambodia, Thailand and Viet Nam and 
supported by the private sector and international organizations; and the adoption 
of the Sustainable Development Strategy for the Seas of East Asia (SDS-SEA) by 11 
East Asian countries and 19 non-country partners.
Although all these actions were taken by governments and other independent 
actors, stakeholder interviews and document analyses clearly indicated that these 
collaborative agreements would have been very unlikely at the time they took place 
had GEF support not been present. These accomplishments are particularly signifi-
cant considering the tensions that exist among the littoral countries and the slow 
progress that had been made in multilateral processes related to the environmental 
management of the South China Sea. Based on these pieces of evidence analysed 
within the region’s contextual conditions, the evaluation concluded that the GEF 
had provided the appropriate type of support at the regional scale, leading to out-
comes that were critical to achieving long-term impacts.
As the analysis progressed, it became increasingly clear that the direct results of 
GEF projects tended to be strikingly similar within and across the different scales. 
Thus, GEF support was found to have a somewhat recursive nature across scales in 
as far as projects supported three broad types of interventions, including: generating 
and expanding information and knowledge (including raising awareness and devel-
oping mechanisms for information sharing and access); developing institutional 
capacities (including policy and regulatory frameworks, administrative structures 
and processes for trust building); and testing implementation strategies (including 
introducing technologies and approaches, implementation mechanisms and bodies 
and financial instruments).
The evaluation also found that the GEF has provided considerable support to 
initiating processes that facilitate the broader adoption of implementation strategies 
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introduced by project demonstrations. Based on these findings, the evaluation 
developed a framework that was used to identify and classify project results and to 
establish chains of causality between GEF support and the observed changes. This 
framework proved to be very useful during the evaluation as a tool to compare and 
establish links of GEF engagement at different scales, regardless of the project type 
country or implementing agency.
Discounting rival hypotheses
Discounting rival hypotheses entails assessing which feasible causes or alternative 
explanations account for the change observed, and which do not. Most important, it 
establishes that the intervention being evaluated is one of the feasible causes, and that 
the observed change can be attributed to it. The evaluation used several approaches 
to discount rival hypotheses, depending largely on the extent to which there were 
confounding factors at play and the extent of information available. The first task 
was to assess if there were rival hypotheses with merit. For example, attributing 
nutrient pollution reduction to the new technology introduced in livestock farm 
demonstrations was straightforward, as the causal link was clear and field visits and 
interviews confirmed that no other plausible explanations could account for such a 
sharp decrease in nutrient loads in wastewater.
In the case of activities that supported mangrove management, a rival 
hypothesis with merit was that widespread policy changes could account for, or 
at least significantly contribute, to the change in the mangrove cover trends in the 
demonstration sites. Counterfactual analysis (i.e. comparison of results in similar 
sites where mangroves had not benefited from an intervention such as that provided 
by GEF projects) would have been desirable to assess the extent to which broader 
factors affected local trends in demonstration sites. But given the various socio-
economic and environmental factors affecting mangrove growth, compounded by 
the lack of environmental monitoring data in both GEF and non-GEF sites, it was 
difficult to determine the counterfactual.
In the absence of information on counterfactuals, the evaluation compared trends 
in mangrove cover data at the demonstration site to more readily available data on 
national- and regional-scale trends. In most cases, it was found that GEF-supported 
sites showed some recovery, whereas national and regional trends continued to 
decline, albeit at a slower rate. This indicated that interventions at GEF-supported 
sites were indeed resulting in positive change compared to the rest of the region and 
countries that had not received these types of interventions. However, the trends 
also showed that widespread policy changes were contributing to this decline in 
mangrove cover slowing down across the region.
The evaluation also considered ongoing processes and other contextual factors 
that could have contributed to the observed changes to better assess the extent of 
GEF contributions. From remote-sensing analysis and interviews, the evaluation 
found that in most cases, mangrove cover was already increasing before GEF support 
began. In Trat, Thailand, for example, the process was driven by local communities 
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as well as national economic conditions as early as 10 years before any GEF projects 
took place. GEF support, however, allowed communities in conflict to develop rules 
for mangrove use that then encouraged cooperative protection of a greater area of 
the mangrove forest. The impact of GEF support then was not increasing mangrove 
cover per se, but sustaining and increasing the momentum of community and gov-
ernment support for mangrove protection that otherwise might have fizzled out 
with no follow-up funding during that critical period.
At the regional scale, where cases were more complex, and plausible rival 
hypotheses grew in number or were more entangled, the analysis of context was 
even more important. The evaluation team made historical analyses of actions, 
programmes or events that took place before, during and after GEF support. For 
example, when assessing the impact of GEF support on the regional environmental 
architecture related to marine and coastal matters, the evaluation started by 
determining the results of efforts to establish regional mechanisms that predated 
GEF support. The evaluation also assessed the ways in which previous attempts to 
establish regional mechanisms affected GEF-supported initiatives.
Among the contextual factors, the Rio processes related to the summits on sus-
tainable development that have taken place in the last three decades since 19927 
were found to be key to raising awareness on environmental issues among policy 
makers, as these coincided with a cluster of regional and national environmental 
initiatives being implemented at specific periods. The Rio processes also implied a 
set of commitments to which countries signatory to the global conventions agreed 
to meet, often using their own resources but also drawing on resources provided by 
donors and multilateral financial institutions.
In the context of this multiplicity of actors and conditions affecting country 
decisions, it became a challenge to assess what had been the GEF’s contributions to 
achieving desired impacts that often had not yet manifested. Thus, at the regional 
scale, the evaluation’s approach was to determine the extent to which the GEF 
helped create the conditions and contributed to regional processes that in the 
causal chain are expected to lead to environmental stress reduction and improved 
environmental status.
To determine if the GEF had a unique contribution or niche in the mix of all 
these actors, the evaluation carried out a comparative assessment of the support 
 provided by the GEF and other donors to marine and coastal initiatives in the 
region using information from a global donor database, historical records, project 
documents and donor reports. The idea was to place GEF support in the context 
of the financial support landscape in the East Asian seas over the last 25 years. 
The  analysis found that the GEF was by far the biggest donor when it came to 
marine and coastal initiatives at the regional scale. Interviews and desk reviews 
of other regional organizations’ reports also showed that the GEF was the only 
actor that linked its initiatives at local, national and regional scales. An important 
GEF  contribution, this enabled actors to interact more effectively and allowed the 
processes necessary for environmental stress reduction in the South China Sea to 
progress in parallel at different scales. Furthermore, the regional mechanisms that 
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the GEF supported had provided a framework that linked the initiatives of other 
donors and actors mainly working at a national scale to existing regional efforts.
Social network analysis was used to compare the current interactions among regional 
actors with GEF support present to a scenario without GEF support. The evaluation 
found that several of the organizations that GEF supported had over the years become 
more central to the network of regional environmental actors. With GEF support, 
some of the long-active organizations were able to expand their activities to include 
regional-scale coastal and marine initiatives. In general, more links among organiza-
tions existed in the presence of GEF support compared to the hypothetical scenario 
without GEF support, where some actors were completely cut off from the regional 
network. This affirmed the finding that one of the GEF’s important contributions to 
the regional environmental architecture was the linking of initiatives and actors across 
local, national and regional scales to address priority regional transboundary concerns.
In both of the examples on the impacts of GEF support on mangrove cover 
at the local scale, and the environmental governance architecture at the regional 
scale, the evaluation team triangulated different information sources and analytical 
methods in order to augment the lack of available information, and to account for 
confounding factors or limitations imposed by the social-ecological system’s inher-
ent characteristics. In the absence of counterfactuals, the task of impact evaluation is 
to develop approaches to discount rival hypotheses that, although not able to attri-
bute changes solely to the intervention being assessed, are nevertheless able to make 
a clear link between the intervention’s contributions and the observed outcomes 
(Mayne 2011).
Assessing progress towards impact
The undertaking of the three tasks of impact evaluation showed that the GEF 
had helped countries improve capacities and identify approaches that resulted in 
positive environmental changes. However, the evaluation also determined that 
much of the accomplishments were found to have taken place at a relatively small 
scale or in specific conditions in which the GEF-supported demonstrations had 
been implemented. Despite this progress, the gains were insufficient to address the 
full range of challenges in the sustainable management of the South China Sea, 
GEF’s goal in the region.
Fully achieving impacts requires that the boundaries of the intervention match 
the boundaries of the system or the environmental concern being addressed. For 
example, the evaluation found that GEF-supported demonstrations protecting 
seagrass and coral reefs were often effective in addressing local-scale stressors and 
helped slow down rates of environmental degradation in the short term. However, 
the evaluation also found that GEF support during that period was less successful in 
addressing stressors that originated beyond these localities, such as siltation from the 
watersheds in which the protected areas were situated or encroachment by com-
mercial fishers from neighbouring countries with lower environmental awareness 
and a lower interest in protecting the local resources.
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These larger-scale drivers have inevitably resulted in continuing trends of degra-
dation. It is not realistic to expect that the type of support provided by the GEF or 
other agencies can by itself counteract the numerous factors driving environmental 
degradation in the South China Sea, such as global demand for natural resources, 
population growth and increasing standards of living in the region. Larger-scale 
changes will have to be initiated at the scale of the countries and the broader con-
sumer markets if positive environmental impact is to be sustained over the long 
term.
Thus, GEF support is intended to catalyse processes leading to these large-scale 
changes, with the engagement of country governments, private sector, civil society 
organizations, local communities and other stakeholders that, with time, will result 
in an improved environment (van den Berg and Todd 2011). Reaching this larger 
goal will, among other things, require a much broader adoption of the approaches 
demonstrated with GEF support. Though these processes may be initiated during a 
project’s lifetime, such broader adoption is not expected to take place until perhaps 
decades after GEF support has ended.
In this context, a central concern of impact evaluation is to assess not only direct, 
immediate impacts, but also – and more important – the progress made towards 
achieving impact at the scale of the targeted system by assessing the extent to which 
broader adoption has begun, will continue or is likely to take place beyond project 
completion. Particularly important is assessing which approaches are truly effective, 
how broader adoption occurs, under what circumstances and why (Pawson and 
Tilley 1997; Pawson, Greenhalgh and Walshe 2005).
The evaluation found that broader adoption took place through three main pro-
cesses. One was through mainstreaming, by which information, lessons or specific 
results of GEF projects were incorporated into broader stakeholder mandates and 
initiatives such as laws, policies, regulations and programmes. This might occur not 
only through governments but also within communities, other development agents 
and the private sector. Another process was through replication, by which GEF-
supported initiatives were reproduced or adopted at comparable administrative or 
ecological scales, often in another geographical area or region. The third process 
was scaling-up, by which GEF-supported initiatives were expanded to cover larger 
geographical scales, often including new aspects or concerns that might be political, 
administrative or ecological in nature. Scaling-up allows the integration of concerns 
that cannot be resolved at lower scales and allows the spread of GEF contributions 
to areas contiguous to the original project sites.
These three processes of broader adoption may be at work in any combination 
at the same time for a given project and may take place simultaneously at different 
spatial and temporal scales, in different degrees of intensity and importance. Often, 
one process may have to occur for another process to take place. Assessing the 
effects of GEF support at a broader scale entails assessing evidence of these processes 
occurring as they relate to the broader adoption of technologies and approaches 
that have been shown effective in improving management of marine and coastal 
resources.
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Contextual factors directly and primarily affected the differences in the extent of 
broader adoption and the extent or likelihood of long-term impact of GEF support. 
For example, although GEF support to the integrated coastal management (often 
referred to as ICM) approach was fairly consistent across the East Asia region and 
mostly appropriate for the demonstration sites that had been selected, scaling-up 
or replicating ICM beyond demonstration sites has greatly advanced mainly in 
countries such as China and the Philippines. In these countries, national policies of 
decentralization were more robust and local economic conditions and institutional 
absorptive capacities in the expansion areas were more developed. This is in contrast 
to processes taking place in countries such as Viet Nam or Thailand, where national 
decentralization policies were not as robust and where local conditions in the areas 
were not as conducive to ICM expansion.
Another factor at play was the extent to which the specific approach introduced 
was an appropriate response to the environmental concerns that were relevant 
to the locality. In Thailand, for example, it was found that the ICM approach is 
well suited for addressing the planning needs of Sriracha, a port city, as well as its 
adjacent coastal municipalities in Chonburi province. But it is not as well suited for 
dealing with livestock and agricultural waste, which is a non-point source pollution 
originating from the province’s upland areas. Thus, although scaling-up from the 
demonstration in Sriracha to the entire coastal area of Chonburi was found to 
improve wastewater management in the area, developments in the upland areas were 
found to take place at a much slower rate. The evaluation therefore concluded that 
progress towards impact was taking place in the coastal municipalities and would 
likely result in large-scale impact in the long term; on the other hand, GEF support 
would be more effective if replicated or scaled up in similar coastal areas rather than 
scaling up the approach to upland areas where evidence of progress towards impact 
was not observed.
Conclusion
The evaluation found that in most areas where GEF support has taken place, evi-
dence of positive direct and indirect change could be observed at the local, national 
and regional scales. At the local scale, in cases where evidence was available, most of 
the technologies and approaches demonstrated through GEF support directly con-
tributed to reducing environmental stress and, in some cases, resulted in improve-
ments in environmental status. At the regional scale, GEF-supported initiatives that 
encouraged collaboration and communication and trust-building across different 
scales; communication and trust serve as enabling conditions to regional environ-
mental cooperation where several sovereign countries are involved. Most important, 
the triangulation of evidence showed that GEF support had a unique role in the 
region that linked interventions at multiple scales, which has resulted in significant 
contributions that no other actor could have made.
However, at the time of evaluation, these positive changes were a far cry from 
the impact that GEF support aims to achieve in the large marine ecosystem as a 
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whole. Many environmental and socio-economic drivers had not been addressed 
due to the highly localized nature of many of the interventions. Perhaps even more 
important, not enough time had elapsed for more significant changes to manifest, 
especially at the regional scale. Under these conditions and given the larger GEF 
goals, the immediate or direct impacts observed merely indicated the extent to 
which the supported technologies and approaches were effective in addressing a 
specific concern in a particular context.
To evaluate the extent to which the GEF is meeting its broader goal, it is critical 
to assess not only the direct impacts that can be observed but also, more important, 
the likely intended long-term effects and indirect impacts of an intervention. To 
determine the catalytic or transformational contributions of any given programme 
or intervention, the evaluation must thus assess the extent to which there is progress 
in establishing the processes and conditions that will likely result in improved 
environmental conditions in the larger system.
This assessment is only possible if the evaluator has a sound understanding of 
the system being targeted by the intervention. This includes a good understanding 
of the system components, system boundaries and the chains of causality through 
which changes in the system take place. It is based on this sound understanding that 
the evaluator can assess if current interventions are contributing to conditions that 
are likely to lead to desired changes in the distant future. Understanding the system 
and how the system develops over time also provides the evaluator with a sense of 
the extent of change that is possible within a particular context, regardless of the 
ambitious objectives set by projects in their proposals. Similarly, through the better 
understanding of the chains of causality across geographical and temporal scales, 
the evaluator can assess which major gaps remain in the conditions necessary for 
change, and which critical ones need to be addressed to increase the likelihood of 
impact at a broader scale.
Postscript, 2020
Nearly ten years after the evaluation was completed,8 the authors had the opportu-
nity to undertake a post-completion evaluation aimed at assessing the sustainability 
of outcomes generated by the cluster of projects linked to the establishment of the 
Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA). 
PEMSEA, a regional organization that itself was an outcome of the GEF-supported 
cluster of projects, was envisioned as the main catalyst for the broader adoption of 
integrated coastal management (ICM) in the region. This unusual opportunity to 
revisit our evaluand allows us to verify some of our assumptions about the condi-
tions that catalyse progress towards impact. This has also allowed us to reflect on our 
understanding of what evaluations can and cannot assess in interventions that aim 
for long-term, large-scale impact in complex systems.
Below we examine three of our key conclusions and related assumptions against 
our updated findings from the post-completion evaluation. Afterwards, we offer an 
alternative approach to evaluating interventions in large complex systems.
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Initiatives to increase communication among governments and other 
stakeholders will foster collaborations to address regional environmen-
tal challenges. The Sustainable Development Strategy for the Seas of East Asia 
(SDS-SEA), intended as a regional framework and platform for collaborative 
action among the East Asian countries and its non-country partners, was updated 
in 2015 with continuing GEF support. From its original membership of 12 
countries in 2003, the SDS-SEA signatories now number 11 countries, with its 
non-country partners increasing from 19 to 21. Included among the non-coun-
try partners are NGOs, multilateral organizations and private sector enterprises. 
Partners continue to meet every three years at the ministerial and technical 
levels through the East Asian Seas Congress; a smaller Executive Committee 
meets twice a year to oversee implementation of the SDS-SEA. Partner coun-
tries report on their progress during the meetings, exchange learning from their 
experience and discuss future directions.
The PEMSEA Network of Local Governments (PNLG), a mechanism for com-
munication, learning and exchange among local governments that was created 
with GEF support in 2001 has continued to grow. Since 2011, its membership has 
doubled to 50 local governments in 10 countries, with a self-sustaining secretariat 
in Xiamen, China. The Gulf of Thailand oil spill preparedness initiative, signed by 
Cambodia, Thailand and Viet Nam in 2006, has evolved into an organization with 
a secretariat based in Thailand. The three countries have agreed on the coordinated 
implementation of the Gulf of Thailand Strategic Action Plan (2017–2021). Based 
on these developments, it appears that GEF support for communication initiatives 
has indeed contributed to countries continuing to work together, with the progress 
aided by uninterrupted grants over more than 25 years.
Broader adoption and significant environmental change at a regional 
scale is not expected to take place until decades after GEF support has 
ended. The updating of the SDS-SEA in 2015 included the adoption of a target to 
have 25% – previously 20% – of the coastline of participating countries under ICM 
by 2021. The extent and thoroughness of ICM adoption differs among countries; 
nonetheless, all the GEF project recipient countries except one had exceeded the 
25% target by 2018.9
Currently all participating countries have ICM sites with intersectoral 
committees at the provincial level, and local staff to manage the ICM process. In 
total, 43 provinces across eight countries have ICM learning sites. An additional 
76 sites are in various stages of ICM development and for which there is little 
information available.
The most aggressive adoption of ICM has taken place in China (32 sites), the 
Philippines (32 sites), Thailand (24 sites) and Viet Nam (14 sites). These develop-
ments challenge the evaluation’s conclusion that broader adoption of ICM can only 
take place in highly decentralized countries such as China and the Philippines, 
rather than in Thailand and Viet Nam. According to country representatives inter-
viewed for the post-completion evaluation, the ICM approach has been useful 
for addressing multiple intersectoral issues, and not just coastal or environmental. 
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In this case, it appears that time was the main constraint in the speed of ICM adop-
tion rather than the inappropriateness of the approach.
However, technical and human resources continue to be a limitation that has 
slowed ICM adoption. Common across the GEF-supported countries was how 
PEMSEA-trained government staff eventually take on more financially attractive 
career opportunities in more urban locations. This relatively frequent staff turnover 
requires local governments to periodically hire and train new staff. Another common 
factor found to slow ICM adoption in most countries was the interruption of 
financial and political support for ICM by election cycles and corresponding 
changes in administrative priorities. This has required PEMSEA staff to also 
periodically re-orient government officials and try to convince them to continue 
their predecessor’s priorities to improve the environment.
The updated findings on ICM scaling-up and replication show that while 
broader adoption has taken place more quickly than we expected, environmental 
change at the regional level is still elusive after more than 25 years of support. This 
is partly because a larger geographical scale requires a corresponding larger tempo-
ral scale for significant change to be detected. At the same time, progress on ICM 
implementation has differed from case to case. ICM has not been fully adopted in 
many sites, and in many cases is resource-constrained, as mentioned above. In China 
where much time, effort and resources have been invested in ICM, improvements 
in water quality have been observed over the last decade (e.g. Zeng et al. 2019); it is 
reasonable to conclude that such significant investments have contributed to reduc-
ing environmental stress along the China’s coast.
Key to measuring ICM’s contributions is having systems in place for monitoring 
and reporting environmental change. Evidence of ICM’s positive impacts has been 
reported at the local level, but some are anecdotal. Many sites lack the infrastruc-
ture and human capacities to monitor water quality. At the regional level, there is no 
overall system to track social and environmental trends related to ICM implementa-
tion. Despite several GEF-supported initiatives promoting monitoring and reporting 
systems in the region, these initiatives have been adopted partially or sporadically by 
participating governments. For example, in 2008, PEMSEA introduced the State of 
the Coast (SOC) Report, a self-reporting scorecard consisting of legal, institutional, 
economic and environmental indicators that have now been adapted for the municipal, 
provincial, national and regional levels. PEMSEA has been assisting ICM sites in put-
ting together SOC reports, but many remain in various stages of development (Padayao 
2018); only a few sites have published more than one report to track changes over time.
Broader adoption of local-scale interventions by stakeholders at dif-
ferent scales is necessary so that large-scale drivers are addressed. At the 
time of the evaluation in 2011, ICM was being gradually replicated from pilot sites 
to neighbouring municipalities or scaled up at the provincial level; the adoption of 
national regulations in support of ICM was in its early stages. Many of the countries 
that had gained broad endorsement of ICM from the executive branches of national 
government then are now in the process of getting ICM-related laws approved 
by the legislative branches. In some countries, implementing mechanisms, such as 
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intersectoral committees, are already being established. Key to this development 
is that most member countries have drawn on the experience of pilot ICM sites 
established in the first 10 to 15 years of GEF support to adopt legal, regulatory and 
institutional reforms that facilitate ICM adoption at a larger scale.
In China, lessons from the pilot sites have been leveraged through the China-
PEMSEA Sustainable Coastal Management Cooperation Center (CPC), which 
provides training and support for ICM expansion in all coastal cities. Other coun-
tries such as Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia are considering establishing similar 
centres. However, widespread geographical expansion of ICM does not automati-
cally address large-scale drivers, many of which originate beyond coastal areas.
At least three ICM sites – also three of the longest-running ones supported by 
the GEF – have aimed to expand the geographical reach of the intervention to 
better match the ecological boundaries of the problem, which in this case is coastal 
pollution originating from both coastal and non-coastal areas.
One site is Xiamen in China where the local government linked with the exist-
ing Jiulong River Watershed Project (JRWP). Together they established a system 
to control pollution discharges in the river that supplied water to the city and 
discharged in Xiamen Bay. Using a payment-for-environmental-services (PES) 
arrangement, Xiamen transferred funds to the upstream municipalities in exchange 
for clean water. Ten years later in 2020, the PES system is still functioning and 
continues to result in improvements in the river’s water quality. The second site 
is Manila Bay, where PEMSEA helped expand ICM in the cities surrounding the 
bay. The Manila Bay ICM initiative is currently linked with the country’s River 
Basin Control Office to address pollution sources in the two major river basins of 
Pampanga River and Pasig River-Laguna de Bay through integrated basin manage-
ment, stakeholder engagement and information management.
In the province of Chonburi in Thailand, the ICM programme expanded to 
include all 26 coastal municipalities from 2005 to 2009; by 2010, the 73 non-coastal 
municipalities had signed on to implement a Provincial Coastal Development Plan 
seeking to address upland pollution from pig and agricultural farms.10 The city of 
Sriracha, Thailand’s ICM pilot site, provided training in non-coastal municipalities. 
Clusters of municipalities were to prepare ICM plans for consolidation into the 
provincial ICM plan. However, due to logistical constraints and the large number 
of local governments involved, only the 26 coastal municipalities developed ICM 
action plans; ICM practices, particularly in solid waste management, continued to 
be applied throughout the entire province, coordinated by the provincial govern-
ment. An interagency and multi-sectoral Provincial Marine and Coastal Resources 
Management Committee was established in 2015, having jurisdiction over both 
coastal and non-coastal municipalities. An informal survey of the heads of 25 coastal 
and 21 non-coastal municipalities in 2015 showed that ICM for them created a 
“platform for intermunicipal dialogue and exchange of information” (Barnette and 
Wiwekwin 2018). We were, however, unable to reach local government officials to 
get an update on what has happened since.
While we do not have complete information on environmental outcomes in 
these three ICM sites, based on the developments post-evaluation, it appears that 
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it may indeed be possible to address large-scale drivers by scaling up a local-scale 
intervention such as ICM. In turn, implementation at higher scales has been made 
possible by the existence of enabling conditions at the corresponding higher scales, 
such as the regulations and intersectoral committees gradually established at the 
national and provincial levels after many years of learning from pilot sites.
From evaluating static long-term goals to evaluating 
development trajectories
The three main assumptions examined in this postscript remain mostly valid. 
However, the analytical model used in the evaluation had other misleading 
assumptions that have become evident in retrospection. First, in the introduction 
of the chapter, we stress the importance of assessing the progress made towards 
achieving impact. This assumes that “impact”, which is the goal of the intervention 
and assumed to take place sometime in the distant future, would remain unchanged. 
Second, the model adopted by the evaluation assumes that a successful intervention 
would put in place a set of conditions that, once achieved, would over time enable 
the achievement of the desired long-term goal.
However, interventions concerned with large complex systems such as the East 
Asian seas are better understood as efforts to steer such large systems towards a 
development trajectory that enhances the likelihood that desired benefits or services 
are generated. This trajectory is constantly influenced by multiple actors and factors, 
which introduces a high degree of uncertainty into the process. Over time, the 
predetermined conditions for success might no longer contribute to sustaining the 
desired benefits and services. Shifting circumstances and new information generated 
during implementation will require periodic reassessment of the conditions that 
are assumed to enable long-term change and, if necessary, a redefinition how 
“impact”—the long-term objective of the intervention—is defined. Since the 
system is inherently unpredictable, it is therefore more pragmatic to track its 
trajectory in providing benefits and services desired, rather than just the extent to 
which the pre-specified enabling conditions have been established.
The environmental problems of the South China Sea and the other East Asian 
seas are far from solved. Even after more than 25 years of GEF support, it may not 
be realistic to expect a dramatic improvement in the environmental health of these 
water bodies. Nevertheless, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that the types 
of adaptive approaches and models supported by the GEF help to steer the region 
towards a development trajectory that enhances the delivery of valued environmen-
tal and economic services.
PEMSEA’s long-term goals have not remained static. To ensure the desired level 
of environmental services, the overall regional goal was increased from 20% to 25% 
of the region’s coastline placed under ICM. Similarly, ICM practices were scaled up 
to address stresses originating from non-coastal municipalities. The conditions tar-
geted for ICM adoption to enable long-term change have gradually been adapted 
to specific local and national circumstances, and are increasingly incorporating new 
approaches, sectors and stakeholders.
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What we have yet to see is a better understanding of the extent to which the 
many local success stories translate into a broader development trajectory that 
will ensure the sustainability of the desired services at a regional scale in the East 
Asian seas. Systematic and regular State of the Coast reports at multiple scales could 
provide valuable information to assess the broader trajectory and make adjustments 
if necessary.
As we say in our conclusion almost ten years ago, the evaluator needs a sound 
understanding of the system; it is clear now that it is also important to understand 
how the system develops over time. However, it is not realistic to expect that we will 
ever have perfect knowledge to predict when, how and what long-term impacts 
will take place due to the unpredictable nature of complex systems. Often we may 
not see the outcomes we wanted or expected in the time that we predicted. After 
more than 25 years of GEF support, we expected to see some large-scale environ-
mental changes in the region by now, yet there is no counterfactual region to allow 
us to say if the system’s pace of change would have been faster or slower without 
this continuous long-term support. In this sense, trying to predict when long-term 
goals might finally be achieved is an almost futile exercise. More useful may be to 
periodically assess changes in the system and the extent to which interventions have 
adapted in ways that support the development trajectory towards desired benefits 
and services – which themselves could also change over time.
Notes
 1 This sea is called the “South Sea”, 南海, Nánhǎi in China and the “East Sea”, Biển Ðông, 
in Viet Nam. In September 2012, the president of the Philippines issued Administrative 
Order No. 29, renaming the “maritime areas on the western side of the Philippine archi-
pelago as the West Philippine Sea”, to cover the areas within the Philippines’ Exclusive 
Economic Zone. “South China Sea” is the international name for this area as recog-
nized by the International Hydrographic Organization and is therefore the name used 
throughout this evaluation.
 2 These are the Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Minamata Convention 
on Mercury. For more information on the GEF, see https://www.thegef.org/about-us.
 3 The GEF strategy for the international waters focal area is largely focused on facilitat-
ing cooperative action among governments that derive benefits from a shared water 
body, such as a large marine ecosystem, lake, river or aquifer. The initial approach is the 
undertaking of a transboundary diagnostic analysis, through which threats to the shared 
water body that cross or extend beyond national jurisdictions (i.e. are transboundary) are 
identified based on available scientific data. The countries then jointly prioritize which 
of these environmental concerns to take action on. The priority environmental concerns 
and actions with which to address them are formalized through the countries’ agreement 
to a regional Strategic Action Programme.
 4 Scale in this context is to be understood as the spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical 
dimensions used to measure and study any phenomenon (Gibson et al. 2000).
 5 A higher scale implies a greater geographical scope, and a greater number and types of 
interacting elements, such as ecosystems and social, political and economic sub-systems.
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 6 A list of large marine ecosystems similar to the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand 
in terms of ecological, political and socio-economic characteristics was derived from 
Mahon et al. (2010).
 7 These were the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the 
Rio Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg and their precursor, the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm Sustainable Development Conference) in Stockholm.
 8 The Impact Evaluation of GEF Support to International Waters in the South China Sea 
and Adjacent Areas was undertaken from 2010 to 2012.
 9 Various figures have been published in 2018 and 2019 PEMSEA reports and proceedings 
of the project steering committee.
 10 In the case of Chonburi, there was no major river draining into marine water bodies, 
only small streams and canals.
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ASSESSING PROGRESS TOWARDS 
IMPACTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROGRAMMES USING THE FIELD 
REVIEW OF OUTCOMES TO IMPACTS 
METHODOLOGY
David Todd and Rob Craig
Impacts in the context of environmental programmes 
and projects
The GEF Evaluation Office impact evaluation programme’s main objective was to 
evaluate the long-term results of interventions several years after GEF support had 
concluded – to assess the sustainability and replication of results and draw out lessons 
learned. An earlier GEF evaluation, The Role of Local Benefits in Global Environmental 
Programs3 had demonstrated that social means must be used in order to deliver environ-
mental results. This is because human behaviour towards the environment is a critical 
factor in achieving sustainable natural resource management. Examples include biodi-
versity (the interactions between the local human population and natural resources), 
climate change (the role of domestic and industrial energy use), international waters 
(damage caused by overfishing, nutrient spill and pollution) and land degradation (the 
importance of changing land and water use practices in farming systems).
These insights on the importance of using social means to achieve environ-
mental ends were combined with the use of cause and effect chains as a theoretical 
basis upon which to assess progress towards long-term objectives. The result was a 
specific fieldwork-based evaluative approach, known as the ‘Review of Outcomes 
to Impacts’(ROtI). This was used to evaluate progress towards project impacts in a 
series of studies, one of which is described in detail here: The Seychelles Marine 
Ecosystem Management Project (SEYMEMP).4
The elements of a Theory of Change for environmental 
interventions
The Theory of Change for a project is the logical sequence of conditions and 
factors that are necessary to deliver its ultimate impact. A basic project Theory of 
Change starts with activities and develops through a means-ends hierarchy until 
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finally reaching a project’s impacts. Project Terminal Evaluations implicitly assess 
against a basic Theory of Change as far as outcomes, but do not usually go further in 
assessing the crucial last steps towards impact. The Review of Outcomes to Impacts 
assessment takes up where Terminal Evaluations leave off and focuses on developing 
and assessing a detailed Theory of Change between outcomes and impacts, referred 
to as outcomes–impacts pathways.
Key elements in the outcomes-impacts pathways are Intermediate States, impact 
drivers and assumptions; these are defined in Table 7.1 and illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
If project outcomes are assessed to be successfully delivered and the key elements of 
the Theory of Change between outcomes and impacts are in place, then it is reason-
able to conclude that there is indirect evidence that the impact has been or will be 
achieved with time.
TABLE 7.1 Definitions of Theory of Change Elements in the Outcomes-Impacts Pathways
Theory of Change terms Definition
Outcomes Short- to medium-term behavioural or systemic effects result 
from outputs designed to help achieve the project’s impacts 
(e.g. capacities developed).
Intermediate States The transitional conditions between a project’s outcomes and 
impacts that must be achieved in order to deliver the intended 
impacts.
Impact drivers The significant factors that, if present, are expected to contribute 
to the ultimate realization of project impacts and that are 
within the ability of the project to influence.
Assumptions The significant factors that, if present, are expected to contribute 
to the ultimate realization of project impacts but that are 
largely beyond the power of the project to influence or address.
FIGURE 7.1 The Relationship between the Key Elements in a Project Theory of Change
Towards impacts in environmental programmes 113
The field Review of Outcomes to Impacts methodology
One of the methods developed and practised by the GEF Independent Evaluation 
Office5 to assess progress towards impacts of completed GEF-assisted activities is the 
‘field Review of Outcomes to Impacts’.6 This uses a combination of different infor-
mation collection methods, as shown in Figure 7.2. It begins with a desk review, 
proceeds with consultations with key project stakeholders and concludes (when pos-
sible) with fact-finding at the project site or sites. Ideally, field investigation is followed 
by further consultation with key informants and additional desk research to confirm 
information and project documentation facts that were collected in the field.
During the assessment process, it is necessary to gradually develop an under-
standing of the status of the Intermediate States, impact drivers and assumptions 
through a combination of the steps shown in Figure 7.2. On this basis, the evalua-
tor is able to draw conclusions and establish a set of qualitative and/or quantitative 
findings. Specifics of the key methodological steps are discussed in the following.
Desk research
As far as possible, all relevant documentation is consulted during the initial desk 
research step. This includes previous evaluation documents, the project outputs/ 
terminal reports and any subsequent reports relating to the sustainability or  follow-up 
to the project. At a minimum, a thorough understanding of the project document 
and Terminal Evaluation is an essential foundation for undertaking the subsequent 
steps of a field Review of Outcomes to Impacts assessment. A useful output of the 
initial desk research step is a ‘key issues checklist’ that summarizes the key informa-
tion that the assessment needs to focus on in order to validate and assess the project 
Theory of Change.
Key informants
The consultation with key informants provides an opportunity to obtain additional 
documents, either produced for or resulting from the project, that assist in cross-check-
ing and validating the assessment. Consultations are conducted in the following order:
 1. Officials: The consultation process should start with the officials involved in the 
project, for example, officials from participating government departments and 
representatives of project implementing agencies.
FIGURE 7.2 Steps in the Field-Based Review of Outcomes to Impacts Assessment Process
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 2. Focus groups: The Review of Outcomes to Impacts field assessment exercise 
is ideally conducted as a group exercise with a cross-section of individuals that 
were responsible for the design and implementation of the specific project 
being assessed. In some cases, it is necessary to hold more than one focus group 
for a particular project depending on the logistics and the politics of bringing 
various individuals together. In other cases, it is not possible to convene focus 
groups; in these instances, it is necessary to discuss the relevant section of the 
Theory of Change with each individual or institution in turn.
 3. Individual experts: After the focus group exercise, it is often necessary to follow 
up and cross-check findings with key individuals who were not able to attend 
the focus group meetings.
The basic order of activities to undertake during the Review of Outcomes to Impacts 
Exercise7 with the focus group and individual experts is illustrated in Figure 7.3.
Step 1: Validating project logic
This is done by presenting the outcomes and impacts identified during the desk 
review stage and asking the focus group to validate and comment on them. Key 
questions to ask are
 • What was the project ultimately trying to achieve (i.e. project impact)?
 • What did the project actually achieve at completion (i.e. project outcomes)?
Step 2: Assessing Intermediate States
The focus group then identifies the Intermediate States and the results are com-
pared with those from the desk review. Questions to ask in identifying and assessing 
the Intermediate States are
 • What has already been achieved since project completion to contribute to 
impacts?
 • What else needs to happen to deliver the intended impacts?
FIGURE 7.3 Steps in Conducting a Field Review of Outcomes to Impacts Analysis with 
Group or Individual Key Informants
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Step 3: Assessing the impact delivery process
Once an understanding has been developed of the achievement or otherwise of the 
intermediate state, it is then possible to look at the factors that may have resulted in 
this situation by examining the presence or absence of the identified impact drivers 
and assumptions. The basic question to ask is
 • What were the reasons for successes or failures in delivering the Intermediate 
States?
The Review of Outcomes to Impacts exercise with the focus groups (and to a lesser 
extent with individual experts) uses visualization techniques to present the elements 
of the Theory of Change and to facilitate a collective process of thinking.
The end result is the establishment of a stakeholder consensus on the outcomes–
impacts Theory of Change model for the specific project, plus a more detailed 
understanding of the status of the project’s outcomes–impacts pathways and the 
key underlying factors responsible for success or failure. Annex 1 shows the specific 
Theory of Change model developed by the focus group exercise for the Seychelles 
Marine Ecosystem Management Project (SEYMEMP).
Field investigations
The project Theory of Change models and the initial assessments given during the 
key informant focus groups and consultations are then cross-checked through field 
visits to former project sites and discussions with relevant beneficiary institutions 
and communities. This also provides a good opportunity to gather available field 
data to back up the overall assessment findings. These findings should then be fur-
ther cross-checked with the key informants and available literature collected during 
the process.
Reporting of the assessment findings
The field Review of Outcomes to Impacts rating system provides a simple score 
that gives a summary indication of progress towards the project’s expected impact 
(see Table 7.2). The rating system is applied at the different hierarchical levels of 
the Theory of Change – namely at the individual Theory of Change element level 
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(outcomes, Intermediate States, impact drivers and assumptions), at the overall strat-
egy level and at the overall project level.
Below the rating, scores are elaborated with descriptions of the general interpre-
tations implied from a theoretical and/or delivery perspective. These descriptions 
are provided as guidance for scoring; it is recognized that projects are extremely 
complicated and that evaluators need to use value judgements in order to score 
projects.
Not achieved – (0)
From a theoretical perspective, the Theory of Change aspect is not explicitly or implic-
itly identified by the project, and/or from a delivery perspective, very little progress 
has been made towards achieving the Theory of Change; the conditions are not in 
place for future progress.
Poorly achieved – (1)
From a theoretical perspective, there are no appropriate mechanisms set out to achieve 
the Theory of Change aspect after GEF funding ended, and/or from a delivery 
perspective, little progress has been made towards achieving the Theory of Change 
aspect; the conditions are in place for future progress.
Partially achieved – (2)
From a theoretical perspective, the Theory of Change aspect is explicitly recognized 
and the mechanisms set out to achieve it are appropriate but insufficient (e.g. there 
is no clear allocation of responsibilities for implementing the mechanisms after GEF 
funding ends). From a delivery perspective, moderate and continuing progress is being 
made towards achieving the Theory of Change aspect, although there is not yet a 
strong basis for the eventual delivery of the intended global environmental benefits.
Fully achieved – (3)
From a theoretical perspective, the Theory of Change aspect is explicitly recognized 
and appropriate and sufficient mechanisms to achieve it are apparent (e.g. specific 
allocation of responsibilities after GEF funding ended), and/or from a delivery per-
spective substantial progress has been made towards achieving the Theory of Change 
aspect and a strong basis is in place for eventual delivery of the intended Global 
Environment Benefits.
The reporting of the Review of Outcomes to Impacts assessment is initially done 
for each strategy, assessing the individual Theory of Change element level compris-
ing the strategy (i.e. the outcomes, impact drivers, assumptions and Intermediate 
States). The assessment for the Intermediate States, by virtue of the means-ends 
logic of the Theory of Change model, is based both on a direct assessment of the 
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intermediate state itself and on the individual assessments of the relevant outcomes, 
impact drivers and assumptions. This is necessarily an inexact measurement, based 
on the evaluator’s considered judgement of the achievement of the intermediate 
state rather than on any definitive measure of achievement.
Background: the Seychelles Marine Ecosystem Management 
Project
The Seychelles Marine Ecosystem Project was a medium-sized GEF/World Bank 
project that was implemented from August 2000 to March 2004. The $1.25 million 
project fell under the Coastal and Marine Biodiversity Operational Programme 
of the GEF Biodiversity Focal Area. GEF provided $0.67 million in funding; the 
Government of the Seychelles co-financed the remainder. The stated goal of the 
project was the ‘successful management of Seychelles’ unique and threatened marine 
ecosystems in light of recent global and local changes in particular coral bleaching’. 
Its overall objective was ‘identify, monitor, manage and rehabilitate remnant ecosys-
tems by the removal of critical barriers including lack of skills, scientific understand-
ing and conservation management knowledge and direction’.
At closure, the project was favourably rated by its Terminal Evaluation, with the 
delivery of project outcomes considered to have been ‘satisfactory’ and the prob-
ability of sustainability assessed to be ‘likely’.
This chapter presents a Review of Outcomes to Impacts that seeks to answer 
whether the completed project has in fact contributed to achieving lasting and 
beneficial environmental impacts.
The impacts towards which the SEYMEMP would contribute
The starting point for the SEYMEMP Review of Outcomes to Impacts assess-
ment was to identify the project’s intended environmental impacts, which for GEF 
projects is the delivery of global environmental benefits. These are defined in the 
Review of Outcomes to Impacts manual as ‘lasting improvements in the status of 
an aspect of the global environment that safeguards environmental functioning and 
integrity as well as benefiting human society’. The SEYMEMP project identified 
four key aspects of the marine environment that provided the justification for GEF 
support to this project and which formed the project’s intended global environmen-
tal benefits. The benefits are lasting improvements in the status of hard coral reefs, 
reef fish assemblages, marine turtles and whale sharks (see Table 7.3).
It is important to have a clear understanding of the desired final impact of an 
intervention, since this provides the foundation for the development of an appropri-
ate outcomes–impacts Theory of Change. To characterize the SEYMEMP global 
environmental benefits further, Table 7.3 provides the rationale for their selection 
according to their documented global significance, lists the key attributes essential 
for their long-term survival and identifies the main threats to attainment of the 
global environmental benefits.
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TABLE 7.3 Global Environmental Benefits (to Biodiversity) for the SEYMEMP Project
Global environmental 
benefits




in the status of:
Hard coral reefs of 
the Western Indian 
Ocean
The Seychelles coral reefs 
are listed as an area 
of ‘rich to very rich 
species diversity’.* 
In addition, the 
comparative lack of 
scientific information 
of the coral reefs 
makes it an important 
area for international 
scientific research in 
future





 • Water quality
 • Water 
temperature





 • Nautical 
activities
Reef fish assemblages Important indicators of 
reef structure and 
composition
 • Diversity  • Fisheries
 • Abundance of 
key species
 • Pollution




Whale sharks Listed on the Convention 
on International Trade 
in Endangered Species 
Appendix II, as data 
deficient by the 
International Union 
for the Conservation 
of Nature, and in 
Annex 11 of the 
Convention on 
Migratory Species
 • Numbers  • Nautical 
activities
 • Reproduction 
rates





 • Sex ratios






imbricata) and a 
significant population 
of endangered green 
turtles (Chelonia 
mydas)




 • Breeding sites
 • Reproduction 
rates
 • Sex ratios
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Outlining the outcomes–impacts Theory of Change for SEYMEMP
The development of the SEYMEMP outcomes–impacts Theory of Change was 
based on a review of project documentation and discussions with key informants. 
Principal consultations with key informants were conducted as a focus group exer-
cise using visualization techniques (as explained earlier and in detail in the GEF 
Review of Outcomes to Impacts Manual).8 The resulting overall project outcomes-
impacts Theory of Change is presented in Table 7.4 and in the chapter Annex 1. The 
Theory of Change sets out what was intended to occur after project completion 
in order to eventually achieve the intended project impacts. In combination, the 
three Intermediate States would deliver direct actions to address threats to global 
environmental benefits (Intermediate State 1), an effective Marine Protected Area 
(MPA)9 system to protect key marine sites (Intermediate State 2) and an enabling 
policy environment to ensure national and regional compliance and cooperation 
(Intermediate State 3). Together, the review considered these three states to be suf-
ficient to achieve the intended impact.
Evaluating progress against the Theory of Change
According to the Theory of Change, achieving the three Intermediate States is nec-
essary (although not necessarily sufficient) in order to achieve the intended impact. 
Therefore, the Review of Outcomes to Impacts assessed, in detail, the progress 
that was made since project completion along each of the cause and effect path-
ways from the four outcomes (already assessed in the project Terminal Evaluation) 
towards the three Intermediate States. However, in order to keep this chapter to a 
reasonable length, only one of the pathways (towards Intermediate State 3) is exam-
ined in detail. In the original review,10 all pathways were comprehensively reviewed 
to provide the evidence necessary to draw conclusions on progress towards impacts.
Assessment of progress towards Intermediate State 3: 
implementation and mainstreaming of enabling marine policies 
at national and regional levels
Theory of Change overview
The third intermediate state, ‘implementation and mainstreaming of enabling 
marine policies at national and regional levels’, was considered necessary to ensure 
that support and commitment for marine protection is maintained and scaled up 
through the formulation and enactment of enabling policies and laws. These would 
provide incentives and support mechanisms for marine ecosystem users (e.g. fisher-
ies and tourism sectors) to comply, cooperate and become active partners in marine 
conservation. This intermediate state includes the neighbouring countries in the 
Indian Ocean in order to seek regional cooperation in protecting the greater eco-
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TABLE 7.4 The SEYMEMP Outcomes-Impacts Theory of Change
Outcomes Impact drivers & assumptions Intermediate States Impacts
What was the situation at the end of the 
project?
What key factors were responsible for delivery (or 
non-delivery) of the Intermediate States?
What has happened since 
the project ended, or still 
needs to happen, to achieve 
impacts?
What was the project 
ultimately aiming to 
achieve?
Outcome 1: Seychelles marine ecosystems 
and their values are better understood
Impact driver: Research and monitoring 
methodology integrated into ongoing initiatives 
and institutions
Impact driver: Research and monitoring capacity 
built in Seychellois institutions responsible for 
marine protection
Intermediate state: Coping 
mechanisms addressing major 
threats to marine ecosystems 
are rolled out nationally
Reduced human and 




Outcome 2: Coping mechanisms that 
directly address marine ecosystem 
degradation introduced
Impact driver: Coping mechanisms integrated and 
funded by existing structures
Enhanced conservation 














Outcome 3: Integrated marine protected 
area system operationalized
Impact driver: Accountability and transparency in 
decision-making
Impact driver: marine protected area network is 
adequate to protect key ecosystem functioning
Impact driver: Financial sustainability of marine 
protected area network is established
Assumption: Government/Department of the 
Environment has a clear vision of what it wants 
from plan and takes leadership role
Assumption: There is sufficient buy-in and common 
ground between stakeholders
Intermediate state: marine 
protected area network is 
being managed effectively to 
achieve conservation goals
Outcome 4: Broad stakeholder 
involvement and cooperation in the 
implementation of regional marine 
conservation programmes
Impact driver: Policies and Regulations established, 
understood and enforced
Impact driver: There are sufficient incentives for 
marine users to participate in programmes




mainstreaming of enabling 
marine policies at the 
national and regional levels
122 David Todd and Rob Craig
The project outcome that leads towards Intermediate State 3 is Outcome 4 (see 
Figure 7.4). This outcome focused on public education about the marine environ-
ment and on obtaining broad stakeholder inputs through institutional involvement 
and partnerships. Such partnerships included links with other regional marine con-
servation initiatives.
In order for the intermediate state to be achieved, the review identified two 
impact drivers and one external assumption, as shown in Figure 7.4. The first, ‘poli-
cies and regulations established, understood and enforced’, is critical to achieving 
the intermediate state, because clear rules and effective enforcement of regulations 
protecting the marine environment are the foundations for obtaining broad com-
pliance from marine users for ensuring conservation. The second impact driver, 
‘there are sufficient incentives for marine users to participate in conservation pro-
grammes’, seeks to complement law enforcement through education and tangible 
incentives to encourage marine users to proactively conserve the ecosystem. The 
external assumption, ‘political leadership is committed to prioritizing marine issues’, 
is critical to realizing the enabling policies and incentive schemes of the impact 
drivers.
The next section assesses the extent to which this element of the Theory of 
Change has been realized by examining the achievement of its components, starting 
with the outcomes and finishing with the intermediate state 3. Table 7.5 provides a 
summary of this analysis.
Theory of Change assessment
Outcomes
The review agreed with the Terminal Evaluation that good progress was made in 
delivering the project’s fourth outcome. The project successfully delivered aware-
ness-raising activities, particularly through using local media and workshops to edu-
cate coral reef users (e.g. boat handlers, divers) and encouraging public participation 
FIGURE 7.4 Theory of Change for Intermediate State 3
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TABLE 7.5 Outcomes-Impacts Assessment Findings for Intermediate State 3
Theory of Change component Qualitative Assessment Rating




Good level of public awareness-raising activities 
(workshops, local media, and publicity)
In addition to the project executing agencies 
(Ministry of Environment, Marine 
Conservation Society of Seychelles and Marine 
Parks Authority), the project also involved the 
Ministry of Land Use and Habitat, Seychelles 
Fishing Authority and the Seychelles Islands 
Foundation to encourage wider stakeholder 
participation and build local capacities
Limited evidence that the above partnership 
led to significant local capacity building 
and inadequate links made with regional 









Based on the SEYMEMP research findings, the 
government declared the whale shark as a 
protected species under the Wild Animals and 
Birds Protection Act (S.I. 1 of 2003) and the 
whale shark programme is now a national 
programme of action
The Government of the Seychelles endorsed the 
RAMSAR Convention in 2005, along with 
the enactment of the Wetlands Policy, which 
provides clear regulations and a mandate to 
the Wetlands Unit. The unit has successfully 
policed illegal activities (dumping/
reclamation) and ensured that major new 
developments undertake environmental 
impact assessments and comply with 
guidelines. However, capacity in the unit is 




Impact Driver: There 
are sufficient 
incentives for marine 
users to participate 
in conservation 
programmes
Limited progress has been made in getting the 
tourism or fishing industry to adopt mooring 
installations and to support other initiatives 
to reduce marine degradation. However, 
the new UNDP/GEF Mainstreaming 
Biodiversity Management into Production 
Sector Activities should address this issue.
Through education awareness, the Wetlands Unit 
has had success in getting schools and hotels 
to look after their wetlands (e.g. establishment 
of the Hotel Babarons’ wetland boardwalk), 
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in monitoring of turtles, whale sharks and aspects of the coral reef programme. 
The project also involved the Ministry of Land Use and Habitat, the Seychelles 
Fishing Authority and the Seychelles Islands Foundation in order to encourage 
wider stakeholder participation and build local capacities. However, an over-reliance 
on overseas consultants (coupled with limitations on their time) meant that local 
capacity-building activities were not given the attention or time needed to make a 
difference. In addition, intended partnerships with broader initiatives (such as the 
integrated coastal area management project) were not realized. The partial delivery 
of this outcome provided some basis for the eventual achievement of Intermediate 
State Number Three, depending on the status of the impact drivers and assumptions.
TABLE 7.5 (Continued)






The government is committed to the 
marine environment, but lacks financial 
resources, especially since the tightening 
of government spending under the new 
International Monetary Fund-supported 
economic reform programme and the 
reduction of international donor support for 
the environment coming to the Seychelles 
The government has not taken the critical 
leadership role needed to overcome the 
impasse in agreeing to and implementing 
an integrated marine protected area system 




Intermediate State #3: 
Implementation 
and mainstreaming 
of enabling marine 
policies at national 
and regional levels
Awareness is certainly in place, and some policies 
are in place at the national and regional levels. 
However, there is a need for policies and 
actions to protect the behavioural aspects of 
marine life, e.g. migratory routes, corridors 
and spawning areas, which are not covered 
under the current marine protected area 
system
New initiatives, such as the European 
Union-funded Regional Programme 
for the Sustainable Management of the 
Coastal Zones of the Indian Ocean 
Countries and the new set of UNDP/GEF 
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Impact drivers/external assumptions
The review found evidence that the first impact driver, ‘policies and regulations 
established, understood and enforced’, was partially delivered. The project made 
effective contributions towards strengthening environmental policy and regulations 
in the Seychelles. A major accomplishment was towards modifying the Wild Animal 
and Birds Protection Act to include whale sharks (S.I. 1 of 2003). This government 
decision was based on the project’s whale shark programme research findings and has 
since become a national programme of action. Another significant piece of enabling 
policy to which the project contributed concerned wetlands management, with the 
government’s endorsement of the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance (the RAMSAR Convention) and its enactment of the Wetlands Policy 
in 2005. These have provided the Wetlands Unit with the regulations and mandate 
to police against illegal activities (such as dumping and reclamation) and to ensure 
that major new developments comply with wetlands guidelines. This should have 
the long-term effect of reducing contamination and damage to the marine environ-
ment and coral reefs. However, this impact driver was not considered to be fully 
delivered because the regulations approved do yet not offer full coral reef protection 
and the capacity to enforce the existing and new regulations remains limited.
The review found that the second driver, ‘there are sufficient incentives for 
marine users to participate in conservation programmes’, has been poorly realized. 
The lack of progress since project closure to create incentives for marine users 
(such as tour operators and the fisheries industry) to participate in conservation 
programmes can, in part, be attributed to the reduction in available environmen-
tal funding. This was due to the decrease in international donors supporting the 
Seychelles and the recent implementation of the International Monetary Fund–
supported economic reform programme. The lack of effective cooperation between 
government and non-governmental organizations and the lack of capacity retained 
in government institutions also played a role.
However, newly funded initiatives have recently been launched that have the 
potential to overcome these barriers to realizing this impact driver. In partic-
ular, there are new United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/GEF 
projects: The Mainstreaming Biodiversity Management into Production Sector 
Activities project, which will focus on the fisheries and tourism sector, and the 
Capacity Development for Sustainable Land Management project, which will 
build on the SEYMEMP work on wetlands management. There is also a UNDP/
GEF marine and terrestrial protected area project in the proposal development 
stage. In addition to GEF projects, there is a European Union–funded Regional 
Programme for the Sustainable Management of the Coastal Zones of the Indian 
Ocean Countries that is in its early stages of implementation, which should help 
to encourage broader community participation and links with other countries in 
the western Indian Ocean.
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The review assessed that the assumption, ‘political leadership is committed to 
prioritizing marine issues’ has been poorly realized. Although the government is, in 
principle, committed to the marine environment, it lacks the financial and human 
resources to fully realize its leadership role.
Overview of progress towards Intermediate State 3
The Review of Outcomes to Impacts concluded that this Intermediate State remains 
at an early stage of delivery. Most notably, progress has been made in promoting 
enabling policies and there is greater awareness concerning the marine global envi-
ronmental benefits. In addition, new initiatives, such as the European Union–funded 
Regional Programme for the Sustainable Management of the Coastal Zones of the 
Indian Ocean Countries and the new set of UNDP/GEF projects are providing 
opportunities for mainstreaming many of the issues raised by the SEYMEMP proj-
ect. However, the current lack of government leadership, intersectoral cooperation 
and participation of marine users has meant that this intermediate state has not yet 
been significantly delivered. Policies and other sectors’ involvement are still needed 
to protect the behavioural aspects of marine global environmental benefits (e.g. 
migratory routes, corridors and spawning areas), which are not covered under the 
current marine protected area system or by regulations. In conclusion, the overall 
assessment for the delivery of Intermediate State Number Three is poorly achieved.
Assessment of progress towards Intermediate State 1: coping 
mechanisms addressing major threats to marine ecosystems are 
rolled out nationally11
Theory of Change overview
The review considered the first intermediate state, ‘coping mechanisms addressing 
major threats to marine ecosystems are rolled out nationally’, to be an essential (nec-
essary) ingredient to delivering the intended impact: improved conservation status 
of the Seychelles coral reef ecosystem and globally endangered marine species. The 
coping mechanisms are a series of direct actions that provide long-term protection 
against human-induced threats (e.g. coral damage by boats or pollution entering 
the ecosystem), as well as protection against detrimental natural events (e.g. the 
coral bleaching events of 1998 that destroyed a large percentage of the corals in the 
Seychelles islands). To minimize the threats to the ecosystem, it is essential that there 
is sufficient sustainable financing and capacity within local institutions (govern-
ment, non-governmental organizations and the private sector) to enable appropriate 
responses to emerging threats to be launched as and when necessary.
The study team identified Outcomes 1 and 2 as important for delivering this 
intermediate state (see Figure 7.5). The research and monitoring activities under-
taken to deliver Outcome 1 are essential for testing, adapting and scaling up the 
coping mechanisms piloted under Outcome 2.
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The review identified three impact drivers necessary to bridge the gap between 
the project outcomes and the delivery of the intermediate state (see Figure 7.5). 
The first, ‘research and monitoring methodology integrated into ongoing initiatives 
and institutions’, is necessary to ensure that the research and monitoring findings 
and methodologies of the project are utilized by all marine research bodies active 
in the Seychelles. This would help ensure the necessary continuity to build under-
standing of the ecosystem and to better inform the development and application 
of coping mechanisms. The second impact driver, ‘research and monitor capacity 
built in Seychellois institutions’, is related to the first driver but specifically relates 
to marine institutions’ capacities to implement the research and monitoring pro-
grammes initiated under Outcome 1 (e.g. sufficiently trained personnel). The final 
driver, ‘coping mechanisms integrated and funded by existing structures’, is regarded 
as fundamental for the successfully piloted coping mechanisms of Outcome 2 to 
be more broadly applied across the marine ecosystem. The review did not consider 
there to be any major external assumptions underpinning the achievement of the 
intermediate state.
Overview of progress towards achieving Intermediate State 1
The review found evidence that the intermediate state had begun to be delivered. 
In particular, the project-initiated research findings have led to important deci-
sions regarding marine protection at the national level (such as controls on fisher-
ies in sensitive marine areas) that are expected to deliver a lasting improvement 
to the conservation status of the overall Seychelles marine ecosystems. In addi-
tion, the formation of the Seychelles Centre for Marine Research and Technology-
Marine Parks Authority (SCMRT-MPA) following project closure provides a better 
FIGURE 7.5 Theory of Change for Intermediate State 1
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institutional mechanism for linking marine research with management actions. 
However, to date, the limited research and monitoring capacity built into gov-
ernment institutions with responsibility for the Seychelles marine ecosystem and 
the lack of funding mechanisms for rolling out marine protection activities have 
formed a barrier to fully delivering the scaling up of coping mechanisms needed to 
achieve the intended impact. In summary, the overall assessment for the delivery of 
Intermediate State 1 is partially achieved.
Assessment of progress towards Intermediate State 2: marine 
protected area network is being managed effectively to achieve 
conservation goals
Theory of Change overview
The intermediate state, ‘Marine Protected Area (MPA) network is being managed 
effectively to achieve conservation goals’, was the second key ingredient necessary 
to contribute towards delivering the intended project impact. As the understanding 
of the Seychelles marine ecosystem improves, it is becoming apparent that exist-
ing marine protected area coverage is inappropriate and insufficient to conserve 
all the ecologically important and sensitive areas, both in terms of global envi-
ronmental benefits and the ecosystem functions and processes supporting them.12 
An effectively managed Seychellois MPA network would adapt its coverage where 
appropriate and feasible and would ensure that each MPA is managed as part of an 
integrated system rather than as an individual, isolated entity. When such an inte-
grated MPA system is in place, the review considers that conservation goals and 
impacts will have been achieved. This intermediate state is focused on enhancing 
the conservation status of the threatened marine species.
The study team identified Outcome 3 as critical for delivering this intermediate 
state (see Figure 7.6). Outcome 3 sought to lay the foundation necessary to run an 
integrated MPA network, in particular by planning and agreeing to the long-term 
arrangements and institutional modalities for implementing such a network.
The review identified two impact drivers and two external assumptions as being 
necessary to bridge the gap between the delivery of Outcome 3 and the achieve-
ment of Intermediate State 2 (see Figure 7.6). The first impact driver, ‘MPA network is 
adequate to protect key ecosystem functions and processes’, is regarded as an important 
consideration that should be asked periodically of all protected area systems, based on 
current scientific understanding, to ensure that they are adequately protecting the eco-
system processes that sustain the associated impacts (e.g. global environmental benefits). 
The second driver, ‘financial sustainability of MPA network is established’, underpins 
the ability to manage, enforce and coordinate activities within and between MPAs and 
is therefore fundamental to the successful delivery of this intermediate state.
Regarding the external assumptions, the first, ‘government has a clear vision for the 
MPA network and takes the leadership role for its development’, is considered crucial 
for achieving the intermediate state, because government is the only stakeholder with 
the mandate and authority to expand or alter protected area system coverage and 
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adjust, where necessary, the associated management regimes. The second assumption, 
that ‘there is sufficient buy-in and common ground between MPA stakeholders’, is 
also considered critical. This is because diverse actors (e.g. parastatal bodies, non-gov-
ernmental organizations and the private sector) are involved in effectively managing 
an MPA network, and without transparency, accountability and willingness to pool 
resources together it is unlikely that such a network will be effectively managed.
Overall, the review found limited evidence to show that the second intermedi-
ate state had been delivered. Due to the lack of an agreed strategy for developing a 
more integrated MPA network, no substantive progress has been made to improve 
the coverage of MPAs to capture the critical coral refugia and other representative 
ecosystem components identified by the project as being outside of the existing 
system. Although informal collaboration between the Seychelles Centre for Marine 
Research and Technology-Marine Parks Authority and the Seychelles Fisheries 
Authority over the management of spawning grounds has been initiated, no signifi-
cant progress has been made to improve management efficiency between organiza-
tions dealing with Marine Protected Areas. In conclusion, the overall assessment for 
the delivery of Intermediate State Number Two is that it has been poorly achieved.
Current status of progress towards the intended impacts
The Review of Outcomes to Impacts did not undertake a direct assessment of the 
status of the intended global environmental benefits that formed the intervention’s 
intended impacts. However, project documentation was reviewed to collate existing 
information about the global environmental benefits and their conservation status. 
Table 7.6 provides a summary of the information that the review acquired.
The research reports emerging from the SEYMEMP project assessed the eco-
logical status of the coral reef and reef fish assemblages following the 1998 coral 
bleaching event, which generally showed slow but steady recovery, and monitored 
the ecological status of whale shark and turtles, which, although providing a good 
FIGURE 7.6 Theory of Change for Intermediate State 2
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baseline, did not provide any clear trends in status. The review was unable to obtain 
information on the ecological status of the global environmental benefits following 
project completion. Although certain non-governmental organizations are continu-
ing to gather data, particularly regarding marine turtles and whale sharks, the analy-
sis of these data (if collected) are not publicly available.
Regarding the status of threats to the global environmental benefits, the review 
did not undertake threat assessments. However, discussions with stakeholders 
TABLE 7.6 Available Information on Global Environmental Benefit Status
Change in status
Global environmental benefit At project end (2004) Since 2004
Coral Reef of the 
Western Indian Ocean
Hard corals had shown a slow but 
accelerating recovery. There was no 
overall loss of coral biodiversity, but 




Reef fish assemblages Project recorded significant increases 
in the abundance of some twenty 
fish categories between 2002 and 
2003, which seems to relate to 
increased recruitment resulting from 
favourable conditions (which may 
not be sustained in the future).
No information 
available and 
no figures on 
sustainable off-take 
of commercial reef 
fish
Whale sharks Exploratory research revealed that 
whale sharks around the Seychelles 
Granitic island population consist 
almost entirely of male juveniles, 
which migrate in when plankton is 
available.








Marine turtles Hawksbill: between the early 1980s 
and 2003, estimated numbers have 
declined by approximately 25%. But 
at unprotected sites the decline has 
been approximately 60%. Population 
in early 2000s was estimated at 625.
Green turtles: numbers of nesting turtles 
in the inner islands have remained 
less than 50 animals from the early 
1980s to 2002–2003. Increases in 
population are only evident on four 
privately managed islands of Cousin 
(571%), Aride (167%), and Cousine 
and Bird islands, for which no 
specific estimates could be obtained.
No data seen by 
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indicated that the threats are likely to be increasing, with more hotels in and around 
MPAs in the inner islands. Although the outer islands used to be protected due to 
their isolation, recent developments in the region (e.g. increased reach of fisheries 
due to larger vessels with greater cruising ranges and the market for more remote 
nature-based tourism activities) have made these threats more likely.
A direct assessment of global environmental benefits would require a separate 
study to compile and assess the monitoring data being collected by various institu-
tions, which was beyond the scope of a Review of Outcomes to Impacts. In the case 
of the Seychelles, the review felt that the Seychelles Centre for Marine Research 
and Technology-Marine Parks Authority would be well positioned to coordinate an 
annual assessment on the status of these and other potential global environmental 
benefits, which could feed into the further development/expansion of the inte-
grated Marine Protected Areas network.
Overall conclusions on progress towards impacts of the SEYMEMP
The study team used the Theory of Change methodology to assess that to date, 
only poor to partial success has been achieved in delivering the intended global 
environmental benefits/impacts (see Figure 7.7). Based on the continued monitor-
ing and protection activities of individual institutions (e.g. the Marine Conservation 
Society of Seychelles, Whale Shark Programme and the Turtle Action Group moni-
toring), and the enacting of more enabling policies, the review team assessed that 
the conservation status of whale sharks and turtles has remained stable or improved 
following project closure. However, the review did not find any evidence of an 
improvement in the conservation status of the coral reef and reef fish assemblages, 
as the overall marine protected area system has not yet been expanded to protect 
the emerging patterns of hard coral distribution and abundance. Furthermore, the 
project’s coral protection measures have not been scaled up (e.g. mooring installa-
tions and maintenance), and in some cases, these activities have been discontinued 
(e.g. programme to remove coral grazing organisms).
The Review of Outcomes to Impacts assessment concluded that the limited 
progress in delivering impacts has been mainly the result of the lack of institu-
tional capacity, leadership and collaboration in further developing and integrating 
the management of the Seychelles’ marine protected area network.
The lack of national-level coordination and leadership capacity for marine 
research and monitoring seems to have partly resulted from the over-reliance of the 
project on external consultants to undertake key aspects of the project. As identi-
fied in the project brief and Terminal Evaluation report, the national Marine Unit 
was envisioned to be the focus for developing research capacity and leadership in 
improving marine protected area management. But the unit relied heavily on a 
project adviser and other institutions and consultants to conduct the research and 
did not develop sufficient internal capacity and long-term funding sources during 
the project. As a result, the future of the marine unit appears to be unsustainable and 
a different institutional arrangement is needed to provide leadership.
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The diverse institutions involved in marine conservation require a clear frame-
work for coordination of research and management and the adoption of a systematic 
approach to the further expansion of a more representative and integrated marine 
protected area network. The failure to date to implement the project’s Integrated 
MPA System Plan and the continued lack of an agreed plan or framework for coop-
eration has meant that the status of the protected area network has remained little 
changed since project closure, with no new protected areas gazetted and manage-
ment effectiveness basically unchanged.
However, the review concluded that the intended impacts could still be achieved 
if this barrier of lack of institutional capacity, leadership and cooperation can be 
overcome. A development in this direction is the amalgamation of the Seychelles 
Centre for Marine Research and Technology with the Marine Park Authority to 
form the SCMRT-MPA in 2003. The SCMRT-MPA provides an appropriate insti-
tution to take over the role envisaged for the Marine Unit in coordinating marine 
FIGURE 7.7 Overall Review of Outcomes to Impacts Assessment of SEYMEMP 
Progress towards Impacts
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research, feeding it into the Marine Protected Area management decision-making 
and championing the revival of the MPA System Plan or an equivalent for develop-
ing an integrated MPA network. SCMRT-MPA has already made progress on the 
research side, but has yet to take on the role of leading the process to develop a more 
integrated and expanded MPA system.
Overall conclusions on assessing progress towards impacts in 
environmental programmes using the field Review of Outcomes 
to Impacts (ROtI) methodology
This chapter gives an introduction to the use of the field Review of Outcomes to 
Impacts as a means of assessing progress towards the intended impacts of an interven-
tion some years after formal project completion. The Review of Outcomes to Impacts 
begins with the project Terminal Evaluation and other key documents and creates a 
Theory of Change for the intended progression from the outcomes identified in the 
Terminal Evaluation towards the long-term impact objectives of the intervention.
The methodology explores the cause and effect chains of the pathway towards 
impacts, including the extent to which defined Intermediate States between out-
comes and impacts have been achieved. This allows the assessment of progress, even 
in cases where the duration of the change process may be many years. By using the 
Review of Outcomes to Impacts method, it can be seen whether the necessary 
follow-up activities to an intervention have been commenced, and, if so, how far 
they have gone and with what results. In other words, are the intervention follow-
up activities on track to eventually contribute towards the impacts for which the 
project was originally funded?
An important issue encompassed by the Review of Outcomes to Impacts method-
ology is the extent to which the original assumptions of the project proved accurate. 
For example, almost all project funding documents have the statement ‘government 
will continue to prioritize this issue for funds and human resources’. If this does not 
prove to be the case, the original positive outcomes achieved may fade. The Review of 
Outcomes to Impacts explicitly assesses whether the assumptions have in fact held true 
in the longer term. In addition, the method looks at the impact drivers set in motion 
by the project – its champions and its support systems, which need to continue after 
the initial project support has gone. It assesses whether these remain sufficiently strong 
to keep the necessary activities and systems moving forward towards their objectives.
As shown by the example of the SEYMEMP field Review of Outcomes to 
Impacts, the method enables a sufficiently detailed picture to be built to give an 
overall assessment of progress towards impacts. It does so in a cost-effective manner, 
usually requiring about two person-weeks of in-country mission, most of which 
is spent with institutional stakeholders and with limited field-visit verification. It 
therefore represents an intermediate method between full impact evaluation (which 
requires far more resources) and desk review (which lacks the opportunity, in par-
ticular, to bring together groups of stakeholders to develop an interactive vision of 
what has actually happened since project closure).
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The ROtI method has been found effective in various environmental sectors and 
for different timescales. For example, another detailed field ROtI was conducted in 
Jamaica for the GEF Energy Demand Side Management project in the field of cli-
mate change. A particularly interesting aspect of this review is that it was conducted 
a full ten years after project completion. A brief overview of its findings is provided 
in Box 7.1.
Furthermore, energy efficiency approaches have recently been supported by UNDP, 
both in terms of specific projects in the health sector and of support to the develop-
ment of the Government’s Energy Policy. The Inter-American Development Bank is 
also providing substantial support in this area. Thus, it appears likely that the progress 
of Demand Side Management/Energy Efficiency will continue and even expand in 
future. The DSM Project has clearly made an important contribution towards these 
trends, although it would not be possible to say exactly how much contribution.
Whereas the earlier World Bank-GEF Post-Implementation Impact Assessment, 
five years after Project Completion, focused mainly on attempting to quantify the 
contribution of reduced GHG emissions (and reduced energy costs), the ROtI after ten 
years has found that a ‘second wave’ of results, further along the Outcomes to Impacts 
pathways, has become evident. These results focus in the field of enhanced knowledge 
and expertise concerning Energy Efficiency/Demand Side Management promoted 
through all levels of the education system; and in the development of a detailed and 
coherent Government approach towards Energy and Climate Change, embodied in a 
new national Energy Policy, intended to focus national approaches until the year 2030.
Overall, the field Review of Outcomes to Impacts presents a valuable addition to 
the range of methods available to those seeking to assess progress from project results 
towards long-term impacts. Furthermore, since it was specifically developed for the 
realm of environmental interventions (notably for global environmental activities), 
it does not suffer from the difficulties commonly experienced in adapting methods 
of poverty-focused evaluation to the environment sector.
BOX 7.1 KEY FINDINGS OF JAMAICA DEMAND 
SIDE MANAGEMENT ROTI
Ten years after project completion, the project had partially achieved its intended 
progress towards impact and the expected Global Environment Benefits. After a 
post-completion period in which it appeared that the project’s contribution might 
fade away (apart from the market transformation for Compact Fluorescent 
Lightbulbs (CFLs), as a result of the privatization of the main national energy sup-
plier, there was a return of interest focused around Government’s development of 
an Energy Policy. This has a component sub-policy on Energy Conservation and 
Efficiency that explicitly refers to the DSM project as part of its antecedents. The 
issues around Climate Change, Energy Efficiency and Demand Side Management 
have also, over time, been well incorporated at all levels of the national educa-
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FIGURE 7.8 Overall SEYMEMP Theory of Change
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Notes
 1 See, for example, Leeuw and Vaessen (2009) and 3ie (2013).
 2 Further details on this work are provided in R. van den Berg and D. Todd (2011).
 3 See GEF Evaluation Office (2006).
 4 See GEF Evaluation Office (2009a).
 5 The range of approaches and methods used by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office 
is described on its website: https://www.gefieo.org/knowledge-methods.
 6 There is also a desk review of Outcomes to Impacts, which uses only project documents 
to assess the fit between project design and delivery at completion and the intended 
pathway towards impacts.
 7 Full details of the Review of Outcomes to Impacts methodology have been provided in 
a handbook. See GEF Evaluation Office (2009b).
 8 See GEF Evaluation Office (2009b).
 9 The acronym MPA refers to the Marine Protected Area system. A similar acronym, the 
SCMRT-MPA, refers to an institution, the Seychelles Centre for Marine Research and 
Technology – Marine Parks Authority.
 10 See GEF Evaluation Office (2009a).
 11 In order to keep the chapter to a manageable length, only a summary of the review 
process is provided for this intermediate state (the full method has been outlined for 
Intermediate State 3).
 12 See Engelhardt (2004a, 2004b).
References
Engelhardt, U., ‘The status of scleractinian coral and reef associated fish communities 6 years after the 
1998 mass coral bleaching event’, Consultancy report by Reefcare International, Australia, 
2004a.
Engelhardt, U., ‘Seychelles integrated marine protected area system plan’, Consultancy report by 
Reefcare International, Australia. 2004b.
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Evaluation Office, GEF Country Portfolio Study: Jamaica. 
Review of Outcomes to Impacts: Jamaica Demand Side Management Project (Volume 2), 
Washington, DC, 2011.
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Evaluation Office, The Role of Local Benefits in Global 
Environmental Programs, Washington, DC, 2006.
GEF Evaluation Office, ‘Seychelles Marine Ecosystem Management Project: Review of Outcomes to 
Impacts’, Nairobi and Washington, DC, 2009a.
GEF Evaluation Office, ‘The Review of Outcomes to Impacts Handbook: Towards Enhancing the 
Impacts of Environmental Projects’, Nairobi and Washington, DC 2009b.
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3IE), 2013 ‘Improving Lives Through Impact 
Evaluation: A Strategy for 3IE 2010–2013’, New Delhi, India available at http://
www.3ieimpact.org/media/filer/2012/05/17/3ie_strategy_report_2010-13.pdf, last 
accessed September 12 2013.
Leeuw, F. and J. Vaessen, Impact Evaluations and Development: NONIE Guidance on Impact, , 
Network of Networks for Impact Evaluation, Washington, DC2009.
van den Berg, R. and D. Todd, ‘The full road to impact: The experience of the Global 
Environment Facility fourth overall performance study’, Journal of Development Effectiveness, 
no. 3, 2011.
8




In evaluating climate change mitigation interventions, a large number of questions 
revolve around the impacts of greenhouse gas mitigation (e.g. Did the interven-
tion actually lead to greenhouse gas emission reductions? Who can claim credit for 
the reductions?). Although these questions are straightforward in some cases, for 
example where renewable fuels are directly substituting for fossil fuels, few climate 
change mitigation interventions in developing countries focus on such a direct 
switch.
Instead, mitigation interventions focus the majority of their effort on capacity 
building, policy frameworks, consumer awareness or training of technicians. This 
complicates the challenge of measuring the impacts, and the challenge of attribu-
tion: assessing the relative contribution of each such activity requires a clear under-
standing of the answers to complex questions, such as why and in what situation 
which technology is used and what effected a change.
Market and behaviour change can be measurable, but not attributable to the 
intervention, because factors outside of the intervention also contributed to the 
change in market conditions. In order to identify an interventions’ impact in a given 
context, it is useful to use a framework to clarify which barriers to the use of the 
‘better’ technology were actually limiting the change for the better in the first place, 
and if these were addressed effectively by the intervention. Such a framework would 
constitute an important step towards solving the attribution question in climate 
change mitigation. Without such a framework, evaluations typically give limited 
weight to capacity building and policy interventions and most greenhouse gas ben-
efits are attributed to investments.
This study presents the ‘Theory of No Change’, an ‘inverted’ theory of change 
for climate mitigation interventions and a tool for assessing situations why projects 
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fail. The core theory is a scheme comprising the barriers that prevent the broader 
diffusion of a product or keep users and consumers from making more climate-
friendly choices. Based on empirical analysis, it was possible to identify a closed 
set of such barriers, which in their sum are close to representing a full programme 
theory, the Theory of No Change.
With the help of this framework, we are able to assess whether or not an inter-
vention contributed to a more favourable framework for a sustainable energy tech-
nology’s market development. This allows a deeper and more useful analysis of an 
intervention’s impacts and potential avenues for improvement than the standard 
practice of using output-based evaluation.
The Climate Change Evaluators Community of Practice, hosted by the 
Evaluation Office of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), sponsored this work. 
The Community of Practice facilitates knowledge exchange, mutual help and inspi-
ration among climate evaluators. It has compiled a library of almost 500 climate 
change mitigation and adaptation evaluations at the project, programme, policy 
and portfolio levels. After a number of more formal summaries (e.g. Matambo and 
Griebenow 2010), this chapter takes a first stab at a fundamental challenge of miti-
gation evaluations – the quest for a common programme logic of climate mitiga-
tion interventions. It can be used as an evaluation framework tool for attributing 
causality. The framework was first published in a longer version by the Community 
of Practice (Wörlen 2011a). The author is grateful to the Community of Practice 
for the support of this work.
Some persistent climate mitigation evaluation questions
Climate change mitigation initiatives attempt to minimize changes to the global 
climate by limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Most mitigation efforts have been 
undertaken in the energy sector, where most interventions strive to replace fossil 
fuels with non-emitting energy sources or to reduce energy consumption. Many 
donors, national institutions and private entities undertake projects to that end.
These projects, almost irrespective of whether they take place in developing or 
developed countries, suffer from a persistent tension – perceived or real – between 
greenhouse gas-related and developmental objectives. Growth often leads to rising 
greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, avoiding greenhouse gas emissions is often put 
on par with limiting growth. Mitigation projects in the development realm need to 
reconcile these seemingly contradictory objectives.
Few development interventions directly reduce emissions. Greenhouse gas 
reducing interventions attempt to facilitate the switch from existing technologies 
to less- or zero-emitting technologies or fuels. With the exception of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), few development-oriented activities help to 
make that switch directly. Instead, non-CDM climate mitigation initiatives often 
help build supply chains, policy frameworks, informed demand, technical skills and 
other types of local capacity, thus enabling the actual users of the greenhouse-gas-
emitting technologies to use cleaner alternatives. Directly replacing them is not 
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typically part of project activities. Rather, most interventions conduct or support 
activities that cause changes in target groups’ behaviour. Projects often educate users 
about the new technologies, build the new technologies’ supply chains or make 
available financing to buy and operate these technologies. The end users themselves 
might not even be part of the intervention (e.g. when interventions work with 
policy makers on regulatory changes or with financiers on the development of 
financial products).
Thus, most interventions work on a more fundamental level, apply a more 
indirect programme logic and intend to provide more catalytic impacts towards a 
 climate-friendly way of living. This presents a challenge for results measurement and 
attribution. Projects’ impacts on greenhouse gas emissions are often assessed based 
on outcome indicators that relate to emission-relevant behaviour (e.g. energy con-
sumption). A number of assumptions are necessary for drawing conclusions regard-
ing the causal link between project activities and greenhouse gas impacts. The basis 
for these conclusions is necessarily a conceptual model of the relationship between 
project outputs and outcomes and between outcomes and objectives. Although 
this is a well-documented challenge for results-based evaluations, the logical chain 
between a project’s interventions and the ultimate objective of climate preservation 
is particularly long and weakly formulated in many mitigation projects.
This is compounded by the fact that a project’s formulation or its underlying 
conceptual model frequently fails to discuss a large number of preconditions. For 
example, there is no common understanding on the right set of preconditions for 
climate-friendly behaviour, appropriate indicators (and on which levels they should 
be measured), standardized data, data sources and data quality requirements. Often, 
the mix of preconditions is described as general ‘lack of capacity’, which hardly 
clarifies what should be done about it. In addition, mitigation interventions do not 
start with a blank slate or exist in a static environment. The context in which an 
intervention takes place and its development over time are highly relevant to the 
interventions’ success. However, contexts are hard to acknowledge, to fully describe 
and for which to account.
A theory of change that accounts for an intervention’s context is the necessary 
basis for assessing an intervention’s results. This theory of change needs to go beyond 
the linear project logic of any single component. It should also serve as a model 
for aggregating the outcomes of different activities that might take place at the 
same time, which can generate synergistic effects, counteract each other or remain 
independent. They might take place with completely different stakeholder groups, 
interventions, instruments and on such different time scales that, in evaluations, they 
are hard to bring into relation to each other.
One challenge in particular compounds this issue: many climate change mitiga-
tion interventions will only result in reduced carbon emissions sometime after the 
project’s end and after its final evaluation. The evaluator can only examine interme-
diary outcomes; conclusions about a project’s ultimate impacts with respect to the 
climate mitigation objectives will need to be drawn based on these interim observa-
tions. Necessarily, these evaluations will have preliminary character and the findings 
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will remain clouded with significant uncertainty as to the project’s ultimate impacts. 
Improving the underlying theory that links the intermediary outcomes with the 
ultimate objectives might reduce this uncertainty.
Objective and methodology of the meta-analysis
A large number of challenges persist in climate mitigation evaluations. One reason 
for a number of these challenges is that there is no agreed-on programme theory of 
change regarding how to transform unsustainable energy use into more sustainable 
use of energy (e.g. by substituting renewable energy for fossil fuels or by shifting 
towards more energy-efficient, less polluting equipment). Having a clear concep-
tualization of what is required for behavioural changes to take place would address 
a significant number of the challenges mentioned – it would help clarify the roles 
that non-investment-related activities play and how different interventions interact 
with each other, so that context can be better analysed. The meta-analysis set out to 
compile theories of change from a large number of evaluations of climate mitiga-
tion interventions, to distil a common theory of change.
Such a theory of change can not only form the basis for formulating systematic 
outcome indicators that reflect the full set of necessary enabling conditions but can 
also help identify the full scope of evaluations that look for reasons for a project’s 
success or failure (not only in the projects proper, but also in their context). Such a 
concept would not only be helpful for the evaluation of projects, programmes and 
policies, but it would also have some predictive power and would be able to support 
project design and monitoring.
There are a number of necessary preconditions for a market to physically switch 
towards sustainable energy technologies: the technology needs to be available, local 
users need to be aware of and create demand for it, they need to understand the 
new technology and might need some kind of supply chain for maintenance ser-
vices. Larger investments might require loan financing, as sometimes the amounts 
of money to be initially invested might be simply unaffordably high despite an 
investment’s long-term cost-effectiveness. Further, in some development contexts 
an energy-efficient cook stove costing just few dollars might represent a significant 
outlay to the target demographic. In other cases, policy frameworks might be neces-
sary to level the economic and regulatory playing field between new and traditional 
technologies. Developing such frameworks requires that policy makers are aware 
of the benefits of a sustainable energy technology and know-how to create policy 
frameworks that leverage these benefits. All of these capacities need to be in place.
They refer to a number of different stakeholders which need to be consid-
ered when analysing mitigation interventions, in particular those interventions that 
intend to trigger market development for sustainable energy technologies. After 
analysing a large number of climate mitigation evaluations, the study on which 
this chapter is based concluded that for sustainable market development, four main 
groups of stakeholders play a role: users of the technology, the supply chain (i.e. 
shops and maintenance technicians), policy makers and local financial institutions.
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Each of these groups typically encounters a number of barriers that keep them 
from using or supporting the sustainable energy technology. This chapter cata-
logues the barriers for the relevant stakeholder groups and puts them together in a 
Theory of No Change, which helps identify why a desired change is not happening. 
Analysing barriers with the theory can serve to design activities for removing the 
barriers to change.
The model uses Tokle and Uitto (2009) as the basis for drafting a full set of 
barriers to be included in the Theory of No Change. For testing, two case studies 
were undertaken on the basis of evaluations from the Climate-Eval library (Wӧrlen 
2011b, 2011c). The Thailand case study selected projects that come from the tradi-
tional realm of market transformation approaches and tried to analyse whether the 
Theory of No Change could completely represent the market barriers and their 
relationship with the ultimate objectives. The second case study, for Poland, worked 
on the public investment sector (district heating and boiler replacement) and ana-
lysed to what degree the market transformation concept and the barrier-oriented 
Theory of No Change helped to understand processes in the transformation of a 
larger, bulky investment. These case studies help extend the versatility of the concept 
and formulate recommendations for evaluative practice and future research needs.
Programme logic for climate change mitigation: the Theory  
of No Change
Typical climate mitigation interventions include public awareness campaigns, 
capacity building for technicians, advisory services for policy makers, provision of 
information and demonstration projects. Very few climate change mitigation inter-
ventions of, for example, the GEF, address direct greenhouse gas emissions on a sig-
nificant scale. Many more are targeted towards providing an enabling environment 
for the deployment of energy efficient technologies or renewable energy use. This 
means that the theory of change for these interventions is necessarily somewhat 
indirect and hard to express in strong causalities or even quantitative indicators.1
The evaluation framework of Tokle and Uitto (2009)
The challenge is to come up with a strong description of the logic that leads from 
enabling environments to greenhouse gas reductions. Tokle and Uitto (2009) pro-
pose an evaluation framework that illustrates a possible programme logic for such 
a market transformation intervention (see Figure 8.1). It shows that an enabling 
environment consists of five different capacities that need to be in existence locally:
• Enabling policies, strategies, standards and certification in place
• Adequate financing available
• Adequate business infrastructure
• Awareness created
• Innovation and technology diffused
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Tokle and Uitto (2009: 143) emphasize that ‘normally all these capacities must be in 
place in order to provide the enabling environment for sustainable development and 
growth of a market, with supply and demand infrastructure for renewable energy 
technologies. Market development and removal of barriers to adoption of climate 
friendly technologies are a continuous process’. When these capacities are in place, 
the authors describe the intermediate outcome of a climate mitigation intervention 
as a sustainable market transformation for increased energy savings or applications 
of renewable energy.
These statements also imply that an intervention addresses only one of these 
aspects (e.g. it works only with policy makers, financiers or the training of techni-
cians), risks not leading to market change or sustainable energy utilization, as they 
might neglect other important preconditions. This limits the intervention’s potential 
overall impact. If an intervention chooses to focus on only one small part of the 
necessary capacities, but still intends to achieve significant greenhouse gas impacts, 
it needs to ensure that the other capacities either are already in existence or are 
addressed through other interventions.
Project strategies often work towards one or more of these results (see Figure 
8.1). For example, awareness campaigns, technical training, policy formulation assis-
tance or development of energy efficiency standards are all typical activities within 
climate mitigation projects. Their evaluations, however, will typically remain inter-
vention specific, pay little attention to the context in terms of the other neces-
sary preconditions and thus not be able to analyse all of the previously mentioned 
attribution and aggregation challenges. Further, the evaluations will not be able 
FIGURE 8.1 Evaluation Framework of Tokle and Uitto (2009)
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to reflect the context of the local market situation in terms of the other necessary 
preconditions, as there is no baseline and no absolute standard of ‘how it should be’.
In their framework, Tokle and Uitto (2009) implicitly acknowledge that a multi-
tude of stakeholders are involved in market transformation. For example, consumers, 
businesses, financial intermediaries and policy makers all constitute relevant target 
groups. Policy makers are responsible for providing the necessary policy framework; 
banks and financiers need to be available for financing the energy transformation; 
service providers and technology companies need to install, sell, operate and/or 
maintain the new energy equipment; and all these groups and individuals need to 
be well informed and aware of the new technologies and opportunities. Figure 8.2 
maps which strategy can apply to which stakeholder group.
Evaluation framework
Figure 8.2 illustrates that the stakeholders find themselves in different positions in 
Tokle and Uitto’s (2009) framework. In terms of sustainable energy use, important 
agents include the users of energy or energy-using equipment; the supply chain of 
sustainable energy technologies, fuels and maintenance services; the financiers for 
both supply chain enterprises and users of energy technologies; and policy makers 
(in the widest sense of the word) who need to provide conducive framework condi-
tions for deploying sustainable energy technologies and services. For each group of 
agents, it is important to identify the reasons why he or she does not yet behave in 
FIGURE 8.2 Evaluation Framework of Tokle and Uitto (2009) with Stakeholder Groups
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an climate-friendly manner (i.e. does not yet use the sustainable energy technology 
in question, foster it with supportive policy schemes, finance investments into this 
technology or selling or servicing that technology). These reasons can be under-
stood as the barriers to climate-friendly behaviour and sustainable energy systems.
Mapping stakeholders onto the Tokle and Uitto (2009) framework makes it pos-
sible to rearrange the strategies from a focus on enabling capacities towards a focus 
on removing barriers: if all stakeholders play their respective role with respect to the 
strategies, the desired outcome of greenhouse gas savings ensues. By turning this 
around, we can identify strategies along the lines of the stakeholders and find the 
reasons why a situation might not change.
The absence of enabling capacities poses a barrier to market development that 
can be measured in a more generalizable and standardizable way for a larger num-
ber and scale of interventions. If the barriers are gone – the enabling capacities are 
 present – the situation is going to change and gravitate to the desired behaviour or 
market situation. This ‘Theory of No Change’ thus formulates a framework describ-
ing the complete set of conditions that might be barriers to more efficient behav-
iour for all relevant stakeholders.
An abstract description of the potential barrier types
Analysing a large number of evaluations for two sectoral developments (energy 
efficiency in Thailand and district heating in Poland, both over almost two decades; 
Wӧrlen 2011b, 2011c) has enabled the identification of seven generic barriers that 
can be observed for almost all stakeholder groups:
 1. Ignorance: Stakeholders might not know that a technological alternative 
exists. This is a particularly obvious barrier for consumers and users – if they 
do not know that an alternative to their current unsustainable behaviour exists, 
they cannot use it. However, all the other market stakeholders also need to be 
aware of the more sustainable alternative in order to play their respective role 
in the market. In terms of Figure 8.1, awareness needs to be created throughout 
the market that is to be changed.
 2. Lack of expertise: Even if people know about the technologies, actually 
using, marketing or servicing them might require specific technical knowledge 
or skills. In this analysis, expertise is defined for each stakeholder group as the 
specific skills that are required in the transformed market. Training of tech-
nicians is particularly important for the supply chain, and many technology 
programmes in developing countries and technology suppliers provide it. In 
addition, policy makers need some expertise in order to provide a supportive 
policy framework, and financiers need to have the skills to evaluate a new tech-
nology in its context.
 3. Lack of access to technology: Even if sufficient people are trained in using 
the technology, the technology might not be available in the local market. That 
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might be an expression of insufficient capacity along the supply chain, which 
might or might not be caused by a lack of financing or one of the other barriers 
to building up a sustainable supply chain. However, in many cases it is related 
to policies in unrelated domains (e.g. terms of trade, taxes, tariffs, administrative 
procedures and other policy areas). This barrier is important for users and for 
the supply chain.
 4. Lack of motivation: Even if the technology is accessible, people are aware of 
it and know how to use it, and even if it might be cost-effective compared to 
the conventional alternative, people might still not be interested in using, sup-
plying, financing or politically supporting it. Reasons for this might lie in the 
image connected with the old technology, in the realm of prejudices, or per-
ceived risks or bad experiences with the new technology. A lack of motivation 
might also be associated with an overall resistance to change. Lack of motiva-
tion can affect all stakeholder groups (with the possible exception of financiers).
 5. Lack of cost effectiveness: One barrier is that on a total cost of ownership 
basis, the technology might be more expensive than the established technol-
ogy. This can be due to a number of factors, such as fossil fuel subsidies or the 
newness of the technology. Barring substantial technological advances, using 
hydrogen fuel cells for self-consumption instead of subsidized grid electricity 
might be more expensive in both the long and short run, and will therefore not 
be a popular choice.
 6. Lack of affordability: Even if a technology is cost effective under total-
cost-of-ownership considerations, sustainable energy technologies are often 
associated with high upfront costs and low operating costs. For example, wind 
turbines entail a large investment but have no fuel costs so that in good wind 
locations the production of a unit of wind power might be cheaper than coal 
power. However, if no investment financing for these technologies is available 
(e.g. in the form of investment capital, equity or loans), the technology will not 
be deployed. This lack of working capital is a barrier for both consumers and 
supply chain actors. In addition, financiers might have issues in providing loans 
due to their own liquidity issues. Policy makers may want to finance incentives 
but not have the fiscal means to do so.
 7. Lack of demand/business model: For some products, it is necessary that 
the market reaches a specific size in order for the supply chain to build up or 
for financiers to become available. If this is not the case, innovative business 
models could reduce this barrier. For example, energy service companies can 
use innovative loans or rental schemes (leasing or exclusive-use contracts) so 
that stakeholders in a niche market can pioneer the technology.
 8. Projects, policies and programmes in the climate mitigation area typically try 
to remove one or more of these barriers. As discussed, the same barrier might 
apply to different stakeholder groups. For example, policy makers, financiers 
and users all might not trust new technologies in terms of their technical per-
formance. For these generic barriers, the same barrier removal strategy – and 
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sometimes even the same activity – can be used, tailored to the respective 
stakeholder group. The more comprehensive the programme, the more barriers 
are addressed. In the best of worlds, all barriers that exist in a specific context 
are identified at the project design phase and comprehensive barrier removal 
strategies are designed accordingly.
The stakeholder–barrier matrix
If every stakeholder group encountered every barrier, a matrix with 28 barriers 
would result. However, not all barriers are relevant for all stakeholders. The follow-
ing section discusses what barriers can be eliminated by theoretical considerations 
in order to reduce the number of barriers that are necessary to draw the full picture.
For example, for financiers and policy makers, it makes no difference whether 
they have access to the technology as they will not use it themselves – they will 
only provide the financing or regulatory frameworks for it. The concept of a 
‘business model’ should also not be applied to policy makers. Excluding these 
irrelevant barriers allows us to draw a reduced stakeholder–barrier matrix (see 
Table 8.1).
For users, the different business cases result in different cost-effectiveness and are 
therefore subsumed under cost-effectiveness. For now, another barrier disregarded 
in the next stages of discussion is the supply chain and financiers’ potential lack of 
interest and motivation – here it shall be assumed that the supply chain consists 
mostly of organizations that strive to increase their business and will not need extra 
motivation if they see a new business opportunity or can expand their product 
offerings. It is also assumed that a lack of liquidity with financiers constitutes the 
same barrier to financiers’ engagement as a lack of cost effectiveness. Excluding 
these irrelevant barriers allows the drawing of a reduced stakeholder-barrier matrix 
(see Table 8.1).
A case study based on ten evaluations of energy efficient market transformations 
in Thailand was used to test whether this set-up of stakeholder groups and barriers 
is able to reflect the situation in the market. The model was tested for the number 
of stakeholder groups to be included: consumers/users of equipment, the supply 
chain that delivers hardware and maintenance services, policy makers who create 
the enabling policy framework and the financiers that provide for the necessary 
financial liquidity.
One test was whether the implementing agency should be part of the model. 
This was rejected as barriers are only relevant for those stakeholders that play a role 
in the functioning market after project implementation. If implementing agencies 
are not active in one of the markets in one of the four roles mentioned earlier, their 
barrier situation is irrelevant for the actual functioning of the market. Once the 
market is sustainably operating, there is no need for further activities of the imple-
menting agency or a special role in the barrier circle. Their activity is expressed 
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in the project mapping. Thus, it is not helpful to include them in the stakeholder 
groups of the Theory of No Change.
A number of barriers might apply only to specific subgroups of the stakeholder 
groups or specific product markets. For example, in the market transformation from 
TABLE 8.1 Example for Barrier Removal Strategies
Stakeholder group Barrier





Lack of expertise Product design
Lack of access Build-up of supply chain
Lack of affordability Subsidy
Lack of interest/motivation Awareness campaign
Lack of cost-effectiveness Product design
Supply chain Ignorance Awareness campaign, 
pilot project
Lack of expertise Training
Lack of access Trade facilitation
Lack of affordability Facilitating finance 
through special or 
mainstream financial 
intermediaries
Lack of cost effectiveness Support policies









Lack of expertise Advisory support
Lack of fiscal affordability Financial transfers
Financier Ignorance Awareness campaign
Lack of expertise Training
Lack of cost-effectiveness Training, financial sup-
port facilities (e.g. guar-
antees, concessions)





incandescent light bulbs to compact fluorescent light bulbs, users do not need any 
additional expertise in using the light bulbs (their functionality is exactly the same 
for both products). The case study in Poland used examples from a number of large 
investment programmes in energy efficient heating and district heating. In district 
heating, consumers often do not have a choice. Heat is provided by a utility, and 
supporting services might be provided by a private sector supply chain. So, depend-
ing on the project set-up or the market complexity, it might be necessary to adjust 
the TONC, e.g. by splitting the stakeholder group of supply chain actors into sev-
eral subgroups. And again, not each stakeholder group faces all barriers. In the case 
studies on Poland for example, three more barriers were found to be irrelevant for 
these particular groups.
Across all market situations studied in Thailand and Poland, two barriers were 
consistently found to not significantly impede market development. These were 
‘access to technology’ for the supply chain and ‘ignorance’ for policy makers. It 
reflects well on the projects that these two barriers were not relevant in the country 
cases studied. ‘Access to technology’ was possible for the supply chain in these cases, 
which meant that international technology markets were effectively supplying the 
countries with the necessary technologies. For the most part, the implementing 
agencies sufficiently included policy makers in the interventions in order to make 
them aware of the technologies and energy efficient options that were available. 
Where it can be assumed that this will be the case for most countries and most 
energy technologies (except nuclear power) it might be possible to shorten the 
concept by these two barriers.
Barriers might not be independent. For example, whenever ‘lack of affordability’ 
for the supply chain was an issue at the project outset (only in the cases of coal to 
gas and geothermal in Poland), the ‘lack of business model/demand’ barrier was 
a dispositive barrier to market development. When the ‘lack of demand’ barrier 
was removed, the suppliers were also able to afford the investment into these new 
lines of business. In those cases in which lack of affordability for the supply chain 
is observed the barrier can be reflected on the financiers’ side. However, this might 
not apply in other areas. For example, in the area of off-grid electrification, higher 
electrification rates can only be reached with higher capital infusions. Therefore, 
one of the two barriers could be taken out, and in later applications of the Theory of 
No Change, we have mostly left out the barrier of ‘lack of business model/demand’ 
as it was shown to be a compound of other barriers, and its inclusion did not lead 
to additional analytical power.
Other barriers appear to have had a negligible impact on market development in 
the case studies. In particular, the lack of motivation for policy makers has not effec-
tively hampered market development in these cases. However, government support 
is part of the decision-making system of most official development assistance bodies, 
and therefore, it is not surprising that in all the projects analysed here, the govern-
ment was motivated to support market development. If these were private sector- or 
civil society-driven market changes, governments’ motivation might have been a 
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barrier. Therefore, it is not recommended to generally leave out this barrier but be 
judgemental about that.
A mapping tool for barriers and interventions
An underlying assumption of the barrier discussion for market transformation is 
that all relevant barriers need to be removed in order for market transformation 
to take place. This can be addressed with a checklist. A visualization tool has been 
developed that illustrates barrier intensity with traffic light colours (see Figure 8.3). 
It can be combined with a visualization of the project intervention (see Figure 
8.4) so that the line-up of the intervention with the barriers can be assessed at one 
glance (see Figure 8.5).
The barrier circle
Figure 8.3 represents the market as a circle with four segments representing the 
four stakeholder groups (users/consumers, supply chain, local financiers and policy 
makers). The barriers, according to Table 8.1, are represented by small elements 
labelled with the name of the barrier. Each element can be coloured according to 
the strength of the barrier in a specific market situation. This colour code follows 
the globally accepted colour scheme of a traffic light, but with two intermediate 
steps (yellow and orange) instead of only one. Green is a situation that is favourable 
to market change. Yellow is a situation that is not necessarily favourable, but there 
is no significant barrier. Orange and red are barriers that impede market change 
(orange is the colour for a situation that significantly slows down market change; 
red is the colour for a barrier that can bring market development to a halt). As long 
as there is a red barrier for any single factor, the market will not change in any 
meaningful way.
The example in Figure 8.3 is taken from the case studies and relates to a mar-
ket where the financiers’ activities, attitudes and awareness levels do not fully stop, 
but do slow down the change in the market, particularly due to a ‘lack of business 
model’ (i.e. they did not encounter enough demand to develop a financial product). 
This is symbolized by the yellow and orange wedges in the financiers’ part of the 
circle in the lower right segment. Policy makers – the lower-left segment of the cir-
cle – know of the opportunity (as indicated by the green of the ‘ignorance’ barrier), 
are motivated to put in place the appropriate policies and frameworks (as indicated 
by green of the ‘lack of interest/motivation’ ring segment) and have the fiscal means 
to do so – indicated by the green colour of the ‘lack of affordability’ ring segment. 
However, policy makers do not know which would be the right policies or how 
to implement them. Thus, ‘lack of expertise’ is coloured orange: it constitutes a 
significant barrier to market change. None of these barriers would necessarily be 
an absolute bar to market change without an intervention. But as shown in Figure 
8.3, the consumers’ ignorance and the lack of cost effectiveness of an engagement 
150 Christine Wörlen
of the supply chain in the market are red, indicating that they are absolute barriers 
preventing a functioning market for energy-efficient products from developing.
The barrier circle can be used for project planning up front and can help iden-
tify the relevant barriers and design the appropriate barrier removal strategies. 
Comparing the barrier circle is drawn for the situation before and after the project 
illustrates the barrier removal impact of a project.
The intervention circle
Figure 8.4 presents an example from the case studies of the second part of the 
visualization tool, the intervention circle. The spikes on the spider web point in the 
same as the direction as the barrier they are designed to address. The axis signifies 
the intensity of the intervention: the farther out the points lie on the spider web, 
the more intense is the project’s focus on these activities. The intensity of the bar-
rier removal activities is ranked on a scale from zero to five. So far, no methodology 
can serve to calibrate the intensity of the barrier removal activity as compared to 
the intensity of the barrier. Therefore, the relative rank of the activity relates to its 
FIGURE 8.3 Example for Mapping the Barriers in the Barrier Circle Diagram
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importance within the intervention. The most important element of an interven-
tion is given the highest ranking of five. Other, less important parts of the inter-
vention received lower rankings, in relation to their relative importance within the 
intervention.
In the example presented in Figure 8.4, the project consisted of several activi-
ties: a consultancy helped policy makers develop expertise on smart policies, in this 
case a labelling policy for energy efficient appliances. The project built a consensus 
on the labelling system among manufacturers of these systems so that a joint move 
towards more market transparency through the labels created a business case for the 
suppliers to produce and distribute more efficient appliances. An awareness cam-
paign helped consumers understand the energy efficient product and the energy 
efficiency labels. A part of the awareness campaign worked on the motivational bar-
rier, by making it ‘the cool thing’ to buy the appliance with the energy efficiency 
label. Side effects of these activities were that financiers also started to understand 
the market for energy efficient appliances (through the labels) and found it a cost-
effective market opportunity (through the consensus building exercise whose pri-
mary target group were the manufacturers).
Thus, with the help of the intervention circle, each project is illustrated as a char-
acteristic fingerprint of barrier removal activities. If interventions or intervention 
FIGURE 8.4 The Intervention Circle
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components cannot be mapped on this circle, their contribution to market devel-
opment might be limited or at least unconventional. On the other hand, the inter-
vention circle does not distinguish between projects carried out by different actors, 
stakeholder groups or agencies. It can also capture the activities of several projects 
and interventions going on in parallel. All of them can be mapped onto a single 
spider web diagram which highlights potential synergies and complementarities (as 
well as potential conflicts) at a glance.
Putting the two together
Figure 8.5 illustrates how the two tools shown in Figures 8.3 and 8.4 can be com-
bined to illustrate an intervention’s match with the existing barriers in a market. A 
simple overlay of the two diagrams illustrates the degree to which the activities align 
with the barriers. In the example presented here, the consensus achieved with the 
supply chain and the energy efficiency labels directly addressed the lack of aware-
ness for this not-yet-cost-effective product and created a new business model, con-
sisting of selling energy efficient appliances in addition to the original appliances. 
This improved consumers’ access to the energy efficient appliance. The awareness 
campaign informed consumers and users about the energy efficient option, and the 
labels motivated consumers to buy the more energy efficient appliance. Another 
FIGURE 8.5 Barrier Circle and Intervention Circle Diagram
Meta-analysis of climate mitigation evaluations 153
project component assisted policy makers in becoming smarter about energy effi-
ciency labelling policies, their development and their enforcement. However, the 
overlay of the diagrams also shows that a number of yellow and orange barriers were 
not addressed by project activities. It seems that these barriers were not removed 
successfully through the intervention. If they are not in place after the intervention 
anymore, this would have to be attributed to other factors that were not part of the 
project.
This example illustrates how, together, the barrier circle and the intervention 
circle can give an indication of the likelihood for success of an intervention at the 
design stage of a project. When used in evaluation, the direction of the lines in the 
Intervention Circle will be aligned with those barriers that they actually addressed 
(even if they might have been designed to address other barriers or without an 
explicit barrier removal consideration). The tool is able to illustrate the sector in 
a holistic manner and reflect that barriers are sometimes not independent. It also 
reflects the barriers in their relative importance: If an intervention is designed on 
the basis of a sound barrier analysis, it will typically strive to remove the red bar-
riers. If the red barriers are removed, the market might grow to some degree but 
market transformation most likely will be slowed down if orange barriers remain. 
As markets develop, new barriers that used to be orange will then come up and 
become ‘red lights’. New barriers can also be created by external factors such as 
changes in government, financial crises, failure of technical infrastructures or new 
technological developments. The traffic light system will reliably indicate these bar-
riers in updated analyses.
Summary and outlook
Effective climate change mitigation requires a long-term fundamental transfor-
mation of almost all energy-consuming processes in society. In order to reach a 
climate-compatible energy system – and this is true for many other areas of green-
house gas emissions as well – we need a close-to-complete transformation of the 
way we provide and use energy. Project designers are aware that their efforts can 
only be small steps on this long path. Thus, most projects strive for some catalytic 
or transformative impacts that would trigger changes beyond the actual scope of 
the interventions. Most of the project documents formulate this explicitly as part 
of their motivation or even as their objective. Their mission is to contribute to an 
altered way of energy use by creating an enabling environment, rather than replac-
ing every light bulb.
The larger goal of reduced emissions is many causal steps removed from what-
ever a project can achieve. This creates a significant attribution challenge. In order 
to better define the logical linkages between the steps and the goal, this chapter 
has developed a programme theory for climate mitigation intervention that allows 
assessing contributions to the larger goal. It looks not at positive contributions but 
at effects of removing barriers – where they exist nothing happens. When they are 
removed, change can take place.
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This concept gave the programme theory its name: Theory of No Change. The 
concept has been developed on the basis of three sources: The online library of 
mitigation evaluations of the Climate Change Evaluation Community of Practice, 
the Evaluation Framework of Tokle and Uitto (2009) and the concept of market 
transformation for energy efficient consumer goods.
It has then been tested on two case studies (energy-efficient products in Thailand 
and district heating in Poland), for which a large number of evaluations were avail-
able. In these, four types of stakeholders played a role: consumers who constitute 
demand, suppliers who satisfy it, financiers who provide the financial liquidity in 
the market and policy makers who set the framework conditions. These groups of 
stakeholders typically encounter a number of barriers that keep them from using 
or supporting the sustainable energy technology. Seven generic barriers have been 
identified (not all of which apply to all stakeholders).
This resulted in a full programme theory for market development, and as such 
the Theory of No Change is able to assess whether or not an intervention has been 
contributing to a more favourable framework for market development for a sustain-
able energy technology. Rather than a positive log-frame-type theory of change, 
the Theory of No Change reflects the relevant context for change and provides a 
theory for what might have been limiting the success of the intervention. This is also 
important in order to identify to what degree the contribution was really decisive 
for change. Was the project really effecting change, or was an impact only perceived 
because it took place together with other changes in the market – changes that 
might have been even more decisive in spurring a change in market conditions? By 
including context into the analysis, the Theory of No Change is a step towards solv-
ing the attribution question in climate change mitigation, which will typically limit 
the importance given to capacity building and policy interventions and attribute 
most of greenhouse-gas benefits to investments.
Further research is needed in testing the Theory of No Change in other miti-
gation fields beyond retail products and heating systems so that a Generalized 
Programme Theory for Climate Change Mitigation can arise step by step. This 
will help identify where a more flexible approach is needed and how it can be for-
mulated. If a general specification can be found, it can be used not only in project 
evaluation but also in monitoring and project design. As the Theory of No Change 
is able to reflect the context, it can also be used for policy evaluations as well as 
project planning.
As the barrier circle includes almost 20 barriers, this analysis requires some effort. 
It can potentially be reduced by identifying SMART2 elegant outcome indicators 
or comprehensive analysis methods (e.g. surveys). Some further analysis is required 
in order to reduce the necessary empirical effort, for example, through more stan-
dardized outcome indicators for barrier removal activities.
Discussions with evaluators from other areas have demonstrated that the Theory 
of No Change can be applied to other areas of evaluation, policy making and 
change management. Whenever we are concerned with effecting change in people’s 
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behaviours, in theory, we can ask ourselves what it is that keeps people from behav-
ing in a beneficial way and then remove the barriers to ‘better’ behaviour.
Notes
 1 The notable exception to this are the project-based Kyoto mechanisms, such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism, in which each project needs to prove direct greenhouse gas 
emission reductions. They also rely to a significant degree on other interventions for 
project identification and development.
 2 That is, Specific, Meaningful, Attainable, Relevant, Time-Bound.
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A PROGRAMME THEORY APPROACH 
TO EVALUATING NORMATIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENTIONS
Segbedzi Norgbey and Michael Spilsbury
Introduction
In the lead-up to Rio+20, many countries commented on the ‘Institutional 
Framework for Sustainable Development’ and articulated the need to promote a 
better balance among its environmental, social and economic pillars. Despite the 
difficulties experienced in finding common agreement on how to take this idea 
forward in practical terms, it is now well accepted that there needs to be a greater 
focus placed on the interlinkages among these pillars in responses to global sustain-
able development challenges.
Global governance frameworks for environmental issues are fragmented. The 
last 40 years have seen a proliferation of multilateral environmental agreements. 
Individually, each has been a step forward in strengthening governance responses 
to environmental concerns, yet collectively, their provisions have lacked coherence. 
As such, country efforts to comply with an ever-increasing number of conventions 
and their related requirements are unlikely to lead to optimal sustainable develop-
ment solutions – resources will continue to be allocated to piecemeal responses. 
Simplifying global governance structures will present opportunities to bring about 
a greater integration of environmental, social and economic objectives in policy-
making at the country level in order to move beyond sector-specific responses (i.e. 
the strengthening of international environmental governance).
A significant portion of the United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) 
work is geared towards influencing these international and national policy-making 
processes; the agency regards environmental sustainability as a key foundation upon 
which sustainable development rests. This work is often described as being largely 
normative in nature.
In this chapter, the authors argue that there are no clear differences between the 
methods used to evaluate normative aspects of development work and the methods 
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used to evaluate more operational (or ‘on the ground’) activities. Any perceived dif-
ferences are in the relative lengths and complexities of the causal chains leading 
from the intervention to the desired results and impacts.
The arguments articulated in this chapter are founded on theory-based 
approaches to evaluating development interventions. They are based on the realiza-
tion that development interventions, whether designed with clear intervention logic 
or haphazardly/opportunistically formulated, have an underlying intent – to produce 
change from one state or condition to another. Thus, development interventions are 
embodiments of theories.1 Inherent in this assertion is the idea that not only is there 
a clear underlying logic or theory on which the interventions (new programmes or 
policy) are based, but also that given stated or unstated assumptions the interventions’ 
outcomes can be traced back to the activities undertaken. Indeed, in the United 
Nations (UN) system (as well as in many international development agencies), the 
most commonly used approach to planning development interventions is the logical 
framework matrix, which has the intentionality of proposed interventions at its core.
If one views development interventions as a set of activities with causal intent, it is 
possible to deploy theory-based approaches to explore the intended changes and deter-
mine whether the interventions have, indeed, produced the expected changes (and 
explore whether interventions yielded unexpected changes). This chapter describes 
approaches to evaluating the environmental aspects of international development with 
particular reference to UNEP work in general, and its normative aspects in particular.
The nature of normative environmental work
The UN defines normative work to include support to the development of norms and 
standards in conventions, declarations, regulatory frameworks, agreements, guide-
lines, codes of practice and other standard setting instruments, at global, regional and 
national levels. Normative work may also include support to the implementation of 
these instruments at the policy level, that is, their integration into legislation, poli-
cies and development plans (UNEG 2014).
In order to effectively address environmental issues, governments and institutions 
need to understand, evaluate, predict and respond to emerging needs. Providing 
information for decision-making is a key role performed by UNEP in interna-
tional environmental governance processes. As part of its mandate to ‘keep the 
world environment situation under review’, UNEP places considerable emphasis 
on supporting and building assessment capacity at the global, regional and national 
levels. Developing policy guidelines and providing support to establishing global 
and regional environmental agreements is one of the key means by which UNEP 
catalyses action among governments.
In order to achieve this goal, UNEP provides support to the development of 
institutional and legal frameworks, especially at the national level, through efforts that 
include building capacities in the fields of institution-building and environmental 
law. UNEP’s activities in this area also include enhancing the ability of developing 
country governments and countries with economies in transition to participate, in 
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a meaningful way, in the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements and 
in meeting their obligations under these agreements. UNEP provides intellectual 
leadership and acts as a catalyst for environmental action by disseminating 
environmental information and promoting public participation through the forging 
of partnerships with non-governmental organizations, the private sector and civil 
society groups.
The 2010–2013 UNEP Medium Term Strategy states the organization’s mandate 
as comprising five overall, interrelated areas:
 1. Keeping the world environmental situation under review;
 2. Catalysing and promoting international cooperation and action;
 3. Providing policy advice and early warning information, based upon sound sci-
ence and assessments;
 4. Facilitating the development, implementation and evolution of norms and 
standards and developing coherent inter-linkages among international envi-
ronmental conventions; and
 5. Strengthening technology support and capacity in line with country needs and 
priorities.
The organization’s scope of work is broad, extensive and predominantly normative. 
It relates to the development of guidelines, norms and standards; to the support 
to conventions, international agreements and policy development processes; to the 
support to the development of legislative frameworks, capacity building and tech-
nology support; and to the assessment of global environmental trends.
Even when UNEP project and programme activities are implemented ‘on the 
ground’, the focus has been predominantly normative; pilot and demonstration sites 
are often intended to feed back into broader policy formulation and improvement. 
Project activities often include developing norms, standards, strategic action plans, 
policy options and strategies to address the environmental dimensions of poverty 
alleviation. Interventions frequently aim at strengthening communication, informa-
tion and research networks on environmental issues; promoting cleaner production 
and sustainable resource use through developing guidelines and policies; and demon-
strating and promoting the use of improved technologies as practical approaches for 
policy improvement or development. UNEP interventions frequently feature main-
streaming environmental considerations (within and across various sectoral policies, 
legislation, programmes and projects), and strengthening institutional capacities for 
disaster and conflict prevention and preparedness in high-risk areas.
Evaluation approaches
Discussion of evaluation methods
Development evaluation literature is replete with categorizations and classifications 
of approaches to evaluating international development interventions. Evaluations 
can be classified as deductive or inductive.
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Deductive methods draw out the intervention’s implications and assess evi-
dence that the intervention’s design achieved its anticipated outcomes. Deductive 
approaches often use theory-based methods that use logic models to describe the 
intervention logic. Commonly used terms and approaches include ‘Theory of 
Change’, ‘causal pathway analysis’, ‘programme theory’, ‘impact pathway analysis’, 
‘outcome mapping’, ‘results chains’ and ‘systemic evaluation’ (Chen 2005; Bamberger, 
Rugh and Mabry 2006; GIZ 2011). Theory-based methods are not new; indeed, 
they are at the core of the long-accepted logical framework approach. However, in 
contrast to a logical framework, a full theory of change allows consideration of mul-
tiple pathways and better captures the actions required and possible risks at various 
stages along the causal pathways from activities towards intended results.
In contrast, inductive methods involve qualitative analysis oriented towards explo-
rations, discovery and inductive logic (Patton 1987). These evaluation approaches 
are inductive to the extent that the evaluator makes no assumptions about prior 
intentions, except at the broad level of general goals. When an inductive approach 
is used, meaning is constructed after the event out of reflections on past events, 
including changes that may or may not be seen as achievements or that may or may 
not have been anticipated (Davies 2003). The approach begins with the evaluator 
making specific observations and builds towards general patterns. The nature and 
dimension of analysis required are often derived from observation as the evalua-
tor gains a greater understanding of existing programmes or projects (Patton 1987; 
Bamberger, Rugh and Mabry 2006; Thomas 2006).
Patton (1987) notes two other ways that evaluation approaches can be inductive. 
Within a programme, an approach can be inductive if it involves exploring pro-
gramme participants’ and stakeholders’ individual experiences through structured 
or unstructured interviews and questionnaires. Among programmes, the inductive 
approach looks for the characteristics of each programme that make them unique. 
Goal-free evaluation is the most commonly used inductive approach.
In goal-free methods, the evaluator starts with the changes that are evident and 
investigates whether the programme being evaluated has played any substantive role 
in the observed change. Approaches based on stakeholder participation are built on 
the principle that stakeholders should be involved in all stages of evaluation, includ-
ing determining objectives and impacts, identifying and selecting indicators and 
participating in data collection and analysis (Leeuw and Vaessen 2009).
Evaluations have been classified as theory-driven and atheoretical. Theory-
driven approaches formulate programme elements, rationale and causal linkages. 
The atheoretical approach to evaluation, at the extreme end, is characterized by ‘a 
step-by-step cookbook method of doing evaluations’ (Chen 1990: 18). The atheo-
retical approach tends to focus on the relationship between inputs and effects (black 
box evaluations) without taking into account the transformational processes that 
are inherent in the programmes being evaluated. Claims of success based on such 
input-effect models generate conclusions about programmes that policy makers 
may find difficult to apply. For example, if a simple input/output evaluation shows 
that eliminating chlorofluorocarbons will reduce climate change without providing 
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information on the underlying mechanisms and processes, the consequences of the 
policy prescriptions on the economy and environment will not be known and 
policy makers will have extreme difficulty in designing policy options.
Furthermore, conclusions from input-effect models that indicate programme 
failure may be misleading. It is possible that models or evaluations that follow this 
approach may not explain which was flawed – the logic on which the intervention 
was based or the processes used to implement the intervention. In other words, such 
evaluative approaches provide limited information to assist managers to improve 
programmes.
In practice, evaluations are neither wholly inductive nor deductive. Some evalu-
ation questions are left for inductive analysis based on direct observation; others are 
determined deductively. Patton (1987: 16) argues that there is often a ‘flow from 
inductive approaches to find out what the important questions and variables are 
(exploratory work), to deductive hypothesis-testing aimed at confirming explor-
atory findings’. Similarly, the methods evaluations apply are seldom wholly natural-
istic or experimental, theoretical or atheoretical.
Evaluation methods have evolved significantly beyond simple black box 
approaches, and a consensus has emerged among evaluators that evaluations must 
deal with multiple values in which different methods can be deployed that are tai-
lored to unique situations. Depending on the specific questions or objectives of a 
given evaluation, some methods have advantages over others. Particular methods or 
perspectives may complement one another in providing a more complete picture 
(Leeuw and Vaessen 2009).
Impact evaluations are ‘focused on quantifying the lasting and significant changes 
that occurred in the short or long term, direct or indirect, produced by an interven-
tion or a body of work, or to which the same has contributed’.2 Impact evaluations 
attempt to establish whether an intervention has caused the observed effects and 
explain how the effects were caused to satisfy the operational improvement/learning 
objective of evaluation. Establishing causation without explanation of the processes 
limits the utility of evaluation findings; a strong theoretical underpinning is essential 
both for intervention design and for evaluation.
Although not routinely undertaken, impact evaluations are in great demand by 
the donor community. The primary reason for the increased demand is that many 
outside of development agencies believe that the results achieved from the expen-
diture of international development resources have been poor or not adequately 
documented. Changes expected from development interventions are not evident 
after the interventions have come to an end, and donors wonder if the interventions 
made any difference (Leeuw and Vaessen 2009). Impact evaluations provide the 
evidence to demonstrate that the interventions have ‘made a difference’ and often 
quantify how large the impacts are. However, evaluating impacts is a complex and 
costly exercise, often fraught with methodological difficulties and therefore under-
taken selectively.
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Theory-based approaches: causal pathways – theory of change
Environment and sustainable development issues are complex and deal with over-
lapping and interrelated biophysical, economic, social and political systems, often at 
multiple scales. Designing and evaluating interventions must both define and bound 
the unit of intervention and the evaluative analysis. Models, as simplified represen-
tations of reality, are needed to focus on interventions’ design and/or to provide 
a framework for the evaluation. Causal pathway analysis or Theories of Change 
provide a means for this.
A Theory of Change depicts and describes (i.e. provides a simple model of) the 
causal processes through which changes occur as a result of interventions. There are 
many published resources that provide guidance on the development and use of 
theory of change approaches and logic models (Bamberger et al. 2004; Chen 2005; 
University of Kansas 2013). Theories of change or causal pathway diagrams should 
be regarded as conceptual frameworks that summarize sequences of planned, desired 
or observed change. As such, they can be usefully applied to aid project design, 
monitoring and evaluation.
Figure 9.1 shows a graphical representation of generic set of causal pathways for 
an intervention. The pathways are comprised of the standard result levels used in 
project logical frameworks: outputs, outcomes and objectives.3 The pathways rep-
resent causal relationships and, when elaborated in detail, help identify or clarify 
FIGURE 9.1 A Set of Generic Results Chains, which can also be Termed ‘Causal 
Pathways’, ‘Impact Pathways’ or a ‘Theory of Change’
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the assumptions in the intervention logic of a project or programme. From the 
schematic diagram, it can be observed that more than one output and change pro-
cess may be required to achieve a certain outcome or, alternatively, one single out-
put may be required for more than one outcome (via different change processes). 
In addition, there may be further outcome stages (termed ‘intermediate states’ in 
the diagram) between the immediate project outcome and the desired objective. 
The figure shows six different pathways from the outputs to the objective, but 
activities to produce outputs and promote/foster change processes are not shown. 
When specified with additional detail, in particular including the key users of out-
puts, description of the change processes (represented by the arrows in Figure 9.1) 
including externalities (assumptions), ‘impact drivers’ and details of performance 
indicators (for either processes or result levels or both), causal pathway analysis can 
be invaluable as a tool for both project/programme planning and for evaluation. 
Figure 9.2 takes one of the six pathways from Figure 9.1 and shows a single generic 
causal pathway with impact drivers and assumptions.
It should be stressed that the activities in a results-oriented intervention are not 
restricted to a level prior to or below outputs as they are often presented in a logi-
cal framework. Rather, activities also feature in the processes that link outputs to 
outcomes and those outcomes to higher-level results. Intervention designs should 
describe the activities needed to produce the outputs and those activities needed to 
ensure that the outputs will lead to outcomes and higher-level results. Project and 
programme activities should therefore feature in or complement the impact drivers 
(see Box 9.1).
Similarly, evaluation considers the observed changes and attempts to establish 
whether the intervention played a role in causing them. There are often several 
pathways that lead to results in a single project or programme intervention, and 
though multiple pathways can be captured in logical frameworks they are often 
more difficult to interpret in that form. Logical frameworks seldom provide suffi-
cient detail in relation to the change processes that link one result level to the next. 
Pathways that do not form part of the intervention do not readily feature in logical 
frameworks. In contrast, casual pathway analysis can incorporate pathways (change 
processes) that are external to the intervention.
FIGURE 9.2 A Schematic Single ‘Impact Pathway’ Showing Intermediate States, 
Assumptions and Impact Drivers
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Does the linear nature of Theory of Change constrain its validity 
and application?
A common criticism of both Logical Frameworks and Theory of Change logic 
models is that they assume linear cause and effect relationships, which limits their 
utility and validity (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere [CARE] 
2012). Critics point out that the majority of real-life development interventions 
with environmental dimensions are complex; there are many interrelated and inter-
acting factors with multiple and often nested feedback loops that involve non-linear 
relationships that, as such, are not scalable (Mayne and Stern et al. 2012; Vogel 2012a). 
It is commonly argued that linear models are inappropriate in such situations.
However, all models are simplified representations of reality, with the utility of 
any model being highly dependent upon its purpose. If any given change process 
is studied in more detail, it may be found to be highly complex with multiple 
actors and external factors affecting the change from one level to the next and with 
feedback relationships between levels. This reality does not invalidate the original 
Theory of Change, but merely highlights that it is a simplified representation of 
reality. Similarly, it does not imply that an evaluation using a Theory of Change 
approach has adopted the assumption that all the change processes are linear. ‘The 
logical sequencing aspect often means that people mistakenly interpret theory of 
change as a linear sequence of change. Building development impact is not a linear 
process’ (Vogel 2012b: 14).
This discussion also highlights the trade-offs between presenting too fine a level 
of detail and oversimplifying causal pathways within a theory of change. When too 
much detail is presented, the big picture can get lost in the complexity of multiple 
interrelationships. If oversimplified, however, clusters of outputs and outcomes may 
end up being lumped together and important interconnections and change pro-
cesses could be overlooked.
BOX 9.1 IMPACT DRIVERS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Impact drivers are the significant factors that, if present, are expected to con-
tribute to realizing the intended impacts and can be influenced by the project, 
by project partners and by stakeholders. They are often referred to as a proj-
ect’s critical success factors.
Assumptions are the significant factors that, if present, are expected to con-
tribute to realizing higher-level results but are largely beyond the control of the 
project and its partners and stakeholders. The likelihood that the assumptions 
will not hold is the risk of not achieving results.
Impact drivers and assumptions are often key factors affecting project 
sustainability.
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To illustrate the similarities and differences between normative work and more 
direct forms of intervention, consider the following example: an intervention’s 
desired results are defined in terms of quantifiable changes to a specific measure of 
environmental status (e.g. reduction in greenhouse gas emissions). An intervention 
that directly affects that environmental status is likely to be readily planned, moni-
tored and evaluated. Another intervention that aims to achieve the same change in 
environmental status, but does so more indirectly via, say, a policy change process, 
followed by formalization of regulations and some form of enforcement ‘on the 
ground’, is relatively more challenging to plan, monitor and eventually evaluate 
because there would be several change processes each with associated actors and 
factors to consider. The number of steps in the causal chain between the initial 
interventions and the desired end result of changed environmental status would be 
quite different. A large portion of UNEP work is normative in nature and is akin 
to this latter situation. It is imperative, therefore, that the multiple, often long and 
indirect, causal pathways for interventions are clearly articulated at both project and 
programmatic levels.
This guides realistic intervention design, effective implementation and facilitates 
robust evaluation. But why would UNEP focus on normative work if the causal 
pathways to results on the ground are indirect? Beyond the fact that such work is 
a key part of the mandate of the organization, it is often the case that more direct 
pathways to environmental benefits operate at smaller scales. For example, an inter-
vention to improve forest management is unlikely to have the resources to be able to 
engage each and every forest manager in a country or continent, whereas normative 
work on forest management standards and regulation processes (such as certifica-
tion) can change the way legal and regulatory systems function, and these, in turn, 
can have downstream effects at much larger scales (albeit indirectly).
Application of the Theory of Change approach to evaluating 
normative environmental projects and programmes
This section gives a brief overview of the use of Theory of Change/causal pathway 
analysis in the evaluation of different types of environmental interventions at UNEP. 
Examples are chosen to highlight trends and lessons.
The ‘Synergies Decisions’ of the Stockholm, Basel and Rotterdam 
conventions
The Decisions (BC.Ex-1/1, RC.Ex-1/1 and SC.Ex-1/1; the… ‘omnibus deci-
sions’), were adopted by the Conferences of the Parties to the Basel, Rotterdam and 
Stockholm Conventions, respectively, at their simultaneous extraordinary meetings 
in February 2010. Parties decided that they would review the arrangements adopted 
pursuant to the ‘Synergies Decisions’,4 in particular actions taken by the Secretariats 
of the Convention to merge and conduct joint activities, joint managerial functions 
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and joint services in order to determine how far they had contributed to achieving 
the following objectives:
 1. Strengthening of the implementation of the three Conventions at the national, 
regional and global levels;
 2. Promoting coherent policy guidance;
 3. Reducing administrative burdens;
 4. Maximizing the effective and efficient use of resources at all levels; and
 5. Protecting human health and the environment for the promotion of sustainable 
development.
The decisions further called upon the Executive Director of UNEP in consul-
tations with the Director General of Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations to undertake an independent evaluation and to prepare reports of 
the evaluation for consideration by the Conferences of the Parties. The evaluation 
was to focus primarily on the extent to which the synergies process among the 
chemicals and waste-related conventions has contributed to improving cooperation 
and coordination at the global, regional and national levels. A Theory of Change 
(Figure 9.3) was developed prior to initiating the main data-gathering phase of the 
evaluation from a desk review of convention documents that outlined the aims of 
the ‘Synergies Decisions’. The Theory of Change sets out the causal intent of the 
synergies decisions and provides a conceptual framework for the evaluation’s imple-
mentation phase, guiding the data collection necessary for assessing performance 
indicators. The Theory of Change framework was used to structure interview ques-
tions with key stakeholders (e.g. Secretariat Staff and Parties to the Convention), 
which aided in identifying assumptions and threats that were key to assessing the 
likelihood of contributions being made to higher level objectives.
Assumptions were identified as the following:
 1. Leadership is actively committed to the synergies process: The syner-
gies process involves merging and restructuring the Convention Secretariats 
into one cohesive team serving all three Conventions, particularly on substan-
tive/technical activities. This requires leadership commitment to the process at 
the highest level (Executive Secretary) and mid-tier management buy-in to the 
process of change management and joint-delivery of services to Parties;
 2. Accountability and incentive structures are in place to support syn-
ergies: Responsibilities and roles are structurally and individually aligned to 
carry out synergies process and to support teamwork within the restructured 
secretariat (e.g. job descriptions, operating procedures, functions and processes 
for teams and clear reporting lines). Appropriate incentives (rewards and sanc-
tions) are in place to underpin delivery of services internally and to Parties;
 3. Synergies restructuring is accepted and supported by all staff: The 
synergies process and actions need to be accepted and supported by all staff and 









FIGURE 9.3 ‘Synergies Decisions’ Theory of Change (Shown in Part)
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 4. Synergies restructuring is cost-neutral and will lead to improved effi-
ciency in implementing the Conventions: The restructuring and merging 
of the Secretariats (while preserving the legal autonomy of each Convention) 
and delivery of joint services and substantive activities to Parties will lead to 
improved efficiency; and
 5. Parties are supportive of synergies and carry out the necessary insti-
tutional and organizational changes at the national level to promote 
cooperation and coordination: For the strengthened implementation of 
the three Conventions and progress towards protecting human health and 
the environment, it is assumed that Parties will support the synergies pro-
cess and pursuant actions and take actions at the national level (supported by 
the Secretariat/UN agencies and other relevant bodies). This will include, inter 
alia, improved systemic and institutional capacities to improve enforcement of 
the three Conventions, inter-ministerial coordination (including cooperation 
between focal points)5 and bringing responsibilities for implementation under 
one ministry (e.g. one focal point for all chemicals Conventions).
Threats to the achievement of outcomes were identified as the following:
 1. Cost of synergistic actions rise, leading to decreases in party interest 
and support: If Assumption 4 (cost neutrality and improved efficiencies) does 
not hold, then Parties may decide to abandon or limit the synergies process;
 2. Potential conflicts between managers, leading to poor delivery of 
services: Managers may have conflicts over human and financial resources 
if managerial controls, responsibilities and roles lack clarity within the new 
matrix structure;6
 3. No increases in funding for implementation of activities to support 
the strengthening of the Conventions: A lack of financial support is likely 
to be a significant threat to the realization of synergies in terms of delivery of 
substantive activities by the secretariat and implementation of synergies at the 
national and regional levels; and
 4. National cooperation and coordination fails: Parties are unable to forge 
operational synergies at the national level due to lack of enabling policy, capac-
ity or mandate disagreements between ministries (e.g. lack of communica-
tion and institutional structures that can facilitate regularized coordination). 
Implementation of synergies actions fails.
In this case, Goal (e) of ‘protecting human health and the environment for the 
promotion of sustainable development’ is intended to result from ‘strengthening the 
implementation of the three conventions at national, regional and global level’, that 
is, changes in third-party behaviours within countries acting in compliance with 
national regulatory requirements that stem from Convention provisions. Although 
reducing threats to human health through the convention mechanisms features in 
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the overall goal, it would be unrealistic to attempt to measure the downstream 
effects of changed management arrangements in Convention Secretariats at that 
level. The locus for measuring performance in the normative work, in this situation, 
is not feasible at the level of changes in environmental status/condition, because 
the causal linkages are indirect and weak and so any observed effects are difficult 
to attribute to the upstream change in question. This implies that evaluation of the 
effects of the synergies decisions are best captured at the outcome level and viewed 
as contributions to higher-level intended objectives.
The Global Environment Facility joint geothermal imaging project
The evaluation of the Joint Geothermal Imaging project and a follow-up study 
undertaken by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Evaluation Office made use 
of Theory of Change and provided another example of normative research work – 
the development of ways to combine data from different imaging methods for site 
identification of geothermal wells. The potential to establish linkages between site 
identification and environmental benefits in terms of CO2 emissions avoided was 
identified during the Terminal Evaluation7 of the project, and UNEP developed 
the Theory of Change as a contribution to the follow-up study undertaken by the 
GEF Evaluation Office. The Theory of Change shows the pathways from imaging 
method development, scientific capacity-building and training events (often con-
sidered as normative activities) through to the resulting benefits expressed as CO2 
equivalents avoided from the use of geothermal electricity generation (rather than 
the ‘business as usual’ scenario, which would have resulted in fossil fuel CO2 emis-
sions) (see Figure 9.4).
The points to note in this example are that many development projects contain 
normative aspects, and it is not unusual for the causal pathways from project activi-
ties to the desired development objectives to be somewhat indirect. In this case, 
tracing the actual results of the project along the causal pathways leading towards the 
intended objectives highlighted the fact that the application of the imaging technol-
ogy could be linked to quantifiable improvements in energy-generating efficiency 
of geothermal wells, which can be expressed in terms of CO2 emissions avoided. 
Routine application of Theory of Change approaches can aid in identifying projects 
that have potential for more detailed impact evaluations, because causal pathways 
that may have high ‘attributive ease’ can be identified.
Forest certification: normative work leading to quantified  
benefits through a regulatory framework
Forest certification provides an example of an evaluation – using Theory of Change 
as a guiding framework – of normative work on improving the criteria and indica-
tors used for assessment and certification of sustainable forest management through 
scientific testing. An example of a previous evaluation8 has applications for several 
UNEP projects, including one UNEP-Global Environment Facility (GEF) project9 
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FIGURE 9.4 Theory of Change – Joint Geophysical Imaging Methodology for 
Geothermal Reservoir Assessment
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that was a follow-up to the original Centre for International Forestry Research 
investigation.
The impact of research is generally more readily appraised in situations in 
which new science-based innovations are clearly defined and in which their adop-
tion directly affects patterns of production, consumption and human welfare. 
Nevertheless, impacts from science may also be achieved indirectly, for example 
through influencing policies, decision-making processes, management assessment 
processes or development assistance strategies. When research leads to developing 
new technologies for use directly by land mangers (e.g. farmers/forest managers), 
the magnitude of the impact often depends on the number of adopters and the land 
areas over which the research innovation yields an improvement (i.e. a cumulative 
effect). However, there are other types of impact pathways in which a small number 
of adoption events (or even a single event) can change the way a system or a process 
functions, for example, national governance processes or a regulatory system (such 
as forest certification); more normative pathways create a systemic effect.
The research criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management gener-
ated information rather than finished technologies. However, utilizing information 
from research (to a greater degree than with finished technologies) is not a binary 
phenomenon (i.e. uptake or no uptake). The use of information from research may 
be symbolic, conceptual or instrumental, and often there is no straight-line cause 
and effect between providing information and outcomes leading towards intended 
environmental effects and benefits. Additionally, information may be only partially 
applied, further increasing the difficulties of determining the level of adoption and 
concomitant linkages to any changes on the ground.
The criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management developed through 
the Centre for International Forestry Research analysis were intended to be of 
relevance for application at individual Forest Management Units to improve for-
est management across a wide range of countries and settings. The criteria and 
indicators were also intended to have relevance for broader forest-related initia-
tives at both national and regional levels. Although the criteria and indicators were 
intended for application at the Forest Management Unit level, a range of path-
ways leading to improved forest management were anticipated. In fact, achieving 
the desired outcomes of widespread improvement in forest management at the 
Forest Management Unit level was thought to be less likely through a series of 
independent, direct (and cumulative) adoption events among multiple, separate and 
widely geographically dispersed forest management entities. Widespread impact was 
thought to be more likely to occur through using criteria and indicators in regula-
tory processes (e.g. national legislation and regulation and voluntary certification) 
(see Figure 9.5).
The uptake (and impact) strategy for the criteria and indicators work was based 
on the premise that collaborative research and engagement of key stakeholders would 
effectively generate interest in, and ownership of, the research findings among key 
user groups. It was anticipated that the work would be used by forest certification 











FIGURE 9.5 A Generalized Representation of Impact Pathways Relating the Centre for International Forestry Research Criteria and Indicators 
Project. Source: Spilsbury (2005)
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authorities and regional and national criteria and indicators development processes 
in order to help assimilate current best practices. The research also helped to orient 
existing criteria and indicators-related trends and initiatives in the right direction.
In the detailed evaluation of this project,10 evidence of causal changes was traced 
along multiple pathways in the Theory of Change. However, the pathways that 
passed through certification processes presented an opportunity to link uptake (by 
certification bodies into their certification standards) of the normative research to 
changes in management practices in certified forests through the regulatory chain of 
independent certification audits that applied the revised standards to different forest 
management enterprises across the world (see Figure 9.6).
It is possible to examine the causal effects of Forest Stewardship Council cer-
tification in terms of changes to on the ground forest management by examining 
the specific improvements in forest management that forest owners/managers were 
FIGURE 9.6 Major Impact Pathways through Forest Stewardship Council Certification 
Processes. Source: Spilsbury (2005)
A programme theory approach 173
required to make in response to the certification auditing process. These provide a 
means of examining before-and-after situations in certified forests.
The Forest Stewardship Council forest certification audit process requires inde-
pendent third-party certifiers to assess forest management against consistent criteria 
and indicators-based standards, highlighting which management aspects are in com-
pliance and, critically, where standards are not met.
Non-compliance with the certifier’s standards or failure to adequately meet the 
certification standard’s forest management performance criteria results in the issu-
ance of a corrective action requests, which outline what needs to be improved in 
order to bring the operation into compliance. Corrective action requests are speci-
fied in publicly available Certification Assessment Reports11,12 and define aspects 
such as forest production, environmental, social and economic issues the operation 
is required to address in order to attain certification.
The certification regulatory system, which includes follow up audits, ensures 
that forest management entities improve their management with regard to these 
corrective action requests in order to become compliant and receive or retain their 
official certified status. Thus, any forest management entity that achieves a certi-
fied status must have successfully addressed any corrective action requests that were 
issued during the certification process. If the corrective action requests are checked 
against, and correspond to, the specific criteria and indicators in the new standards 
that the research work improved, then a credible causal link between normative 
research and changes in the on the ground management of multiple forest enter-
prises that have been certified can be established. Early identification of causal path-
ways through Theory of Change analysis during project design and implementation 
proved invaluable in identifying possibilities for robust evaluation.
Programme theory and results-based monitoring and evaluation
Results-based monitoring and evaluation systems are designed to address the ‘so 
what’ question in project or programme implementation. A results-based system 
provides feedback on the actual outcomes and goals of organizational interven-
tions. ‘Results-based monitoring is a continuous process of collecting and analyzing 
information to compare how well a project, program, or policy is being imple-
mented against expected results’ (Kusek and Rist 2004: 16). Key elements of results 
monitoring include collecting the baseline information that describes the existing 
situation before the intervention, defining outcome indicators, collecting informa-
tion on outputs and intermediate states (or milestones) to determine if they con-
tribute to achieving outcomes, systematic quantitative and qualitative reporting on 
progress made towards achieving outcomes, collecting information on stakeholder 
perceptions and collecting information regarding the success of the partnership 
strategy adopted. Results-based monitoring and evaluation is often undertaken col-
laboratively with strategic partners.
A critical point to note is that monitoring and evaluation of development inter-
ventions can be meaningfully undertaken only when the interventions’ intended 
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outcomes are stated as explicitly as possible. The explicit statement of outcomes 
becomes the key to developing appropriate indicators that measure success because 
the outcomes will ultimately lead, particularly in the case of UNEP, to environmen-
tal benefits. Developing a system to monitor and evaluate development interven-
tions is essentially ‘a deductive process in which inputs, activities, and outputs are all 
derived and flow from the setting of outcomes; indicators, baselines, and targets, all 
crucial elements of the performance framework, are derived from and based on the 
setting of outcomes’ (Kusek and Rist 2004: 57).
Within UNEP’s planning framework, project activities are designed to deliver cer-
tain outputs that are intended to lead to certain predefined results, which are expected 
to contribute to the expected accomplishments (immediate outcomes). Within proj-
ect-, programme framework- and sub-programme strategy documents, the interven-
tion logic is captured both in logical frameworks and project narratives. As many 
projects within UNEP’s larger organizational work plans have a normative nature, 
applying the Theory of Change approach to evaluating higher programmatic levels 
is instructive and reveals a number of strategically significant findings. A Formative 
Evaluation of the UNEP Programme of Work 2010–2011 (UNEP 2011) analysed 
the causal relationships embedded in all UNEP planning documents that contributed 
to the Programme of Work in order to understand whether project designs were 
optimally linked to higher-level results. Such feedback was aimed at inducing adapta-
tions to programme implementation in order to enhance the likelihood of success in 
achieving the intended results and to improve future UNEP work planning processes.
The evaluation noted that performance indicators for outcomes are normally 
defined within project documents. Projects, however, are often designed separately 
(despite efforts to promote greater collaborative design). Project-specific outcome 
indicators, even among sets of closely linked projects within a programme, usually 
have quite different metrics (depicted by tinted triangles in Figure 9.7), and out-
comes often cannot be aggregated. This poses challenges for assessing aggregate per-
formance at the level of programmatic outcomes. Programmatic outcomes are often 
more broadly defined outcome statements in higher-level planning documents than 
project-specific outcomes. In many organizations, including UNEP, higher-level 
planning processes are ‘top down’ in the sense that they derive the higher-level 
results statements from official mandates of governing bodies and longer-term pro-
grammatic strategies. In effect, programmatic outcomes define a ‘set’ or category 
intended to encompass several project-specific outcomes. Most organizations face 
challenges in both monitoring and evaluating performance at this level.
Analysis of Theories of Change at higher organizational levels shows that pro-
gramme designs can contain inherent weaknesses that pose problems. For example, 
in UNEP’s Programme of Work 2010–2011, outcome indicators were not suitable 
for assessing performance across the contributing projects. In addition, there were 
often temporal problems in using such indicators to monitor progress in programme 
implementation. It was often the case that achieving project-level outcomes was 
neither linear nor incremental. Outcomes of normative international work may 
frequently involve a change in national policies that are discrete events, not ones that 
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gradually accrue over time. Monitoring such outcomes would repeatedly record ‘no 
change’ until such time as a policy change occurred – often anticipated towards the 
end of (or considerably beyond) project implementation.
The utility of directing highly aggregated monitoring information as results-based 
feedback into lower level management processes is extremely limited. Monitoring 
should focus on verifiable milestones that chart progress towards desired result lev-
els. Milestones capture progress from project initiation to achievement of outcomes, 
and should be specified as activities, sub-outputs needed to deliver key outputs, the 
key outputs themselves or activities or events needed to ensure that outputs lead 
to outcomes. Milestones will usually be closely linked to the outputs and impact 
drivers identified in a Theory of Change and should be activities or deliverables for 
which clear accountability can be specified.
This is the crux of results-based management – the interface between sound 
causal logic, results frames and individual accountabilities within organizational 
management structures. Organizations can aspire to achieve outcomes (and the 
benefits that stem from them). However, individuals within an organization can-
not be held directly accountable for outcome achievement. An outcome involves a 
change in behaviour beyond the direct control of a project or intervention. Thus, 
individuals cannot reasonably be held accountable for a change in someone else’s 
behaviour, although they can (and should) be held accountable for doing all the 
things that are necessary and feasible to maximize the likelihood that an outcome 
will be achieved. These activities should form a standard component of work plan-
ning and performance appraisal. For example, though UNEP projects cannot be 
FIGURE 9.7 Theory of Change – Common Problems in Capturing Performance at the 
Programme Level
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held directly accountable for the promulgation and implementation of national cli-
mate change policies, they can facilitate policy development processes by presenting 
workshops, providing technical support, ensuring the engagement of relevant gov-
ernment institutions and civil society in policy processes, enabling access to good 
practice examples and fostering of high levels of ownership.
Project milestones should be used to track the progress of project implemen-
tation through outputs and onwards to outcomes to immediate objectives. The 
Formative Evaluation of the UNEP Programme of Work 2010–2011 (UNEP 2011) 
found that the overwhelming majority of project milestones in approved project 
documents were pitched at or below the output level. In a few cases, milestones 
referred to external events that would have happened anyway. Very few milestones 
captured processes and achievements further along the intended causal pathways 
towards higher-level results in the organization’s Medium-Term Strategy.
Evaluating the cost-effectiveness of normative work
Although it is possible to track progress towards achieving outcomes and impacts 
through theory-based approaches, one of the more problematic evaluative issues in 
normative work is how to determine cost-effectiveness. Often, donors and govern-
ments are unsatisfied with the simple answer that outcomes have been achieved. 
Invariably, they seek an answer as to whether the intervention represents value for 
money. Determining value for money involves analysing cost-effectiveness, which 
should measure the cost of achieving intended programme outcomes and impacts 
and should compare the costs of alternative ways of producing the same or similar 
benefits.
In general, although it may be feasible to document programme or project costs, 
estimating the environmental and other benefits further along the results chain often 
presents a much more complex problem and is seldom attempted. Environmental 
benefits stemming from project outcomes are less amenable to measurement because 
they are often not easily quantifiable and are frequently only partially attributable to 
the intervention. Comparing alternative ways of producing the same or similar ben-
efits involves benchmarking for which data are frequently unavailable. For norma-
tive environmental work, therefore, the difficulties related to determining outcomes 
and impacts that occur further along the results chain (as well as attribution issues) 
make cost-effectiveness analysis at that level an almost intractable exercise.
Given the difficulties associated with undertaking cost-effectiveness analysis 
within the context of limited evaluation resources, the authors are of the view that 
initiating any effort to determine value for money for development interventions of 
a normative nature, especially as it relates to environmental activities, should focus 
on assessing cost-efficiency. Cost-efficiency relates to how well inputs are converted 
to outputs. Expected benefits should be set out along the results chain found in 
well-prepared logframes and causal pathway/Theory of Change analysis. Outputs 
(and sometimes outcomes) are often clearly defined in planning documents and 
their achievement is often better documented and more readily verifiable.
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Conclusion
Our experience from evaluations of a wide range of environmental activities leads 
us to conclude that the causal logic that undergirds the theory-based approach pro-
vides a robust method for understanding development interventions and facilitates 
the evaluator’s ability to clearly map progress towards the results of development 
interventions. Although the approach does not guarantee that impacts can be readily 
identified and irrefutably attributed to particular development interventions, it nev-
ertheless facilitates contribution analysis and the identification of impact drivers and 
intermediate states that, from both a planning and adaptive management perspective, 
can increase the likelihood of attaining impacts. From an evaluative perspective, such 
approaches increase the clarity and rigour of assessments. Contrary to some com-
monly expressed views in the evaluation community, we see no clear differences in 
methods used to evaluate normative as opposed to operational activities. Normative 
interventions do not define a separate category but are part of a continuum from 
very indirect to more direct (on the ground) interventions. The differences relate to 
the relative lengths/complexities of the causal pathways to impact with associated 
attribution issues.
The bulk of the work undertaken in UNEP has a normative character, and 
hence the various causal pathways to ultimate impact are often quite long – which 
presents challenges for assessing ultimate impacts. Theory of Change analysis, how-
ever, improves the clarity of evaluative analysis with regard to achieving the imme-
diate outcomes and their causally linked intermediate states in order to enhance the 
analysis of performance.
It is our view that because project logical frameworks do not often provide com-
prehensive information on the processes by which project outputs yield outcomes 
and eventually lead, via intermediate states, to impacts, causal pathways need to be 
carefully examined and the following questions addressed:
 • Are there other causal pathways that would stem from the use of project out-
puts by other potential user groups?
 • Is each pathway complete? Are there any missing intermediate states between 
project outcomes and expected accomplishments?
 • Have the key impact drivers and assumptions been identified for each step in 
the pathway?
Our experience shows that it is possible, within a programmatic framework, for an 
evaluation to map the causal pathways for sets of related projects in order to clarify 
how projects intend to deliver project outputs, achieve outcomes and contribute to 
higher-level results. Within the context of evaluations, a Theory of Change approach 
can provide the conceptual framework for detailing the relationship among explicit 
(planned) and implicit outcomes and impacts or to set clear targets and reconstruct 
indicators of success where they are not readily available. The analysis can iden-
tify whether interventions, by design, are mutually reinforcing and converge and 
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synergize with one another to deliver the intended higher-level results. At the same 
time, the analysis can highlight possible interlinkages between related programmes. 
The approach is sufficiently flexible to incorporate analysis of causal pathways that 
were not foreseen in interventions’ initial planning. Indeed, comparing the causal 
pathways from the initial project designs to the pathways that evaluative evidence 
highlights as being the most effective can offer insights into project/programme 
adaptive management processes.
The use of Theories of Change or causal pathways aids project design, imple-
mentation and evaluation by clarifying causal logic and identifying performance 
measures and key impact drivers. This information can also help define or refine 
appropriate monitoring approaches and provide feedback to help guide results-
oriented adaptive management. It is also the key guiding framework for results-
oriented evaluations.
Notes
 1 See Leeuw and Vaessen (2009),  Chapter 3, p. 15.
 2 Adapted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
DAC (2002).
 3 Logical frameworks show some variation from one agency to another – outcomes are 
sometimes termed ‘purpose’, some logical frameworks include ‘immediate objectives’ and 
‘development objective’ and/or ‘goal’.
 4 See Decision BC.IX/10 (June 2008), RC.4/11 (October 2008), and SC.4/34 (May 
2009), available at http://www.brsmeas.org/Implementation/DecisionsandDocuments/
Decisions/tabid/2616/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
 5 For example, among ministries of agriculture, environment, health, industry, customs and 
excise and trade.
 6 See Proposal from the Executive Secretary of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm 
Conventions for the Organization of the Secretariats of the Three Conventions, 
December 2011.
 7 See https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/terminal-project-evaluations/terminal- 
evaluation-unep-gef-project-joint-geophysical.
 8 See Spilsbury (2005, 2007).
 9 GEF Project No. 1897, Improved Certification Schemes for Sustainable Tropical Forest 
Management.
 10 See Spilsbury (2005, 2007)).
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FROM EVALUATION OF JOINT 
PROGRAMMES TO JOINT 
EVALUATION OF SDGs-READY 
INTERVENTIONS
Lessons from the Joint GEF-UNDP Evaluation 
of the Small Grants Programme
Carlo Carugi and Heather Bryant
Introduction
The signatories to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development resolved not only 
“to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want” but also to “secure 
our planet” (UN 2015). The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that con-
stitute the Agenda integrate and recognize the indivisibility of the three dimensions 
of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental. At least three 
goals are considered to be “environmental”, 39 of the targets are directly related 
to the environment (Elder and Olsen 2019) and 93 of the 244 indicators – spread 
across almost all goals – have an environmental dimension (UNEP 2019). However, 
while the SDGs have brought the social, the economic and the environmental closer 
to each other in discourse, development practice, monitoring and evaluation do not 
equally address or integrate these dimensions. For example, while approximately half 
of all SDG indicators are classified as Tier 1,1 only 27% of the environment-related 
indicators are in this category.2 With respect to evaluation, Uitto (2019) observes 
that the profession has primarily focused on the human dimensions of development 
while neglecting the environmental, while Rowe (2019) points out that evaluations 
usually take a “single system perspective” where, for example, evaluations address-
ing conservation concerns in a natural system tend to be unconcerned with effects 
on the human system, and evaluations focused on a human system concern do not 
consider effects in the natural system.
Joint programming (where different agencies bring complementary expertise 
to address complex development problems) and joint evaluations (where differ-
ent evaluation offices combine diverse skills to evaluate development interven-
tions) offer opportunities to better integrate and understand the social, economic 
and environmental dimensions of development programming and results. In the 
UN system, joint programming has been encouraged since the beginning of the 
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century, with the adoption of Guidelines on Joint Programming in 2003, and given 
new impetus through the creation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Achievement Fund which funded 130 joint programmes between 2007 and 2013 
(UNDP 2014). Building upon the experience and lessons learned of the MDG 
Achievement Fund, the Sustainable Development Goals Fund was created, acting 
as a bridge in the transition from the MDGs to the SDGs, providing concrete 
experiences on how to achieve a sustainable and inclusive world post-2015 through 
integrated and multidimensional joint programmes. This fund represents a concrete 
response to SDG 17’s call for strengthening the means of implementation and revi-
talizing the global partnership for sustainable development, implicitly promoting 
partnering in joint programmes.
In the first edition of this book (2014), Bodemann-Ostow and Gallego Piñero 
explored the opportunities and challenges of evaluating environment joint 
programmes, based on lessons from the MDG Achievement Fund. They analysed 
28 evaluations of joint programmes under two funding windows that addressed 
climate issues: environment and climate change and water governance. The authors 
sought to draw lessons from the review to help evaluators and programme teams 
develop effective tools to evaluate joint programmes, discussing challenges but also 
benefits of evaluation processes. They noted that a central feature of the Fund’s 
development programmes was the application of a multi-sectoral approach, based 
on the Fund’s view of the MDGs not as a set of individual targets, but rather 
closely interconnected ones. The evaluations of the Fund’s joint programmes thus 
considered, among others, whether a joint programme’s objectives and overall 
design had been holistically designed. This meant, for example, in the environment 
and climate change and water governance thematic windows, that “issues of 
environmental infrastructure, entrepreneurship promotion and environmental 
education, for example, were considered jointly with capacity building, local 
empowerment and gender mainstreaming” (p. 257).
Bodemann-Ostow and Gallego Piñero found, among others, that the evalua-
tion processes had significant implications for the programmes themselves, with 
“positive effects on programme cohesiveness, management and decision making, on 
programme partner coordination and on ownership and stakeholder commitment 
to programme objectives” (p. 270). They also highlighted common challenges the 
evaluators faced, such as the lack of cohesion between individual programme com-
ponents to their overall objective, weak monitoring and evaluation  frameworks, and 
the fact that geographic dispersion, time limitations and  frequent national coun-
terpart staff turnover created information gaps (pp. 273–274). These are  challenges 
common to many programmes and their evaluations, whether joint or not.
The evaluations analysed by Bodemann-Ostow and Gallego Piñero were not 
“joint”; the evaluations were commissioned and managed by the Fund’s Secretariat, 
and generally carried out by a single evaluator or teams of two. This chapter picks 
up where Bodemann-Ostow and Gallego Piñero left off and argues that joint evalu-
ation, where diverse institutions bring together their corporate skills, data, techni-
cal knowledge, expertise and experience to the assessment of the social, economic 
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and environmental dimensions of development initiatives, is well suited to assess 
development interventions in the SDG era. Joint evaluation however also brings 
its own challenges. Lessons from a joint evaluation by the Independent Evaluation 
Offices (IEOs) of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) of the Small Grants Programme (SGP) point to 
both advantages and potential pitfalls of such an approach.
This chapter begins with an overview of joint evaluations and some of the lessons 
learned, followed by a short reflection on the SDGs and joint evaluation. Then 
follows an introduction to the joint evaluation of the SGP and a discussion of the 
lessons from this evaluation, including both practical aspects of carrying out a joint 
evaluation and reflections on how this evaluation examined multiple dimensions of 
the SGP and on potential lessons for future “two system” evaluations.
Overview of joint evaluations
Joint evaluations are not a recent phenomenon. The OECD DAC evaluation net-
work considered them “at almost every meeting” in the 1980s (OECD-DAC 2013: 
17). In the 1990s, members of this evaluation network undertook a number of 
important joint evaluations, one example of which is an evaluation of the interna-
tional response to conflict and genocide in Rwanda, led by Denmark with several 
OECD members and UN Agency partners (OECD-DAC 2005). In the late 1990s, 
the DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation began focusing on joint sector evalu-
ations in selected developing countries. The group observed that “in the medium 
term this will be particularly relevant for monitoring progress towards achieving 
the goals of ‘Shaping the 21st Century’ ” (OECD-DAC 1998), an OECD-DAC 
precursor to the MDGs. In 2000, the MDGs were adopted, and in 2006, the 
UN Secretary General convened a panel on UN system-wide coherence. In his 
remarks on the panel’s report, he stated that, “It will be essential that we swiftly 
modernize and achieve full compatibility on processes for resource planning, 
human resources, common services and evaluation, as these are important drivers 
of coherence in the United Nations system (UN 2006, para.17).” As discussed in 
Bodemann-Ostow and Gallego Piñero, evaluation of joint programmes was an 
important component of the MDG Achievement Fund.
Joint evaluations are not without their challenges, and the OECD DAC 
observed in 2013, “a bit of a backlash to joint evaluations” (OECD-DAC 
2013: 24). Data on UNDP evaluations also shows that the number of joint eval-
uations peaked in 2013 and then decreased (Carugi and Bryant 2019). Various 
papers published over the past several years have highlighted benefits and chal-
lenges of joint evaluations. On the positive side, several of them emphasize the 
importance of joint evaluations in a context of common, multidimensional 
development goals that can only be achieved through partnerships (OECD-
DAC n.d.) with specific reference to the MDGs (Feinstein and Ingram 2003; 
OECD-DAC 2005; UNEG 2014). Joint evaluations allow expansion of the scope 
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and the number of evaluation questions that can be addressed with combined 
resources (OECD-DAC n.d.). They may also “facilitate a sense of the bigger 
picture within which a programme or set of joint activities is situated” (UNEG 
2014: 24). Joint arrangements have the potential to yield higher quality, more 
credible evaluations (Feinstein and Ingram 2003; OECD-DAC n.d.; OECD-
DAC 2005; UNEG 2014). Analyses, findings, conclusions and recommendations 
of joint evaluations are based on broader knowledge and a wider range of inputs 
and contributions (OECD-DAC 2005). They also benefit from joint rather than 
individual scrutiny and quality assessment procedures (UNEG, 2014). There is a 
greater likelihood that a variety of methods for data collection and analysis will 
be used in a joint evaluation, as different agencies may have different types of 
data available, and experiences using different approaches (OECD-DAC 2005; 
UNEG 2014). Similarly, interviews can be more easily conducted with a wider 
range of stakeholders, allowing for better triangulation (UNEG 2014). Several of 
these sources emphasize that joint evaluations typically carry more weight and 
are less easy to ignore than a single agency evaluation as they reflect the views of 
multiple partners (Feinstein and Ingram 2003; OECD-DAC 2005; UNEG 2014). 
It is also argued that joint evaluations reduce transaction costs for the evaluand 
and the stakeholders consulted, as the total number of missions with a joint 
evaluation is less than if each donor carried out its own evaluation (Feinstein and 
Ingram 2003; OECD-DAC 2005; UNEG 2014). Joint evaluations also reduce 
multiple messages, and the risk of conveying conflicting evaluation messages to 
partner countries (OECD-DAC 2005; UNEG 2014). Joint evaluations result in 
a reduced financial burden through cost sharing (Feinstein and Ingram 2003; 
OECD-DAC n.d.). Another benefit, it is also postulated, is that joint evaluations 
foster mutual capacity development and peer learning, as agencies learn from 
each other and share evaluation techniques, and partners come to understand 
better the different perspectives, mandates and approaches of each of the insti-
tutions involved (Feinstein and Ingram 2003; OECD-DAC n.d.; OECD-DAC 
2005; UNEG 2014).
However, these papers also highlight a number of challenges with joint evalu-
ations. Developing comprehensive and yet manageable terms of reference that 
meet each partner’s needs may take time and require compromises (OECD-DAC 
n.d.; SADEV 2008; UNEG 2014). Joint evaluations are typically characterized 
by complex management, communications and governance arrangements, and 
generally require more time to carry out, which in turn may result in being more 
costly than individual agency evaluations (Feinstein and Ingram 2003; OECD-
DAC n.d.; OECD-DAC 2005; SADEV 2008; UNEG 2014). Methodologies can 
also become an area of contention and reaching agreements on methods may 
also extend the time frame of the preparatory phase (OECD-DAC 2005; SADEV 
2008). Other challenges may include power differentials between partners and 
different needs and accountability requirements of the partner organizations 
(UNEG 2014).
184 Carlo Carugi and Heather Bryant
SDGs and joint evaluation
These reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of joint evaluations are 
relevant as the adoption of the SDGs in 2015 is leading to renewed interest in 
joint evaluations. First, the 2030 Agenda gives greater recognition to evaluation 
than did the Millennium Declaration. Paragraph 74 of the 2030 Agenda states 
that “follow-up and review processes at all levels will be guided by the following 
principles: … they will be rigorous and based on evidence, informed by coun-
try led evaluations…” (UN General Assembly 2015). Second, new commitments 
such as the “funding compact” between Member States and entities of the UN 
Sustainable Development Group highlight that
the objective of pursuing joint activities, notably in the areas of analytical work 
and the formulation of operational support and policy options for acceleration 
and evaluation of progress towards the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, is to ensure that United Nations support is coherent and 
efficient across economic, social and environmental issues (UN 2019, para. 30).
And third, the UN Secretary is establishing a dedicated capacity to coordinate 
system-wide evaluations and advance shared learning and accountability for the 
2030 Agenda (UN 2020). This new office will be tasked with conducting evalu-
ations designed to complement the evaluative work of UN entities, focusing on 
“joint activities that cannot adequately be addressed through other existing UN 
accountability mechanisms” (UN 2020, para 111). Joint evaluations serve an inter-
mediary purpose – addressing issues that can be better addressed together rather 
than by a single evaluation entity, but which may not require a system-wide evalua-
tion. The Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG) (whose members are multi-lateral 
development banks) is also giving increased attention to joint evaluations, discussed 
at the ECG Fall 2018 and Spring 2020 meetings. During the last discussion, joint 
evaluations were proposed among the ideas for future collaboration on upcoming 
priorities in response to the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, a global public health issue 
that is strongly related to environment and socio-economic interlinkages. The UN 
Evaluation Group, equally cognizant of the burdens multiple evaluations may pose 
on programme countries, is seeking ways to increase joint evaluations and other 
forms of evaluation cooperation between the UN evaluation units.
To understand progress in the context of the SDGs, evaluation needs to go 
beyond examining results in a single dimension and carefully look at trade-offs and 
synergies between the economic, social and environmental dimensions to assess 
how different outcomes can be valued. In this line, Uitto (2019) highlights the 
importance of mixed methods approaches and the need for interdisciplinary teams 
to evaluate at the nexus of the environment and development. Similarly, Rowe 
(2019) argues for “sustainability-ready evaluation” that addresses coupled human 
and natural systems, recommending that expertise from “both systems” be present 
in an evaluation team.
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One way to bring the interdisciplinarity needed to assess the integrated nature 
of the SDGs is for specialized institutions to partner in joint evaluations, each con-
tributing their respective corporate skills and technical knowledge as well as their 
institutional expertise, data and experience on the issues under scrutiny. The discus-
sion on partnering for addressing the integrated nature of the SDGs is particularly 
relevant to the GEF, one of the few international institutions based on partnership. 
A special challenge is posed in adequately monitoring and evaluating the achieve-
ments of the GEF, accounting for the activities of all partners in a consistent and 
coherent manner.
In 2015, the IEOs of the GEF and the UNDP carried out a joint evaluation of 
a unique programme, the SGP. While the evaluation itself pre-dated the SDGs, the 
experiences not only nourish the ongoing discussion of challenges and opportunities 
of joint evaluations but also bring new insights with respect to the need to integrate 
multiple dimensions into evaluations in the context of the SDGs.
The joint GEF-UNDP evaluation of the Small Grants Programme
The GEF is a financial mechanism for international cooperation that addresses global 
environmental concerns while supporting national sustainable development initia-
tives. The GEF operates through a large partnership involving 183 countries, 18 
agencies and a large network of civil society organizations and private sector entities. 
The GEF created the SGP in 1992 with the aim of developing community-led and 
-owned strategies and technologies for reducing threats to the global environment 
while addressing livelihood challenges. Implemented by UNDP, the SGP awards small 
grants—up to a maximum of $50,000—to needy communities to support the use 
of practices and technologies that benefit the global environment. Since its start up, 
the SGP has provided about 23,990 small grants with a total of $653 million in grants 
(as of June 2019; GEF IEO and UNDP IEO 2020) to communities in more than 125 
countries. The SGP cannot be considered a joint programme as it is implemented by 
only one agency, the UNDP. However, it incorporates the social, economic with the 
environmental at the local level, in full alignment with the SDG philosophy. To note, 
UNDP is the largest GEF Agency in terms of both number of projects and funding. 
UNDP is also one of the very first three GEF implementing Agencies and has been 
implementing the SGP since 1992.
The SGP has been jointly evaluated by the IEOs of the GEF and UNDP twice, 
in 2008 (GEF IEO and UNDP IEO 2008) and in 2015 (GEF IEO and UNDP 
IEO 2016). The 2008 joint SGP evaluation was an important milestone for the 
SGP. Overall, the evaluation found that the SGP is a cost-effective way for the GEF 
to generate global environmental benefits while addressing country priorities and 
responding to the needs of local populations. It also found that the SGP manage-
ment model had reached its limits and was not suitable for a new phase of growth: 
the SGP governance and audit procedures needed to be strengthened. The 2015 
joint SGP evaluation assessed the extent to which the most important recommen-
dations from the 2008 evaluation had been implemented and the extent to which 
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these recommendations and Council decisions remained pertinent. The evaluation 
also reported on the SGP’s current role and results in terms of achieving global 
environmental benefits while addressing livelihoods, poverty, and gender equality; 
broader adoption of grant-level results; the SGP’s strategic positioning; and moni-
toring and evaluation.
Lessons from the joint evaluation of the SGP
Experiences from the recent Joint GEF-UNDP evaluation of the SGP further illus-
trate many of both main advantages and challenges of joint evaluations. Lessons 
from this experience add to the lessons provided by Bodemann-Ostow and Gallego 
Piñero on evaluation of MDG-funded joint programmes. The evaluations of MDG-
Fund joint programmes, often conducted by one consultant, did not benefit from 
the full spectrum of advantages inherent to joint evaluations such as the Joint GEF-
UNDP Evaluation of the SGP.
The following discusses the lessons learned from conducting this joint evaluation in 
the approximate order encountered in the evaluation process. First, practical and often 
challenging aspects like partnership arrangements, timing and management structure 
are described. More substantive aspects follow, including scope, methods and analysis, 
where the advantages and benefits of joint evaluations become more apparent.
#1 Deciding on a joint evaluation
The decision to carry out a joint evaluation is made within a political or institu-
tional context. In the case of the SGP, the decision to conduct a joint evaluation 
was straightforward. The GEF funds the SGP, and UNDP implements it, making 
the two institutions natural partners for a joint evaluation. Both the UNDP and 
GEF evaluation offices are independent and have considerable scope in determining 
their work plans. A precedent had been set with the 2008 joint evaluation. For the 
two institutions, this specific context was conducive to the decision of conducting 
a joint evaluation.
Moving forward, the decision to undertake a joint evaluation may also be 
informed by Rowe’s call for SDGs-ready, two-system evaluations, where the nec-
essary capacities to assess the socio-economic and its interlinkages with the envi-
ronmental are brought in by the participating institutions. Nevertheless, there are 
practical challenges: while partnering to carry out a joint evaluation may be an ideal 
way to approach “two system” evaluations, the programming and/or financial cycles 
of each participating institution do not always coincide; and timing an evaluation to 
meet the different institutional needs can be a challenge, as discussed below.
#2 Partnership arrangements
The SGP experience suggests that institutions working as equal partners enhance 
joint evaluation success. It has been observed that there are often power differen-
tials at play in joint evaluations, where one agency may end up dominating the 
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evaluation process, either because it has invested more funding, has a stronger posi-
tion in the management structure or because it has an agenda it wishes to pursue 
(UNEG 2014). The last point is particularly important. The political dimension can 
be a strong derailing force in any evaluation, and joint evaluations are no exception. 
For example, one institution may be seeking to terminate or exit from a programme, 
while the other may wish to continue. In such cases, the independent nature of the 
evaluation function within each institution mitigates such political interferences by 
bringing partnering agencies to the table together and reiterating the need to main-
tain focus on evidence-based responses to evaluation questions.
The SGP evaluation was carried out by the two IEOs as equal partners. 
The different mandates of the two institutions, development for UNDP and 
environment for the GEF, did mean the two had slightly different interests in the 
evaluation. This led to significant debates during the evaluation (see below on the 
scope of the evaluation), but these were debates between equal partners. Looking 
forward, the SGP experience – where the GEF and UNDP offices ensured both the 
environmental and the human dimensions of the evaluation were given appropriate 
weightage – suggests equal partner arrangements may help achieve balance and 
synergy when evaluating interventions in a two-system approach.
Partnership for joint evaluations includes agreeing on financial arrangements. 
A success factor of this joint evaluation – of potential interest to practitioners if 
not specific to the SDGs context or the question of two-system evaluations - was 
the approach adopted to co-financing. This is important in consideration of the 
fact that not only the share of co-financing from each participating institution but 
also the funding management modalities may influence the power dynamics in a 
joint evaluation. The joint SGP evaluation was co-financed by the IEOs of GEF 
and UNDP in equal shares, and by the SGP itself, from the SGP budget allocated 
for an Operation Phase 5 terminal evaluation. A key aspect of the co-financing for 
the evaluation was that the two offices agreed to share costs equally while avoiding 
complicated fund transfers between two institutions, each with its own financial, 
administrative and operational rules and procedures. The budget for the evaluation 
was designed with each institution taking responsibility for the funding of different 
components, with regular consultation to ensure the cost split remained equal. 
The trust built through the previous experience of joint work by the two offices 
facilitated the budget sharing arrangement.
#3 Timing
Following the decision to conduct a joint evaluation and establishment of adequate 
partnership arrangements, the next practical consideration for a successful joint 
evaluation is timing. Timing is important in several respects. First, the evaluation 
process may be influenced by different reporting time frames of partnering 
institutions. In the case of the Joint Evaluation of the SGP, the timing of the evaluation 
was dictated by institutional programming time frames, rather than the state of the 
programme implementation or its results. More specifically, timing considerations 
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led to a decision to conduct the evaluation in two phases. The first phase served 
the GEF IEO’s need for information on the adoption and implementation of the 
2008 recommendations within a fairly short time frame in order to contribute to 
the Fifth Overall Performance Study of the GEF (OPS5). The second phase was an 
opportunity to build on the first phase findings by addressing additional issues at the 
heart of the UNDP mandate, particularly related to livelihoods, poverty reduction 
and gender/inclusion. In practice, opportunities for a joint evaluation should be 
seized whenever possible and the evaluation process adapted as needed to meet 
organizational requirements.
A second aspect of timing is the length of time required to complete an 
evaluation. Joint evaluations typically take longer than a single-agency evaluation, 
and the SGP evaluation was no exception. The data collection and analysis phases 
(six months from approval of the terms of reference to submission of the draft report 
to the evaluation’s joint steering committee) were no different than they would 
have been in a single agency evaluation, but convening the steering committee 
to review the drafts and agree on issues, followed by finalization of the report and 
obtention of final approval of the report by the steering committee took four 
months in the first phase, and seven months in the second phase, considerably longer 
than the usual time to finalize a single agency report. With reference to the SDG 
context and multi-sectoral interventions, the extended time line of joint evaluations 
as referenced in the literature and as experienced in the present case may present 
challenges to relevance and use of the final evaluation results, as conditions and 
interactions between dimensions are constantly changing on the ground.
A third element of timing that should be considered when looking at evaluations 
covering both human and environmental systems is the different time scales for 
environmental (usually long term), social and human development (shorter term) 
outcomes to materialize and become observable (Uitto 2019). For example, evi-
dence from recent GEF IEO evaluations indicates that a lag time of 4.5–5.5 years 
was an important inflection point at which impacts of land degradation projects 
were observed to be larger in magnitude (GEF IEO 2016). To garner and maintain 
people’s support for these initiatives, they are often accompanied by shorter-term 
livelihoods interventions. In the case of the SGP evaluation, given the nature of the 
small grant projects, it was often possible to observe initial changes in the natural 
environment (e.g. new plantings in a reforestation project or waste management 
improvements in villages) as well as in new socio-economic arrangements, such 
formations of cooperatives that not only engaged in conservation activities but also 
undertook income generating activities to provide economic benefits in the short 
term.
#4 Management structure
Designing an appropriate management structure and developing adequate 
communication mechanisms are important for successful implementation of a 
joint evaluation. Joint evaluations have typically been characterized by complex 
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management and governance arrangements. This was also the case of the present 
joint evaluation, with a three-tier management structure, including a top-heavy apex 
body. The challenges of the structure were partially mitigated by the communication 
strategies adopted by the evaluation managers. The management architecture and 
roles and responsibilities included a Steering Committee, a Management Team and 
an Evaluation team. The Steering Committee was co-chaired by the two offices’ 
directors and included senior staff members from each office. The Committee 
proved to be an unwieldy decision-making forum, the convening of which required 
careful coordination of the members’ respective busy agendas to avoid delays.
The Management Team, formed by two evaluation co-managers took care of the 
selection, hiring and supervision of consultants in accordance to mutually agreed 
Terms of Reference and institutional procedures; coordinated the evaluation activi-
ties carried out by both offices, quality-controlled evaluation deliverables and pro-
cesses; and ensured the timely delivery of evaluation products. The quality of the 
collaboration between co-managers was key to the success of the joint SGP evalu-
ation. Frequent communication, including short chats over Skype on specific issues 
significantly contributed to effective co-management.
The Evaluation Team included the management team complemented by one 
lead consultant, nine regional or national consultants and research assistants from 
both UNDP and GEF evaluation offices assigned to the evaluation. In addition 
to a long and diversified experience in evaluation (including joint evaluation), 
both evaluation co-managers had complementary skill sets. The UNDP IEO task 
manager has experience in poverty, livelihoods, gender and inequalities; the GEF 
IEO task manager in environment, natural resource management, and sustainable 
development. The lead consultant was an expert in evaluation and climate change.
The SGP evaluation structure did not include an Evaluation Reference Group, 
which was a feature of the joint programme evaluations discussed in Bodemann-
Ostow and Gallego Piñero, where representatives from each of the participating 
UN agencies and their national counterparts came together. Given the multi-layer 
management structure of the SGP evaluation, the addition of another formal mech-
anism would have been a burden. Key is ensuring that the management struc-
ture and evaluation process foster ownership and learning: at the country level, the 
MDG-Fund evaluation reference groups gave government counterparts a voice in 
the evaluation process (Bodemann-Ostow and Gallego Piñero 2014: 24). In the case 
of the SGP evaluation, ad hoc briefing sessions were held with key corporate level 
stakeholders to gather feedback and strengthen ownership of the recommendations 
before the evaluation report was finalized.
#5 Scope
Determining the scope of an evaluation – balancing the potential interest in 
answering a wide range of questions with the available resources – is critical for any 
evaluation. One of the main benefits of joint evaluations cited in the literature is the 
potential to broaden the scope and the number of questions to be answered given 
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combined resources, provided it is kept at a manageable level. This is of particular 
interest if one is seeking to conduct a “two-system” evaluation, where there will 
necessarily be questions on both the environmental and the human spheres.
This was reaffirmed with the SGP evaluation, where the scope was broader 
than it might have been had only one agency conducted the evaluation. The 2015 
evaluation broadened the scope beyond that of the 2008 evaluation, to not only 
examine environmental benefits but to include a more in-depth look at SGP’s role 
in improving livelihoods, reducing poverty and contributing to gender equality and 
women’s empowerment. Thus, the evaluation looked not only at the environmental 
but also at the interactions between the environmental, social and economic, the 
three dimensions at the heart of the 2030 Agenda.
Agreeing on the scope in the context of a two-system evaluation may generate 
debate. In the case of the SGP evaluation, expanding the scope beyond environ-
mental considerations sparked numerous debates throughout the conduct of the 
evaluation. One reason was that different programme and evaluation stakehold-
ers had differing interests. For example, the SGP programme manager (UNDP) 
saw one of the values of the programme as its ability to “reach the most vulner-
able”, whereas many environment specialists and GEF stakeholders challenged the 
claim, some arguing that it is virtually impossible to work with the most vulnerable 
as they do not have the necessary capacities to engage in development initiatives 
or are themselves a threat to the environmental benefits the programme seeks to 
secure. Some GEF stakeholders questioned UNDP’s interest in examining SGP’s 
socio-economic benefits in detail. The relevance of these questions and tensions 
is illustrated by the fact that one of the evaluation recommendations refers to the 
need to clarify the SGP’s long-term vision, including the balance between global 
environmental benefits and socio-economic objectives.
A risk of joint evaluations with their potentially broader scope is however that 
the number of evaluation questions becomes unmanageable, as each agency has its 
own requirements, needs and interests. Again, this risk may be particularly relevant 
to two-system evaluations. In the case of the SGP evaluation, the scope was overly 
ambitious in the beginning. For example, the original terms of reference included 
a key question for the second phase of the evaluation, asking, to what extent 
the SGP, through its work with non-governmental and civil society organizations 
alike, facilitated civic engagement in the local and/or national policy arena, espe-
cially in post-conflict and fragile states. UNDP was interested in this aspect of the 
programme, given its mandate on governance and peacebuilding issues (which, 
in terms of the five “Ps” of the 2030 Agenda, would have added “peace” to the 
elements of “people, planet and prosperity” already captured by the focus on the 
social, environmental and economic aspects of SGP). However, the question was 
not of primary interest to GEF, and the evaluation management team also came to 
realize that there was a need to narrow the scope of the second phase of the evalua-
tion, given resource constraints. Thus, maintaining the dual focus on environmental 
and socio-economic benefits required choices on the extent to which the latter 
could be addressed.
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#6 Multidimensional analysis
Another feature and important benefit of this joint evaluation was the strength-
ened multidimensional analysis, composed of environmental and socio-economic 
research issues which drew on the strengths of the two partner evaluation offices 
highlighted earlier and which illustrates the interest of joint evaluations in the 
SDGs context. The GEF aims at achieving global environmental benefits. While not 
directly targeting socio-economic co-benefits, it welcomes when the initiatives it 
supports manage to achieve them too. UNDP focuses more on poverty reduction, 
livelihoods and gender, while the environment is a theme that cuts across UNDP’s 
main strategic and operational pillars. The mandates of the two organizations over-
lap, but they are not identical, which can lead to differences in approach or emphases 
to programming, and by extension, to evaluation (Uitto, 2016). This joint evaluation 
however, in terms of evaluation purpose, objectives and key questions, was designed 
with a high degree of complementarity. Gender equality and livelihoods are both 
components of the SDG sustainability and resilience principles. The 2015 evalua-
tion added a stronger emphasis on livelihoods, poverty reduction and gender results 
than the 2008 evaluation.
#7 Methods and tools
Uitto (2019) argues that in most cases, a mixed methods approach is needed for 
sustainable development evaluation, with methods that capture changes in both the 
natural and human systems, further stating that “interdisciplinary teams are the gold 
standard” (p. 52). Earlier discussions on advantages of joint evaluations point to the 
potential for methodology development and the use of a greater variety of methods 
for data collection and analysis (UNEG 2014) brought to the table by the partner 
agencies. In the case of the SGP joint evaluation, many of the evaluation methods 
and tools were built upon and adapted from the ones developed and used in the 
2008 joint evaluation. The team modified these tools to align with the new evalu-
ation questions. New tools were also introduced. For example, 12 country studies 
were conducted, with field verification of 144 small grants projects. The team used 
the same tool that had been developed for the 2008 joint evaluation to assess grant 
project effectiveness in terms of economic benefits (also allowing for comparison 
with the 2008 evaluation results). Inspired by UNDP’s “gender marker”, the team 
developed new rating tools to assess the contributions of the grant projects to 
gender equality and women’s empowerment as well as to the reduction of pov-
erty, inequality and exclusion, allowing for more in-depth analysis of these aspects. 
More generally, data were collected through several additional complementary 
methods and tools: a global online survey reaching out to almost 2500 programme 
country stakeholders; an in-depth literature review of SGP documentation at all 
levels, from global to national; a meta-analysis of 30 randomly selected SGP coun-
try programme strategies and 50 evaluations covering SGP interventions; a port-
folio review of performance and financial data for 18,000 small grant projects; and 
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several key stakeholder interviews and focus groups at central level as well as in 
the countries visited during the evaluations. These tools generated a huge amount 
of both quantitative and qualitative data that could be used for generating solidly 
triangulated findings using techniques developed by the GEF team (Carugi, 2016) 
in response to each evaluation question.
This joint evaluation benefited from complementarity of skills and professional 
experience from UNDP – stronger than GEF in gender and livelihoods – and 
from the GEF, strong in environment. In addition to this complementarity, the 
experience offered an opportunity for peer learning, confirming one of the most 
common benefits of joint evaluations reported in the literature. Each component 
was designed together bringing diverse experience to bear on each section. The 
multidimensional analysis improved as a result, fitting perfectly to the nature of the 
evaluand, a global programme tasked with achieving both environmental and socio-
economic benefits at the local level. In other words, the nature of the SGP calls for 
this kind of integrated analysis, which makes this experience informative in the 
context of the discussion on joint evaluation for the SDG 2030 Agenda.
#8 Reducing multiple messages while multiplying use
Recognized advantages of joint evaluations also include the potential for reduc-
ing multiple (and potentially conflicting) messages and broadened ownership of 
findings and recommendations (UNEG, 2014). The joint evaluation of the SGP 
examined several strategic and controversial (within the SGP universe) questions 
and, after extensive consultations including presentations of preliminary findings 
and recommendations to stakeholders, provided a single set of messages to both the 
GEF and its Council and UNDP (and by extension its Executive Board). This also 
contributed to evaluation use. The joint SGP evaluation led to structural changes 
in both organizations, a clear benefit. The evaluation recommended revitalization 
of the global SGP Steering Committee as a forum to provide high-level strategic 
direction and clarity of purpose to the programme, for example in terms of balanc-
ing the contributions to global environmental benefits and to other socio-economic 
benefits, which is central to SDGs’ call for attention to dual-systems thinking in 
sustainable development interventions. Revitalization of the Global SGP Steering 
Committee also addresses the political/balance of power dimension related to two 
partnering institutions with complementary yet very diverse aims – the environ-
mental and the human – both in terms of time (short vs long term) as well as scale 
(global vs local). The GEF Council, to which the GEF IEO reports directly, issued 
a corresponding decision addressed to the GEF Secretariat. UNDP also adopted 
recommendations regarding management of different SGP country programmes at 
different levels of maturity within a single unit to ensure coherence. Had the evalu-
ation not been joint, detailed recommendations may not have been made to both 
institutions at the highest level. For example, UNDP alone could not have made 
recommendations to the GEF Council, and the GEF ensured that recommendations 
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related to global environmental benefits were included, which might not have been 
the case had UNDP undertaken the evaluation by itself.
Looking at this in a broader context, the 2030 Agenda emphasizes the 
importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships to support achievement of the SDGs. 
Joint evaluations can facilitate, as did the SGP evaluation, formulation of common 
messages to stakeholders working in different “systems”, the environmental and 
human, with the potential to lead to meaningful change.
Conclusions
Bodemann-Ostow and Gallego Piñero (2014), in their chapter in the first edition of 
this book, sought to draw lessons to help evaluators and programme teams develop 
effective tools to evaluate joint programmes, discussing challenges but also benefits 
of evaluation processes for improved programme coherence and results. This chapter 
has broadened the discussion on these opportunities and challenges to look at joint 
evaluations in the new context of the SDGs, where the social, the economic and the 
environmental have been brought closer together in development discourse.
Joint evaluations have been the subject of several guides and analyses over the 
past two decades (Feinstein and Ingram 2003; OECD-DAC n.d.; OECD-DAC 
2005; SADEV 2008; OECD-DAC 2013; UNEG 2014), producing many lessons in 
terms of advantages and disadvantages as well as “do’s and don’ts”. Many of these 
were confirmed by the 2015 SGP evaluation discussed in this chapter. Joint evalu-
ations have seen highs and lows over the years, with a backlash and resistance to 
these evaluations due to high transaction costs and heavy coordination requirements 
observed in the period leading up to 2015. The year 2015, however, represented a 
shift in the international development agenda with the adoption of the SDGs. The 
implications of the SDGs for multi-stakeholder approaches and integrated program-
ming need to be incorporated into the evaluation agenda. As argued by Uitto (2019) 
and others, despite the increasing awareness of environmental threats to ecosystems 
that support human life and society, the evaluation profession has focused primarily 
on the socio-economic dimensions of development. This chapter has illustrated that 
joint evaluations – despite their challenges – offer significant advantages that can 
lead to important institutional and strategic changes with a view to strengthening 
development results in both the human and environmental spheres.
The literature and the 2015 SGP evaluation have shown that, for example, joint 
evaluations are suited when all institutions involved have a stake in the scope cov-
ered, provided the scope remains sufficiently delimited so that the key evaluation 
questions are kept to a manageable number. The temptation to add evaluation ques-
tions is likely to increase when looking at multiple dimensions – the environmental, 
the social and the economic – and thus must be carefully managed. Institutional 
arrangements for joint evaluations can easily become cumbersome, and care should 
be taken to keep institutional architecture of the evaluation as simple as possible, 
especially at the joint steering committee level. Joint evaluations will inevitably 
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have transaction costs for the partnering evaluation units, but these can be mini-
mized with appropriate architectures and regular communication. Joint evaluations 
have the potential to bring together institutions and evaluators with complementary 
expertise and professional experience, facilitating the creation of an interdisciplinary 
evaluation team, which is important when evaluating at the nexus of the natural and 
human systems (Uitto, 2019).
In summary, the experience of the Joint SGP Evaluation supports the findings of 
earlier studies that the greatest advantages of joint evaluations include the potential 
for broader scope than single-agency evaluations, increased multidimensionality in 
the analysis and a single set of coherent messages addressed to multiple partners. The 
Joint SGP evaluation also illustrates how complementary tools can be used to exam-
ine results of a common intervention through different lenses, the environmental, 
the social and the economic. This is very relevant in the context of the SDGs, where 
interactions and linkages between goals and targets are increasingly analysed, and 
the need for integrating different sectoral programmes and to develop cross-sectoral 
policy is increasingly recognized (e.g. Mainali et al. 2018). Joint evaluations such 
as the SGP evaluation facilitate the expansion of scope beyond a traditional single 
sector, bringing together partners with different knowledge and skill sets to foster 
cross-sectoral analysis, examine trade-offs and highlight synergies and to craft mean-
ingful messages for actors in multiple spheres.
Notes
 1 “Indicator is conceptually clear, has an internationally established methodology and stan-
dards are available, and data are regularly produced by countries for at least 50 per cent of 
countries and of the population in every region where the indicator is relevant.” https://
unstats.un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/tier-classification/.
 2 Analysis based on the classification of environment-related indicators by UNEP 2019 
and 11 December 2019 updated tier classification https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/
tier-classification/.
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EVALUATING THE POVERTY–
ENVIRONMENT NEXUS IN AFRICA
Michael Stocking1
Background
The idea that poverty and environmental degradation are linked has been discussed, 
debated, rediscovered and reinvented numerous times. An early published manifes-
tation came from Thomas Malthus who saw the main threat to ‘the intention of 
the Creator that the earth should be replenished’ being ‘an unhealthy, vicious and 
miserable population’ (Malthus 1826: XXIV). Colonial powers in Africa and Asia 
ensured continuity of the thesis. The entire discourse of increasing populations of 
poor and desperate people undermining the integrity of the natural environment 
is imbued with hidden messages, not least of which is that rural peasantry equates 
with poverty, poverty with ignorance and ignorance with environmental stupidity.
Since the 1992 Earth Summit, the concept of sustainable development has 
renewed interest into the poverty–environment debate (Gray and Moseley 2005). 
Popularizing the concept, the Brundtland Report described how ‘poor people 
are forced to overuse environmental resources to survive from day to day, and 
their impoverishment of their environment further impoverishes them’ (World 
Commission on Environment and Development [WCED] 1987). Influential orga-
nizations have perpetuated the link between the condition of the environment 
and the state of poverty, especially via issues such as food security and health. For 
example, the International Food Policy Research Institute has stated unequivocally 
‘the condition of the world’s natural resource base in the year 2020 largely depends 
on whether poverty has been eradicated’ (Pinstrup-Andersen and Pandya-Lorch 
1995). The basis for such assertions is the presumed coexistence of areas of poor 
people with areas of severe environmental degradation, leading to the assumption 
that poverty drives people to use their resources unsustainably; the evidence, how-
ever, is weak.
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Indeed, such has been the pervasive nature of the sustainability concept that 
poverty (along with population) and the environment have become so inextri-
cably associated that they have earned the epithet ‘nexus’ – that is, a set of mutu-
ally reinforcing links between poverty and environmental damage (Ekbom and 
Bojö 1999; Dasgupta et al. 2005). Nexus is particularly used in the context of it 
being one of the main challenges to achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
[UNESCAP] 2003). There is a compelling body of evidence, both biophysical and 
socio-economic that the environment is one of the core building blocks for pro-
poor economic growth (UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Facility 2008). The 
predominant school of thought argues that poverty is a major cause of environ-
mental degradation. If policy makers want to tackle environmental issues, then the 
nexus discourse states they must first address the poverty problem (Duraiappa 1998). 
Poverty, it is argued, undermines environmental sustainability through a number of 
complex drivers, not least of which is that the poorest in their desperation to sustain 
their lives have to undermine their environment (Lufumpa 2005). Deforestation, 
land degradation, low agricultural productivity, water scarcity, threats to biodiversity 
and the impact of civil conflicts are all frequently cited as negative impacts resulting 
from the close linkages between poverty and environment (Lufumpa 2005).
This chapter describes the challenge of evaluating such a broad and complex 
concept as the poverty–environment nexus. It reports on the ‘Evaluation of UNDP 
Contribution to Environmental Management for Poverty Reduction: The Poverty-
Environment Nexus. Final Report’ (hereinafter the Poverty–Environment Nexus), 
an evaluation commissioned by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
to examine how the organization handles on the one side its core mandate (address-
ing poverty in the developing world) and environmental sustainability on the other 
side (an issue that is more often seen as the concern of other agencies and, by many 
developing countries, not a high priority (EO of UNDP 2010). The evaluation had 
to accommodate a number of theoretical and practical questions, the first of which 
was why should poverty and the environment be linked; is it just received – and 
assumed – wisdom that UNDP should be addressing environmental issues as a way 
of achieving poverty reduction targets? Or would the ready availability of finance 
for the environment through the Global Environment Facility (GEF) dictate a focus 
on poverty–environment linkages without embedding the intellectual underpin-
nings of the nexus in the organization? These and other issues are addressed in the 
following sections that describe the methods and principal findings of the evalua-
tion, with a special focus on Africa.
Why might poverty and environment be linked in Africa?
Poor people live more intimately with their biophysical environment, depending 
much more directly on the natural resource base for their food, energy, water and 
shelter. They till the soil, collect wood for the fire, fetch water in buckets and con-
struct their houses from local materials. Their livelihood is spatially and temporally 
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tied to the condition of their natural resources. Therefore, if the resources are 
degraded, poverty ensues; if poverty is endemic, resources are degraded. The media 
reinforces this two-way link. Images of starving people in the Ethiopian famine of 
1984 were always seen against a backdrop of treeless desert or bare fields. When 
their survival is at stake and alternatives are impossible, it is argued that people will 
overuse their resources. Desperate hunger leads to desperate strategies for survival. 
Future welfare has to take a back seat when sheer survival is in question.
Nevertheless, a direct link between poverty and environment is contested. One 
study of two adjacent farming blocks in central Zambia found that the more pros-
perous commercial farming block was far more subject to environmental degrada-
tion than the adjacent block of small subsistence farms (Stocking 1983). Indeed, 
affluence may enable greater investment in land use technologies that intensify 
farming practices and more readily degrade the soil of its organic and nutrient con-
tent. In contrast, the more elaborate and complex practices of smallholders are less 
damaging to the environment and may even mimic nature.
Linkages are, however, complex and involve secondary influencing factors. In 
Kenya, the now (in) famous Machakos study, More People, Less Erosion (Tiffen, 
Morimore and Gichuki 1994), showed how – under certain conditions – increas-
ing population can provide opportunities for better control of soil erosion and the 
development of sustainable small-holder production systems. It helped by providing 
empirical evidence that the closely related population-environment nexus is not nec-
essarily true (Tiffen, Mortimore and Gichuki 1994). The influence of nearby urban 
markets stimulated intensive but integrated land use practices, while at the same 
time supporting three times the population. The status of the environment improved 
almost beyond recognition with the innovation spurred by secondary factors. Access 
to credit and technologies to practice environmentally sustainable agriculture, plus 
the gaining of land entitlements, all combined to heal what had been an extremely 
degraded part of Kenya that supported only a low density of very poor people.
Property rights can be a major influence on the status of the environment. Not 
only does security of tenure lead to increased investment in the land, but it also 
encourages longer-term environmentally beneficial investments such as tree plant-
ing and soil conservation structures.2 In Africa, communal tenure and common-
property resources are often the norm, where, it is argued, there is little incentive 
for the individual to conserve for the good of the community. Africa is, therefore, 
the continent in which the poverty–environment nexus is most widely discussed; 
it is also the location for the largest global programme that addresses the nexus, the 
UNDP-UNEP Poverty–Environment Initiative (PEI 2012).3 The case of Malawi is 
instructive, where a 2011 PEI study calculated that unsustainable – and therefore, 
degrading – practices costs the country 5.3% of its gross domestic product annually, 
substantially more than its total funding of education and health (UNEP 2013). If 
this loss of gross domestic product translates to increasing rural poverty in agricul-
ture, fisheries, forestry and wildlife (as PEI claims the government of Malawi now 
believes), than there is a powerful argument for a development strategy that targets 
sustainable practices as a way out of poverty.
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Why evaluate the poverty–environment nexus?
A prevailing view among some development professionals is that investments in 
UNDP’s core mandate may have to allow for some environmental damage. Even 
more common is the view that investments in environmental conservation, such 
as national parks and forest reserves, need not worry unduly about their impact on 
local people. Land alienation and restricted access are issues that have been hotly 
debated in Africa since colonial times.4 An evaluation should not only identify 
whether these views were entrenched, but should also seek empirical evidence as 
to whether investments in the poverty reduction or environmental conservation 
areas had beneficial unintended effects for the other area (and, if so, what aspects of 
project design contributed to the co-benefits?). Given UNDP’s reliance on Global 
Environment Facility funding of environmental issues, it was especially important 
that UNDP could demonstrate co-benefits for both the global environment and 
for local development.
The hypothesis behind the poverty–environment nexus evaluation is that 
there is a set of closely linked issues – the nexus – that affects two major goals 
of United Nations developmental and environmental agencies: poverty alleviation 
and environmental protection. The nexus stems in particular from evidence that 
development schemes often sacrifice longer-term environmental sustainability for 
short-term economic and job creation benefits, and that over-exploitation of natural 
resources adversely affects ecosystem health (and, in time, reduces economic output). 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, completed in 2005, the largest review of 
such linkages to date, produced compelling evidence at the global, national and local 
scales that inter alia, human health and welfare depends on the sustainable function-
ing of ecosystems and that these ecosystems are vulnerable to depletion by overuse 
that is often driven by the needs of poor people. For example, the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment found that ‘over 1 billion people lack access to safe water sup-
plies; 2.6 billion people lack adequate sanitation. This has led to widespread micro-
bial contamination of drinking water. Water-associated infectious diseases claim up 
to 3.2 million lives each year, approximately 6% of all deaths globally. The burden 
of disease from inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene totals 1.7 million deaths 
and the loss of more than 54 million healthy life years’ (Corvalan et al. 2005). It is 
the poor that are selectively and adversely impacted – it is also the poor who largely 
contribute to the microbial contamination. However, as this example illustrates, the 
links are by no means direct or uncontroversial. An evaluation should assist UNDP 
in building empirical evidence of how investments in poverty reduction might ben-
efit the environment and, if they do, what multiple co-benefits may arise that would 
further justify gains in productivity bringing environmental benefits.
The rural poor disproportionately depend on the availability of natural resources 
for their subsistence livelihoods. Efforts to protect ecosystems and address other envi-
ronmental factors can affect poor people’s access to resources. Conversely, reducing 
poverty can affect the environmental systems’ sustainability. There should, therefore, 
be a substantial poverty dimension to environmental protection, and a substantial 
environmental dimension to poverty reduction. Public support for these efforts is 
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a critical factor, as efforts to reduce pollution and conserve natural resources are 
unlikely to succeed if they unfairly restrict opportunities for local people to work 
and feed their families. Taken together, these dynamics suggest that integrated pro-
gramming is necessary to simultaneously improve livelihoods for the poor while 
protecting the environment. An evaluation must identify not only whether integra-
tion is built into project design, but also how it is practised.
Scope and method of the poverty–environment nexus evaluation
The Evaluation Office of UNDP conducted the evaluation and assigned two 
senior officers specifically for it. A team of three consultants undertook much of 
the interviewing and analysis and drafted the final report. The team was led by a 
senior developing country professional and former Minister of the Environment 
with leadership experience in a number of high-profile international organizations. 
A professional evaluator with World Bank experience and an academic with Global 
Environment Facility and substantial project experience supported the team leader. 
All three met with staff from the Evaluation Office of UNDP at least three times in 
New York. UNDP assigned two support staff for research and data analysis. In addi-
tion, 21 national consultants were contracted for detailed case studies. The whole 
exercise took just over one year to complete.
At an early stage, it was decided that the evaluation should be both retrospec-
tive and prospective – it should take stock of the past while looking into the future. 
The latter is especially important given UNDP’s leadership roles, being the most 
prominent agency sponsoring poverty reduction and, in many countries, the leading 
sponsor of environmental projects. Additionally, UNDP coordinates multi-agency 
donor support in many countries and has specific responsibilities regarding the 
United Nations reform processes.5
In terms of timeframe, the evaluation acknowledged that activities involving 
poverty–environment linkages have been ongoing since the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development. However, the evaluation’s focus 
of analysis was limited to after 2004, covering the Second Multi-Year Funding 
Framework (2004–2007) and the strategic plan 2008–20116 implementation periods. 
This narrower timeframe conforms to the period after the Johannesburg summit, 
when the Poverty–Environment Partnership7 and the UNDP-UNEP Poverty–
Environment Initiative (PEI)8 were established. It also conforms to the period when 
the then newly appointed UNDP Administrator articulated a ‘vision for UNDP to 
be widely acknowledged as a world class, knowledge based development organization 
which helps developing countries make transformational change and helps channel 
the strengths of the entire United Nations (UN) development system to that end’.9
The evaluation took an approach that built from standard evaluation criteria (rel-
evance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (UNDP 2009), organized around 
a set of broad evaluation questions (see Box 11.1). Relevance assessed the extent 
that poverty–environment interventions met the mandates of UNDP, other agen-
cies that UNDP works with and its recipient countries. UNDP’s core focus on 
poverty reduction was vital here, but so were the more recent priorities of UNDP 
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on the Millennium Development Goals, climate change and donor coordination. 
Effectiveness, a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives, was 
tested with how far the nexus of poverty–environment issues was factored not only 
into the UNDP poverty and environment practice areas, but also in other practice 
areas such as crisis prevention, governance and gender. In addition, effectiveness was 
evaluated in the extent to which UNDP persuaded its agency and country partners 
to include poverty–environment issues in their work. Efficiency measured the out-
puts – qualitative and quantitative – in relation to the inputs in two principal ways in 
this evaluation. First, it looked at country requests and how these better link poverty 
and the environment, and second, it addressed internal UNDP structures to see if 
they were responsive to the poverty–environment nexus. This last question on the 
internal barriers to cross-disciplinary issues such as poverty–environment proved to 
be very important. Finally, sustainability examined how well poverty–environment 
linkages are embedded in the organization and are likely to continue.
BOX 11.1 EVALUATION QUESTIONS AGAINST UNDP 
STANDARD CRITERIA OF RELEVANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, 
EFFICIENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY
Relevance
What is the relevance of addressing poverty–environment linkages in UNDP 
work and activities, in relation to its overall mandate and the needs of pro-
gramme countries?
 • Is explicitly dealing with these linkages of high importance to achieving 
UNDP’s strategic objectives, including support for MDG achievement?
 • Is the poverty–environment nexus a critical aspect in the global effort 
to reduce and mitigate the effects of greenhouse gas emissions and 
assist in adapting to climate change?
 • How does dealing with the nexus relate to UNDP’s relationship with 
other United Nations agencies, the World Bank and other donors?
Effectiveness
Have UNDP efforts to link poverty and environment been ‘generally acceptable’ 
and have they achieved results?
 • Do the poverty and environment practice areas at global, regional and 
country levels focus attention on this nexus of issues?
 • Are poverty and environment-related priorities being factored into 
UNDP strategies and activities in other practice areas, such as crisis 
prevention and recovery, and governance?
(Continued)
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The evaluation employed a variety of data collection methods, including desk 
reviews, stakeholder interviews and country case studies. It was conducted in accor-
dance with Evaluation Office of UNDP guidelines and methods, as well as standard 
evaluation practices such as the triangulation principle and the validation of facts and 
findings with relevant stakeholders. The evaluation team decided not to use ques-
tionnaires because of past experience with limited responses and the difficulty of 
obtaining clear responses on this conceptual topic without face-to-face interaction.
Because poverty and environment issues are so country-specific and vary so 
enormously between regions and between countries within regions, the evalua-
tion team decided to use as large a sample as resources and time would allow. 
Therefore, the Poverty–Environment Nexus evaluation included detailed case 
 • Is UNDP having success in encouraging country government partners 
to implement policies and programmes that harmonize poverty allevi-
ation and environmental protection priorities?
 • Has UNDP succeeded in establishing successful partnerships with other 
United Nations and international agencies in support of efforts to more 
closely link poverty alleviation and environmental protection?
 • What approaches have been most successful, and what improvements 
should be made to enhance UNDP effectiveness?
Efficiency
Have the programmes and projects developed to better link poverty and envi-
ronment issues been carried out efficiently?
 • Has the effort enabled UNDP to respond more efficiently to country 
requests for assistance on sustainable development issues?
 • Are there internal structural and financial aspects that have a significant 
bearing on UNDP efforts to improve poverty–environment programme 
linkages?
Sustainability
How well are the results of UNDP’s work to more closely link poverty alleviation 
and environmental protection policies being sustained?
 • What are the contributions of UNDP in this regard to the long-term 
benefits to people’s well-being?
 • Is there adequate support in UNDP’s structure and financial basis to 
continue addressing the nexus where there is further need and demand?
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studies for nine countries, four of which are African (Mali, Morocco, Rwanda and 
Tanzania), telephone interviews with personnel in 29 other countries, 8 of which 
are African (Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, South 
Africa and Tunisia) and regional consultations including UNDP offices in Nairobi 
and Pretoria and with key partner organizations. The telephone interviews were a 
departure from previous evaluations and proved to be rewarding. Country Offices 
telephoned took these interviews seriously, often as conference calls with several 
of their staff made available. Other telephone interviews were with individuals and 
were conducted by one of the core consultants. English, French and Spanish lan-
guages were used in these interviews. Responses in this format were often candid 
and sometimes surprising. Individuals appeared to be willing to give detailed and 
often critical information, sometimes asking that responses be taken confidentially. 
The team respected such wishes and anonymized all reporting, although it would 
probably have been possible for views to have been traced back by anyone with 
close UNDP experience.
The detailed case studies were contracted to local consultants who were given a 
standard format for reporting. The case study outputs provided less useful informa-
tion than had been hoped for, tended to repeat large amounts of data on poverty 
and environment information already in the public domain and were somewhat 
light in analytical rigour. Criticism of the organization of Country Offices, the bar-
riers to uptake on poverty–environment nexus issues and difficulties with individual 
projects were muted. In retrospect, the contracted consultants chosen for their local 
knowledge were perhaps being careful to avoid undue criticism of their subjects, 
given their reliance in the future on building good relationships for potential further 
consultancies. Nevertheless, the core consultants were able to use these studies to 
give empirical backing to views and opinions expressed in the telephone interviews 
and other face-to-face meetings. The methodological approach enabled the team to 
sample a wide variety of opinions, engage stakeholders in more substantive discus-
sions and probe country-specific issues.
Challenges and limitations
Cross-cutting topics such as poverty and the environment present major challenges 
to agencies with a singular or thematic focus. There is little incentive under such 
conditions for professionals to work together. With the exception of the PEI, few 
results frameworks or baseline indicators are available to assess efficiencies and effec-
tiveness. Consequently, many of the findings are subjective and rely on participants’ 
and stakeholders’ views. Therefore, the PEI was given special attention along with 
UNDP’s role as an implementing agency for GEF, the largest funder worldwide of 
projects to improve the global environment. From 2006 to 2010, UNDP assisted 
partner governments to secure a total of US$1.146 million in funding from the GEF, 
an average of US$286 million per year. GEF funding has comprised roughly 50% 
of UNDP annual environment and energy expenditures. As part of its GEF imple-
mentation responsibilities, UNDP also administers the Small Grants Programme, 
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which focuses on local environmental issues and is especially pertinent to the 
 poverty–environment nexus.
However, the emphasis on PEI and the GEF brought challenges and limitations 
to the evaluation. PEI was (and still is) a somewhat isolated outpost of UNDP, 
both geographically (Nairobi) and thematically (cross-disciplinary). Being jointly 
run by the two UN agencies has meant that its survival in times of budgetary crisis 
was continually in question, with financial priorities usually assigned to mainstream 
practice areas. The GEF provides the ‘increment’ or top-up to development projects 
in order to deliver global environmental benefits such as biodiversity conservation, 
climate change mitigation and protection of international waters.
In many GEF projects, the increment is no more than one-twentieth of total 
project expenditure. Three challenging outcomes arise from this model of proj-
ect funding: (1) the environmental components assume a far lower priority than 
developmental components; (2) a particular slant is imposed on the environmen-
tal component to gain what are accepted as global environmental benefits, rather 
than domestic or national environmental issues such as soil conservation or agricul-
tural sustainability; and (3) the availability and relatively easy access to GEF funding 
enabled UNDP to become dependent on GEF for environmental funding, thereby 
allowing its core resources to be more concentrated in its other practice areas. The 
poverty–environment nexus evaluation used these points initially to interrogate 
some of the difficulties of the GEF model of project funding as applied to UNDP 
and encourage a more holistic and integrated approach by UNDP.
Findings: country case studies
This section summarizes the findings from the evaluation’s four country-based case 
studies conducted in Africa (out of nine worldwide). By most criteria, the Mali, 
Rwanda and Tanzania case studies provide situations of substantial rural poverty 
alongside considerable environmental degradation. Hence, they could be expected 
to be country cases where the poverty–environmental nexus would not only be 
prominent but also a high priority for development agencies and country minis-
tries. The evaluation used these case studies as an important source of evidence to 
support its findings. Each case study involved a review of relevant documents and 
interviews with key individuals. The documents reviewed included major national 
policies and strategic frameworks as well as UNDP country programme docu-
ments (such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework [UNDAF] 
and the country programme action plan) plus specific documents related to the 
 poverty–environment nexus.
Mali
Mali ranked 184th out of 189 countries in the 2019 UNDP Human Development 
Report (UNDP 2019), with a Human Development Index rating of 0.427. Just 
under half of its population (49.7%) earns less than US$1.25 per day (UNDP 
2019).10 The annual birth rate is projected at 2% through 2014, and the adult literacy 
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rate is 33.1%. Mali’s economy is primarily based on agriculture and agropastoralism, 
with agriculture accounting for more than 35% of GDP and 80% of livelihoods 
(FAO 2017). More than 80% of rural and urban household energy requirements are 
met by wood fuel and biomass resources.
The country’s geographical location, small percentage of arable land (14%) and 
low level of economic development leave Mali vulnerable to climate change. Almost 
three quarters of the population (73%) lives in rural areas under extreme poverty. 
Sustainable land management is a major concern, with the economy largely depen-
dent on the primary sector, notably agriculture and farming.
Given the seriousness of both the status of poverty in Mali and the condition 
of its environment, it was not surprising that the evaluation found high levels of 
political and public awareness of the nexus. UNDP has been a major partner in the 
effort to mainstream natural resources and environment into the country’s Strategic 
Framework for growth and Poverty Reduction and the National Policy for the 
Protection of the Environment. It has also been a partner in implementation of 
the PEI, which included several diagnostic studies, including the development of 
indicators. Two thirds of the Country Office programme budget is committed to 
activities directly related to the poverty–environmental nexus under the UNDP 
country cooperation framework 2008–2012, most of it (54%) to poverty reduction 
and achieving the MDGs (only 12% went to environment and energy). The main 
results of the PEI project included greater awareness and knowledge on poverty 
and environment linkages at national level, establishment of tools and mechanisms 
to integrate environment into national development planning and decentralization 
frameworks and enhanced national capacity to integrate environment into national 
development planning and decentralization processes.
Yet, problems remain in mainstreaming the nexus as opposed to poverty and 
environment as single issues into UNDP practice areas. A PEI evaluation concluded 
that the initiative in Mali has not achieved all its intended results (Bass and Renard 
2009). Problem areas related to the structure and composition of project manage-
ment committees and delays in fund disbursements, a weakness identified generi-
cally in the marginal structural position of PEI in the UNDP portfolio. In contrast, 
the GEF Small Grants Programme successfully supported communities in develop-
ing and implementing poverty–environment community projects through linked 
environmental conservation and income-generating activities.
Underlying the weaknesses in the poverty–environment nexus in Mali is that 
UNDP staff has limited understanding as to what constitutes the poverty– environment 
nexus in practical terms. This leads to operational issues such as delays in release of 
funds, institutional issues (e.g. coordination) and structural issues that inhibit collabo-
ration between units. Lessons from PEI implementation in Mali included the need 
for a stronger project management unit at country level to ensure greater impact on 
national and local planning processes and stronger advocacy with national decision 
makers. The best way forward was considered to be community-based demonstra-
tion projects on sustainable environmental management and improved living condi-
tions to support decentralization of  environmental management
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Morocco
In 2018, Morocco had an annual per capita income of US$3,273 (UNSD 2018) 
and a population of approximately 36.03 million people.1 From 2001 to 2020, 
relative poverty declined from 15.3% to 4.8% nationally,2 while for the same 
period, vulnerability decreased from 22.8% to 17.5%. The data indicate that 3.9% 
of people were subjected to undernourishment in Morocco between 2015 and 
2017 compared to 5.7% in the period between 2004 and 2006 (FAO et al. 2018). 
However, 4.8% of the population still live below the national poverty line in 2018 
(UNDP 2019).
Morocco has three principal ecosystems: the mountain forest ecosystem; the 
oasis, desert, semi-desert ecosystem; and the Mediterranean coastal and marine eco-
system. Each zone experiences different forms of land use, providing important 
environmental goods and services. Some of these land uses are vital to the national 
economy (e.g. phosphate mining, tourism) and also to the livelihoods of the rural 
poor (e.g. rain-fed and irrigated agriculture, pastureland, water for irrigation). One 
of the major concerns in Morocco therefore relates to degradation of environmen-
tal resources (land, water, biodiversity), which also poses a threat to the livelihoods 
of communities that depend on these goods and services. There is, however, little 
information on the current status of environmental degradation.
Given the middle-income status of Morocco and the low profile on environ-
mental issues, it might be expected that the poverty–environment nexus issues are 
relatively muted in their inclusion in country strategies for Morocco. Unsurprisingly, 
Morocco had only one policy framework relevant to the poverty–environment 
nexus: the national initiative for human development policy statement, which the 
king promulgated in 2005. The national initiative for human development encapsu-
lates the poverty–environment nexus principles of participatory local development. 
This is the means by which progress towards achieving the MDGs is being driven. 
At the time of the evaluation, a poverty strategy was being formulated but had not 
entered into force.11 At the project level, the evaluation found several projects that 
could be said to be ‘poverty–environment nexus compliant’, such as integrated rural 
development.
There is public awareness of poverty–environment nexus issues, as indicated 
by the large number of domestic Non-governmental organizations undertaking 
relevant activities with communities. The UNDP Country Office, in its position 
as trusted strategic partner with the government, is playing a role in promoting 
the coherent implementation of the poverty–environment dimension of sustain-
able development in Morocco. Nevertheless, constraints to effectively  integrating 
 poverty– environment nexus issues include limited understanding of the concept, 
need for indicators/guidelines, lack of criteria for nexus and the clustering of 
programmes as either ‘poverty’ or ‘environment’. For this middle-income coun-
try, there is some way to go before it could be said that the poverty–environment 




Rwanda ranks 157th out of 189 countries in the 2019 Human Development 
Report; its Human Development Index is 0.536 (UNDP 2019), which is below the 
average of 0.541 for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2018). Consequently, 
poverty is a priority issue in Rwanda’s development policy. The structural dimen-
sions of poverty and vulnerability, particularly demographic pressures and environ-
mental degradation, exacerbate an already complex situation. Population density in 
Rwanda is the highest in Africa, with more than 415 persons per km2 [highest com-
pared to neighbouring countries such as Burundi (333), Uganda (173) and Kenya 
(73)], and the approximate population growth rate is 2.6% per year. In addition, 83% 
of the nearly 10 million people live in rural areas, with livelihoods dependent on the 
natural environment (NISR 2012).
The significance of environmental management to the government’s policy 
objectives is underscored in several strategic documents, including the Environment 
and Natural Resources Sector Strategic Plan (2009), the Environment and Climate 
Change Strategic Plan and the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 
(Government of the Republic of Rwanda 2009a, 2009b and 2003). A key goal of 
the government to be achieved by 2020 is integrating environmental objectives into 
all policies and programmes pertaining to economic and social development as well 
as all decision-making processes. Strategic inclusion of the poverty–environment 
nexus in Rwanda is, therefore, significant.
Nevertheless, barriers remain, not least of which is the persistent separation of 
environmental from poverty issues. The United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework 2008–2012 addresses poverty and environment as two separate issues. 
Outcome 4 of the component on energy and the environment for sustainable devel-
opment is ‘management of environment, natural resources and land is improved in 
a sustainable way’, and Outcome 5 of the component on achieving the MDGs and 
poverty reduction is ‘Rwandan population benefits from economic growth and is 
less vulnerable to social and economic shocks’.
The 2008–2012 UNDP country programme document proposed a total contri-
bution of US$41 million, with US$9.5 million earmarked for programmes related 
to the poverty–environment nexus (US$8.5 million to environment; US$1 million 
to poverty). The country programme document also treats environment and pov-
erty as separate issues for budgeting and programming purposes. This indicates that 
UNDP, in its discussions with a country partner, has not yet embraced the poverty–
environment nexus concept at the planning or operational levels.
UNDP has a special role in Rwanda, as the country was one of only eight cho-
sen to pilot the Delivering As One concept to achieve ‘a more effective, efficient, 
coherent, coordinated and better performing United Nations country presence’.12 
The UNDP Country Office is promoting implementation of the poverty and envi-
ronmental dimensions of sustainable development in Rwanda, particularly in the 
context of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the One 
UN programme. Yet indications are that the poverty–environment nexus has not 
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taken root in the Development Framework, and the country programme document 
still addresses poverty and environment as separate issues. This points to the need for 
concerted efforts to develop the tools (e.g. manuals, brochures and guidelines) for 
awareness raising and targeted training of UNDP staff who are expected to man-
age poverty–environment nexus–related programmes. It also calls for commitment, 
determination and consistency by the UNDP Country Office to support national 
priorities and initiatives.
The United Republic of Tanzania
Poverty in the United Republic of Tanzania can be considered within the context 
of three fundamental realities. First, about 80% of the country’s poor lives in rural 
areas (UNDP 2017). Second, these rural people overwhelmingly depend on agri-
culture and other natural resource uses for their livelihoods. Third, the economy 
is based largely on land and natural resources, particularly forests, biodiversity and 
agriculture. Thus, poverty and the environment are intrinsically linked, and the 
 poverty–environment nexus is a central consideration in all sustainable develop-
ment policies and strategies.
The government displays a clear political will to address the poverty–environment 
nexus at the national level. This is demonstrated by the development of poverty– 
environment indicators.13 Tanzania is one of the few countries into a second genera-
tion of poverty-reduction strategy papers, supported by UNDP.  The agency plays a 
key role in supporting programmes and projects to mainstream poverty and environ-
ment issues in government policies, strategies and programmes at all levels. The PEI 
project has promoted awareness of the linkages between poverty and environment, 
and it continues to contribute to understanding and development of poverty–environ-
ment nexus tools and indicators. Key results include the establishment of a national 
environment education strategy; development of poverty–environment indicators and 
reviews of the Poverty Reduction Strategy process and Poverty Monitoring System. 
UNDP continues as a trusted partner with government as the lead authority on sus-
tainable development, promoting coherent implementation of the poverty–environ-
ment dimension.
Even in Tanzania, almost a model country in terms of sensitivity to poverty–
environment linkages, the evaluation identified limitations to both the inclusion 
and practice of the poverty–environment nexus. UNDP staff had limited under-
standing as to what constitutes the nexus in practice. Definition, guidelines and cri-
teria for the nexus and guidance in how to assess progress in achieving operational 
targets regarding the nexus were absent.
In government agencies, policies and legislation on benefits and cost-sharing 
arrangements through ecosystem payment mechanisms were weak or non-existent. 
For example, few benefits of big projects on biodiversity and ecosystem conserva-
tion and protection trickled down to local populations, a disincentive to participa-
tion in the poverty–environment nexus. Joint programming and funding of the 
nexus will remain a major challenge.
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Development partners of UNDP continue justifiably to have policies that dictate 
their preferences on thematic areas, different proposal approval and funding cycles 
and/or different monitoring and evaluation and reporting requirements. This has to be 
appreciated in the promotion of even cross-cutting issues such as the linkages between 
poverty and the environment. Harmonizing and coordinating joint programming for 
the poverty–environment nexus will, therefore, remain a challenge. Country Office 
experience suggests that integrating environment into the policies, strategies and plans 
should continue at the ‘upstream’ level. However, there is a need to extend integration 
and mainstreaming to implementation, particularly to projects at community level.
Despite the promotion of the poverty–environment nexus from UNDP head-
quarters and elsewhere, the Country Office continues to cluster programmes as 
either poverty or environment. This creates difficulties for gaining credence for the 
nexus and for fostering its true integration into projects and programmes.
Overall findings: the retrospective
The country case studies from Africa – and indeed from Asia and South America 
– revealed a reasonably consistent set of findings for the evaluation. Weaknesses in 
UNDP dealing with poverty–environment nexus issues arise from a poor under-
standing of what the nexus means and how it can be practically implemented, 
entrenched views among staff that activities are either poverty focused or environ-
ment focused, lack of incentive to develop poverty–environment nexus projects 
across practice areas and the marginalization of the topic itself and lack of partners’ 
awareness of the poverty–environment nexus (including other agencies and donor 
governments). The practice structure of UNDP was often seen as inimical to cross-
disciplinary initiatives: ‘silos’ were mentioned frequently, meaning that careers, pro-
motion and plaudits from headquarters depended more on how well an individual 
developed his or her practice (or focus) area in UNDP, than on how well he or she 
cooperated with other practice areas.14
Interviews with agencies, telephone interviews with Country Offices and meet-
ings with professionals involved with the poverty–environment nexus corroborated 
the overall findings. Strategically, UNDP has embraced the poverty–environment 
nexus at the global, regional and national levels. Many countries have quite impres-
sive strategies that emphasize the importance of nexus in achieving sustainable 
development. Yet, the poverty–environment nexus is a difficult and sometimes elu-
sive topic that does not easily translate to meaningful actions. Most people agree it 
is vital to adopt an integrative approach, but when it comes to practice it is easier 
to develop single-practice projects that are ‘poverty–environment nexus-compliant’, 
in that the linkage is recognized but are not ‘poverty–environment nexus-active’ in 
terms of real activities on the ground.
The major findings, including for non-African countries, are outlined next.15
 1. Within UNDP there is substantial recognition of a poverty–environment 
‘nexus’ and of its importance for countries to achieve sustainable development. 
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However, the articulation of this awareness is uneven and somewhat haphazard 
throughout the organization.
At the field level, the linkages are generally understood to mean taking account 
of poverty issues in environmental work. At regional and headquarters levels, the 
understanding of the nexus is sometimes more sophisticated but is rarely translated 
into a consistent articulation of principles and practices in strategies or guidance. 
Where good practice is found and replicated, it more often than not arises from 
individual ‘champions’ and Country Office initiatives rather than a coordinated 
institutional approach.
1.  UNDP’s focus area structure promotes a ‘silo effect’ that 
makes cooperation across sectors difficult.
Because the nexus is not incorporated into UNDP’s goals or measures of perfor-
mance, there is no incentive for staff to take up integrative, cross-sectoral initiatives. 
Interviews and other evidence from the 38 Country Offices analysed in this evalu-
ation show that in some Country Offices there has been very little coordination 
between the environment and poverty focus areas (e.g. Botswana, Costa Rica, India, 
Kenya), while in others they have worked together on an ad hoc basis (Malaysia, 
Mozambique, Papua New Guinea and Viet Nam).
In some Country Offices, a close working arrangement can be seen (Bangladesh, 
Dominican Republic, Ghana, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand), whereas in others, the Country Offices have combined their focal-area 
structures to better address linkages (Cameroon, Senegal), or simply for greater pro-
gramme management efficiency (Bulgaria, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine).
2.  UNDP’s dependence on external funding, especially for 
environmental activities, reinforces the institutional 
focus on area-specific work and makes it more difficult to 
articulate the connections among UNDP priorities.
Most donors do not provide incentives to address poverty–environment linkages, 
although many external funding sources for environment programmes tend to be 
receptive to their inclusion. The GEF has been seen in the past as an impediment to 
poverty–environment linkages due to its focus exclusively on global environmental 
benefits. This has been changing in its past two replenishment cycles. Strategic plans 
now acknowledge the importance of promoting sustainable livelihoods to build 
local support, and there has been an expansion of programmes (especially small 
grants and programmes addressing land degradation) that focus on local impacts. 
There is evidence that UNDP has influenced GEF policy with regard to main-
streaming global environmental and local development benefits, particularly in the 
biodiversity focal area.
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3.  A systemic impediment to effective integration of 
poverty and environment in UNDP’s work is the absence 
of monitoring processes and indicators, which affects 
both the initiation and the design of programmes and 
projects and the determination of their results.
The lack of indicators to track poverty–environment linkages, either qualitative or 
quantitative, significantly diminishes attention to the related issues. Reduced ability 
to monitor progress also reduces incentives. This applies to both programme and 
project monitoring, as well as to performance reviews of Country Offices and staff. 
The absence of monitoring and evaluation eliminates the potential for sharing and 
learning from best practices, and there is less information to disseminate about what 
is being done related to the poverty–environment nexus.
4.  UNDP’s efforts to highlight the importance and potential 
of poverty–environment linkages have been mixed, with 
significant achievements but considerable variation in 
direction and priority.
In many cases UNDP has used the processes of donor coordination and devel-
opment of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework to encourage 
greater attention to poverty–environment linkages. In Mexico, UNDP has convened 
multisector environmental consultative groups and established ‘platforms for debate’ 
at local, state and federal levels. In Dominican Republic, UNDP has taken the lead 
on environmental sustainability aspects of achievement of the MDGs and used this 
work to foster poverty–environment nexus issues in its interactions with govern-
ment. In Sri Lanka, UNDP and the government have worked closely under the 
UNDAF to promote more attention to the nexus. In United Republic of Tanzania, 
UNDP has led the pilot ‘Delivering as One’ and UNDAF activities to expand coor-
dination among donors and ministries regarding poverty–environment issues.
5.  UNDP’s cooperation with other institutions on the 
poverty–environment nexus varies based on opportunities 
and on the level of interaction between organizations in 
a particular context.
Globally, UNDP is a partner to the major multilateral accords and conventions 
related to development. At the country level, UNDP plays a pivotal role due to its 
extensive Country Office presence and its management role of the United Nations 
resident coordinator system. This enables it to lead donor coordination and promote 
integrative activities through the UNDAF. Inter-agency rivalry at country level has 
sometimes inhibited cooperation, except where co-funding and donor support have 
been sought, such as for a GEF project where such cooperation is mandatory. One 
specific partnership that formally integrates the two focus areas has exhibited high 
potential: the PEI, with UNEP.
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6.  Country studies and interviews have shown that when 
nexus issues are recognized as critical to achieving 
sustainable development, there is strong support to 
address them in programmes and projects.
Positive examples have been seen in GEF-funded projects, notably the Small Grants 
Programme, as well as recent programmes on climate change adaptation.
7.  There is evidence that positive results at country level can 
be replicated.
Favourable outcomes of initial PEI projects in Rwanda and United Republic of 
Tanzania in 2005 led to a significant scaling up of the programme in 2007. Eighteen 
countries were involved, including several in Asia and Pacific and two each in 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. A further expansion of the PEI is 
anticipated.
8.  Country-specific circumstances regarding the nexus play 
a major role in how poverty–environment linkages are 
understood and addressed.
Results vary by country depending on the commitment of the government, degree 
of cooperation within the government, efficiency of UNDP advocacy and effec-
tiveness of PEI implementation. When government officials have recognized their 
country’s dependence on natural resource management as a means to reduce pov-
erty, there is good receptivity to the PEI. In five of the seven case study countries 
where it is operative, UNDP Country Offices were found to be supportive of the 
projects. They were using this approach to promote cooperation among practice 
groups and integrate poverty and environment into their activities as well as into 
government planning. Significant progress has also been achieved in other coun-
tries where Country Offices have actively promoted taking account of the nexus 
(UNDP 2019a).
Conclusion: the prospect
At the outset, UNDP always intended that the evaluation would include a vision 
into the future as to how poverty and the environment could be better linked 
and how investments could yield simultaneous co-benefits from both. In part, this 
prospective desire was driven by the knowledge that the nexus was relatively lit-
tle understood except in rather simplistic terms, as indeed the evaluation found. 
Evidence was sparse and experience of employing positive results for future projects 
was rare. The evaluators, however, felt that this somewhat negative perception could 
and should be remedied and that identification of good practice in the poverty–
environment nexus should be promoted. These lessons will be valuable in mak-
ing make generic recommendations based upon solid evidence from UNDP’s own 
practices and that of others.
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The evaluation identified five conclusions and articulated four recommendations 
for UNDP to encourage transformational change in the organization especially in 
breaking down some of the internal structural barriers to cross-disciplinary integra-
tion, an aspect over which UNDP should have full control itself as a learning agency 
(see Box 11.2).16
BOX 11.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions Recommendations
 1. Addressing the poverty–environ-
ment nexus is essential to achieving 
the UNDP mission. The linkages 
between poverty reduction, envi-
ronmental sustainability and prog-
ress on achievement of the MDGs 
have been well established in analy-
ses by UNDP and other major insti-
tutions. Poor people depend 
disproportionately on access to 
natural resources for their liveli-
hoods, and development and pov-
erty-reduction programmes have 
significant effects on the 
environment.
 2. Strategic planning and advocacy 
on the poverty–environment nexus 
are occurring at UNDP, but policy is 
not yet systematically translated 
into practice. Conversely, examples 
of good practice and success at 
local and regional levels are not 
being effectively communicated 
and replicated.
 3. UNDP’s institutional and financing 
architecture serves as a barrier to 
integrated approaches. Particular 
problems are dependence on exter-
nal financing and concentration of 
substantive capacity in headquar-
ters focus area teams, not in 
Country Offices.
 1. UNDP should ensure that prac-
tices follow principles. In addi-
tion to following policy and 
advocacy, UNDP needs to learn 
from good practices and repli-
cate successes.
 2. The  Poverty–Env i ronment 
Initiative represents good prac-
tice and should be scaled up to 
provide a model of how UNDP 
does business at the country 
level. It should also be used as a 
model for working together 
with UNEP and other agencies.
 3. UNDP should provide guide-
lines and create verifiable indi-
cators to further integrate 
poverty reduction and environ-
mental protection into other 
UNDP operations. It must also 
invest in developing staff 
capacity.
(Continued)
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As summarized in Box 11.2, the evaluation concluded that UNDP has made spo-
radic and patchy progress in the poverty–environment nexus; it recognizes that 
the issue has particular resonance for poor people and for its own operations 
(Conclusion 1). Consequently, UNDP should learn from the pockets of good 
practice at country, regional and global levels, build better communication and 
replication facilities (Conclusion 2) and spread these examples throughout the 
organization (Recommendation 1). One of UNDP’s main roles is to enthuse its 
country partners and other UN agencies via donor coordination to prioritize the 
poverty–environment nexus (Conclusions 4 and 5). The joint UNDP-UNEP PEI 
is a model of the poverty–environment nexus practice worth both replicating and 
disseminating more widely; it should be brought more fully into the mainstream of 
UNDP operations (Recommendation 2). As part of picking up on good practice, 
UNDP should set the lead in developing guidelines and indicators for the poverty–
environment nexus, as well as building staff capacity to handle the complex of issues 
(Recommendation 3).
Conclusions Recommendations
 4. UNDP efforts to integrate poverty 
alleviation and environmental pro-
tection programmes at country 
level depend on the interest of 
countries. All governments are 
committed to both poverty reduc-
tion and environmental sustainabil-
ity. However, evidence suggests 
that many partner governments 
continue to believe there are major 
trade-offs between these goals. 
Given the wide variation in poverty 
and environment challenges faced 
by countries, UNDP can demon-
strate how to minimize such 
trade-offs.
 5. UNDP is ideally situated to 
strengthen partnerships within the 
United Nations system to coordi-
nate action on poverty alleviation 
and environmental protection.
 4. UNDP must overcome the func-
tional silos that prevent coop-
eration and integration 
between focus areas. Analysis of 
poverty and environment pri-
orities should be incorporated 
into governance and crisis pre-
vention and recovery, as well as 




One of the evaluation’s principal findings is that UNDP’s own structural archi-
tecture, including its operational and financing mechanisms, is not suited to cross-
disciplinary initiatives (Conclusion 3). The practice-area ‘silos’ are too big and their 
foundations too entrenched. A first step towards breaking the barriers would be 
to ensure that poverty–environment nexus issues are also included in governance, 
crisis prevention and gender strategies, approaches and projects (Recommendation 
4). A further step would be to take the examples of good practice, identifying where 
individual staff took strong leadership for integrating poverty and environment – 
the role of ‘champion’ – and then implementing cross-disciplinary practice based on 
how the individual ‘champion’ managed to overcome practice-area ‘silos’. However, 
looking to the sustainability of the poverty–environment nexus within the organi-
zation will necessarily involve fundamental structural reform, an issue rather bigger 
and more controversial than this evaluation was mandated to address.
The poverty–environment nexus will always be harder to implement than stan-
dard mono-focal approaches because it will not only be more complicated but also 
will require people from different disciplines to work together and share a similar 
vision of poverty reduction being positive for the environment and environmen-
tal rehabilitation as positive for poverty reduction. The vision includes having the 
appropriate strategies and the practical means to identify poverty and environment 
synergies – and conversely, to exclude activities where poverty and environment 
may be in conflict. This will require good leadership, the promotion of ‘champions 
for the poverty–environment nexus’ at all levels and the agency-wide dissemination 
of good practices – all of which the evaluation found, but not sufficiently consis-
tently or intensively.
Notes
 1 Prof. Michael Stocking passed away in 2018. This analysis and argumentation in this 
chapter remains valid and consequently has not been revised. However, the country-
specific statistics have been updated to the extent relevant (J.I. Uitto, ed.).
 2 For an example from Ghana, see Besley (1995).
 3 PEI is jointly run by UNEP and UNDP; see PEI (2012).
 4 For an example from Ghana, see Amanor (1999).
 5 For example, UNDP takes the lead role in partner countries in the ‘Delivering as One’ 
concept initiated by Kofi Annan in 2005 designed to capitalize on the strengths and 
comparative advantages of the different members of the UN family.
 6 See http://web.undp.org/execbrd/undp-action-plan.shtml.
 7 The PEP is an informal network of development agencies, which seeks to improve the 
coordination of work on poverty reduction and the environment.
 8 PEI was launched in 2005 and scaled up in 2007; see https://www.unpei.org/.
 9 Helen Clark, UNDP Administrator, Statement to the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board, 
24 June 2010.
 10 Country specific information from UNDP HDR website: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data 
and http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/167106# (accessed 30 June 2020).
 11 Morocco still has no Poverty Reduction Strategy. Tackling rural and urban poverty does, 
however, appear as a priority in the African Development Bank’s Country Strategy paper, 
2007–2011, for the Kingdom of Morocco.
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 12 See https://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/.
 13 See Vice President’s Office, Development of Poverty-Environment Indicators Report, 
August 2006.
 14 UNDP practice areas include environment and energy, inclusive growth and poverty 
reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, HIV health and devel-
opment, capacity development and women’s empowerment.
 15 Taken from the Executive Summary of EO of UNDP (2010). More details are in the full 
evaluation report at http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/thematic/pen.shtml.
 16 UNDP claims to set importance on learning from current practices. It has a Learning 
Resource Centre providing online training to staff and a Virtual Development Academy, 
for example.
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SMALL GRANTS, BIG IMPACTS
Aggregation challenges
Sulan Chen and Juha I. Uitto
Introduction
‘Think globally, act locally’ refers to the argument that global environmental prob-
lems can be only properly and effectively addressed by considering the ecological, 
economic and cultural differences of our local surroundings. This approach is based 
on the premise that environmental issues are globally connected – that issues’ com-
plexities manifest themselves at the local level through physical, climatic and cultural 
contexts. Therefore, local actions designed for specific environmental issues are most 
effective in tackling global environmental issues. However, translating global think-
ing into local actions does not happen easily and smoothly, recognizing contextual 
complexities and local needs. Although local actions may effectively address issues 
at the small scale, employing such an approach to address global issues is often chal-
lenged by difficulties in scaling up successes to benefit more localities. One solution 
could be to duplicate the action in many other similar local sites, hence scaling 
up impacts through replication. Another solution is to scale up projects’ authority, 
funding and coverage to achieve greater coverage, results and impacts. The result 
pathway of such approach is not clear-cut, linear and one-dimensional. Instead, 
results and impacts are achieved over a long time horizon, and sometimes randomly 
and unintentionally.
The complexities and difficulties of implementation of global thinking in local 
contexts also pose similar challenges to evaluating the global programs or projects 
that work at the local level. This chapter takes the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) Small Grants Programme (SGP) as a case and discusses the management 
challenges of the programme in translating global policies to local actions, coor-
dinating numerous small-scale activities to achieve coherent global objectives, and 
reconciling global and local interests. Further, this poses similar challenges to evalu-
ate the programme comprehensively: aggregating numerous local actions for global 
220 Sulan Chen and Juha I. Uitto
results, assessing the relationships between global and local benefits and identifying 
the complex web of forces and factors of results. More fundamentally, SGP is a 
unique programme of GEF in that it is a corporate programme, is not time bound 
or limited to GEF replenishment cycles and is different from other projects funded 
by GEF, which set clear timelines, targets and indicators. The GEF global evaluation 
framework, which is geared towards projects, does not necessarily reflect the high 
complexities and variations a programme such as SGP faces and manages.
It is often difficult to distinguish the impacts of development interventions from 
the wider processes of which they are only a part. This is even more so for SGP, 
a global programme running almost like an international organization in itself in 
terms of its geographical coverage, reach and timeframe. Particularly, the number 
of projects is large and activities are scattered around the world. Specifically, first, 
how do evaluators gauge the collective impacts and results of numerous small-
scale projects spread throughout the world, and furthermore, how do evaluators 
draw conclusions on the projects’ aggregate effectiveness in addressing global issues? 
Second, how do evaluators assess the extent to which replication and upscaling are 
being carried out, and furthermore, how to attribute the indirect impacts (derived 
from replication and upscaling) to these small projects which might have inspired or 
contributed to such impacts?
This chapter presents the challenges of measuring SGP results and impacts. 
It argues that there is a tension between the global environmentally focused and 
sectoral approach of the GEF and the SGP’s demand-driven, community-based 
approach. The scale and diversity of SGP projects makes it operationally difficult 
to aggregate and report according to the global framework, which was developed 
for government-centred projects that are orders of magnitude larger in scale and 
funding. This results in a large portion of the transformative changes that SGP has 
contributed to being left unaccounted for or not captured by the existing evaluation 
system. This chapter calls for an adapted, flexible and inclusive GEF approach to 
monitoring and evaluating SGP results and impacts. It suggests that a country 
programme level of analysis – rather than a global aggregation of individual projects 
– would provide a more appropriate picture of SGP impacts.
GEF small grants programme
The GEF was launched in 1991 as a pilot programme in order to assist devel-
oping countries and countries with economies in transition to protect the global 
environment and to promote sustainable development. The GEF also serves as 
financial mechanism for several conventions (the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, and the Minamata Convention on Mercury). 
The GEF, although not linked formally to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
That Deplete the Ozone Layer, supports implementation of the Protocol in coun-
tries with economies in transition. GEF provides grants to various types of projects 
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ranging in size from several thousand dollars to several million dollars through vari-
ous modalities.1
The SGP, launched in 1992, is the oldest programme funded by GEF. It originally 
included more than a dozen countries, and then expanded to cover 125 countries 
presently. Like in the case of full-sized projects, the GEF Council’s approval of fund-
ing for the SGP is based on a Project Document which sets forth the objectives and 
activities to be undertaken. SGP submits a Project Document to the GEF Council 
in each operational phase (every five years) to seek funding. These SGP Project 
Documents provide the framework for SGP operations in accordance with the GEF 
mandate, including specific benchmarks for expected project achievements. It also 
sets forth many of the programme and financial reporting requirements for which 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has responsibility as the 
implementing agency for SGP.
The SGP provides direct support to civil society organizations and local com-
munities to take action in the areas of biodiversity, climate change, international 
waters, land degradation and sustainable forest management and chemicals. SGP 
supports community-level initiatives across the range of global environmental issues 
addressed by the GEF – with the added integration of actions that lead to poverty 
reduction and empowerment, in recognition that environmental issues cannot be 
dealt with alone without tending local needs. To date, SGP has funded more than 
25,000 projects with US$625 million in 134 countries, having generated about 
US$800 million in co-financing. Table 12.1 presents the overall global portfolio of 
SGP by focal area.
SGP structure2
The structure of SGP is decentralized and country driven. Within the parame-
ters established by the GEF Council and Secretariat and reflected in the Project 
Document for its Operational Phases, it provides for maximum country- and com-
munity-level ownership and initiative. This decentralization is balanced against the 
need for programme consistency and accountability across the participating coun-
tries for the achievement of the GEF global environmental objectives and the SGP’s 
TABLE 12.1 SGP Portfolio by Focal Area








Biodiversity 12,099 $293,699,380 $180,592,161 $214,923,856
Climate Change 6,197 $160,242,658 $101,039,167 $103,912,620
International Waters 1,183 $25,302,393 $15,674,692 $23,185,808
Chemicals and Waste 769 $19,280,855 $10,478,576 $10,878,890
Land Degradation 4,391 $100,125,065 $51,413,090 $68,400,429
Capacity Development 1,202 $26,123,431 $8,345,833 $10,747,492
Total 25,841 $624,773,782 $367,543,519 $432,049,095
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particular benchmarks as stated in its Project Documents. In terms of management 
and execution, SGP is run by a team of about 200 staff members. Through the 
global management team, SGP reports to UNDP and the GEF Council on its 
achievements and results. Figure 12.1 includes SGP’s management diagram.
Global-level management
A GEF Unit at the UNDP Headquarters in New York manages all of its GEF activ-
ities, including the SGP. The SGP Central Programme Management Team (CPMT), 
located in New York, is composed of the Global Manager, Deputy Global Manager, 
Programme Advisors, Knowledge Facilitator, Programme Assistant, and consultants 
as needed. The CPMT in New York is currently staffed with eight professionals and 
two support staff members. The CPMT is responsible for overall programme man-
agement; provides operational guidance and support to the country programmes, 
including identification and establishment of the SGP in new countries; and reports 
to the GEF Council. The United Nations Office for Project Services provides 
programme execution services and project management for SGP, such as financial 
management and audits, recruitment, procurement and other financial and admin-
istrative matters.
Country-level management
The SGP operates in a decentralized and country-driven manner through a National 
Coordinator and National Steering Committee (NSC) in each participating country, 
and with management, financial, and administrative support from UNDP Country 
Office. NSC is composed of voluntary members from national non-governmental 
organizations, academic and scientific institutions, other civil society organizations, 
the UNDP Country Office and government, with a majority of members coming 
from the non-governmental sector. It provides overall guidance and direction to the 
country programme and contributes to developing and implementing strategies for 
country programme sustainability. In collaboration with the National Coordinator, 
NSC helps to develop the country programme strategy in accordance with the 
global SGP Project Document and national environmental priorities, and oversees 
its implementation. NSC is responsible for selecting and approving projects, and for 
ensuring their technical and substantive quality.
The UNDP Country Office provides management support to the SGP country 
programme. The UNDP resident representative in each country assigns a senior staff 
person (typically the sustainable development advisor or environment focal point) 
to serve as the SGP focal point. The resident representative or the focal point as his/
her delegate participates in NSC. Each UNDP Country Office also contributes to 
monitoring programme activities, usually through broad oversight by the designated 
focal point as part of NSC responsibilities, facilitating interaction with the host 
government and developing links with other in-country financial and technical 
resources.
Sm






FIGURE 12.1 SGP Management Diagram
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SGP operational challenges
Challenge to coordinate country programmes for coherent global 
objectives
SGP is a country-driven programme in the sense that key policies and decisions 
regarding strategic direction, funding eligibility and project selection are made at 
the national level. The NSC is the final decision-making body of country pro-
gramme operations (as long as its decisions fall within SGP global Operational 
Guidelines, which allow for adequate innovation and flexibility for specific country 
contexts). NSC not only reviews and approves projects but also provides strategic 
direction and technical guidance and ensures strategic dissemination and utilization 
of SGP knowledge and experience. The majority of NSC members are typically 
from non-governmental organizations or chosen independently as individuals. The 
NSC is often composed of influential and accomplished persons in the country, 
which provides an effective interface between policy formulation processes and 
community development activities. However, NSCs are focused on national priori-
ties and often put them ahead of global GEF priorities.
SGP country programmes are usually thinly staffed, often with only a national 
coordinator and a programme assistant who are in charge of the development, imple-
mentation, monitoring and evaluation of an average of about 100 projects over an 
SGP operational phase. Previous evaluations have noted that SGP country teams are 
often overloaded; their priority work is to deliver grants to communities, leaving lim-
ited time for other activities, such as strategy development, monitoring or evaluation.
The work to ensure global coherence and align with global objectives falls on 
the small CPMT team, which reviews and comments on country programme strat-
egies to ensure technical soundness and policy alignment with GEF priorities, over-
sees country programming and operations, and communicates global policies and 
priorities to country programmes. Each SGP country program team submits annual 
reports to CPMT for global consolidation and reporting to the GEF Council and 
Secretariat. It should be noted that it is CPMT that plays the critical role in trans-
mitting global GEF policies to national level actors (national coordinators, NSC 
and grantees), through whom the policies are further translated into local actions 
on the ground. When it comes to aggregating results from the ground up, CPMT is 
the global data-mining centre to collect information, consolidate it and report the 
results to the GEF. The challenges for CPMT include the large number of country 
programmes (each programme advisor in CPMT covers approximately 30 country 
programmes), limited face-to-face interactions with key stakeholders and limited 
travel and capacity-development budgets to train and coordinate country teams.
Tension between community needs and global environmental mandate
The communities SGP focuses on are often the poorest and most vulnerable, and typi-
cally have low levels of technical and institutional capacity to adequately address global 
environmental problems. More than 60% of SGP grants target poor communities in 
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participating countries, which have the greatest need for assistance (GEF 2008). At 
least 15% of SGP grants target indigenous peoples (frequently amongst the poorest 
communities), who often have the knowledge and experience to create sustainable 
solutions to environmental challenges. More than a quarter of SGP grants specifically 
support women, who constitute another priority target group.
As these poor and vulnerable communities struggle for basic daily needs such 
as food, water, sanitation and education, it is hard for SGP to focus on effectively 
achieving global environmental benefits without investment in promoting these 
basic needs. The second independent evaluation report of SGP noted (Wells, 
Ganapin and Trempe 1998: 22):
Access to and acceptance by communities – the GEF/SGP’s principal clients 
– almost invariably requires an emphasis on activities which communities per-
ceive are closely linked to their own immediate concerns, a characteristic by no 
means limited to poorer countries. Ask a low-income rural community in the 
developing world what their priority problems are, and the answer is unlikely 
to feature biodiversity or climate change. Few, if any, communities begin with 
an understanding or awareness of these terms.
To address the challenges to reconcile global environmental benefits and local bene-
fits, SGP has three pillars in its comprehensive development approach: environmental 
protection, poverty reduction and community empowerment. This approach recog-
nizes the intrinsic linkages between environment and development, particularly at 
the community level, and advocates for integrating environmental protection into 
development. The SGP approach is intended to leverage shifts towards environmen-
tally sustainable livelihood options and increase education and awareness on envi-
ronmental issues. The centrality of local development for SGP was demonstrated by 
a 2009 global survey by the CPMT, which estimated that SGP generated more than 
half a million jobs for local communities around the world. In a major study led 
by the GEF Evaluation Office (2008), SGP was found to address local benefits and 
needs while contributing to global environmental benefits. However, the impor-
tance of these local benefits are often neglected in the GEF Focal Area Results 
Frameworks (focusing on global environmental benefits), and sometimes are even 
considered ‘non-GEFable’,3 leaving them unaccounted for or unappreciated.
Gaining communities’ confidence and encouraging community members to 
participate in projects and modify their behaviour in ways that generate global envi-
ronmental benefits is a long-term proposition. Such an ambitious task needs to be 
approached with considerable patience and restrained expectations. This was why, 
in the early stage of SGP, many activities were related to poverty reduction, some-
times with ambiguous linkages to global environmental benefits (Wells, Ganapin 
and Trempe 1998). Over the years, however, after developing the foundational 
capacities with communities, SGP was able to demonstrate its critical role in achiev-
ing global environmental benefits (GEF 2008). The challenge lies in managing the 
complex realities in the field and the expectations of GEF Council and Secretariat 
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for the programme to deliver global environmental benefits. The GEF’s operational 
phase-based funding replenishment cycle requires that SGP demonstrates immedi-
ate global environmental benefits in order to justify its continuous funding. At the 
community level, the environment is intrinsically intertwined with development. To 
achieve environmental results it is essential to address the urgent local development 
issues. The SGP joint evaluation (GEF 2008) concluded that SGP has a significantly 
higher sustainability rate than the full-sized projects. Although the evaluation did 
not give the reasons, it seems likely that SGP’s integrated approach in the field is a 
contributing factor.
SGP evaluations
There have been five global evaluations of the SGP, conducted in 1995, 1998, 2002, 
2007 and 2015. The three first ones were commissioned by the CPMT, while the 
latter two were conducted as joint evaluations by the Independent Evaluation 
Offices of the GEF and UNDP with CPMT involved only as an evaluand.4 The 
2007 evaluation noted that the previous three evaluations ‘were primarily oriented 
toward improving SGP operations and design and toward distilling lessons’ (GEF 
EO and UNDP EO 2008: 5). It further stated that the evaluation was ‘not able to 
assess which global environmental benefits had been achieved, whether the pro-
gramme was cost effective, or whether there were trade-offs between the SGP and 
other GEF projects’ (GEF EO and UNDP EO 2008: 5).
It did conclude that ‘SGP has contributed to numerous institutional reforms and 
policy changes in the recipient countries to address global environmental issues’ 
(GEF EO and UNDP EO 2008: 27). The evaluation report cited a number of cases 
in which SGP influenced institutional reforms and policy changes.
The following joint evaluation that was presented by the two IEOs to the gov-
erning bodies of the GEF and UNDP in 2015 was able to go further based on 
thorough research that included portfolio review, extensive meta-analysis of exist-
ing country and project level evaluations, document and literature review, a global 
online survey sent to 2,449 program country stakeholders, focusing on the SGP’s 
strategy and niche, broader adoption, gender, and poverty, and field work in 12 
countries ranging from the longest running country programmes to several more 
recently established programmes, and covering the main geographical regions (GEF 
IEO and UNDP IEO 2015). The research used a mixed methods approach com-
bining qualitative and quantitative approaches (see also Chapter 10 by Carugi and 
Bryant in this volume).
The evaluation concluded that the SGP continues to support communities with 
projects that are effective, efficient, and relevant in achieving global environmental 
benefits while addressing livelihoods and poverty as well as promoting gender equal-
ity and empowering women. The evaluation report stated: ‘The SGP results are nev-
ertheless impressive, given the high number of small-scale projects, the emphasis on 
innovation and piloting, the wide variety of intended outcomes, and the wide range 
of competencies of local project managers’ (GEF IEO and UNDP IEO 2015: 5).
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Referring to five transformational processes – sustaining, mainstreaming, rep-
lication, scaling-up, and market change – that have been found to lead to broader 
adoption in the GEF, the evaluation sought to verify cases where SGP action on 
the ground had led to broader adoption and the factors influencing such processes 
(GEF IEO and UNDP IEO 2015: 17–20). Although the formal expectations for the 
SGP to lead to broader adaptations of successful approaches pioneered by the small 
projects were quite new, the evaluation was able to confirm that ‘broader adoption 
certainly occurs, particularly in the form of replication and scaling-up and at a local 
scale; and the SGP deserves recognition for its contribution to results that extend 
beyond the project level’ (GEF IEO and UNDP IEO 2015: 19).
Aggregation challenges: measuring local actions through 
global lenses
There are some fundamental challenges to evaluate SGP and aggregate results 
and impacts from SGP projects. First, SGP reporting indicators were guided by 
the global SGP Project Documents with results frameworks extracted from the 
GEF Focal Area Results Frameworks, a thematically focused, government-
centred approach that caters to full-sized development projects. These indicators 
may not fully and comprehensively reflect the impacts of SGP, because of SGP’s 
comprehensive approach to environment and development that address not only 
the global environmental benefits but also attend foundational development needs at 
the community level. Second, the ongoing SGP global monitoring and aggregation 
system uses community projects as the unit of analysis and attempts to aggregate 
direct environmental benefits from numerous small projects to a global level. Such 
aggregation tends to overlook some major results and impacts that are not directly 
associated with the on-the-ground changes in the physical project sites. Third, some 
types of impacts are individual-country based and are difficult to measures, such as 
changes in attitude towards the environment, and therefore, they cannot easily be 
aggregated at the global level. Fourth, there are operational challenges in collecting, 
standardizing and aggregating data and information, such as the lack of baseline 
information, the lack of staffing and technical capacity, and application of a globally 
applied methodology to more than 120 country programmes.
Focal area-based environmental indicators versus inclusive community 
development
The challenges to evaluate SGP stem from the fact that it is a unique programme 
that does not neatly fit into GEF’s project modalities and frameworks. SGP is a 
continuous programme with a rolling modality, but the funding is released based on 
a three- or four-year Project Documents submitted to the GEF Council. Overall, 
GEF technical work is built on focal area divisions covering biodiversity, climate 
change, chemicals, international waters, land degradation and sustainable forest 
management/REDD+. During the GEF replenishment process, each focal area 
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produces a focal area strategy with a results framework to present to the donor gov-
ernments the expected results during an operational phase. SGP, which is expected 
to deliver small-scale projects in all focal areas, therefore draws from these focal 
area results frameworks relevant to local and community work to form its own 
programme document for funding. This approach tends to oversimplify the real on-
the-ground complexities and the processes through which the results and impacts 
are achieved.
The GEF focal area results framework provides clear operational guidance on 
what GEF focuses on and what GEF looks for in terms of results and impacts. GEF 
Secretariat focal area managers, working with national stakeholders, develop and 
review projects by following rigorously developed policies and strategies developed 
for each of the focal areas. Such focal area approaches have been successful in bring-
ing global attention to thematic environmental issues and can enable project devel-
opers and managers to produce and generate immediate and comparable impacts 
and results by focal area for global consolidation and aggregation. Because GEF 
work is thematically organized, each focal area cluster within the GEF Secretariat 
and implementing agencies has a clear understanding of the specific objectives, out-
comes, indicators and outputs in each focal area.
GEF’s focal area results frameworks were developed to serve the needs of the 
majority of the projects GEF funds. The majority of these are single-country proj-
ects with a focus on a thematic focal area. SGP is a global programme intended 
to cover all GEF focal areas (except ozone depletion) and is operational in more 
than 120 countries. There is an inherent dilemma in measuring and reporting SGP 
results and impacts: GEF’s focal area-based results framework cannot properly cap-
ture SGP’s comprehensive approach to development. As the various evaluations 
have noted (Wells, Ganapin and Trempe 1998; Wells et al. 2003; GEF 2008), SGP’s 
results and impacts are comprehensive, providing a whole package of community 
solutions that addresses not only environmental issues but also social and economic 
conditions. Environmental protection cannot be singled out as the only target and 
cannot be achieved without attention to the local context and immediate needs 
of local communities. Effective environmental actions must be embedded within 
specific social, economic, cultural and political conditions.
Using GEF focal area indicators to monitor and evaluate SGP leads to a fun-
damental contradiction. GEF focal area indicators are sector-based and focal-area 
specific, whereas SGP takes on an integrated approach that crosses focal areas and 
integrates other development efforts at the community level. SGP’s bottom-up, 
demand-driven and comprehensive approach requires flexibilities to adapt to local 
conditions, while GEF, as the funder, has a global vision and develops global strate-
gies that require more focused implementation by its projects or programmes. This 
leads to an inherent dilemma in designing SGP’s global results framework: How to 
translate the global framework into local actions while capturing the diversity of 
local actions?
The thematic focal area approach poses a series of difficulties to SGP operations, 
monitoring and evaluation. First, the results framework was developed to cater to 
Small grants, big impacts 229
full-sized projects with a government-centred approach; it places limited impor-
tance on communities or non-governmental processes and results. For example, all 
GEF focal areas emphasize the development of national plans, policies and regula-
tory frameworks but lack concrete activities of implementation and specific mea-
surement of the number of households, communities, vulnerable people, women 
or children who are reached by GEF initiatives. Second, to gather and consolidate 
results by focal area, SGP has to code its thousands of projects by focal area. Yet, the 
realities at the community level are a lot messier and complicated than one focal 
area.5
Furthermore, the focal area approach can have the unintended effect of fostering 
a fragmented approach to global environmental issues. As an ecosystem is non-
divisible, attempting to address separate parts of the system in isolation does not 
fulfil the purpose of environmental management. Failing to take a comprehensive 
approach to the entire process and system risks overemphasizing the achievement 
of single focal area results. Projects may be designed, developed and implemented 
to artificially achieve focal area results, while neglecting overall ecosystem needs, 
interlocked environmental issues or degradation causes.
The focal area results framework approach places great barriers to adopting 
an integrated social, environment and development approach on the ground. The 
numeric outputs in each focal area (hectares of protected areas or reduced CO2 
emissions) may satisfy the needs of donors who are looking for immediate and 
concrete results to justify continued funding of the GEF. However, it also diverts 
attention from addressing the broader social, environment and development issues 
that underpin GEF’s ability to effectively address global environmental challenges. 
Environmental issues are intrinsically linked at the community sites; separating one 
issue from another only offers a partial perspective and often proves to be ineffective.
Project-based evaluation versus programming approach
Most of GEF funding is released to full-sized or medium-sized projects which typi-
cally take three to five years to complete. The projects typically have a set of planned 
activities with budgets set aside to be carried out through a work plan. These project 
activities have been designed with clearly stated expected outputs and outcomes, 
which are directly linked to focal area results frameworks. The SGP approach is 
completely different.
First, SGP’s main activities depend on small-scale projects developed and 
proposed by civil society organizations and communities. SGP itself runs more like a 
fund, managing its project portfolios and monitoring project progress. Activities are 
developed and implemented after the Project Documents (the basis of evaluation) 
are developed and approved.
Second, although SGP is a continuous programme, it is divided into operational 
phases for funding purposes. In order to aggregate project results it requires certain 
stability and fixed indicators across all operational phases. To align with GEF’s focal 
area results and strategies which change every operational phase, the SGP Project 
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Documents also changes its indicators accordingly. The shift and change cannot 
be implemented as quickly as every three to four years for a global programme 
covering thousands of projects in more than 120 countries. The constant change in 
indicators makes it difficult to ensure global coherence and coordination. CPMT 
staff often find themselves busy communicating the changes in the field, and before 
they manage to familiarize all NCs with the new indicators and strategies, there are 
new changes due to a new round of replenishment negotiations. Furthermore, the 
changing and shifting indicators and targets makes evaluation and aggregation of 
results more difficult.
Third, the time frames for projects developed under the Project Documents for 
each operational phase do not necessarily overlap with the time frame of the specific 
operational phase. Therefore, funding supplied from the previous operational phase 
may continue to support projects in the next operational phase, with mixed results 
and impacts that cannot be divided and attributed to the funding of a specific 
period. The complexities for evaluation far exceed those for a normal GEF project. 
The fact that SGP is a programme but is requested to fit into a project template not 
only poses challenges for SGP’s replenishment processes, but also makes evaluation 
devoid of a solid and concrete base document to evaluate against.
Unit of analysis: community project versus country programme
The unit of analysis for SGP’s routine monitoring and reporting is on the local 
project level. There has been a great interest from the GEF Council and Secretariat 
in reporting direct global environmental benefits through quantifiable indicators 
at the aggregate level. Quantitative aggregation of outputs from a large number 
of projects will often be possible only for rather simple common denominator 
indicators, such as hectares under conservation, tons of carbon emissions avoided 
or numbers of environmental protection measures enacted. Such indicators are 
measured and aggregated from individual project results. To meet such requests, 
ongoing global monitoring of SGP is conducted by CPMT through its global 
database, which includes all past and ongoing projects. The structure of this database 
is organized around the focal areas and select quantitative indicators (mainly related 
to environmental results).
Additionally, qualitative analysis is conducted mainly on individual project level. 
For instance, SGP National Coordinators, in annual reporting or ad hoc knowledge 
management exercises, select and submit good cases of individual projects for 
CPMT consideration. Individual community case studies have been developed and 
disseminated globally to present how ‘small’ projects can create larger impacts.
The approach to analysing individual projects’ results and impacts leaves out 
some significant changes achieved at the country level, often through non- project 
activities, such as extensive media coverage, constructive working relationships 
between the government and civil society, advocacy and upscaling. For instance, 
NCs and NSC members have in many countries played a key role in developing 
community capacity, fostering civil society networks, influencing national policies 
and sharing knowledge and information, but these achievements are outside of the 
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SGP projects or not directly attributable to them and, consequently, are not rou-
tinely recorded and documented.
It has been noted by SGP stakeholders that some of the more critical impacts 
are generated by SGP’s governance approach and presence rather than individual 
projects. A former UNDP Deputy Country Director in China noted,
The significance of SGP in China is that it is probably the biggest (if not the 
only) NGO grant-making mechanism officially recognized by the government 
of China – yet (unlike other mechanisms) it is not run solely by a ministry. In 
this case the NSC is unique, with a ministry being just one more voice in a 
steering committee with [civil society organizations] present. . . In a real sense that 
SGP represents another milestone in the history of [non-governmental organiza-
tions] in China. . . To see an institutional mechanism that brings government and 
[non-governmental organizations] together is indeed progress. (UNDP 2012: 49)
There is a need to shift the level of analysis to place more emphasis on the country 
programme level. Country case studies should be conducted to look deeply and 
contextually to upscaling impacts. Country-level aggregation and impact analysis 
can examine the results achieved by the SGP presence and its portfolio. Mechanical 
aggregation of individual projects’ results (such as summing up the total hectares, 
tons and numbers) often leaves out the results and impacts achieved outside of 
physical project sites, which played key roles in environmental conservation and 
sustainable development.
Non-environmental impacts of SGP
In practice, SGP is an organic web of knowledge, experiences and influence at 
community, national and global levels, not just an aggregation of many small 
projects addressing GEF focal area issues. The measurement of SGP successes and 
achievements should not focus solely on the number of species protected, the 
tons of CO2 emissions reduced or prevented or hectares of areas conserved or 
managed. Rather, measurements of SGP successes should also include changes at 
the community level, such as community empowerment, enhancement of local 
livelihoods, achievements in gender equality and knowledge sharing and learning, 
which over time contribute to enhanced sustainability. Aggregation of biophysical 
environmental indicators can leave out such non-environmental impacts that foster 
broader environmental impacts. In the words of the former UNDP Administrator, 
Mark Malloch Brown,
Real change comes community by community. It does not come top-down, 
from the global level or even from national capitals. It takes place at the 
grassroots, when local communities are empowered to take their future into 
their own hands: that is the real frontline where the struggle to build a more 
prosperous and sustainable planet will be won or lost. This where the GEF 
Small Grants makes a real difference (Qayum 2002: 6).
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Furthermore, SGP sites serve as demonstration sites and are often visited by senior 
government officials from the donors and the governments. These governmental 
officials then advocate nationally and globally for replication and upscaling of SGP 
experiences. How to collect and measure the impact of these ‘spill-over’ activities by 
senior government officials can be difficult to determine. For example, the president 
of the Dominican Republic made a televised speech in February 2013 on the 
occasion of the national Independence Day, citing SGP’s micro-hydro project as 
an example to follow and committing to scaling up the good experiences at the 
national level. The quantitative aggregation of such ‘spill-over’ impacts created by 
the senior government officials, in terms of number of projects, beneficiaries or 
hectares of land protected as a result of up-scaling, will be difficult to gauge and 
beyond the abilities of an SGP country team staff.
Baseline and scale of measurement
SGP is a demand-driven grant-making programme. It runs like a fund but with direct 
implementation and execution activities. When GEF approves the global SGP Project 
Document, it only contains some global strategic directions and policies towards 
overall global objectives and targets as they pertain to the global environmental 
benefits expressed in the focal area results framework. After the Council’s approval, 
CPMT sends grant allocation amount to each country programme. Each country 
programme then develops a Country Program Strategy that guides the country’s 
priorities in SGP programming. Until then, no project activities were planned. After 
the approval of the Country Program Strategy, a call for proposals is issued, and 
communities and non-governmental organizations submit their proposals to SGP 
country programmes for project selection and approval.
Because SGP covers more than 120 countries working on multiple focal areas 
of GEF, establishing a global baseline for SGP is akin to undertaking a review and 
study of global environmental issues and trends. Although it may be possible to 
establish such baseline information, its meaning would be questionable. Because 
SGP projects are scattered around the world, while it is possible to trace impact at 
the country level, attributing global-scale environmental benefits to SGP projects 
will be difficult.
Decentralized operation of SGP versus global aggregation
SGP is run by country-based staff members, National Coordinators and Programme 
Assistants, who may not use English as a primary language and have  different 
 technical capacities. Any attempt to introduce a methodology can be time- 
consuming and may generate different data and information as a result of different 
understanding or interpretation by SGP country teams. A methodology or concept 
that seems easy or straightforward may turn out to be confusing or complex to field 
staff  members. Hence, monitoring and evaluation of SGP will always remain to be 
an operational challenge. The SGP global database provides general  information 
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and project descriptions, but follow-up to activities and measurement of impacts 
and results often require technical expertise and capacity that varies among the 
more than 120 SGP country programmes. In terms of evaluating direct global 
environmental benefits, a 2007 evaluation team concluded that SGP contributed 
to direct global environmental benefits and addressed local populations’ livelihood 
needs (GEF 2008: 7). The conclusion was arrived at by aggregating sample projects’ 
and country programmes’ results in an individual focal area. Yet, even the extensive 
Joint Evaluation (costing more than US $1 million, with a team of 25 evaluators) 
was not able to collect, consolidate and aggregate sufficient data on SGP’s direct 
global environmental benefits, thus demonstrating the operational challenges faced 
by SGP in monitoring and measuring achievements towards global indicators.
Global quantitative aggregation of project results is inherently incompatible with 
the concept of demand drivenness,6 innovation, flexibility and diversity that SGP 
champions and relies on for success. In order to achieve aggregation, there should 
be some common and comparative variables across the portfolio. Overemphasizing 
some common quantitative indicators can send a signal to the global SGP network 
to focus on short-term approaches, simplify the complexity of development work 
and limit possible innovation and national ownership. Operationally, SGP is similar 
to a mini-GEF; hence, aggregation of common indicators globally can prove to 
be challenging and may not produce meaningful data. That is perhaps the reason 
why, until today, no efforts have been attempted to calculate the total CO2 emis-
sions reduced/prevented or hectares of protected areas supported. Strengthening 
country-level monitoring and evaluation capacity with a focus on country-level 
impacts can help address the global aggregation challenges.
Standardization versus diversification
Global aggregation of results requires some common standardization or focusing 
of project activities. Such standardization may not work for SGP, as SGP promotes 
diverse community-based approaches and innovation. Meaningful aggregation 
depends on comparable indicators with data and information developed and 
collected based on similar assumptions. To achieve the necessary comparability 
and measurability at the global scale, it is often necessary to bring down units and 
measurement scales to the most elementary and least demanding levels, implying 
a great loss of information. For example, in order to use an indicator that covers as 
many projects as possible, a simple indicator (such as hectares, tons and numbers) is 
selected. Different understanding, definition and applicability of indicators at local 
contexts further pose challenges to data quality and comparability. Because of the 
large diversity of small projects and their goals, global-scale quantitative aggregation 
has its limits. In practice, this means that although it is possible to aggregate the 
numbers of specific types of activities and outputs, providing aggregate measures of 
outcomes and impacts are virtually impossible. Relying exclusively on the global-
level GEF results framework risks that significant results and impacts of SGP are 
left out.
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As SGP takes on a community-based approach that emphasizes demand 
drivenness and innovativeness, projects are not tailor-cut to consolidate and aggregate 
around certain indicators. The diversity of SGP projects poses great challenges to 
the meaningful global aggregation of results. The global database developed in 2001 
provided a list of indicators for SGP. However, no one indicator was applicable to all 
projects, and most indicators were left unfilled by the majority of projects. Hence, 
aggregating any one of the indicators may only reflect a small sample of the SGP 
portfolio, not the entire portfolio results. Therefore, any selection of indicators for 
aggregation from that set will underestimate real, on-the-ground results.
Even at the project level, for communities, all focal areas are mixed; hence, many 
projects can be recorded as ‘multiple focal area’ projects. It may not be possible to 
separate and report on focal area results. For example, conservation of mangroves 
can be put under international waters or biodiversity; similarly, reforestation can 
be counted as land degradation focal area work and as climate mitigation work. 
Country programmes often report on and account for these activities as considered 
necessary for their focal area portfolio focus. Consequently, when reporting to GEF, 
SGP often has to retrofit its results and impacts against the focal area indicators, while 
leaving out some possibly more fundamental and transformative results and impacts 
achieved on the ground. A more flexible and adaptive approach to monitoring and 
evaluation will be perhaps more productive.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is quite a complex process to implement the idea of ‘thinking 
globally, acting locally’, which poses tremendous challenges to global aggregations 
of local actions’ collective impacts. SGP’s case demonstrated that the great variations 
between local complexities and global simplified frameworks make it difficult to 
comprehensively measure the overall depth and coverage of the impacts achieved 
by SGP through global lenses. Global environmental complexities are expressed not 
only in the multiplication of issues, linkages and forms but also in the various mani-
festations of issues in different localities. As such, although principles and approaches 
on sustainable environmental management may be generally agreed, specific actions 
and solutions to environmental issues are largely dependent on locally contextual-
ized conditions. Attempts to ‘standardize’ for global aggregation should be avoided.
To enhance operation as well as evaluation effectiveness for SGP, an adapted, 
flexible and inclusive results framework approach that is independent of individual 
focal area results should be adopted to better monitor and evaluate SGP results and 
impacts. Such an approach can encompass a comprehensive evaluation framework 
that incorporates environmental, social, economic and political indicators to be fully 
evaluated and aggregated at the country programme level for global synthesis. Given 
the time, effort and high transaction costs needed to translate global policies into 
local actions, it is recommended a longer time horizon should be considered for 
such a framework to maintain global consistency and coordination so that country 
programmes and communities will not constantly shift indicators and their targets.
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Notes
 1 The modalities include full-sized projects, medium-sized projects, enabling activities, 
the small grants programme, as well as programmes; see https://www.thegef.org/about/
funding.
 2 The structure and management of SGP are stipulated in SGP Operational Guidelines as 
approved by the GEF Council. It regulates all aspects of SGP management and operations.
 3 This word is used within the GEF system to describe activities that are not eligible for 
GEF funding.
 4 Yet another joint evaluation by the GEF and UNDP Independent Evaluation Offices has 
been started while this is being written for presentation to the GEF Council and UNDP 
Board in 2021.
 5 During a global review of SGP ocean and coastal management projects in small island 
developing states (SIDS) led by CPMT, it was found that although only about 200 proj-
ects were coded as ‘international waters’ projects in SIDS, there are more than 200 proj-
ects related to ocean and coastal management coded under the ‘biodiversity’ and ‘land 
degradation’ portfolios. Similarly, it was estimated that among the more than 3,000 proj-
ects focusing on forest management, about half were classified under ‘biodiversity’ and 
the other half was placed under the ‘land degradation’ focal area. Such ambiguity reflect-
ing the cross-cutting nature of community projects renders the focal area approach quite 
ineffective on the ground and becomes meaningless for the purposes of monitoring and 
evaluation.
 6 Demand drivenness refers to the fact that SGP funds project activities demanded by 
communities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Project activities are devel-
oped and implemented by communities and NGOs, not by UNDP, GEF or SGP global 
management team.
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GREEN ECONOMY PERFORMANCE 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES IN 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Ronal Gainza and Simon Lobach
Introduction
A major outcome of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20), is the international community’s recognition that a green 
economy is a tool for achieving sustainable development. Countries attending the 
conference emphasized that any green economy intervention should simultaneously 
contribute to the following three goals: sustaining economic growth, enhancing 
social inclusion and maintaining the healthy functioning of the earth’s ecosystems 
(United Nations Environmental Programme [UNEP] 2011; United Nations 2012). 
The Green Economy Report produced by UNEP (2011) asserts that the transition 
towards a green economy contributes to achieving sustainable development. The 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that countries adopted in 2015 speak to 
these same objectives.
As suggested by Strange and Bayley (2008), assessing progress on sustainability 
has to identify not only the economic, environmental and social impacts but also 
the synergies and trade-offs across the three pillars of sustainable development. By 
definition, a green economy has to address the complex connections and interde-
pendence of these three pillars, with the aim of avoiding the trade-offs that tradi-
tional sustainable development policies can imply. The key assumption of the green 
economy approach is the idea that initiatives that help achieve outcomes in one 
pillar do not need to lead to trade-offs with other pillar objectives. Consistent with 
this, we argue that any set of indicators for green economy initiatives must measure 
and give equal weight to economic growth, social equity and ecosystem protection.
UNEP has been at the forefront of promoting a green economy and it is provid-
ing policy advice, technical assistance and capacity building to governments around 
the world. One initial gap was the absence of a measurement approach. Efforts to 
introduce metrics to evaluate the transition towards a green economy have recently 
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been initiated. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD; 2011) proposes indicators to monitor progress towards green growth; the 
Global Green Growth Institute launched in 2019 the Green Growth Index, which 
measures country performance in four green growth dimensions – efficient and 
sustainable resource use, natural capital protection, green economic opportunities 
and social inclusion (Acosta et al., 2019), and PAGE (2017) developed the Green 
Economy Progress Measurement Framework to help countries evaluate their over-
all progress towards an Inclusive Green Economy. In 2020, UN-Environment has 
developed the Inclusive Green Economy Policy Review methodology (UNEP, 
2020), which assesses the coherence and effectiveness of existing policies in foster-
ing an Inclusive Green Economy transition.
The scope of most existing measurement frameworks is at the country or sub-
national level1 and gives little space to comprehensively and simultaneously measure 
stand-alone initiatives’ contributions to green economy and the SDGs. If the green 
economy is to be viable and successful, then measurement frameworks need to also 
identify potential trade-offs and win–win–win options between the three pillars of 
sustainable development.
This chapter proposes a methodology to fill this gap. Acknowledging that 
indicators traditionally require a lot of system- and measurement-related work, 
we develop a system of assessment that is quick and helps policy makers and oth-
ers assess whether so-called green interventions actually meet the objectives of a 
green economy. We develop criteria built on existing indicator frameworks and 
a green performance grading system. These criteria help measuring the social, 
environmental and economic performance of environmental initiatives, and 
informing about their contribution to the SDGs. We then test this framework by 
applying it to four environmental initiatives (located in Latin America and the 
Caribbean).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: we first describe our pro-
posed methodological framework for assessing the green economy performance 
of environmental initiatives. Then, we present the four environmental initiatives. 
Finally, we discuss the major results from our analysis, including enabling conditions 
and financing as well as main challenges and opportunities.
Methodological framework for assessing green economy 
performance of environmental initiatives in developing countries
A green economy has three pillars of sustainable development: ecosystem protec-
tion, economic growth and social equity.
Evidence-based criteria
A checklist that examines initiatives with regard to their green economy perfor-
mance must address all these criteria. In the following, the three pillars are briefly 
described.
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Ecosystem protection
In a green economy, natural capital must be used efficiently while reducing envi-
ronmental risk so that resource use is sustainable and ecological scarcities are allevi-
ated.2 Based on this, this chapter proposes the following proxy indicators to assess 
the performance of green economy initiatives in developing countries with respect 
to environmental sustainability in four sectors:
Forest: forest cover stays the same or increases (contributes to SDG 15);
Freshwater: watersheds or water surfaces remain or come under effective protec-
tion (contributes to SDG 6);
Renewable energy technologies: cleaner technologies are introduced for improving 
access to clean energy and energy efficiency as well as reducing GHG (contributes 
to SDGs 7 and 13); and
Cities: the public transport network stays the same or increases; energy demand is 
met by green sources; green areas in urban areas increase or remain the same; food 
is increasingly produced in urban/peri-urban areas; the stock of green buildings and 
sustainable infrastructure in general increase; and materials are preferably locally 
sourced and where appropriate they can be composted, recycled and reused in order 
to reduce waste or avoid its increase (contributes to SDGs 6, 11 and SDG 12).
Economic growth
Green economy initiatives must promote and deliver economic growth over time. 
Gross domestic product growth is traditionally regarded as the single most important 
indicator for economic growth and development. Besides assessing the impact of 
specific green economy initiatives on the local economy, this chapter also proposes 
that public and private investments that support the initiative can be used as proxy 
indicators for gross domestic product growth. These indicators contribute to SGDs 
8 and 17.
Social equity
Green economy initiatives must improve people’s lives and well-being and promote 
social equity and health benefits. Based on the system of indicators developed by 
Villatoro and Feres (2007) to monitor social cohesion in Latin America, this chapter 
proposes the following proxy indicators to assess social equity:
Poverty reduction (contributes to SDG 1)
 • People’s income increases or at least does not diminish; and
 • Additional benefits are received by vulnerable groups in society.
Employment (contributes to SDG 8)
 • Jobs are created or at least remain the same.
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Social protection (contributes to SDG 1)
 • People are incorporated into social protection schemes.
Education (contributes to SDG 1)
 • More people are educated or trained through green economy initiatives.
Health (contributes to SDG 3)
 • People live in improved environments (i.e. indoor and outdoor pollution is 
reduced or at least does not increase);
 • People have healthier lifestyles.
Consumption and access to basic services (contribute to SDG 1)
 • Increased access to basic services including access to safe water and sewerage;
 • Increased access to social infrastructure (e.g. supermarkets, hospitals, public 
transport).
Grade system to assess green performance
Through the assessment of environmental initiatives’ performance levels, this chap-
ter provides a framework for determining whether a given initiative can be classified 
as a green economy initiative (see Table 13.1).3
Environmental initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean
Forest: national forestry financing fund in Costa Rica
Background
Costa Rica has an estimated forest cover of 2.6 million hectares, which represents 
51% of its national territory (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] 2011). 
The country suffered extensive deforestation in the beginning of the second half of 
the 20th century. Vast stretches of rainforest were burned and converted into cattle 
lands and for agriculture use. Between 1986 and 1991, the country lost 4.2% of its 
remaining forest cover per year (Daniels et al. 2010), and by 1990 its forest cover was 
only of 1.6 million hectares (Madrigal, Alpízar and Otárola 2006).
Beginning in the late 1970s, Costa Rica introduced forestry incentives with the 
aim of enhancing the forest cover. These included favourable credit conditions, trad-
able tax vouchers and subsidies (Daniels et al. 2010). As a result of a third loan nego-
tiation process with the World Bank, general subsidies (including forestry subsidies) 
were abolished and the forestry sector started exerting pressure on the government 
to receive support.
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The initiative
In response to this worsening situation, the government of Costa Rica established 
the National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO)4 to complement existing 
forestry legislation. It is used to compensate the opportunity costs borne by pri-
vate landholders of forests affected by legislation that prohibits land use change. 
FONAFIFO collects funds to support the payment for ecosystem services (PES) 
programme. Small and medium landholders may participate through reforestation, 
protection of existing forest, natural forest regeneration and agroforestry systems 
(see Table 13.2 for a list of modalities of compensation).
Functioning
FONAFIFO receives funding from four different sources. First, it receives public 
funds (the government assigns 3.5% of its fuel tax revenue to the fund). This financ-
ing mechanism is based on the ‘polluter pays’ principle. Second, FONAFIFO makes 
TABLE 13.1 Grading System to Assess the ‘Green’ level of Performance of Environmental
Performance Ecosystem protection Social equity Economic growth





risks and ecological 
scarcities, preserving 
natural capital).
It significantly contributes 
to enhancing social 
equity and reducing 
poverty, and/or 
improves the human 
well-being of all social 
groups involved.
It has a significant 
positive spill-
over effect on the 
overall economy 
at the national or 
regional level (i.e. 
it stimulates steady 
economic growth).
Medium It is possible to measure 
a reduction or halt 
in environmental 
degradation.
It contributes to reversing/
avoiding social 
inequalities and/or 
enables more than one 
social group to receive 
direct or indirect 
benefits.
It has a positive impact 
on the overall 
economy.
Poor Though it is expected 
to have a positive 
impact on the 
environment, there is 
no reliable evidence 
that supports it, and/
or the impact on 
the environment is 
negligible or neutral.
It benefits/excludes 
specific social groups 
or social benefits are 
minimal, or the impact 
is neutral.
No impact on local or 
national economic 
growth can be 
observed.
Negative It has adverse effects on 
the environment.
It deepens social inequality. It causes economic 
losses.
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voluntary agreements with specific enterprises, which allocate funds for conserva-
tion activities in areas of their interest. Third, international organizations provide 
grants and loans for the provision of global public goods. Fourth, FONAFIFO sells 
Certificates of Environmental Services to individual investors, private companies 
and public organizations interested in investing in legally recognized environmen-
tal services. Investors can select the forest area of their interest, and the price per 
hectare will vary depending on the location and features of the area. This is not a 
trade system, since certificates are not exchangeable among investors. The main 
motivation for companies to invest is a desire to enhance their corporate image. The 
government creates an additional incentive, as these investments are tax deductible 
(see Table 13.3).
TABLE 13.2 Modalities of Compensation in the PES, Costa Rica
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Forest Law 7,575 










Sources: Compiled from Daniels et al. (2010); Madrigal et al. (2006); FONAFIFO website (2012).
a Contracted hectares as of 31 May 2011.
b  Trees.
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Freshwater: water protection fund, Quito, Ecuador
Background
The availability of water for the Metropolitan District of Quito (approximately 2.3 
million inhabitants), depends on the conservation of protected areas upstream. Of 
the district’s water supply, 80% originates in two ecological reserves, the Cayambe–
Coca (4,000,000 hectares) and the Antisana (120,000 hectares), both of which are 
national parks managed by the Ministry of Environment (UNEP 2010). Although 
these ecological reserves are formally protected for conservation, their ecological 
balance is menaced by unregulated activities, such as unsustainable agricultural prac-
tices. This results in degradation of water quality, which further affects Quito’s water 
supply. Unfortunately, the lack of resources for the operation and protection of the 
reserves threatens the long-term conservation of these vital ecosystems and the 
water services they provide (Echavarria and Arroyo 2002).
TABLE 13.3 Cumulative Contributions to FONAFIFO from 1998 to June 2011
Contributors Cumulative contribution (million of $2011)
Public Financing
3.5% of collected fuel tax revenues 121.74
Public–private agreements
Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz 3.77/ to protect 11,900 haa
Florida Ice and Farm and Empresa Servicios 
Públicos de Heredia
0.15/ to protect 1,000 hab
Hydroelectric enterprises 0.42/ to protect 5,711 hac
International financing
Ecomercados 57.37d/ to protect 137,033 hectares of forest/
enhance participation of women and 
indigenous communities
Kfw 11,606,677.29 (grant)/ to protect 74,000 
hectares for seven years
Certificates of Environmental Servicese 0.43
Total 195.49
Source: FONAFIFO (2011); Madrigal et al. (2006).
a Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz pays $40/hectares for a period of ten years.
b  Florida Ice and Farm paid $45/hectares from 2001 to 2007, and Públicos de Heredia has contributed 
$22/hectares.
c  Two hydroelectric enterprises have signed agreements with FONAFIFO. Energía Global paid $10/
hectares between 1997 and 2002 and $12/hectares ever since. Hidroelectrica platanar pays $15/
hectares to FONAFIFO for the areas which are already under the PES and $30/hectares directly to 
landholders who are outside the PES due to a lack of funds and/or because they do not meet the 
requirements.
d  Loan of about $32.8 million from the World Bank, a grant of about $8.0 million from the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), and $8.6 million from the Costa Rican government.
e  At the time of writing, around 40 enterprises have acquired Certificates of Environmental Services.
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The initiative
In 1995, the Fundación Antisana carried out a study supported by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), to design sustainable manage-
ment plans for the ecological reserves upstream. As a result of this study, the Fund for 
Water Protection (FONAG) was established in 2000 as an economic instrument to 
support conservation efforts that were underway. Two other conditions that enabled 
the creation of FONAG were the political will of local decision makers and the 
change in the law governing public financing in 1999, which allowed public orga-
nizations to assign resources to a private mechanism (Echavarria and Arroyo 2002).
Functioning
FONAG is an economic-financial mechanism that is mandated to operate for 
eighty years in the form of a private mercantile trust. This trust fund under FONAG 
collects funding, in principle, from water users who, in turn, can become members 
of its board and determine FONAG’s policies and strategies. Voting power depends 
on the amount of resources provided to the fund. Furthermore, constituents can 
appoint the members of the Technical Advisory Committee, which assists in defin-
ing and monitoring programmes and projects.
The current constituents of FONAG are the Municipal Water and Sewerage 
Authority of Quito, the Nature Conservancy, the Electric Utility of Quito, 
Cervecería Nacional, Swiss Development Cooperation and the Tesalia Springs 
Company. (FONAG 2013). The initiative also accepts additional funds from other 
organizations to co-finance specific programmes and projects. However, these addi-
tional resources are not allocated in the trust fund and co-financier organizations are 
not member of FONAG’s Board. See Table 13.4 for details about the main contri-
butions to the fund by constituents and other participating organizations as of 2011.
The Technical Secretariat reviews the mechanism’s financial performance, 
ensures project implementation and supervises the distribution of investments. 
Enlaces Funds, a private bank, is the financial manager of the trust fund (Echavarria 
and Arroyo 2002). Its main mission is to enhance the fund’s profits through stock 
market investments (Cisneros and Lloret 2008). Only the profits of this trust fund 
are allocated to co-finance (along with national and international institutions) 
programmes and projects addressed to undertake upstream watershed protection 
activities, including reforestation, watershed management, environmental education, 
waste management and surveillance and monitoring (Echavarria and Arroyo 2002).
By rule, the trust fund under FONAG cannot provide more than a quarter of 
a project’s total funding (Cisneros and Lloret 2008). From 2005 to 2009, for each 
dollar invested by FONAG in projects and programmes, the counterpart organiza-
tions contributed up to $4 (FONAG 2011). Once a year, the fund reports to the 
government, and this information is made available to the public. Local-level imple-
menting organizations and volunteers from local communities undertake watershed 
protection activities.
Green economy performance 245
So far, there has not been any direct monetary compensation to farmers for tak-
ing part in protection activities. Nevertheless, FONAG has recently co-financed 
studies that assess and propose the implementation of PES programmes that might 
compensate farmers for carrying out reforestation activities.
Renewable energy: solar water heaters in Barbados
Background
Barbados’ large potential for solar energy stems from its high solar endowment. 
Nevertheless, Barbados relies on imported refined fuels to meet nearly all (about 
95%) its power and transport needs. In 1999, Barbados imported more than 2 mil-
lion barrels of petroleum products (Headley 2001). Less than 15% of the refined 
product comes from domestic oil production. Electricity demand in the domestic 
and commercial sectors has grown recently at an average annual rate of more the 
4%. In 2003, total annual electricity consumption was about 735 gigawatt hours or 
almost 2,700 kilowatt hours per capita, one of the highest rates in the Caribbean 
TABLE 13.4 Contributions to FONAG by Constituents and Donors
Contributors Contribution/goals
Constituents
Municipal Water and Sewerage 
Authority of Quito
$20,000 as capital seed and 1% drinking water sales 
per year
The Nature Conservancy $1,000 as seed capital and $145,000 as technical 
assistance and support
Electric Utility of Quito $45,000 per year
Cervecería nacional $6,000 per year
Swiss Development Cooperation $30,000 as one-off payment
Tesalia Springs Co. $7,000
Co-financiers of programmes and projects
USAID $3 million (2007–2012), institutional strengthening, 
environmental education, surveillance, monitoring 
and communication activities
Dutch Entrepeneurial Development 
Bank (FMO) - Inter-American 
Development Bank
$140,000 (2006–2010) development of water 
management programmes
Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ)
Capacity building on watersheds management
Environmental Systems Research 
Institute
In-kind payment (i.e. software, technical books on 
geographic information systems)
Corporation ‘Vida para Quito’* Reforestation programmes
Sources: FONAG website; USAID website; IDB (2006); Vida para Quito website.
*  The Vida para Quito foundation is a non-profit organization subordinate to the Municipality of 
Quito. Its main goal is to carry out activities to protect and preserve the environment. Natural and 
legal persons may voluntarily make donations up to 25% of the amount of their income tax.
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region (Perlack and Hinds 2003). The government of Barbados has been advocating 
for renewable sources of energy, notably by expanding the use of solar water heaters. 
This policy has become the best example of the exploitation of a renewable energy 
technology in the Caribbean.
The initiative
Solar water heater policy in Barbados seeks to reduce energy consumer costs, stimulate 
the local market (including manufacturers and suppliers), reduce Barbados’ depen-
dency on imported fossil fuels and enhance the country’s energy security. It has been 
led mainly through a set of fiscal policies. The first policy, adopted in 1974, suspended 
import duties on raw materials needed to manufacture the heaters, and introduced a 
30% consumption tax on electric water heaters. Perlack and Hinds (2003) estimate 
that the effect of the duty-free importation of raw materials lowered installed costs 
by about $100 per solar water heater. Between 1980 and 1993, homeowners were 
allowed to deduct the full cost of solar water heater installation, up to a maximum of 
$1,750 per year. From 1996, this deduction was reintroduced and extended to repairs, 
renovations, energy or water saving devices and water storage tanks.
Table 13.5 shows the estimated payback periods for domestic solar water heaters 
in Barbados. The investment payback periods are short, particularly for households 
having an income of more than $12,000.
Cities: sustainable urban planning in Curitiba, Brazil
Background
The processes of urbanization and internal migration in Brazil have caused problems 
such as pollution, traffic congestion, disappearance of public and green spaces, infor-
mal housing settlements and socio-economic ruptures in most of the country’s urban 
TABLE 13.5 Estimated Payback Periods for Domestic Solar Water Heaters, Barbados
Parameters Solar water heater size (gallons)
40 52 66 80
Installed cost (US$2011) 1,125 1,200 1,425 1,750
Energy savings (kWh) 1,190 1,545 1,965 2,380
Electric price ($BD/kWh) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Annual savings ($BD) 420 546 693 840
Payback period (years)
- Without fiscal incentives 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1
- With fiscal incentives:
Taxable income (US$2011) Tax rate
<12,000 25% 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.6
>12,000 40% 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.2
Source: Slightly modified from Perlack and Hinds (2003).
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centres (Rabinovitch and Leitman 2004). The most noteworthy example of an urban 
policy to counter these developments is the Sustainable Urban Development pro-
gramme, first implemented in Curitiba in the 1960s. Curitiba, the capital of Paraná 
state, has 1.8 million inhabitants (the metropolitan region has 3.2 million inhabit-
ants), which makes it the country’s eighth largest urban centre in terms of population.
The initiative
The starting point of Sustainable Urban Development stems from the 1965 creation 
of the Institute for Research and Urban Planning of Curitiba, an independent pub-
lic authority. The Institute conducted the drafting of the city’s 1966 master plan, and 
in subsequent decades, it coordinated the development of a series of integrated poli-
cies to be executed by the municipal authorities (Rabinovitch 1992; Rabinovitch 
and Leitman 2004), including the following:
 • Relocating employment to areas outside the city centre (e.g. through the 
creation of an ‘industrial city’ in a concentrated area west of Curitiba, where 
industries are bound by strict environmental regulations);
 • Developing a system of roads with exclusive busways at their centre (Bus Rapid 
Transit system);
 • Rationalizing of the integrated transport system;
 • Improving land use legislation, providing clear incentives for commercial 
developments to be located as closely as possible to the public transport axes 
and outside the city centre;
 • Developing green areas across the city, some of them in former slum areas; and
 • Improving, either through relocation or not, of the quality of life in slum areas, 
from the point of view of public transport access, garbage collection and flood 
prevention.
Important factors for the success of Sustainable Urban Development in Curitiba 
included the continuity and consistency of the Institute for Research and Urban 
Planning’s policies; the holistic vision of the institution (which allowed it to design 
policies accounting for the economic, social and environmental aspects of urban 
planning); the harmonization between urban development and the legal framework 
on construction and environment; the availability of specific funding for the project; 
the fact that the city had been able to easily purchase land for transport, residential 
and industrial use; and the hydrological features of the area that facilitated the cre-
ation of green areas across the city (de Oliveira 2001).
Functioning
The Institute for Research and Urban Planning coordinated various aspects of 
urban development and ensured continuity and consistency in planning processes 
amid turnover in city administrations. The Bus Rapid Transit system, which has 
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a construction cost of US $3 million per kilometre, pays for itself. A city agency 
manages the operation of the system, which is served by private companies. The 
law stipulates that transportation revenue is exclusively dedicated to paying the 
Bus Rapid Transit system (World Bank, 2010). All the infrastructure costs of the 
Bus Rapid Transit system have been financed by the municipality (which still 
pays for the maintenance of the roads), whereas private bus operators finance the 
buses and station maintenance themselves, without external funding. The Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) provided more than $262 million in loans to 
the municipality for additional expansion of the Bus Rapid Transit system (IDB 
1995, 2004, 2011).
Policies for spatially reorganizing the city have been financed by a set of 
taxes and public funds. For example, special property taxes for new neighbour-
hoods close to green areas partially finance the construction of such green areas 
and improvements to living conditions in slums. Historical rights to develop 
certain areas may be exchanged for rights to develop other city areas deemed 
more propitious for further urban development. In addition, the municipality 
sells construction and forest exploitation rights, which partially finances slum 
improvement and historic building preservation. The Institute for Research 
and Urban Planning regulates and monitors the transfer of development rights 
among interested parties.
For waste collection, the city implemented the Green Exchange Programme, 
which compensates people for collecting garbage and litter and handing it in at 
neighbourhood centres. This programme allows the municipality to save money on 
waste collection and to create a cleaner living environment while providing addi-
tional livelihoods for the poor (World Bank 2010). In addition to these self-financ-
ing mechanisms, an Inter-American Development Bank grant of about $850,000 
(IDB 2009) and a grant from the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) of 
more than $50 million (AFD 2011) have supported diverse urban development 
projects.
Assessment of the initiatives
Major themes: enabling conditions and financing
Enabling conditions
The enabling conditions for the four assessed initiatives have some elements in com-
mon. First, the initiatives share the political will and engagement of key local lead-
ers. The Costa Rican Forestry Law that underpins the PES scheme was the result 
of dedication and particular support from the then Minister for the Environment, 
who is also the author of a scientific assessment of the feasibility of the scheme. 
FONAG was supported by the then mayor of Quito, who was interested in fund-
raising for watershed protection (Pérez et al. 2006). The then prime minister of 
Barbados personally advocated for the initial fiscal incentives to help stimulate the 
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market for solar water heaters, pointing at their performance and potential energy 
savings (Perlack and Hinds 2003). In Curitiba, the city’s mayor from 1971 to 1992 
had previously been president of the Institute of Research and Urban Planning, and 
drafted the city’s 1966 master plan, laying the foundation for today’s Sustainable 
Urban Development initiative (World Bank 2010).
Second, the implementation or modification of the regulatory framework for 
environment and economy catalysed the conception of the four initiatives. While 
the local initiatives were only driven by internal issues (e.g. population growth in 
Curitiba and concerns around water availability and quality in Quito), the national 
initiatives (FONAFIFO in Costa Rica and solar water heaters in Barbados) were also 
influenced by international factors. The suppression of forestry subsidies in Costa 
Rica during the mid-1990s, imposed by the Structural Adjustment Programmes of 
the World Bank, fostered the pursuit of another way to support forest protection. In 
Barbados, the first oil peak in 1973–1974 forced the government to find substitutes 
for imported oil, turning it towards solar energy.
Financing
Table 13.6 highlights the funding sources and the main financing mechanisms 
employed to finance the four initiatives at their different stages. Following are the 
important lessons.
Public pre-investment finance was employed to scale up the level of investments 
in all four cases (UNEP 2011). During the capacity-building and initiation phases, 
public funds and donors prevailed as the main source of funding for research and 
development and for creating institutional capacity.
During the initiative’s operational phase, the source of funds was diverse and 
public funding still played a key role. Very well-defined public–private mechanisms 
were established to support PES in Costa Rica, protect watersheds in Quito, to 
develop public transport in Curitiba and to boost the national solar water heater 
industry in Barbados. The private sector is fully engaged in the Barbados and 
Curitiba initiatives, in which it reacted positively to the financial incentives provided 
by public funding. Fiscal policies are in place to support PES in Costa Rica and to 
drive Sustainable Urban Development in Curitiba. In Barbados, the solar water 
heater initiative is fully funded and driven by fiscal policies.
Multilateral development finance institutions (e.g. IDB and the World Bank), and 
bilateral development finance institutions (e.g. the French Development Agency, 
Dutch Entrepreneurial Development Bank FMO, the German Development Fund 
and USAID) have played a key role in supporting all these initiatives (with the 
exception of solar water heaters in Barbados). In Curitiba, IDB provided several 
loans and grants to the local government for developing the transport system and 
implementing sustainable urban policies. The World Bank is involved in forest pro-
tection in Costa Rica through the provision of loans and grants. Bilateral develop-








TABLE 13.6 Type of Funding by Initiative and Phase
Initiatives Initiative-specific funding General funding: allocations 
from other sources








FONAFIFO was established 
by public funds to set up 
PES for forest management.
A fiscal policy was started 
to nourish the fund 
(3.5% of the fuel tax).
Through a PES scheme nourished 
by contributions from public 
funds (3.5% of the fuel tax), 
public–private partnerships and 
Certificates of Environmental 
Services (buyers of these 
certificates receive an equivalent 
deduction in their income tax)
Grants from the World 
Bank and the German 
Development Fund




A study supported by 
a USAID grant 
recommended the creation 
of a water protection 
scheme based on local 
funding.
Seed capital provided by 
public enterprises and 
donors
Semi-PES scheme
Public enterprises and minor 
contributions from institutional 
and private donors
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Solar Water Heater 
initiative in 
Barbados
A public grant to the 
private sector helped 
spur the development of 
a marketable solar water 
heater.
A loan from a public bank 
helped the private 
sector to carry out the 
first project.
Fiscal policies (i.e. tax reductions) 
aim to encourage the use of 
solar water heaters.
Three private companies dominate 
the Barbadian solar water heater 
market.
Minor solar water heater 





Public funds founded the 
Institute for Research 
and Urban Planning of 
Curitiba and designed 
the city’s sustainable 
development plan.
Public and private funds Public–private partnerships for the 
Bus Rapid Transit system and for 
the industrial city of Curitiba
Fiscal policies to finance slum 
relocation, park construction 
and heritage preservation
Inter-American Development Bank 
loans to government of Curitiba 
for improving public transport
Inter-American 
Development Bank 




for transport and 
biodiversity conservation
252 Ronal Gainza and Simon Lobach
Green economy performance
When applying the grading system developed in Section 2 to the four environmen-
tal initiatives with the aim of assessing their green economy performance, we obtain 
the following findings (see Table 13.7).
National forestry financing fund, Costa Rica
The PES system to protect forests in Costa Rica shows good performance for the 
three pillars of sustainable development and can therefore be considered a green 
economy success story. The PES scheme in Costa Rica contributes to forest expan-
sion, includes special provisions to enhance social inclusiveness, has boosted the 
forest industry and has fostered private investments to the sector. Sub-national stud-
ies show that the PES scheme has lowered deforestation rates and contributed to 
forest expansion (Daniels et al. 2010). From 2000 to 2010, net forest cover increased 
by approximately 23,000 hectares per year (FAO 2010). In the initial stage of the 
initiative, social aspects were not sufficiently taken into account, but some recent 
measures have enhanced minority access to the programme, including abolishing 
the requirement of land ownership, introducing PES for agroforestry services and 
prioritizing cantons with a low social development index (Madrigal et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, reforestation activities are at least 33% of permanent employment in 
the forestry sector (Arias 2004).
Forest plantations have become the largest permanent cultivation in the coun-
try, contributing more than $141 million to the gross domestic product in 2001. 
The forest industry has experienced significant growth since the 1997 implementa-
tion of PES, reaching an installed capacity of 446 cubic metres of timber per year 
in 2001. The PES has also fostered private investments in the forestry sector. For 
example, from 1997 to 2002, private investments were four times the investment 
made by FONAFIFO (Arias 2004). The initiative shows that a significant growth 
of the forestry industry can not only be achieved with forest depletion but can also 
go hand in hand with sustainable forest management and expansion of forest covers, 
creating a long-term source of revenue.
Water protection fund, Quito, Ecuador
This initiative obtains low evaluations for the three dimensions. In terms of real 
impact on ecosystem protection, improved watershed management has only 
been implemented in 65,000 of the potential 520,000 hectares (UNEP 2010). 
Furthermore, there is no reliable evidence about positive environmental changes 
that the set of all upstream projects financed by FONAG have produced on the 
availability and quality of water in Quito. Only a few projects produced observable 
positive local impacts (Pérez et al. 2006). Concerning social inclusiveness, despite 
the fact that more than 1,800 farmers upstream are estimated to receive indirect 
economic benefits (UNEP 2010), there are no specific provisions to ensure social 
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TABLE 13.7 Green Performance of the Initiatives
Initiatives Green performance based on evidence





Good: PES scheme has 
lowered deforestation 
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inclusiveness. Furthermore, as decisions in FONAG are made by constituents based 
on their financial contribution, there is a risk of social exclusion (Pérez et al. 2006).
It is not clear whether this initiative is contributing to the project area’s eco-
nomic development. Though some projects are creating the right conditions for 
developing ecotourism and forestry sector activities, there is no reliable evidence 
that the initiative is contributing to the economic growth of the areas where it is 
operating. Since a sound evaluation of the eventual economic, social and environ-
mental benefits of the initiative is absent, the initiative cannot yet be considered a 
green economy success story, nor can it serve as an example for replication in other 
areas. A possible explanation might lie in the amount of funding that was made 
available, which is quite modest, considering the forest area it needs to protect in 
order to ensure the qualitative and sufficient water supply to the city of Quito. 
FONAG is the only initiative among the four that is not state-controlled.
Solar water heaters in Barbados
The solar water heater initiative in Barbados obtains good evaluations for environ-
mental sustainability and economic development, and a medium grade in social 
equity. It provides global and local environmental benefits due to the reduction of 
fossils fuels. The use of solar water heaters contributes to the reduction of climate 
change and local air pollution by reducing the consumption of fossil fuels (and con-
sequently greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants). For example, in 2002 carbon 
savings amounted to 15,000 metric tons, which represented 4% of the emissions 
from all Barbadian carbon sources. Fiscal exceptions have yielded positive results 
among middle-income households. However, tax incentives might not be the most 
appropriate instrument to achieve the inclusion of the poorest households, which do 
not have sufficient income to qualify for a tax deduction (Perlack and Hinds 2003).
The programme has had positive spill-over effects on the overall economy. It has 
fostered the creation and further development of the solar water heater industry in 
Barbados, which has become the most consolidated in the Caribbean. Sixty percent 
of the heaters are produced locally (Government of Barbados and IDB 2010). The 
country has the developing world’s highest per capita rate of solar water heater 
installations. In 2009, 324 heaters were in operation per 1,000 inhabitants (Weiss 
and Mauthner 2011). Economic benefits have been larger that the tax costs. The 
cumulative tax cost of solar water heater incentives is estimated at about $10.8 mil-
lion through 2002, whereas the cumulative value for energy savings is in the order 
of $134 million (Perlack and Hinds 2003). Furthermore, Barbados benefits from the 
initiative, as its reduced dependence on fossil fuel imports renders the country less 
vulnerable to the effects of shocks in the international oil price.
Sustainable urban development in Curitiba, Brazil
The Sustainable Urban Development initiative resulted in very positive impacts 
on environment and society, enhanced social inclusiveness and fostered economic 
development in the city.
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The initiative has achieved several environmental benefits, including an increase 
in the green area per person from 1 square metres in 1970 to 50 square metres in 
2008. Of all trips in the city, 45% are made in public transport; 32%, on foot or 
bike using the city’s 120-kilometre network of bike lanes. Moreover, the city has 
low levels of unregulated waste dumping. Around 13% of waste is recycled. Proper 
tire collection has reduced dengue disease by 99.7%. Furthermore, relocating and 
improving slum areas and replacing them with green spaces have led to more effec-
tive water regulation. Curitiba has one of the lowest rates of ambient air pollution in 
Brazil due to the strengthening of public transport, the creation of green areas and 
the good environmental regulation of the industrial city. Greenhouse gas emissions 
in the area have dropped (World Bank 2010).
Sustainable Urban Development in Curitiba has had a favourable impact on 
social inclusiveness. It has achieved a positive effect on job creation (estimated at 
200,000 jobs). The garbage collection programme has created alternative sources of 
income for the poorest. Income from the sale of recyclables is being used to sup-
port social programmes. Slum areas have decreased and areas for unofficial occu-
pancy have been designed and included in the city planning. The decentralization 
of city services to areas that are easily reached by public transport has significantly 
increased the social inclusiveness of the services provided. The flat ‘social fare’ for 
public transport has benefitted around 80% of the population, especially the poorest 
as they tend to commute over longer distances. In addition, the city has provided 
compensation when relocating slums and promoted the diversity of income groups 
in new neighbourhoods (World Bank 2010).
Sustainable development policies have fostered economic development. The reor-
ganization of the city and the creation of an industrial city have boosted economic 
growth. Curitiba’s Industrial City produces 20% of Paraná’s exports and it accounts 
for 25% of the state’s value added tax revenue on sales and services. After three 
decades, the industrial city hosts more than 7,000 companies, including the car man-
ufacturer that produces Bus Rapid Transit system buses. By improving infrastructure 
and traffic plans, the city has saved on construction costs. The Bus Rapid Transit 
system pays for itself without government subsidies. It has also helped to diminish 
economic losses that result from traffic congestion. The cost of building parks and 
relocating slums has been estimated at five times less than the projected cost of build-
ing concrete canals to control the significant flood risk. Preservation of culture and 
heritage maintains a lively cityscape and attracts tourism (World Bank 2010).
Lessons learned and opportunities for improvement
Strengths
The analysis of these initiatives helps to draw some lessons learned and identify 
their potential for improvement. When determining the main strengths, weaknesses, 
challenges and opportunities of the initiatives, we arrive at the conclusions that can 








TABLE 13.8 Strengths, Weaknesses, Challenges, Opportunities Matrix




 • Flexibility on adapting 
regulations over time for 
obtaining funding sources
 • Effective compliance and 
monitoring mechanisms
 • There are not enough 
incentives for attracting the 
participation of some kinds 
of landholders and some 
modalities
 • Available funding 
covers only a 
percentage of the 
requests
 • To look for new sources 
of international funding 
mechanisms (e.g. 
REDD+)
Water Protection Fund, 
Quito, Ecuador
 • Political and financial 
stability
 • There are incentives for 
free-riding
 • The water price does not 
reflect watershed protection 
costs
 • Scientific basis for benefits is 
weak
 • Low monitoring and 
compliance for watershed 
protection






 • To transit into a well-
defined PES scheme
Solar water heaters in 
Barbados
 • Appropriate mix of fiscal and 
trade incentives
 • Fiscal incentives attract 
mainly middle-income 
households
 • High up-front 
costs of solar 
water heaters
 • To extend to other 





 • Well-interconnected social, 
economic and environmental 
policies
 • Leadership and continuity
 • Institutionalized planning
 • Lack of regional integration  • Population 
growth, also due 
to immigration
 • Changing 
consumption 
patterns
 • To launch an initiative 
beyond the borders of 
Curitiba that integrates 
the social, environmental 
and economic aspects
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The strengths of the policies are as diverse as the policies themselves. The high 
flexibility in obtaining funding, the capacity to adapt over time and the strong 
compliance mechanisms are strengths of the PES scheme in Costa Rica. The PES 
scheme is supported by several complementary regulations, some of which can be 
adapted over time. This initiative includes randomized monitoring visits to farms, 
undertaken by both independent evaluators and external audits. It also allows for 
flexibility for obtaining funding sources (Madrigal et al. 2006).
FONAG, in Ecuador, shows both political and financial stability in its operations. 
The initiative is a local solution, financed by private resources and without direct 
intervention by the government (Pérez et al. 2006).
In the Barbados initiative, the appropriate mix of fiscal measures and custom 
incentives for encouraging solar water heater use is the strong point. These have 
allowed the development of a national solar hot water industry and promoted the 
introduction of solar water heaters by households.
Sustainable Urban Development’s success is based on the implementation of a 
coherent approach, the leadership of local authorities and the institutionalization 
of urban planning. It is based on well-interconnected social, economic and envi-
ronmental policies. There has been significant and consistent political commitment 
to sustainable urban planning. The Institute for Research and Urban Planning of 
Curitiba as a public institution of the municipality has provided integrated, cross-
sector urban planning and monitoring for several decades (World Bank 2010).
Weaknesses
All policies present weaknesses that will affect long-term sustainability if unad-
dressed. In the Costa Rican initiative, transaction costs for landholders are still high 
(15%) and landholders who face high opportunity costs resulting from forest pres-
ervation do not have sufficient incentives to participate. Some PES modalities, such 
as reforestation projects, have been disadvantaged because of specific requirements. 
For example, landholders who apply for reforestation projects are required to pause 
their agricultural activities until assessment and procurement processes have ended, 
which can entail economic losses. Incentives to attract landholders, who face high 
opportunity costs, have been insufficient (Madrigal et al. 2006).
FONAG has to resolve free-riding problems, internalize watershed protection 
costs, improve the scientific basis of the scheme and strengthen monitoring and 
compliance. Concerning free-riding, as financial contributions to the fund are vol-
untary, there are incentives for small beneficiaries to not contribute to the payment 
for services provided. Further, the current water fees do not include the full cost 
of services provided, which include watershed protection. The mechanism’s imple-
mentation was not based on scientific data about the hydrology of the area. With 
regard to monitoring and compliance, there is no reliable monitoring of the impacts 
of sustainable management activities on the improvement of water flows nor are 
there any penalties for lack of compliance (Pérez et al. 2006).
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The solar water heater initiative in Barbados should find ways to include both the 
higher and lower-income households in the programme because, despite the high 
rate of solar water heater penetration, fiscal measures do not sufficiently encourage 
the introduction of solar water heaters in the lower-income households. Further, 
the measures do sufficiently incentivize higher income households that prefer elec-
tric water heaters over rooftop solar panels for aesthetic reasons (Perlack and Hinds 
2003).
The achievements of Curitiba’s initiative are at stake if a better regional inte-
gration is not reached. Integration in the rest of the state could be improved. 
Polluting industries are being authorized to settle in surrounding municipalities, 
and Curitiba’s water supply depends on reservoirs controlled by other municipali-
ties (Lubow 2007). Additionally, as a result of migration and a lack of innovation of 
the BRT system since its introduction, Curitiba’s achievements are partially offset 
(e.g. car ownership has risen and use of public transport has decreased). Currently, 
the policy is by-passed by other cities inspired by Curitiba’s example (Giacomini 
Martínez et al., 2016).
Challenges
A lack of funding presents the main challenge to three of the initiatives. In Costa 
Rica, funding is available only for 40% of the participation requests that comply 
with the PES eligibility requirements (Madrigal et al. 2006). FONAG finances only 
13% of the 520,000 upstream hectares of watersheds. Financial resources obtained 
to date are insufficient to include the whole area of the two ecological reserves in 
sustainable management activities (Pérez et al. 2006). In Barbados, where the fund-
ing for the initiative originates from final consumers directly, the lack of financing 
facilities to overcome the high upfront costs is an economic barrier for the lower-
income households to the point that monthly repayment rates equal the installed 
and electric costs for electric water heaters (Schwerin 2010).
The main challenges to Urban Sustainable Development in Curitiba are shifting 
consumption patterns and population growth. Successful economic growth has led 
to increased car ownership. A measure to counter this might be to continuously 
upgrade the public transport system in order to remain an appealing alternative to 
private vehicles (Lubow 2007). Migration has become a major challenge for sustain-
ing this policy over time. The city’s population has tripled between 1970 and 2008 
(World Bank 2011), and although the number of people living in slums is much 
lower in Curitiba than in other Brazilian cities, slum inhabitants still compose 8% of 
the city’s population (Grostein 2001).
Opportunities
Finally, opportunities for improvement and learning are manifold. For example, in 
order to increase availability of funding, FONAFIFO needs to be able to inte-
grate new international financial mechanisms that compensate forest protection. An 
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example could be the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) scheme under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. FONAFIFO is currently involved in the REDD readiness phase financed 
by the World Bank/Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. The REDD readiness pack-
age also includes the development of a national forest baseline, the creation of a 
national measurement, reporting and verification system and the development of an 
environmental and social management framework that includes consultation pro-
cesses involving all relevant stakeholders (World Bank 2009). These elements could 
significantly strengthen the PES scheme.
FONAG has the potential to evolve towards a well-defined PES scheme for 
watershed protection that guarantees water provision to the city of Quito. Once 
consolidated as a PES scheme, it could be able to take the advantages of a REDD+ 
mechanism to obtain better access to international funding. However, in order to 
become a PES scheme, the initiative needs to adopt adequate supportive legisla-
tion and regulation, strengthen tenure security in the basins, enhance the scientific 
basis of the activities with regard to the local hydrology (specifically concerning the 
link between watershed protection and water supply), include provisions to address 
leakage issues and provide guarantees that water supply and treatment will remain 
affordable for the poorest inhabitants of Quito (Pérez et al. 2006).
Barbados faces the same kind of challenges as other Caribbean nations with 
respect to high fuel costs. For this reason, the Barbados solar water heater initia-
tive has a high potential for replication in the region. The potential solar water 
heater market in the Caribbean is estimated at 798,000 solar water heater units 
(based on an envisaged penetration rate of between 10 to 50%, depending on the 
country (Solar Dynamics 2010). Barbadian solar water heater manufacturers are 
already creating the conditions that will allow them to meet this market demand. 
Strengthening current regional frameworks for renewable energy could help to 
create the enabling environment. This could be achieved, for example, through the 
Caribbean Renewable Energy Development Programme launched in 1998 by the 
Caribbean Community and UNDP (Schwerin 2010). Furthermore, solar water 
heater use could be extended beyond the domestic use, which would scale up the 
use of solar energy in Barbados.
Similarly, the Sustainable Urban Development initiative in Curitiba could be 
extended to other cities. The launch of an ambitious initiative beyond the borders of 
Curitiba that integrates the social, environmental and economic aspects will enable 
a lasting progress and will prevent development disparities within the region.
Since 2014, all four initiatives have growth, matured and served as a model for 
other countries. For instance, the Payments for Environmental Services pioneered 
by Costa Rica has become particularly common in Latin America, embraced by 
countries like Mexico, Colombia and Chile. More than 20 water protection funds 
have seen the light in Latin America countries. They are organized under the ‘The 
Latin American Alliance of Water Funds’.5 The solar water heater experience of 
Barbados has been expanded to the other Caribbean countries which are providing 
incentives to promote renewable energy such as Jamaica in building its own wind 
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development and Dominica have all sought to develop geothermal energy proj-
ects (The Guardian, 2015). Sustainable Urban Development continues in Curitiba 
where a new Land Zoning, Use and Occupation Law was adopted late 2019 which 
will guide the future development of the city for the next 10 years with the support 
of several public–private programmes.6
Conclusion
The main objective of this research is to measure the environmental, social and 
economic performance of environmental initiatives that have been touted as green 
economy success stories by diverse international organizations, including UNEP. 
The chapter assessed in detail four policies that are currently being implemented 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, covering four sectors (forests, freshwater, 
renewable technologies and cities). We propose a methodological framework that 
includes evidence-based criteria and a grading system built on existing indicators. In 
addition, the study analyses the enabling conditions that favoured the development 
of the initiatives, the ways in which they are operated and financed and the main 
challenges and opportunities for further improvement and strengthening. The 
application of our method to the four case studies revealed the following conclusions.
First, despite the fact that the environmental initiatives assessed are catalysing 
the transition from a business as usual development pathway to one that is more 
resource efficient and socially inclusive, not all fulfil the criteria of green economy 
policies. The PES scheme for forest protection in Costa Rica and the Sustainable 
Urban Development initiative in Curitiba, Brazil can clearly be considered ‘green 
economy success stories’, as they show good performance for the three pillars of 
sustainable development. These initiatives are closely followed by the solar water 
heater initiative in Barbados, which obtains good economic and environmental 
performance. However, the initiative receives a medium grade on social equity, as the 
programme does not yet guarantee full social inclusion (particularly as it excludes 
lower-income households from its potential benefits). FONAG, in Ecuador, is far 
from reaching the criteria of a green economy policy because there is no reliable 
evidence regarding the positive impact of upstream watershed management on the 
availability and quality of Quito’s water resources. The way that the fund operates 
does not guarantee that programmes and projects will enhance social inclusion, and 
it is not clear that this initiative is contributing to the protected area’s economic 
development.
Second, despite the fact that the enabling conditions that promoted the initia-
tives differed, some key elements for policy-making can be identified: the establish-
ment of sound regulatory frameworks, the full engagement of local leaders and the 
success of employing public funds to leverage private investments for addressing 
environmental issues.
Third, the analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and opportunities of 
these environmental initiatives shows that the strengths of the policies are as diverse 
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as the policies themselves (e.g. flexibility on both obtaining funding and adapting 
over time in FONAFIFO, political and finance stability in FONAG, the appropriate 
mix of fiscal measures in Barbados and the implementation of a coherent approach 
in Curitiba). All policies present weaknesses that must be addressed in order to 
improve their effectiveness and likelihood of long-term sustainability (e.g. transac-
tion costs are still high for landholders in the PES scheme in Costa Rica, free-riding 
problems in FONAG, economic barriers for customers in Barbados and population 
growth in Curitiba). The main challenge faced by the policies is a lack of funding.
Fourth, despite the progress made since the first edition of this chapter (2014) in 
the development of measurements frameworks for assessing green economy progress 
and performance, the approach presented in this chapter remains valid for assessing 
specific green economy initiatives, in spite of their geographical diversity. Alternative 
methodologies developed so far have a national or sub-national scope, preventing 
the evaluation of the impacts of single initiatives and policies. Furthermore, the 
evidence-based criteria and a grading system are relevant to assess how the green 
economy initiatives are contributing to the SDGs.
Finally, we recognize that this research has two main caveats. First, for the 
assessment of the initiatives, we have relied on the accuracy of previous studies, 
studies that were not all peer-reviewed papers. Furthermore, the sample of 
policies may not be enough to draw general conclusions. In order to overcome 
these drawbacks, we recommend enlarging the number of initiative assessments 
and following a participatory approach with key stakeholders involved in their 
development and operation.
Notes
 1 Some of these methodologies have been adapted to a sub-national level such as the Green 
Economy Progress Index, which has been used to measure Green Industry Progress in 18 
Chinese Provinces (PAGE, 2019).
 2 We based our choice on the set of indicators to assess environmental sustainability both 
in natural capital and in economic sectors proposed by the OECD (2011), which is pres-
ently the most complete and practical.
 3 An important impact variable that is missing from this listing is governance. However, 
to the extent that good governance is required to achieve many impacts related to social 
equity, we assume that presence of good governance is necessary and implicit in the 
indicators we have laid out. Most indicators are criticized because they ignore enabling 
conditions and changes in the baseline contextual conditions.
 4 FONAFIFO was established under the Payments for Environmental Services programme, 
by Forestry Law 7575 of 1997.
 5 More information about ‘The Latin American Alliance of Water Funds’ is available at 
https://www.fondosdeagua.org/es/que-es-la-alianza/, last accessed 20 January 2020.
 6 Additional information about recent development of Curitiba’s urban planning is avail-
able at https://www.curitiba.pr.gov.br/noticias/prefeito-sanciona-a-nova-lei-de-zonea-
mento-uso-e-ocupacao-do-solo-de-curitiba/53099, last accessed 20 January 2020.
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Over the past two decades there has been growing recognition of the transboundary 
nature of aquifers – systems that cross the borders of at least two countries – and a 
corresponding increase in international support for managing these complex sys-
tems. This chapter considers these shared groundwater resources within the broader, 
global context of potable water supplies and intensifying water stresses. The chapter 
notes the legal and development assistance frameworks for international support to 
developing countries on transboundary aquifer issues and examines a subset of five 
transboundary aquifer projects implemented with Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) support. Evaluative evidence from these projects is used to highlight com-
mon issues and lessons for consideration in future transboundary aquifer projects.
Significance of transboundary aquifers
Water scarcity1 is adding to the difficulties of supplying potable water to poor per-
sons; increasing demand and shifting weather patterns are exacerbating these dif-
ficulties. UN-Water notes that
around 1.2 billion people or almost one-fifth of the world’s population, live in 
areas of physical scarcity, and 500 million people are approaching this situation. 
Another 1.6 billion people, or almost one quarter of the world’s population, 
face economic water shortage (where countries lack the necessary infrastruc-
ture to take water from rivers and aquifers). (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization [UN-Water, FAO 2007: 4)
By 2025, water shortages are forecast to broaden, with as many as 1.8 billion people 
living in areas with absolute water scarcity and two thirds of the world’s population 
living under water-stressed conditions (UNESCO 2012).
266 Alan Fox
The confluence of poverty and water scarcity exacts a heavy toll. The ‘water poor’ 
in water-stressed areas face persistent threats to their livelihoods due to hydrologic 
extremes. Excess pumping results in greater drawdowns, which increases energy 
costs to the poor. Persons forced to travel long distances to secure potable water 
face security risks and lose educational opportunities. There are elevated health 
risks from living in areas with high levels of water-associated diseases (e.g. bilharzia, 
cholera, guinea worm, malaria, trachoma, typhoid) (Puri and Aureli 2005).
Facing acute and growing water shortages, societies must consider all potential 
sources, and groundwater is an obvious choice where available. Aquifers contain 
almost 96% of the useable freshwater on earth (excepting freshwater locked up as 
ice; UNESCO 2012). Aquifers account for more than 70% of the water used in the 
European Union and are often one of the only sources – if not the only source – in 
arid and semi-arid zones. For example, aquifers account for 100% of water in Malta, 
95% in Tunisia and 75% in Morocco (UNESCO 2012). Globally, 67% of ground-
water is devoted to irrigation, 22% for domestic purposes and 11% for industry 
(Margat 2008; Integrated Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre [IGRAC] 
2009; Siebert et al. 2010; Aquastat 2011; Eurostat 2013).
Aquifers underlying arid areas are typically (and logically) slow to recharge, and 
consequently are susceptible to rapid depletion. An analysis of global groundwa-
ter use and availability in six major aquifer systems (North Arabian, North China 
Plain, Persian, Upper Ganges, U.S. High Plains and western Mexico) found that all 
showed signs of acute overuse, that some recharge rates were inadequate to match 
withdrawals and that water tables were lowering precipitously (Gleeson et al. 2012). 
Some aquifers barely recharge at all. ‘Fossil’ aquifers, such as the Ogallala in the 
Midwest United States, the Sana’a Basin in Yemen and the vast Nubian aquifer sys-
tem underlying parts of Chad, Egypt, Libya and Sudan are isolated from the streams 
that once fed them (Gleeson et al. 2012). In such systems, extraction equals deple-
tion – the resource is non-renewable.
Most large aquifers are transboundary. The UNESCO–International Hydrological 
Programme has identified 273 transboundary aquifers in the world, which is roughly 
equal to the number of transboundary river basins: 68 transboundary aquifers are on 
the American continent, 38 in Africa, 65 in Eastern Europe, 90 in Western Europe 
and 12 in Asia. One hundred and sixty-six of these transboundary aquifer systems 
are larger than 5,000 square kilometers (GEF IEO 2018). At least 40% of the world’s 
population resides in areas underlain by transboundary aquifers (IGRAC 2009).
International community engagement
International law and conventions
There are no binding international agreements setting out how governments should 
cooperate in managing transboundary aquifer systems. This reflects the very limited 
international legal structures for shared waters as a whole. Efforts to build a stronger 
legal basis include two UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions. The first, passed 
in July 2010, recognizes ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation 
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as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’ 
(UNGA 2010: 2) The second, a nonbinding resolution adopted by consensus at 
the General Assembly in December 2011, seeks to establish a law of Transboundary 
Aquifers (UNGA 2011). The resolution builds from the International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (2008), which 
were formally annexed to the UNGA resolution. The resolution encourages states 
concerned ‘to make appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for the proper 
management of their transboundary aquifers’, including cooperation among states to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of shared aquifers. Under this resolution, states 
are invited to consider the draft articles as a basis for the elaboration of a conven-
tion. The Law of Transboundary Waters has repeatedly come up for discussion in the 
General Assembly sixth committee; however, it has not progressed further, with some 
member states contending that bilateral and regional arrangements and agreements 
are more appropriate for addressing transboundary aquifer management issues.
Regionally, the body of transboundary aquifer legislation, treaties and other 
obligations is quite limited. This is not just a developing country phenomenon. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
also generally lack formal treaties on aquifer management. For example, 36 aquifers 
have been identified as straddling the U.S.–Mexico border, many of which pro-
vide drinking water to large local populations. The need for a groundwater treaty 
between the two countries has been discussed and acknowledged as far back as 
1973, through the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC 1973); 
yet the U.S. and Mexican governments have never signed an agreement or estab-
lished guidance on how these systems should be managed (Eckstein 2011).
Official financial flows and international support for water and sanitation
International finance in the water and sanitation sector constitutes one of the largest 
areas of development assistance. Official financial flows in the water and sanitation 
sector have averaged 5% annual increases over the last decade, reaching US $14.3 
billion in 2014–2015. Official development aid during this period was $8.2 billion, 
58% of the total. Other official flows have averaged 13% increase per year since 
2006–2007, and amount to $6 billion. In total annual aid commitments for all offi-
cial donors (OECD), Germany (1.67 $billion) and Japan (1.1 $billion) are the largest 
donors in the sector. Low-income countries received 22% of total aid in the sector, 
closely matching the regional breakdown of 21% going to sub-Saharan Africa.
UN and multilateral agency attention to groundwater 
and aquifer management
In 1997, the International Association of Hydrologists established a Commission 
on Transboundary Aquifer Resources Management, coincidental to the adop-
tion of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention). In 2000, the UNESCO 
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Intergovernmental Council at its 14th session approved joint activities on trans-
boundary aquifer issues among the International Association of Hydrologists, 
the UNESCO International Hydrology Programme, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization and the UN Economic Commission for Europe. This joint effort 
produced a framework document on Internationally Shared Aquifer Resource 
Management. Subsequently, the programme has grown to include regional initia-
tives in the Americas, the Balkans and Europe (Puri & Aureli 2005).
The International Atomic Energy Agency fills an important technical niche in 
the effort to better manage transboundary aquifers. Agency experts use isotope 
 science to determine the origin, age and renewal rate of groundwater and whether 
aquifers face contamination risks. Isotope techniques are particularly useful for map-
ping slow-recharge and non-renewable groundwater resources, which are at risk of 
rapid depletion if not managed carefully. The Agency has worked to model, charac-
terize and monitor transboundary aquifer systems for a series of projects in Africa, 
Asia, Europe and Latin America, including the Nubian, North-western Sahara and 
Iullemeden Aquifer systems of Northern Africa and the Guaraní Aquifer in South 
America (International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] 2013).
The global environment facility
GEF was launched as a pilot effort in 1991 and broadened into a major global 
programme in 1994 (GEF 2013). The GEF brings 183 countries together with 
international institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector in order 
to address global environmental issues and support national sustainable development 
initiatives. GEF is an independently operating financial organization that provides 
grants for projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land 
degradation, the ozone layer and persistent organic pollutants (GEF 2013). GEF 
takes a multi-level approach in the international waters sector, providing support for 
global actions and conventions, regional (catchment) analysis and action planning, 
and support at national and local levels. By design, GEF is focused on achieving 
global environmental benefits, and its international waters portfolio covers nearly 
all large freshwater catchments globally, with 156 GEF recipient countries and 24 
non-recipient countries cooperating on transboundary water resource management 
(GEF 2020).
Transboundary groundwater and aquifers were added to GEF programming 
during the 2nd fund replenishment (GEF-2), and now include 19 projects. Of these, 
all but two are focused on specific transboundary aquifers. Eight of the projects have 
been completed, using $27.83 million in GEF trust fund grants and an estimated 
$25.58 million in co-finance. The 11 with concepts or projects approved bring the 
total anticipated GEF trust fund commitment to $83.84 million, with an estimated 
$1.28 billion in anticipated cofinancing. Eight of the recently approved projects 
build from previous GEF transboundary aquifer projects (Guarani, Dinaric Karst, 
Nile Basin, Nubian Sandstone, Iullemeden Aquifer, SADC Groundwater, Nile 
Basin, Northwest Sahara).
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The overriding development objective for most GEF transboundary aquifer 
projects is to help beneficiary countries jointly elaborate and implement a com-
mon institutional and technical framework for the management and preservation 
of the aquifer. The typical programme of support emulates the two-phase process 
developed and honed in the GEF International Water surface water programme: a 
transboundary diagnostic analysis is carried out to determine aquifer pressures and 
measures (Uitto 2004; Pernetta & Bewers 2012), then a Strategic Action Programme 
is drafted for partnering countries to agree on concrete actions designed to mitigate 
threats and protect the shared groundwater resource (Uitto 2004). Support is also 
provided for enhancing institutional capacities to manage groundwater and reduce 
pollutant risks. In addition, stakeholder awareness efforts are launched to change 
local perceptions in order to enable better groundwater management.
Evaluating GEF transboundary aquifer projects
For this analysis, five of the GEF transboundary aquifer projects that have been 
evaluated at project completion are presented: 1) The Iullemeden Aquifer System 
(Mali, Niger and Nigeria), 2) Northwest Sahara (Algeria, Libya and Tunisia); (3) 
Guaraní Aquifer (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay); (4) Dinaric Karst 
Aquifer System (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro); and (5) 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Groundwater and Drought 
Management Project (covering 15 countries in Southern Africa and spanning 14 
major transboundary aquifers).
The following is a brief explanation of each project and select evaluation findings.
Iullemeden aquifer system
The Iullemeden Aquifer System underlies Mali, Niger and Nigeria. These countries 
and the United Nations Environment Programme implemented a GEF-financed 
project from 2003 to 2007 (GEF provided $1 million of the $1.7 million project 
budget). The project was designed to establish joint mechanisms to identify risks and 
uncertainties relating to land use, climate change, extraction and other key drivers 
that could have an impact on the quality and quantity of water in the aquifer. The 
project was also expected to develop mechanisms to formulate policies for manag-
ing identified risks and uncertainties, and then to establish a legal and institutional 
cooperative framework among the three countries to address these risks (Hearns 
2009).
An evaluation of the project was carried out in January 2009, taking into account 
the project’s achievements beyond its June 2008 termination to include residual 
achievements through November 2008 (Hearns 2009). The evaluation methodol-
ogy included interviews, site visits and a desk review of pertinent documents. In 
keeping with GEF evaluation guidance, the questions focused attention on a range 
of project design, implementation and outcome aspects (including efficiency, effec-
tiveness and sustainability), the achievement of planned outputs and activities, the 
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catalytic role played by the project, the monitoring and evaluation systems used and 
the extent of engagement with stakeholders.
The evaluation rated the project satisfactory across most of the evaluation crite-
ria. The evaluator noted in particular that there was good cooperation at the techni-
cal level, especially in the transfer of information and data, and good cooperation in 
the effort to identifying risks to the groundwater resource through a transboundary 
diagnostic analysis. The project was slow in getting started, requiring 18 months for 
the project team to get up and running (Hearns 2009). On the positive side, the 
countries then formed a tripartite steering committee supported by a technical and 
scientific committee. The evaluator noted a continuing need to provide support to 
the countries in order to maintain the momentum of the project’s outcomes. In 
particular, the evaluation report highlighted the importance of reaching agreement 
among the countries to develop and implement measures to minimize the risks of 
pollution and excessive drawdown of the aquifer and to organize for future close 
cooperation through a suitable regional institution (either an existing institution or 
one newly configured for this purpose). Another notable recommendation was to 
extend the hydrology analysis work to better clarify interactions between surface 
water and groundwater (Hearns 2009).
A follow on project has been approved, in January 2018, entitled: Improving 
IWRM, Knowledge-based Management and Governance of the Niger Basin and 
the Iullemeden-Taoudeni/Tanezrouft Aquifer System (NB-ITTAS). The new 
project is designed to build on previously separate surface and groundwater projects, 
integrating their strategic action plan implementation.
Northwest Sahara
The Northwest Sahara Aquifer System underlies Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. It is 
considered a non-renewable water source, as most of the area has virtually non-
existent precipitation and there is no significant surface/ground water mixing. From 
2003 to 2006, the three beneficiary countries and the United Nations Environment 
Programme implemented a GEF project as the second of a two-phase project, using 
$600,000 in GEF funding and an additional $816,000 in co-financing. The project 
design included expanding the use of a previously developed multi-layer math-
ematical model for the aquifer system in order to determine the water balance and 
to identify risks to the aquifer (e.g. excessive water pumping depths, drying up of 
the Tunisian outlet and salinization). The project also called for developing a water-
quality monitoring network, conducting studies to determine water demand and 
for carrying out water cost analysis (Puyoo 2007).
An evaluation of the project was conducted in March 2007 and included inter-
views, site visits and a document review (Puyoo 2007). According to the evalua-
tors, there were significant delays in getting the project started and it encountered 
difficulties in achieving planned outcomes. The planned water-quality monitoring 
network was not established, and a water-costing analysis was not done. More suc-
cessfully, a synthesis of environmental impacts connected with exploitation of the 
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aquifer was carried out and an action plan was proposed. Further, the project inven-
toried wetlands and developed reports on the causes and distribution of salty-soil 
zones. A permanent consultation mechanism was successfully put in place, signed by 
the three country ministers of water.
A follow up project was carried out for the North West Sahara Aquifer System, 
entitled: Reducing Risks to the Sustainable Management of the North West Sahara 
Aquifer System (NWSAS). The project was approved in 2009 and closed in 2018. It 
sought to address risks associated with unsustainable exploitation and management 
of groundwater resources in the NWSAS, to formulate and initially implement 
a set of actions, focusing on sustainable agricultural practices and environmental 
management. The project was structured around five linked components: (1) 
Socio-economic surveys; (2) Pilot demonstration projects; (3) Development of 
databases and GIS; (4) Support for a regional consultation mechanism; and (5) 
Project management. A terminal evaluation of the project in 2015, indicating that 
the planned socioeconomic surveys, databases and pilot demonstration projects 
were carried out as intended, with one pilot moved from Libya to Tunisia due to 
political instability. The Regional Consultation Mechanism expectations were less 
successful, with weaknesses in the set up and support provided to this mechanism. 
The evaluation notes that the likelihood of long-term impact achievement is not 
very high, due to the political climate in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, with water 
resource management issues not high on the ledger of national priorities.
Guaraní aquifer
The Guaraní Aquifer underlies Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. One of the 
world’s largest aquifer systems; its current water storage is estimated at 37,000 cubic 
kilometres, and it has an estimated natural recharge rate of 166 cubic kilometres per 
year. 24 million persons live within the aquifer boundary area and another 70 mil-
lion access it through water diversions (Erickson & Rogers 2006).
In 2000, the countries sharing the Guaraní aquifer launched the Environmental 
Protection and Sustainable Development of the Guaraní Aquifer Systems Project. 
The overall focus of the project was to support the partnering countries to elabo-
rate and implement a common institutional and technical framework for the man-
agement and preservation of the aquifer. GEF contributed $13.4 million and the 
partner countries equally contributed an additional $12 million, with small con-
tributions from other donors. More than 80 percent of the project’s $26.8 mil-
lion budget was allocated to research, analysis, dissemination and management. The 
project was implemented by the World Bank; the Organization of American States 
handled day-to-day management as executing agency (Erickson & Rogers 2006).
An evaluation of the Project was carried out in 2006. The evaluation notes that 
the participating countries made progress on a number of sub-objectives, yet were 
far from achieving their overall goals. In particular, the evaluation noted significant 
delays in developing a transboundary diagnostic analysis and a strategic action plan 
for the aquifer, serious delays in launching technical studies on the chemical, physical 
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and dynamic aspects of the aquifer system, and delays in establishing a monitoring 
and information system. The project was extended by 22 months and came in 20% 
over budget (Erickson & Rogers 2006).
A new GEF project for the Guarani has been approved in concept, entitled: 
Implementation of the Guarani Aquifer Strategic Action Program: Enabling 
Regional Actions.
Dinaric Karst aquifer system
The Protection and Sustainable Use of the Dinaric Karst Transboundary Aquifer 
System Project (DIKTAS) was a cooperative effort by the countries of Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, executed by UNESCO, with 
UNDP as the implementing agency, and the International Groundwater Resource 
Assessment Centre (IGRAC) as another involved partner. The project began in May 
2010 and operational closure was in May 2015. The $5.6 million project included a 
$2.16 million GEF grant, plus $3.4 million in co-financing from the involved gov-
ernments and other sources. The Dinaric Karst aquifer system is one of the largest 
karstic geological aquifers in the world, and underlies the Dinaric mountain range.
DIKTAS was designed to help the cooperating countries establish and implement 
sustainable development models, including harmonized land use policies and physi-
cal planning, conceptual frameworks for balancing water resource demand, avoiding 
over-extraction and coping with strong seasonal variability of water resource usage; 
and accounting for the impact of wider systemic issues such as population growth 
and climate change. The project utilized the TDA-SAP process that typifies GEF 
international waters programming, moving from a transboundary diagnostic analysis 
to a strategic action plan for addressing risks and pressures to the water body.
The evaluation of DIKTAS indicated an overall moderately satisfactory assess-
ment of project outcomes, noting high relevance, satisfactory efficiency and mod-
erately satisfactory effectiveness and likelihood of sustainability. As can be seen in 
many of the GEF IW projects, and in particular for transboundary aquifers, the first 
step of the process – to diagnose the uses and threats to water systems – tends to 
move slowly yet successfully, but the projects then have serious difficulties in achiev-
ing binding agreement across the countries on actions they will take to protect the 
resource (Komitina 2016).
In the case of DIKTAS, a Strategic Action Plan was not signed by the countries 
by project end, and the envisioned consultation and information exchange body 
(CIE) was not created. A follow on study was recommended by the evaluation, in 
order to continue working towards an approved SAP and CIE. Other recommen-
dations were to establish a joint monitoring programme, improve awareness raising 
and capacity building and consider enlarging the cooperation to include also Serbia 
and North Macedonia. This recommendation has led to the approval, in concept, of 
a $5.145 million GEF grant for a follow on project entitled: Implementation of the 
SAP of the Dinaric Karst Aquifer System: Improving Groundwater Governance and 
Sustainability of Related Ecosystems.
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Southern African development community groundwater and drought 
management project
The SADC Groundwater and Drought Management Project covered 15 countries 
of southern Africa with 14 major transboundary groundwater aquifer systems.2 The 
aim of the project was to develop a consensus on a SADC strategic approach to 
support and enhance the capacity of its member states in defining drought manage-
ment policies, specifically in relation to the role, availability and supply of potential 
groundwater resources. The project provided a $7 million grant to SADC for a 
project implemented by the World Bank and executed by the SADC Secretariat 
Water Division, with support from United Nations Office for Project Services. The 
project had four components:
 1) Development and testing of a groundwater drought and management plan for 
the Limpopo River Basin pilot areas;
 2) Support for regional groundwater drought management;
 3) Establishment of the groundwater institute of Southern Africa; and
 4) Project management and administration.
The Implementation Completion and Results Report on the project, dated 31 
October 2011 (World Bank 2011), generally noted success in raising awareness on the 
value of protecting groundwater resources in southern Africa. The Report also noted 
that the project succeeded in providing ‘increased access to groundwater information 
to facilitate sound technical decisions by policy makers’ (World Bank 2011: 27).
The project had a measure of success in strengthening regional coordination 
through the regional monitoring network, although efforts to more fully engage 
SADC countries who were not part of the pilot effort would have been useful, as 
many need assistance to upgrade their data on groundwater resources. Poor data had 
an impact on the quality of the regional drought and management maps created 
through the project. The authors of the Completion and Results Report concluded 
that the project was too ambitious given the complexity of the issue and region and 
should have had fewer project components. Results were weighed down by the long 
delay – 18 months – in getting the project started. The project ended prior to achiev-
ing discernible impacts in terms of reduced stress on groundwater resources and bet-
ter capacity of the SADC countries to manage future droughts (World Bank 2011).
A follow-on project, using $8.2 million in GEF grant funding, has been approved, 
entitled: Sustainable Groundwater Management in SADC Member States. The 
project was approved for finding in March 2014 and is under implementation by 
the World Bank.
Future considerations for transboundary aquifer projects
The transboundary aquifer project evaluations discussed here provide evidence of 
an evolving international support effort spearheaded by the GEF and its imple-
menting agencies. It is not an exhaustive study of the results of international support 
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to transboundary aquifer management, yet the findings from the evaluations of these 
projects raise important issues and lessons for future effort to protect these critical 
water resources.
The five transboundary aquifers considered have all demonstrated success build-
ing greater awareness of groundwater system boundaries, extraction rates and pollu-
tion risks. The projects have also helped raise international awareness of the presence 
and importance of transboundary aquifers and have helped to enhance govern-
ments’ capacities to determine risks to groundwater systems. Over an extended 
period of time, and including follow on projects, the transboundary aquifer projects 
have also achieved legally binding agreements (Northwest Sahara and Nubian) or 
are close to achieving agreement (Guarani, Iullemeden) on strategies and action 
plans aimed at reducing pollution and excessive drawdown risks.
There is a clear progression in the sequencing of these aquifer projects, with 
medium size projects (under $2 million in grant funding), used to establish the 
transboundary diagnostic analysis and draft Strategic Action Plan, being followed 
by a larger SAP-approval and implementation project. This progression has become 
a hallmark of the GEF International Waters programme, including also for fresh 
surface waters and coastal marine systems. This recognizes the tendency for the 
portion of the project focused on transboundary diagnostic analysis to dominate 
most of the initial project period. Most of the projects have required a year or more 
extension to complete, and the use of ‘no-cost’ extensions is common. This suggests 
the need for more realistic project outcome expectations, longer timeframes for 
project implementation and a push for greater commitment from participating 
governments to start earlier on the difficult negotiations to achieve SAP agreements.
GEF transboundary aquifer projects typically call for the creation of joint com-
mittees among the countries involved. This mirrors the approach taken in GEF 
transboundary surface-water projects. The formation of self-standing transboundary 
aquifer commissions is a slow and difficult process, and those that do form tend to 
lack the power and capacity to influence national land and water use laws. Many 
remain viable only so long as international financial support continues.
While technical training in groundwater assessment and awareness-raising ini-
tiatives are helpful, many developing countries face significant practical operational 
difficulties that limit their ability to carry out conservation and protection mea-
sures for aquifers at the national and local levels. Many need to improve use and 
efficiency and reduce pumping in transboundary aquifers through regulatory and 
fiscal policy changes and through improved water resource management. Although 
some attention has been paid to resource substitution and augmentation, this area 
needs increased support. Ultimately, water-scarce nations will need to greatly 
expand the use of grey water and brackish water for non-potable uses and expand 
their access to resources through desalination, artificial recharge,3 conjunctive use 
of groundwater and surface water and the use of aquifers for surface water storage 
(Galloway et al. 2003).
These projects have yet to achieve systemic changes in water and land use poli-
cies and, ultimately, reductions in environmental stresses and pollution risks. There 
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is an assumption that participating countries will act on policy and management 
recommendations from the project and agreed to in strategic action programmes. 
Conflicting use demands among actors within each country often stand in the way 
of such actions. Results from the aquifer projects highlight the difficulty in forging 
political agreements on complex resource sharing arrangements, where it may take 
decades before positive environmental impacts can be discerned.
This review of the results of GEF transboundary aquifer projects also points to 
the need for greater attention to the equitable use of groundwater resources. It is the 
poor and disenfranchised who suffer the most when water is scarce, yet few of the 
transboundary aquifer projects focused attention on access rights and equitable allo-
cations. Of the five evaluated projects, only the SADC Groundwater and Drought 
Management Project focused specific attention on communities at risk (female-led 
households, landless labourers, pastoralists and displaced persons; World Bank 2011). 
Each of the seven pilot drought and groundwater management studies in the SADC 
project focused on communities at risk as the prime beneficiaries. As water scarcity 
becomes more acute in many regions, due to increasing consumption coupled with 
climate change-impacted variability, it will be important for transboundary aquifer 
projects to pay greater attention to the equity aspects of groundwater access.
Notes
 1 ‘Water scarcity is defined as the point at which the aggregate impact of all users impinges 
on the supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional arrangements to the 
extent that the demand by all sectors, including the environment, cannot be satisfied fully’ 
(UN Water and FAO 2007: 4).
 2 The SADC countries are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
 3 Artificial recharge involves enhancing natural infiltration into ground-water systems by 
using spreading basins, recharge wells and induced infiltration of surface water.
References
Aquastat, Online Database, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2011 
available at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/index.html, last accessed 
September 23 2011.
Eckstein, G. E., ‘Buried treasure or buried hope? The status of Mexico–US transboundary 
aquifers under international law’, International Community Law Review, 13: 273–290, 2011.
Erickson J. and P. Rogers, ‘An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Support of Regional 
Programs’, Case study of the Guaraní Aquifer Project, World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group, Washington, DC, 2006.
Eurostat, Online Database, Brussels, European Commission, 2013 available at http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/, last accessed September 26 
2013.
Galloway, D. et al. ‘Evolving issues and practices in managing ground-water resources: Case studies and 
the role of science, US Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey, Circular 1247, 
2003.
276 Alan Fox
Gleeson, T., Y. Wada, M. Bierkens, and L. van Beek, ’Water balance of global aquifers revealed 
by groundwater footprint’, Nature, 488 (9 August): 197–200, 2012.
Global Environment Facility (GEF), What is the GEF, 2013, http://www.thegef.org/gef/
whatisgef, accessed May 8 2013.
GEF, International waters, 2013, http://www.thegef.org/gef/International_Waters, accessed 
May 8 2013.
GEF, Independent Evaluation Office, International Waters Focal Area Study, October 2018
GEF International Waters, April 2020, https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/gef_international_waters_2020_04.pdf
Hearns, G., ‘Terminal Evaluation of UNEP/GEF Project GF/1030–03–06 (4728) Managing 
Hydrogeological Risk in the Iullemeden Aquifer System (IAS)’, Evaluation and Oversight Unit 
United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, January 2009.
Integrated Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre (IGRAC), ‘Transboundary aquifers map 
of the world – update 2009’, 2009, available at http://www.un-igrac.org/publications/320
IAEA, UNDP and Governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Libya, Republic of the 
Sudan and Republic of Chad, ‘Regional strategic action programme for the Nubian Aquifer 
System’, 18 September 2013, available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressre-
leases/2013/sap180913.pdf, accessed May 10 2013.
IBWC Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973, Mexico-United States, 24 U.S.T. 1971, T.I.A.S .No. 
7708.
Komitina, D., Terminal Evaluation of the GEF/UNDP MSP project ‘Protection and 
Sustainable Use of the Dinaric Karst Aquifer System’ (DIKTAS) [PIMS No. 4056, ATLAS 
59453] January 2016.
Margat, J., Les Eaux Souterraines dans le Monde, BRGM Editions, United Nations Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, Paris, 2008.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC), ‘Financing water and sanitation in developing countries: The contri-
bution of external aid’, June 2010, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/45902160.
pdf, accessed June 2 2013.
Pernetta J. and J.M. Bewers, ‘Transboundary diagnostic analysis in international waters inter-
ventions funded by the gobal environment facility’, Oceans and Coastal Management, 55 
(January): 1–12, 2012.
Puri, S. and A. Aureli, ‘Transboundary aquifers: A global program to assess, evaluate, and 
develop policy’, Ground Water, 43 (5): 661–668, 2005.
Puyoo S., ‘Terminal evaluation of the UNEP/Swiss/FFEM Project “Protection of the North West 
Sahara Aquifer System (NWSAS) and Related Humid Zones and Ecosystems, Project Number: 
GF/2010–03–06”, Evaluation and Oversight Unit, United Nations Environment 
Programme, Nairobi, September 2007.
Siebert, S. et al., ‘Groundwater use for irrigation – a global inventory’, Hydrology and Earth 
System Sciences, 14: 1863–1880, 2010.
Uitto, J. I., ‘Multi-country cooperation around shared waters: Role of monitoring and evalu-
ation’, Global Environmental Change, 14: 5–14, 2004.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Managing 
water under uncertainty and risk: The United Nations world water development report, United 
Nations World Water Assessment Programme (UN-Water), Paris, March 2012, available at 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml
Evaluating international support 277
UNESCO, ‘UN General Assembly adopts resolution on the law of transboundary aquifers’, news 
article, available at http://www.unesco.org/water/news/transboundary_aquifers.shtml, 
accessed May 18 2013.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 28 
July 2010 on The human right to water and sanitation (A/RES/66/104), 2010 available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/292
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), ‘Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 
9 December 2011 [on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/66/477)], 66/104. The Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers (Agenda Item 85)’, 13 January 2012, available at http://www.un.org/
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=%20A/RES/66/104.
UNGA, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 28 July 2010 [without reference to a 
Main Committee (A/64/L.63/Rev.1 and Add.1)], 64/292. The Human Right to Water and 
Sanitation’ (Agenda Item 48), 3 August 2010.
United Nations Water (UN Water) and Food and A (FAO) ‘Coping with water scarcity. Challenge 
of the twenty-first century’ 2007 available at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/docs/escarcity.
pdf
World Bank, ‘Implementation completion and results report (TF-55090) on a grant from the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) trust fund in the amount of $7 million to the Southern African 
Development Community for a Groundwater and Drought Management Project through the World 
Bank as implementing agency’, 31 October 2011.
15




Frequent natural disasters severely impact poorer sections of the population and 
exacerbate socio-economic vulnerabilities and reversing development gains. Over 
the past decade, more than 1.5 billion people have been affected by disasters that 
have cost at least US$ 1.3 trillion – and disasters have compounded existing prob-
lems of poverty and inequality and have reversed development gains. Overall losses 
from natural disasters in 2019 came to US$ 150 Billion.1 According to the Sendai 
Monitor, while there is a marginal decrease in the number of people affected in 
2019, there is an increase in the human loss as well as economic cost attributed to 
disasters in relation to global gross domestic product.2 These numbers are only the 
tip of the iceberg, as they are comprised of estimates of the replacement value of 
the physical infrastructure damaged or lost; the systemic impacts on human devel-
opment are much larger. Progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) is challenged in many countries by losses from disasters triggered by 
natural hazards. Even in regions where a comparatively smaller number of disasters 
have occurred, the economic impact has been significant. Countries with medium 
to low levels of income and weaker governance have been particularly vulner-
able. Reducing disaster risk is therefore critical to poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. Although government mechanisms and systems to respond to disas-
ters are critical, resilience to disaster risk must be integral to development planning 
processes.
Drawing on the evaluations of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), programme at the global and national level carried out by the Independent 
Evaluation Office of UNDP, this chapter revisits the disaster risk reduction efforts, 
progress and challenges since the adoption of the SDGs and Sendai Framework 
and discusses UNDP’s contributions at the national level.3 This chapter examines 
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integrated approaches to addressing disaster risk and vulnerability reduction in devel-
opment programming. The chapter draws on the country programme evaluations 
as well as the conclusions and lessons based on the global “Evaluation of UNDP 
Support to Poverty Reduction in the Least Developed Countries,” “Evaluation of 
UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery.”4 These evaluations 
paid particular attention to the challenges posed by climate change in increasing 
natural hazards and the need for a more coordinated approach to adaptation. After a 
brief introduction, this chapter discusses how national governments and the inter-
national community have attempted to respond to these challenges. This is followed 
by the section on the approach and methodology used by the evaluations, followed 
by a discussion of the UNDP programme. The findings section analyses UNDPs 
contribution to disaster risk reduction, enabling linkages to poverty reduction and 
climate change adaptation and addressing multiple crises. The last section presents 
conclusions and selected recommendations that are relevant to other agencies and 
governments working in the area.
Poverty, vulnerability and disaster risk
Losses from disasters that are triggered by natural hazards significantly reverse devel-
opment gains in many countries.5 The economic cost of disasters on development 
interventions and human development varies widely. Several studies and assessments 
have established that disasters heavily affect the poor in developing countries and 
that disaster risk is fundamentally associated with poverty levels.6 The adverse effects 
of disasters on social investments, particularly in health and education, and invest-
ments that provide employment and income are considerable. Besides short-term 
effects such as direct economic losses, disasters affect long-term human develop-
ment and human security.
The low resilience of the poor is further undermined by weak or absent social-
protection measures and the low prevalence of disaster insurance in most countries. 
While urban and rural areas are equally affected by disasters, poverty translates into 
disaster risk because of the vulnerability of rural livelihoods.7 The diversity in the 
structure of rural societies and economies and their interactions with the environ-
ment make livelihoods more susceptible to disasters. Another factor that increases 
risks from natural disasters in poor rural areas is the lack of safe housing, infrastruc-
ture and public services (UNDP 2004; United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction [UNISDR] 2009a; UNDP 2015). The key vulnerability factors 
that contribute to mortality risk are low GDP per capita and remoteness of location.
Annual exposure to GDP losses is high for cyclones and storms of medium 
intensity, as is nationally reported disaster loss. Destruction in the housing sector 
usually accounts for a significant proportion of direct economic loss in disasters. 
The economic losses and the number of people affected due to natural disasters are 
increasing at a rapid rate, faster than risk reduction can be achieved (Rodriguez, J, 
et al. 2009; UNISDR 2009a; UNDRR, 2019). Considerable evidence suggests that 
the impact on national economies adversely affects social investments, particularly 
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in the areas of health and education and in areas that contribute to employment 
and income generation. Although disaster risk has been identified as an investment 
priority for achieving the SDGs, more systematic efforts are required. Though 
governments often prepare for worst-case disasters, recurrent small- and medium-
scale disaster risks are generally insufficiently addressed. Furthermore, well-
meaning efforts to increase social and economic development may inadvertently 
increase disaster risk unless disaster risk reduction considerations factored into all 
development-related investments. Disaster risk reduction as a governance issue is 
still emerging in both government policy and planning.
There are increasing concerns about the implications of climate change. The 
consequences of an increase in either slow- or rapid-onset disasters caused by 
extreme weather events are enormous and threaten agricultural production, food 
and water security, public health and peace and security. Among many impacts, cli-
mate change will increase the frequency and intensity of weather-related hazards, 
such as floods, cyclones and droughts.8 Other potential effects of climate change, 
such as ecosystem degradation, reduced availability of water and food, energy crises 
and changes in livelihoods will increase communities’ vulnerability to natural haz-
ards (Prasad et al. 2009).
Developing countries will be hardest hit by climate change; consequently, 
they suffer from increased disaster risk. Climate change will have implications for 
most regions, but some will be more affected than others, such as East Asia and 
the Pacific and the Caribbean, which are already vulnerable to natural disasters 
and extreme climatic events.9 An analysis of the climate risk index and extreme 
weather events from 1998 to 2007 indicates that the top ten countries hardest hit 
include Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, India, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Venezuela and Viet Nam.
Disasters affect women and men differently. It is widely documented, for exam-
ple, that women are particularly vulnerable to natural hazards and that mortality 
from disasters is high among them. Gender inequalities in accessing resources, capa-
bilities and differential opportunities place women at a disadvantage, making them 
more vulnerable to the impact of disasters (Bhatt 2005; Neumayer and Plümper 
2007). Although attention is paid to women as a disadvantaged group, gender per-
spectives have yet to be systematically integrated into disaster-related interventions.
Lack of attention to gender is a recurring feature in disaster response despite 
the fact that individually and collectively, governments, international development 
organizations and donor agencies have made strong commitments to gender equal-
ity and women’s empowerment. Yet despite such efforts, the operationalization of 
gender-responsive policies and practices has been ad hoc and inconsistent (UNISDR, 
UNDP and ICUN 2009). Reporting by the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 
indicates that although an increasing number of governments are recognizing the 
importance of gender issues in national disaster risk reduction efforts,10 meaningful 
progress has yet to be made.
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National initiatives
After a decade of concerted effort to achieve the MDGs, and as we approach the 
mid-point of the ten-year HFA, definite progress can be seen in terms of govern-
ment action to address disaster-related issues. First, more people are recognizing that 
disasters can be prevented and disaster impacts can be mitigated. Second, various 
actors at the national, regional and global levels have acknowledged the added value 
in coordinating disaster-related interventions. Third, there are positive indications 
that the perspectives of agencies working on disaster support and those working on 
long-term development are converging. Fourth, recognition is growing that reduc-
ing disaster risk is a development issue – one that requires addressing the underlying 
risk factors that make people and their livelihoods more vulnerable to both slow- 
and rapid-onset disasters.
The 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2009a) 
appraised the progress made in implementing the HFA. The findings indicate that, 
globally, national efforts have focused on HFA Priorities 1, 2 and 5: strengthen-
ing policy, legislation and institutional frameworks, and on building capacities for 
disaster preparedness, response, risk assessments and early warning. The effort was 
found to be less adequate in HFA Priorities 3 and 4: using knowledge, education 
and outreach programmes to stimulate a culture of disaster resilience and addressing 
the underlying factors related to social, economic and infrastructure development 
across rural and urban contexts.
Challenges remain in compiling comprehensive risk assessments in a way that 
can inform disaster risk reduction and link early warning with disaster prepared-
ness and response planning. Efforts also fell short in using national information 
to inform local action. One reason why progress in HFA implementation has 
been limited is that the scale of resources available for disaster risk reduction falls 
well short of what is needed to ensure the resilience of nations and communi-
ties (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] 2008). Although the HFA pays 
attention to broader institutional frameworks and policies for risk reduction, the 
response to major disasters indicates the need for better and more suitable admin-
istrative systems and procedures (e.g. the Myanmar earthquake, Gujarat earthquake 
and the Asian tsunami).
Limitations were also found in the extent to which national development poli-
cies and plans included dimensions of disaster risk reduction. An evaluation review 
of 67 poverty-reduction strategy papers in 2012 indicated that only 20% discussed 
in detail disaster risk reduction, 25% did not mention disaster risk at all, and 55% 
mentioned only the relationship between disaster risk and poverty without pro-
viding concrete recommendations for addressing it. Countries that have inte-
grated disaster risk reduction into their poverty-reduction strategy papers include 
Bangladesh (2005), Malawi (2006), Mozambique (2006) and Viet Nam (2006). 
Since the adoption of Sendai Framework, there is an improvement in incorporating 
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disaster and climate risk factors in national strategies. In terms of the global targets 
of the Framework, 59 out of 195 countries have initiated efforts to address disaster 
risk.11 However such efforts are not sufficient for addressing significant and increas-
ing climate and disaster risks.
Intergovernmental response
Since 2015 the landmark intergovernmental agreements, the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction,12 the Paris Agreement13 and the Sustainable Development 
Goals14 have set the agenda for reducing risks associated with all hazards and unsafe 
conditions. These agreements are significant as they put risk reduction as central to 
the development agenda, as integral to sustainable and equitable economic, social 
and environmental development. The interlinkages between these agreements are 
equally significant. Effective disaster risk management and reducing vulnerability to 
natural hazards are key to progress on SDGs. An additional dimension to risk reduc-
tion is managing the interrelated vulnerabilities compounded by climate change. 
The Paris agreement to combat climate change and adapt to its effects is therefore 
fundamental to the disaster risk reduction agenda. Climate change intensified disas-
ter risks with the increase in the weather and climate hazards and related vulner-
abilities, particularly through ecosystem degradation. The three intergovernmental 
agreements present an opportunity to ensure that risk management became central 
to development policy and planning and for efforts to reduce disaster losses.
Although most countries are signatories to the Sendai Framework, integrating 
environment management, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction 
has yet to manifest in practice. Besides, greater regional and global collaboration is a 
necessity for greater accountability of risk-causing countries, because the countries 
that will be most affected by climate change have done the least to contribute to 
it. Greater coordination between disaster risk reduction, development and climate 
change actors while recognized as critical for responding to the humanitarian chal-
lenges of climate change and addressing the root causes of vulnerability concrete 
actions are evolving but not at a faster pace.
Given the slow progress of the Sendai framework after five years of its adoption, 
it is important to address the limitations of the previous iterations of the Framework, 
the HFA. A key issue the intergovernmental efforts should address is the interface 
of multiple crises and their interlinkages. Disaster risk cannot anymore be seen in 
isolation from climate-related impacts. Also, climate impact needs new institutional 
systems and process at the national level that can adapt to new types of risks. The 
absence accountability mechanism is another issue that is slowing Sendai framework 
progress.
There has been an international governmental consensus on the importance of 
gender equality in disaster risk reduction which was reflected in the formulation 
of the Sendai Framework. In its guiding principles, the Framework emphasizes that 
disaster risk reduction policies and practices should be informed by gender, age, 
disability and cultural perspective. Besides, the SDGs provide the necessary thrust 
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on gender quality as a cross-cutting principle for all the goals. Global advocacy on 
the importance of gender in disaster risk and vulnerability reduction while gained 
momentum is yet to translate into concrete policies at the national level.
Approach, data and methods
Drawing from an analysis of key concerns in prevention and recovery and UNDP 
strategic documents on support to countries affected by natural disasters and climate 
impacts, the evaluation approach acknowledges the multiple dimensions of disaster 
risk reduction. Reducing disaster risk and vulnerability is a development issue and an 
important factor in achieving the SDGs. The enormous consequences of disasters for 
human development, poverty reduction and economic growth necessitate effectively 
managing disaster risk as an integral part of development planning; an integrated 
approach during recovery and reconstruction can be a way to reduce future risk. 
Similarly, links between disaster risk, climate change and environmental manage-
ment make an integrated national planning and programming approach essential to 
risk reduction and long-term recovery. Addressing disaster risk reduction and cli-
mate change adaptation is critical to minimizing development reversals and reducing 
poverty and vulnerability, although strategies to accomplish this are still emerging.
Strengthening national capacities, particularly governance and coordination 
mechanisms, is critical to responding to disasters and reducing risk. Prevention and 
recovery work provides an opportunity to go beyond restoring things to the way 
they were – if done strategically, it can enable affected communities to achieve even 
greater levels of resilience. This also includes systematically integrating gender into 
development frameworks, which in many instances influences how gender dimen-
sions are addressed in disaster risk reduction and recovery.
The questions of the evaluation of disaster management support related to the 
standard evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability 
of UNDP work, including its responses to challenges posed by disasters. The pov-
erty reduction in least developed countries (LDCs) evaluation used a set of criteria, 
namely UNDP programme positioning, strengthening national capacities, contri-
bution to global policy and advocacy, convening role and enabling partnerships. 
Areas covered in the evaluation are that of relevance for disaster reduction in the 
poverty–environment nexus and addressing multiple crises. The evaluations used a 
variety of methods and data to build evaluative evidence for answering its questions.
The evaluations included case studies of twenty-four countries.15 Country case 
studies entailed a comprehensive document review, stakeholder analysis, consulta-
tions and interviews. At the country level, a stakeholder analysis was carried out to 
identify organizations working in the area of disaster management, those involved 
in development support and those engaged in pertinent aspects of environmental 
management, climate change adaptation and coastal area management. The consul-
tations involved a wide range of development stakeholders, including government 
officials, international agencies, UNDP programme donors and international and 
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
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Structured and semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were 
used to collect primary data. The method took into consideration country-level 
data limitations, the delineation of different phases of support, the linking of 
different levels of analysis and varied timeframes and the systematic validation of 
causality, linking process to results. This evaluation method ensured that different 
stakeholders’ perspectives were captured and that the findings could be triangulated. 
Other sources of evidence were used to either substantiate findings or further 
explore the country case studies, thus ensuring that they were credible and robust.
UNDP response
UNDP recognizes the importance of disaster risk management to poverty reduc-
tion and sustainable human development and has, over the past four decades, sup-
ported interventions in the areas of prevention, response and recovery. The aim of 
such programmes has been to strengthen national capacities to prevent (reduce risk) 
as well as to respond to natural disasters. More specifically, UNDP provides assis-
tance to develop government capacity to manage recovery and to ensure renewed 
progress towards the MDGs and later SDGs while reducing vulnerability to future 
disasters. Programming in key areas of development, an extensive national presence 
and partnership with governments and other national stakeholders provides UNDP 
with a unique opportunity to address disaster risk as a development challenge and 
to focus recovery on reducing vulnerabilities.
The Strategic Plans of UNDP (for the periods 2008–2011, extended to 2013, 
2014–2017 and 2018–2021)16 strongly emphasizes strengthening the national 
capacities needed to manage recovery while reducing vulnerability to future disas-
ters. The key areas of UNDP support are as follows: strengthening policies and 
institutional capacities, legal and regulatory frameworks, assessment and analysis, 
sectoral strategies for disaster risk reduction, risk-informed development planning 
and budgeting, disaster recovery governance, community-based rural and urban 
risk management and gender equality informed disaster management. A keystone 
of UNDP’s approach has been the provision of long-term and sustained support 
which has been instrumental in accompanying countries through the many ups 
and downs in their endeavours to strengthen their risk governance capacities and 
build resilience. UNDP’s coverage has grown significantly – from programmes in 
34 countries in 2000 to 125 countries in 2020, with over 1500 projects addressing 
different areas of disaster management. While UNDP has supported large, national-
level disaster management programmes over the years (e.g. in Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia and Pakistan), other countries have smaller programmes of shorter dura-
tion, concentrated at the subnational level.
Resilience approach to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation 
underpins the UNDP approach, for ensuring that development gains are resilient 
to the impacts of disasters and extreme weather events. UNDP strategic documents 
highlight the importance of addressing disaster-related issues and their linkages 
to climate change adaptation and human and economic development. UNDP’s 
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support for sustainable development emphasizes the importance of protecting the 
environmental base and reducing disaster risk as necessary for long-term poverty 
alleviation.
UNDP sees its role as supporting countries in their efforts to resume public 
service delivery as early as possible in the post-disaster period. During the 
humanitarian phase, UNDP aims to assist national governments set up aid 
coordination mechanisms and strengthen the capacities of local administrations to 
manage recovery processes. Another objective is to use its global knowledge and 
experience with disaster risk reduction to engage governments and other partner 
institutions to develop capacities for recovery and reducing future disaster risks.
Guided by the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women,17 SDGs and other intergovernmental agreements, UNDP corpo-
rate strategies place considerable emphasis on promoting gender equality in all of 
the organization’s initiatives and its support to the government. When necessary, this 
includes specific women’s empowerment initiatives.18 The commitment to achiev-
ing the SDGs provided further impetus for a gender equality focus in programme 
support. The UNDP commitment in this area is reflected in its global gender strate-
gies, the Gender Action Plan (2006–2007), the Gender Equality Strategies (2008–
2013; 2014–2017; and 2018–2021)19 and the Eight-Point Agenda for Women’s 
Empowerment and Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which 
provide a framework for all UNDP activities (UNDP 2007b; UNDP 2008a). 
Gender Equality Strategies acknowledge women’s increased vulnerabilities during 
conflict and disasters. It also recognizes that giving attention to the differing needs 
of women and men maximizes the potential for full community recovery.
At the country level, areas of thematic engagement include institutional and 
legislative systems, community-based disaster risk management, support to national 
governments to establish risk reduction and climate risk management. In recovery 
efforts, UNDP focused largely on restoring normalcy following a crisis, transitioning 
effectively from crisis to development, and using recovery work as an opportunity 
to promote resilience to disasters and climate shocks. Such efforts have focused on 
strengthening governance structures and policies for better disaster management 
(e.g. prevention, mitigation and response, and providing post-disaster support in 
social and economic areas).
In the last decade, several rapid-onset disasters have taken place, both those that 
are large in scale and annually recurrent events of smaller intensity. UNDP supported 
responses to all major recent disasters. Support for recovery consisted mainly of 
post-disaster needs assessments, support to livelihoods and housing, coordination 
(involving both NGOs and governments) and strengthening government capacities.
Drought-related mitigation and recovery were not included in the UNDP disas-
ter management programme due to the way programmes are categorized in UNDP 
programme frameworks. Drought and floods are considered as a consequence of 
climate change, affecting livelihoods and development in general. These are largely 
addressed as part of poverty reduction and climate change adaptation programmes. 
UNDP recognizes that climate change is a major threat to sustainable development 
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and has provided support to this area for the past three years. Similar to drought-
related mitigation, climate change adaptation is under a different programme unit 
of UNDP, although the inter-linkages with disaster risk reduction are relevant from 
the point of achieving programme results.
Findings
The UNDP programme strategy acknowledges disaster risk reduction as an impor-
tant factor in reducing poverty and vulnerability and achieving the SDGs. In its 
publications, UNDP advocates giving greater importance to disaster risk reduction 
in achieving development results. In the last ten years, UNDP has actively partici-
pated in debates to further consensus on global policies to strengthen links between 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Sustained commitment is 
reflected in closer integration of disaster risk reduction with other UNDP priority 
areas (e.g. poverty reduction, governance and adaptation to climate change). The 
following sections discuss areas where UNDP contributions, its comparative advan-
tage and programming constraints.
Working with national systems
Governments are making important efforts to fulfil their commitments to the 
Sendai Framework (and its predecessors) and other conventions, and this has pro-
vided the impetus for formulating related legislation and policies. UNDP responded 
to such needs at the national level and supported governments establish institutional 
and legal frameworks for disaster management. UNDP support in this area was cru-
cial in creating an enabling environment for policy formulation and in setting up 
key institutions for disaster risk management. Out of 58 country programme evalu-
ations analysed, UNDP played a key role in policy formulation in 31 countries; in 
27 countries, UNDP contributed to creating an enabling environment for disaster 
risk management.
Contribution to the policy discourse on sustainable livelihoods was evident in 
UNDP’s engagement in the shaping of the SDGs and integration for climate change 
adaption issues in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. UNDP 
remains a leading United Nations provider of environmental protection support at 
national and local levels and has been a significant provider of technical support to 
the government during global and regional negotiations on environmental issues 
such as climate change, biodiversity loss and water pollution. UNDP advocated 
for environmental budgeting by supporting efforts to engage parliament, creating 
committees on poverty–environment issues and engaging high-ranking govern-
ment officials in poverty–environment projects. Most importantly, tracking budgets 
and expenditures by analysing budget data according to special issues, poverty– 
environment concerns and climate change adaptation has enabled better advocacy 
aimed at increasing budget allocations for poverty–environment mainstreaming, as 
well as to raise awareness on related issues. With a wide-ranging climate change 
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programme in place, UNDP has played a prominent role in regional and global 
policy debates on global climate change in support of countries preparing for and 
responding to the 2015 Paris Agreement.
UNDP has been more effective in enabling sector-specific support, particu-
larly when establishing disaster management institutions and policies or pilot inter-
ventions in disaster preparedness. Although in many ways this reflects the larger, 
national-level challenge, UNDP has had limited success in addressing issues related 
to the integration of disaster risk reduction in development planning and in 
strengthening government capacities in intergovernmental coordination for disaster 
risk reduction. UNDP responded to governments’ expressions of interest to main-
stream disaster risk reduction in Honduras, for example, and at the state level in 
Mexico. However, this was not often given adequate priority in UNDP program-
ming.20 In countries such as Colombia, the roles, responsibilities and accountability 
at different levels of government and among institutions responsible for disaster risk 
management could be better harmonized.
Increasingly, governments are recognizing the links between disaster risk reduc-
tion, poverty reduction and development; efforts are being made to address these 
links. For example, in Mexico the government is taking measures to include disas-
ter risk reduction in social development programmes. In the Maldives, disaster and 
climate risk reduction are considered critical issues and are fully integrated into 
development planning. UNDP’s support in Bangladesh provides an example of a 
typical UNDP programme at the country level in the context of multiple crises. In 
Bangladesh, as part of the disaster risk reduction, UNDP’s Early Recovery Facility 
initiated a pilot short-term employment project linked to the rehabilitation of 
community infrastructure and solid waste management. Solid waste management, 
ecosystem restoration and mapping of social risks are areas of UNDP’s support. 
Each of these initiatives is critical to addressing the vulnerabilities of the host 
communities as well as the Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazaar. UNDP played a 
strategic role in disaster risk reduction in the refugee areas in managing hazards 
and risks. This support is widely perceived as critical for the local government. 
Advisory role of UNDP in disaster risk reduction enabled work on resilience in 
the Rohingya refugee camps and training humanitarian actors on how to manage 
disasters and extreme weather. UNDP’s Early Recovery Facility in the country 
office facilitated this strategic contribution within the refugee camps, in host com-
munities and preparedness support to the district government. UNDP provided 
disaster risk reduction technical support to the JRP agencies, a critical require-
ment in the region with refugees. A series of socio-economic impact assessments 
and the initiation of a district development planning process have enabled a more 
structured local response to the crisis. An area that needs further attention is the 
consolidation of activities by various agencies in the areas of employment and 
livelihood and local services.
Despite commitments of the countries to international agreements such as 
Sendai Framework here remain significant challenges in integrating disaster and cli-
mate risk reduction into national plans and programmes. The progress remains slow 
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in integrating disaster risk reduction into national development planning in most 
countries, particularly in the allocation of budget for risk reduction. The same can 
be said about contributing to implementation in countries where risk reduction is 
already a development priority.
UNDP strategy acknowledges disaster risk reduction as an important factor 
in reducing poverty and vulnerability and achieving the SDGs. Although disaster 
risk reduction is prioritized as a programme area in many countries, UNDP 
has paid sparse attention to its interface with poverty reduction. Despite the 
organizational commitment, closer integration of disaster risk reduction with 
other UNDP priorities, such as poverty reduction, governance and adaptation to 
climate change, is progressing in some country programmes has not been given 
sufficient priority in many others. UNDP poverty reduction initiatives are yet to 
include a risk-reduction dimension, although there are exceptions. A disaster risk 
reduction or climate change adaptation component in poverty reduction initiatives 
is seen as an expendable, additional cost. A few exceptions were found, which offer 
important lessons for strengthening synergies among complementary areas of the 
UNDP programme, government and other development agencies. In Mexico, for 
example, integrating disaster risk reduction components into projects significantly 
contributed to sustaining local-level development investments. Similar results are 
evident in Bangladesh in a community-based poverty-reduction programme that 
incorporated disaster preparedness and risk reduction. In Honduras, disaster risk 
reduction is addressed as a governance issue.
A notable change is the UNDPs resilience approach, introduced in 2008, is 
enabling a shift towards vulnerability reduction in UNDPs programme support. 
Resilience approach, with long-term focus, is gathering momentum in UNDPs 
crisis response. The integrated framework promoted by the 2017 Strategic Plan is 
enabling a shift in UNDPs programmes, particularly in establishing linkages between 
its programme response in the areas of poverty reduction, climate change adaptation 
and disaster risk reduction. Similarly, disaster risk reduction as a governance issue 
is emphasized in UNDPs support, particularly in enabling policies and governance 
structures.
In several LDCs, climate impacts have increased the frequency of droughts, 
floods and cyclones, and the national policy response does not reflect the sever-
ity of the issue. Promoting approaches to improve food security and sustainable 
development linkages through adaptation strategies contributed to livelihoods 
change processes at the subnational level. Climate-related disaster risk reduction 
initiatives that have livelihood resilience components were aligned with adapta-
tion efforts, complementing government priorities to reduce poverty and vul-
nerability to risks and improving food security (e.g. in Mozambique). Cash for 
work activities supported by UNDP provided income during disaster recovery 
on a short-term basis (Haiti and Nepal). While debris removal provided employ-
ment immediately after disasters, solid waste management in post-disaster situ-
ations was critical, with consequences for enhancing community income and 
living conditions.
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Addressing multiple and interlinking crises
While there are conducive organizational policies to promote resilience, intersect-
ing elements of crises and their linkages are yet to be prioritized in implementa-
tion. The LDCs, for example, have experienced natural and climate-related disasters 
(both rapid-onset disasters and droughts), health pandemics and conflict. To better 
understand the scale of the problem, over half of the LDCs are subject to multiple 
crises including recurrent disasters, in addition to poverty, the volatility of com-
modity prices and aid flows, and severe structural challenges. The macroeconomic 
impact of these episodes of extreme drought and flooding is not only significant 
by itself but exacerbates the impact on poverty in the context of conflict or early 
conflict recovery. At any given point in 10–12 LDCs, UNDP programmes are 
implemented in the context of multiple fragilities.21 UNDP has programmes in the 
areas of climate-resilient agriculture and livelihoods, inclusive growth and income-
generation initiatives, economic revitalization and peacebuilding; it is also progres-
sively adopting ways to improve resilient development. Despite the range of support 
provided, opportunities were not used to enable an integrated approach to address 
intersecting linkages between drought and poverty or drought-conflict and poverty.
Poverty and drought can potentially become drivers of conflict when attention 
is not paid to nexus issues. In Mali, while each of UNDP’s initiatives (in the areas 
of poverty, crisis and environment) is relevant individually for the development 
priorities of the country, opportunities were lost in enabling a focus on linkages 
between multiple fragilities, such as food security, resilience and vulnerability, and 
conflict. While the humanitarian situation is fragile, the socio-political instability in 
the northern region of the country, coupled with recurrent floods and pressures due 
to the events in the Central African Republic and northern Nigeria, have impacted 
the lives and livelihoods of over 3 million people. UNDP is better positioned to 
raise the importance of balancing development and crisis support and to advocate 
for more integrated policies, instead of getting subsumed in the larger conflict-
centred development discourse at the country level.
UNDP’s resilience approach aims to reduce development risks, prevent crises, 
avert major development setbacks and promote human security. This approach 
provided an impetus to closely align climate change adaptation and disaster risk 
reduction frameworks in livelihood support, and to position policy advice on these 
intersecting areas with a risk-sensitive approach to poverty reduction. Despite these 
policies, UNDP’s poverty reduction efforts in the context of multiple crises are yet 
to address the combined effect of multiple crises and resulting vulnerabilities.
Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction
Climate change adaptation programmes of UNDP evolved in the past two decades 
and several interventions that were part of the poverty reduction and environment 
area had comparable goals. UNDP has aimed to address climate change adapta-
tion as a development issue and as a factor in achieving the MDGs and later SDGs 
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provided the necessary thrust. With increased recognition of the links between envi-
ronment and climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, efforts have 
been made within UNDP to explore possible synergies in programming. There has 
been progress in consolidating climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction 
teams. There is scope for improving synergies between programmes in these two 
areas. UNDP is taking measures to strengthen synergies to demonstrate through its 
programmes the critical urgency of integrating disaster and climate risk reduction.
The countries included in the evaluation have different levels of vulnerability to 
climate change, ranging from Colombia, India and Mexico (where climate change 
is one of many challenges), Tanzania (where climate change has had a significant 
impact on agriculture and livelihood), to the Maldives (where it threatens the very 
future of the country). In all countries, the anticipated impacts of climate change will 
likely be superimposed over existing climate-related disasters. This superimposition 
is particularly true for countries with a large population living in coastal areas and 
arid regions. Overall, UNDP adaptation projects are designed to decrease vulner-
ability to climate change impacts, although there is considerable scope for integrat-
ing it in poverty-reduction interventions. Some of these constraints of establishing 
linkages are also due to the funding mechanisms that require specific outcomes.
In the Maldives, the disaster risk reduction and adaptation links are well 
established by the government through its development plan – but such an example 
is more of an exception. In most countries, environment, climate change adaptation 
and disaster risk reduction activities tend to be spread among different government 
agencies. Besides, national frameworks for implementing the intergovernmental 
commitments are spread across different ministries, with responsible for each activity.
Coordination between disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation 
has been limited in most countries despite intersectoral taskforces. Although gov-
ernments acknowledge the need for synergies between the two areas, both at the 
conceptual level as well as in programme implementation, concrete efforts towards 
this end are rare. UNDP is supporting efforts to addresses the policy, programming 
and partnership issues that integrated programming would necessitate. Further, the 
current climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction frameworks do not 
lend themselves to an integrated approach.
The severity of recent disasters has pushed the issue of climate change adaptation 
to centre stage, with direct implications for UNDP programming. Through its 
assistance to national governments both before and after disasters, coupled with 
extensive country-support mechanisms covering the environmental protection 
aspects of climate change, UNDP is well positioned to help countries develop 
effective adaptation strategies.
UNDP considers its responses to slow-onset disasters (e.g. drought) to be an 
aspect of poverty reduction and sustainable environment support, and are therefore 
not under the purview of disaster risk management. The impact of climate change 
is likely to blur the boundaries between slow- and rapid-onset disasters in the 
future and measures for better coordination among programme areas are critical. 
Support to prevent or mitigate slow-onset disasters entails a different approach and 
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alternative strategies. It will require closer coordination with poverty reduction 
and environment programmes and new partnerships with different government 
agencies and stakeholders.
UNDP’s initiatives in climate change adaptation have been critical for reducing 
the vulnerability of LDCs to climate change shocks, strengthening their resilience, 
and mainstreaming sustainable development into national development policies and 
strategies. Managing over one-third of GEF, GCF and other vertical green funds, 
UNDP is well situated to enable a national focus on factors that facilitate sustainable 
livelihoods. Environment and climate change adaptation programmes have 
consistently incorporated or promoted a sustainable approach to the environment 
as well as livelihoods by linking community income generation and natural resource 
management interventions. UNDP has had some success pursuing a greater 
consideration of poverty and livelihoods within the framework of its support to UN 
conventions, both climate change and disaster risk reduction in the past five years, 
which need further consolidation. UNDP should not only further leverage this 
work for a global policy engagement but also increase the scale of such programmes.
Promoting gender equality
UNDP has taken policy measures to ensure greater attention to gender equality 
and women’s empowerment in programming. The mandatory allocation of 15% 
of funds for gender-related activities in crisis-related programmes (both conflict 
and disaster) is a measure unique to UNDP that operationalizes gender policy. At 
the global and regional levels, UNDP contributed to advocacy and publications to 
make disaster prevention and recovery more gender sensitive.
A few country programmes (e.g. Mexico) outlined gender equality as a prior-
ity area and set up a gender unit to support government efforts and to integrate 
gender priorities within the UNDP country programme. Important efforts were 
also made to prepare training modules for creating awareness and integrating 
gender-related issues into disaster risk reduction. Manuals were produced for 
regional programmes in South Asia and Mexico. Coordination with other agen-
cies, particularly NGOs, was instrumental in ensuring that a gender perspective 
was integrated into all aspects of recovery work. In Indonesia, UNDP supported 
the government to develop strategies for integrating gender in recovery and 
reconstruction activities. Gender-disaggregated recovery indicators developed by 
UNDP at the country level were key to including gender and women’s empower-
ment as a cross-cutting dimension in recovery programmes. UNDP contributed 
to efforts to ensure that women had a say in post-disaster housing and were joint 
owners of the assets provided as part of recovery programmes in Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
Attention paid to gender-related issues did not reflect UNDP’s commitment to 
accelerating gender equality. Although programmes were targeted at women and 
efforts were made to ensure their participation in disaster prevention and recov-
ery, gender issues were not addressed systematically in programme planning and 
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implementation. Constraints in addressing gender concerns in disaster risk manage-
ment persist, including limited progress in dealing with gender priorities in devel-
opment. While a commitment to gender equality may exist at the national level, 
practical measures to fulfil commitments were lacking. Reporting on progress of 
Sendai Framework on integrating gender perspectives in disaster risk reduction and 
recovery points to similar issues.
An area where there are lessons for synergies with disaster risk reduction is 
Development Finance Assessments (DFAs). Bangladesh (Climate Fiscal Framework) 
and Cambodia (Climate Change Financing Framework) have demonstrated 
leadership in reforming climate financing approaches and institutional arrangements, 
with indications of improved inter-ministerial coordination and an increasing role 
for and importance of ministries of finance in climate financing arrangements. In 
Bangladesh, based on the DFAs, the government has reformed the institutional 
set-up for managing development cooperation and drafted a National Policy on 
Development Cooperation; financing needs for the SDGs have also been estimated. 
Drawing upon lessons learned from Bangladesh and Cambodia on the Climate 
Fiscal Framework, other countries in the Asia region are developing climate 
financing frameworks. Such efforts have salience for disaster risk reduction financing 
arrangements.
Building local-level capacities
An area where UNDP has consolidation its support is strengthening local capacities 
in disaster management. An area where there were tangible results is the integra-
tion of disaster risk reduction in local plans, which were important particularly in 
the case of recurrent local level disasters. Disaster preparedness and risk reduction 
initiatives were implemented in more than 45 countries since 2009. Community 
approaches to sustainable livelihoods, natural resource management and enhanc-
ing resilience to disasters and climate change are areas where UNDP engagement 
has helped generate tangible local-level impacts. Women’s economic empowerment 
received sufficient attention across programmes with contributions at the project 
level. Urban poverty is an evolving area of UNDP programme support that merits 
greater attention.
The scale and duration of such programmes varied across countries. Community 
preparedness initiatives were useful in strengthening local capacities. In several 
instances, UNDP used community programmes to demonstrate the importance 
of disaster preparedness and to integrate a disaster risk reduction component into 
local-level development interventions. In Mexico, for example, UNDP was able to 
scale up community-based preparedness interventions to the state level. UNDP has 
also been successful in informing government practices in Bangladesh and India. 
In India, the programme succeeded in demonstrating the importance of local-level 
preparedness. Other examples were also found where preparedness programmes 
contributed to better coping at the community level.22
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The challenge in programming at the community level was the limited links to 
related government programmes. The fact that interventions were rarely institu-
tionalized meant that they were one-off successes and failed to inform government 
programmes and policies. Strengthening local governments’ capacities remains a 
challenge. There is also the risk of community programme mechanisms becoming 
parallel structures to local governments. With some exceptions, limitations were 
found in the links established among different levels of government. Excessive focus 
on contingency planning and preparedness and limited interventions in risk reduc-
tion weakened the possible contributions of community-based initiatives.
Conclusion
It is five years since the SDGs and the Sendai Framework have been adopted and 
commitments were made by countries to sustainable development and reduce the 
impact of natural and other disasters. Considering its cross-cutting nature, across 
different sectors of development, there are 25 disaster risk reduction related targets 
across 10 of the 17 SDGs, reinforcing the importance of addressing this challenge as 
part of the national development strategy. Besides, SDG 13 underscores the need to 
strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate change for achieving sustain-
able development. Compared to the MDGs period, acknowledging the negative 
implications of disaster risk for development and poverty reduction in the inter-
national frameworks is a significant step forward. On both the SDGs and Sendai 
Framework, while there has been progress, the pace of it has been slow, and there 
remain significant gaps in achieving the objectives of the Framework. Natural haz-
ards, both slow and rapid onset, are largely foreseeable. They provide governments 
and international agencies a rationale for taking prevention and preparedness mea-
sures to ensure that impacts are minimized. While an increase in the frequency and 
severity of recent disasters has called attention to the need for disaster risk reduction, 
challenges persist in taking practical measures to see it realized. Disaster recovery 
is generally regarded as urgent, but the focus is often limited to recovering what 
existed before, rather than addressing underlying vulnerabilities and future preven-
tion. Reducing disaster risk is key to achieving objectives in poverty reduction and 
sustainable development.
The extent to which international agreements resulted in national policies that 
promote integrated approaches to development, to reduce disaster risk and enable 
climate change adaptation is evolving. For a resilient development, national poverty 
reduction efforts, particularly in the area of rural livelihoods need to systematically 
integrate disaster risk reduction and adaption. The role of international agencies in 
national disaster risk reduction as part of development support assumes importance 
in strengthening related policy processes.
In the area of climate-related disasters including slow-onset disasters, disaster 
risk reduction and climate change adaptation have similar goals, which calls for 
more coordinated programming at the national level. There has been increasing 
financing for climate change adaptation through various funding mechanisms 
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further strengthened by Paris Agreement in 2016, while there remain resources 
challenges for disaster risk reduction efforts, which have similar goals in the area 
of slow-onset disasters. This highlights the importance of combined efforts in the 
area of adaptation and climate-related disaster risk reduction efforts, specifically 
integrating such efforts as part of key development strategies than as stand-alone 
efforts.
There is a need to strengthen institutional systems and capacities at the local level. 
Local governments typically lacked the authority and capacity to manage recovery 
programmes. Even in countries with strong national institutions, local governments 
were without the financial resources needed to carry out disaster risk reduction 
activities. Typically, the responsibilities of local governments are ill defined. Agencies 
such as UNDP that have a long-term presence at the country level have a pivotal 
position to bring risk-reduction issues into greater focus during recovery and in the 
development process more generally.
The lack of focus on the interface between poverty reduction, environment 
and disaster risk management has been compounded by several factors. The com-
partmentalized nature of programming has often constrained partnerships beyond 
disaster management agencies. Disaster management agencies in most countries pre-
dominantly addressed vulnerability from the perspective of location and physical 
infrastructure. Engaging only with disaster management institutions narrowed the 
perspective of disaster risk reduction interventions. If disaster risk management is 
to focus on vulnerability or poverty reduction, government institutions that have a 
mandate for poverty reduction, the environment, gender equality and related devel-
opment issues must be involved.
There are cost implications for considering poverty reduction from the wider 
perspective of disaster vulnerability reduction and climate change risk, which 
includes incorporating a disaster risk reduction component. This also applies to 
recovery programmes in most countries, where integrating long-term risk reduc-
tion is not regarded as viable because of the extra costs involved. Although gov-
ernments in many countries perceived the need for a more integrated approach 
to development planning, such efforts are at early stages. Most countries lacked a 
cost–benefit analysis of the advantage of vulnerability and disaster risk reduction in 
poverty reduction, which could inform government decisions and resource alloca-
tion. Advocacy in this area has been minimal. For example, MDG monitoring is not 
used as a tool to emphasize how disasters, particularly recurrent small-scale natural 
events, increase poverty levels and reverse development gains.
In recent years, greater attention to climate change adaptation has contributed 
significantly to raising awareness and understanding of the importance of addressing 
the interlinkages coherently, including its relationship to work on preventing and 
recovering from natural disasters. Interrelated policies and legislative frameworks 
are important from the perspective of disaster risk reduction and climate change 
adaptation. Aside from poverty reduction strategy papers and national development 
plans, policies related to climate change, environment, water management, coastal 
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area/resource management, energy management, land use and urban planning 
are critical to a multidimensional approach to disaster risk reduction. Support for 
harmonizing overlapping mandates pertaining to disaster risk management and 
coordination among government agencies furthers policy consolidation.
Notes
 1 Munich Re NatCatSERVICE database.
 2 UNDRR, 2019, Sendai Monitor. https://sendaimonitor.undrr.org/analytics/
global-targets/15.
 3 The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) is charged with conducting evaluations of the 
relevance and performance of UNDP’s work at the country, regional, global and thematic 
levels. The IEP reports to the UNDP Executive Board, which has requested the office to 
conduct evaluations of critical aspects of UNDP’s work in order to ensure accountabil-
ity and to achieve organizational learning. In 2018–2019, IEO carried out “Evaluation 
of UNDP Support to Poverty Reduction in the Least Developed Countries,” and 
2009–2010, the Evaluation Office carried out the Evaluation of UNDP Contribution 
to Disaster Prevention and Recovery. See http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/
thematic/poverty-ldc.shtml; http://www.undp.org/evaluation/thematic/par.shtml.
 4 IEO, 2019. Evaluation of UNDP Support to Poverty Reduction in the Least Developed 
Countries. http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/thematic/poverty-ldc.shtml.
 5 See GAR, 2019. https://gar.undrr.org/sites/default/files/reports/2019-05/full_gar_report.
pdf.
 6 See UNISDR (2009b), Harmeling (2009), Telford and Cosgrave (2006) Benson and Clay 
(2004), and Wisner et al. (2004).
 7 See UNISDR, 2015. Disaster Risk Reduction And Resilience In The 2030 Agenda 
For Sustainable Development, A reflection Paper; UNISDR (2009), Assessment of 
Development Results in Tajikistan (EO 2009), Assessment of Development Results in 
Nicaragua (EO 2007), Telford and Cosgrave (2008), Wisner et al. (2004).
 8 Robert Glasser (2020). The Climate Change Imperative to Transform Disaster Risk 
Management, Int J Disaster Risk Sci (2020) 11:152–154; Sneed, A. 2018. The next cli-
mate frontier: Predicting a complex domino effect. Scientific American. https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/the-next-climate-frontier-predicting-a-complex-dom-
ino-effect/; Prasad, et al.
 9 See Harmeling (2009); UNISDR (2009a); United Nations Development Programme 
(2007a); IPCC (2007); WFP, IFRCRC & OCHA (2009); and Chibber and Laajaj (2008).
 10 There is no significant change in the extent to which national strategies address gender 
concerns in disaster risk reduction. Sendai Framework has limited information on this.
 11 See https://sendaimonitor.undrr.org/.
 12 Sendai Framework https://www.undrr.org/implementing-sf.
 13 Paris Agreement https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/
the-paris-agreement.
 14 https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/.
 15 For the disaster management evaluation following country case studies were conducted: 
Colombia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mexico, Mozambique and 
Myanmar; and for the Poverty reduction in the LDCs evaluation 15 case studies were 
conducted in Angola, Comoros, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, 
Djibouti, Sudan, Yemen, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Samoa, Haiti.
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 16 UNDP (2008a) Draft Strategic Plan, 2008-2011: Accelerating Global Progress on Human 
Development (extended to 2013); UNDP (2013), Changing with the World. UNDP 
Strategic Plan: 2014–17; UNDP,UNDP Strategic Plan 2014–2017’, UNDP (2018). 
UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021.
 17 Adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly.
 18 UNDP is bound by several international conventions, including the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action (1995), Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security, and the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNGA 2005).
 19 UNDP, (2008b). “Gender Equality Strategy; UNDP, 2018.” Gender Equality Strategy, 
2018–2021; UNDP, 2014. “Gender Equality Strategy, 2018–2021.”
 20 In Honduras, for example, UNDP is the key agency working on disaster risk reduction. 
Recent efforts include support to the Ministry of Planning in developing a national 
strategy for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction. UNDP has focused on linking disaster 
risk reduction planning at the municipal, regional and national levels.
 21 A sizable percentage of major droughts during 2014–2018 globally occurred in Africa, 
impacting 15 LDCs severely. At least 13 LDCs in Africa are facing two consecutive 
droughts that will affect the livelihoods of over 30 million people: Angola, Burundi, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. In Asia, Cambodia, Myanmar and Timor-
Leste have been affected by drought. Some of these countries also face other weather-
related challenges, including floods in Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan and Sudan.
 22 For example, villages that participated in the programme had fewer casualties during the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
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THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON 
INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL 
RESEARCH APPROACH TO 
EVALUATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 




The aims of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) are to reduce global poverty and hunger, to improve human health and 
nutrition, and to enhance ecosystem resilience and the environment through inter-
national agricultural research and partnership. CGIAR claims that, had it not existed, 
world food production would be 4%–5% lower, developing countries would pro-
duce 7%–8% less food, world grain prices would be 18%–21% higher (adversely 
affecting poor consumers in particular), cultivated area in the developing countries 
would be 11–13 million hectares larger (having expanded into fragile forests that 
harbour a high biodiversity), and per capita food consumption in developing coun-
tries would be 5%–7% lower on the average. In a time of global food and ecological 
crises and of rapid economic, technology, and climate changes, the role of CGIAR 
is critical.
These crises impose particularly harsh consequences on the approximately 2.1 
billion people who live on less than two US dollars a day – three fourths of whom 
live in rural areas and depend on agriculture. Although investments in agricultural 
research had seen a declining trend, the 2008 global food crisis brought agriculture 
back to the fore of the development agenda, which prompted a global revival of 
funding for agricultural research. Within this context, the role of impact assessment 
and evaluation to validate the efficiency of funding and the effectiveness of invest-
ment has also been growing. This trend has also been driven by the arrival on the 
global development stage of new and large donors and foundations demanding clear 
accountability for returns on their investments.
Agricultural research poses particular challenges for evaluation, distinct from 
evaluation of technical cooperation, investment, and emergency assistance. Research 
is often very specialized, so its evaluation also demands specialist skills. Impact 
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assessment in CGIAR is either associated with impact evaluation or serves as an 
important input to overall evaluation. Furthermore, the impacts of interventions in 
agriculture and sustainable development cannot generally be assessed until many 
years after an intervention ends. The time horizon of impact assessment and evalu-
ation in CGIAR means that it cannot usually be utilized for immediate decision-
making on current or new programmes.
This chapter outlines the approach to the evaluation of climate change, environ-
ment, and natural resource management in the context of the CGIAR. Evaluating 
the impact of research activities poses specific challenges that differ from evaluating 
development programmes or normative work. Given the nature of the work of 
the CGIAR system, it is important to take a systematic and common approach to 
evaluation that covers the network’s various dimensions – including its environ-
mental, social, and economic dimensions. Over the last decade the relative impor-
tance, the urgency, and share of CGIAR investments in climate change research in 
relation to agriculture have also grown dramatically, together with the gearing up of 
the CGIAR Research Program (CRP) on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food 
Security (CCAFS) since 2011, and the evaluation of the CCAFS by the CGIAR-
IEA (2016), which forms the basis of the discussion of climate change research and 
evaluation over the last decade, as well as in this chapter.
CGIAR and its role in climate change, environment, and natural 
resource management
The CGIAR, funded by developing and industrialized country governments, foun-
dations, and international and regional organizations, is a global partnership that 
unites organizations engaged in research for sustainable development. Its complex 
and unique architecture of partnerships has no equivalent in other international 
development organizations. Fifteen international research centres carry out CGIAR 
work in close collaboration with hundreds of national and regional research partners 
and institutes, civil society organizations, academia, and the private sector. CGIAR 
objectives include improving food production (by accelerating sustainable increases 
in productivity and production of healthy food by and for the poor) and creating 
a better environment (by conserving, enhancing, and using natural resources and 
biodiversity to improve livelihoods of the poor in response to climate change and 
other factors).
CGIAR operates within the context of promoting institutional and policy 
changes that can stimulate agricultural growth and equity to benefit the world’s 
rural poor. A recent restructuring of the CGIAR system added a new outcome, 
sustainable management of natural resources, to its three traditional system-level, 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG)–aligned outcomes (those of reducing rural 
poverty, increasing food security, and improving nutrition and health). The focus 
on environmental outcomes is now explicit and environmental impact assessments 
and evaluations of climate change impacts have become an important element of 
CGIAR’s work.
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Environmental, climate change, and natural resource 
management activities in CGIAR: development and sustainability
The CGIAR research focus has mainly been on natural resource management. 
Research on environmental aspects is a more recent but growing focus and research 
on climate change has progressively taken the central stage over the last two decades. 
Accordingly, impact assessment and evaluation studies on natural resource manage-
ment, and the focus on climate change in the last decade, have thus far received 
more attention than environmental impact assessments.
Natural resource management1 research aims to generate outputs that help 
maintain or improve the natural resource base for agriculture and to mitigate the 
often negative environmental side effects of agricultural production. In cases in 
which benefits from natural resource management research are framed in terms of 
maintained or improved agricultural productivity, farmers are considered the likely 
adopters of natural resource management technologies such as improved seed irri-
gation techniques, pest control, and improved management practices. Often, trade-
offs exist between agricultural productivity and conserving natural resources that a 
society values. In such cases, the incentives for farmers to adopt or not adopt a tech-
nology are not always clear. Additional research outputs include influencing policy 
and creating new institutions to facilitate socially desirable outcomes.
Environment-related work in CGIAR covers different types of agricultural 
resource use and issues, including land, water, agrochemicals and pesticides, live-
stock production aspects related to the environment, biodiversity, climate change, 
forests and deforestation, and greenhouse gas emissions. Environmental impacts 
in CGIAR refer to public goods associated with ecosystem services that provide 
inputs into productive processes, such as consumption goods that confer well-being 
directly (e.g. enjoyment of environmental quality) or indirectly (e.g. drinking water 
of a given quality), or have non-use values associated with knowing that a par-
ticular environmental resource exists (Renkow 2010). Several impact assessments 
conducted by CGIAR have refrained of measuring environmental impacts due to 
complexities in assigning monetary values to non-market environmental services.
Natural resource management research impact pathways flow either via adoption 
of specific outputs by farmers or via institutional innovations and policy influence. 
In the first case, the outputs (new technologies for managing farm natural resources) 
are adopted by farmers, leading to either direct (to adopters) or indirect (to non-
adopters, labourers, and consumers) impacts that can be either positive or negative 
and have an economic, social, or environmental nature. In the second case, institu-
tional innovations or policy influence, the outputs consist of engaging with policy 
makers through dialogue, scientific presentations, briefings, and technical support 
in creating new institutions for managing natural resources. The resulting outcomes 
influence policy decision-making, policy changes, and the creation of new insti-
tutions contributing to improving natural resource management. Impacts tend to 
accrue to those ultimately affected by policy changes. CGIAR research on manag-
ing soil, fisheries, water, forests, and pests has shown substantial benefits and positive 
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internal rates of return on investment. However, much of the impact reported is 
on a small scale (although there are some exceptions, such as reduced or no-tillage 
technology that conserves soil and water and reduces carbon emissions).
The environmental and natural resource management and development sides 
are closely interlinked within the context of farming systems. The environment-
poverty nexus is very strong; people depend on the sustainability of the natural 
resources and are affected by environmental issues linked to how they manage the 
natural resource base in their own farming systems. The public goods deriving from 
CGIAR research are most often technologies and innovations or policy changes 
that have a direct impact on the farmers’ livelihoods and income levels.
Various reviews2 reveal that assessing the environmental impacts derived from the 
use of modern technologies has received limited attention from CGIAR centres. 
Some progress has been achieved, for example, on quantifying the impacts of research 
on genetic diversity, soil erosion, and pesticide use (though pesticide studies have 
focused primarily on human health impacts). More environmental impact assess-
ments are being done at the CGIAR centres, but few results have been published.
The methodology for quantifying productivity impacts of research outputs or out-
comes is much more advanced than the methodology for quantifying other types 
of research impacts (e.g. social, health, equity, and environmental impacts; Djurfeldt 
et al. 2009). Even the assessment of impacts of CGIAR research investments in nat-
ural resource management (where environmental aspects would be expected to be 
prominent) done by the CGIAR Science Council Secretariat (2006)3 and Waibel and 
Zilberman (2007) includes little quantification of environmental benefits, and the prin-
cipal focus of assessing these investments remains on agricultural productivity aspects.
As CGIAR is moving upstream from individual projects to clusters of projects 
(focusing, for example, on a watershed or an agro-ecological zone), this has bear-
ing on evaluation, which must also move beyond project thinking and consider the 
context of national sustainable development.
CGIAR research in genetic improvements, natural resource management, and 
policy research has generated a large set of technology, management, and knowl-
edge products (Renkow 2010). These produced a similarly broad set of economic, 
social, and environmental impacts. Over the past two decades, ex post assessment 
of these impacts has become increasingly institutionalized, following the growing 
demand for evidence that CGIAR research investments have generated benefits 
and good rates of return (Walker et al. 2008). Various guideline documents for con-
ducting ex post impact assessments have been followed, both at the CGIAR system 
and individual research centre level, with a growing emphasis on environmental 
impacts (Maredia and Pingali 2001; Nelson and Maredia 2001; Shiferaw, Freeman 
and Swinton, 2005; La Rovere and Dixon 2007; Walker et al. 2008). These docu-
ments seek, whenever possible, to build on earlier economic impact assessments, 
resulting in more comprehensive and integrated types of assessments. In addition, 
the CGIAR Standing Panel on Impact Assessment serves as a repository of such 
resources, studies, and methodologies on impact assessment and evaluation (https://
cas.cgiar.org/spia).
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Notable examples of CGIAR studies on natural resource 
management and environmental impacts
Little has been done to trace the full chain of outputs, outcomes, and impacts 
of CGIAR research as it pertains to the natural environment. Impact assessment 
research in CGIAR initially focused on assessing the impacts of germplasm adoption 
and crop management research (1970s and 1980s), then shifted to rates of return and 
benefit distribution assessments (1980s), and research on spillovers and inter-sectoral 
impacts (1980s and 1990s). In the 1990s, the focus broadened to include significant 
environmental impact assessment studies (Pingali 2001).
The biggest environmental impact from CGIAR research appears to relate to 
changes in the total area under agricultural production as a result of widespread 
adoption of productivity-increasing technologies (see Box 16.1). In this regard, there 
are two competing types of impact. On the positive side, increases in agricultural 
productivity in areas used for agriculture may provide a disincentive to clear more 
land (via reduction in the price of outputs). On the negative side, if the technology 
raises productivity significantly but only dampens output prices a little, there may be 
incentives for further clearing of land for agriculture. Other environmental impacts 
relate to externalities to the agricultural production system, for example, whether 
adopting CGIAR technologies increases net carbon emissions, reduces biodiversity, 
or increases the rate at which pollutants are emitted from farming systems. Getting 
good data that can allow evaluating these impacts is difficult and the relative impor-
tance of these factors is uncertain. The use of economic valuation methods, such 
as contingent valuation or choice modelling, is noted as being able to help identify 
where such impacts are important (Bennett 2009).
(Continued)
BOX 16.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 
AROUND THE GREEN REVOLUTION
One of CGIAR’s greatest – if not the greatest – success stories is the green revolu-
tion in South Asia, catalysed by personalities such as the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize 
Winner Dr. Norman Borlaug. From 1960 to 2000, international agricultural 
research centres, together with national research programmes, contributed to 
developing modern varieties for many crops. These varieties have contributed to 
large increases in crop production. Productivity gains were, however, uneven 
across crops and regions. Consumers generally benefitted from declines in food 
prices. Farmers benefitted only where cost reductions exceeded price reductions 
(Evenson and Gollin 2003). The green revolution helped to pull the South Asia 
region back from the edge of an abyss of famine, led to regional food surpluses 
within two decades, lifted millions of people out of poverty, made crucial contri-
butions to economic growth, and saved large areas of forest, wetlands and 
other fragile lands from being converted to farmland. The research behind the 
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(Continued)
green revolution achieved the objectives of the time and yielded high rates of 
economic return. However, Hazell (2008) points out that new problems and 
challenges arose that required significant evolution of the research and develop-
ment system and its research priorities. Poverty and malnutrition were not elimi-
nated and, although poverty shares fell, the number of poor people remained 
high. The study by Evenson and Gollin (2003) neglected the environmental 
impacts and the environmental costs (e.g. of pesticide use) that have been 
largely identified in subsequent studies.
In fact, the green revolution introduced new environmental problems of its 
own, especially those related to poor management of irrigation water, fertilizers, 
and pesticides. Doubts have increasingly arisen regarding the sustainability of 
intensively farmed systems and regarding off-site externalities such as water pol-
lution, siltation of waterways and loss of biodiversity have imposed wider social 
costs. In this evolving context, research and development priorities have changed 
from a narrow focus on productivity of food grains to a need to focus on natural 
resource management and sustainability issues. The results of this changing 
research agenda are mixed, but considerably more research has focused on 
South Asia’s agriculturally related environmental problems.
In green revolution areas, the best yields and environmental impacts have 
been obtained from research on more efficient use of fertilizers, water, and inte-
grated pest management practices. For example, the latter appeared to save on 
pesticide costs, reducing workers’ exposure to harmful pesticides and protecting 
biodiversity. No-tillage and greater incorporation of organic matter into inten-
sively farmed soils have also proven beneficial.
The evidence is less clear about the benefits of organic farming or systems 
of rice intensification. Research on these topics generated favourable results, 
but the potential benefits have been constrained by adoption levels that are 
far too small in relation to the scale of the environmental problems to be 
solved. Major reasons for poor adoption include the higher labour require-
ments of many improved management practices, the high levels of knowledge 
required by farmers, water and fertilizer subsidies in many South Asian coun-
tries, and the externality of some environmental issues. These are typical issues 
emanating from research that need complementary changes in policies and 
local institutions to be effective.
Following the green revolution model, several examples of research on 
watershed development and associated soil and water management issues have 
contributed to successful watershed development programmes in South Asia 
that integrated environmental impacts. These have been shown to increase agri-
cultural productivity, reduce soil erosion, and improve groundwater levels. In 
the late 1990s, another CGIAR initiative explored the extent of land savings that 
were attributable to large productivity increases that followed widespread 
 dissemination of improved varieties (Renkow 2010; Stevenson et al. 2010). 
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CGIAR approaches to evaluation and impact assessment
The CGIAR mandate initially focused on improving crop genetics, but has since 
expanded to include a range of subjects and activities extending the scope of 
research and impact assessment to natural resource management and environmental 
impacts (Djurfeldt et al. 2009) and climate change impacts increasingly more chiefly 
since the early 2000s. In methodological terms, this broadening of responsibility 
posed a number of challenges. Although issues in crop genetic improvement may 
be evaluated with techniques that seem to offer a high level of credibility (e.g. 
econometrics), social and policy-oriented research often require methods that are 
less prone to generalization and different from the standards of traditional science 
(e.g. qualitative approaches). Whereas the CGIAR centres have generally measured 
poverty by using income and consumption data, current impact evaluations include 
the concept of sustainable livelihoods. Such assessments seek a broader and more 
holistic understanding of poverty, taking into account a variety of factors that influ-
ence or impinge on people’s capacity to address their vulnerability and poverty (e.g. 
access to land and water, social relationships, physical safety, and personal strategies 
to achieve context-specific and individual livelihood goals). Given the character of 
these questions, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is the most 
appropriate. This makes it possible to identify factors such as causal relationships, 
general trends, and adoption rates while also considering the multidimensional 
nature of poverty and the indirect consequences of agricultural research.
Problems arise in trying to scale up to larger geographical aggregation levels 
(particularly at the country level, which, for CGIAR, is not a level of intended 
Had  CGIAR crop genetic improvement work not taken place, an additional 
20–25 million hectares of land in developing countries would have been needed 
at the beginning of the 21st century to produce the same amount of cereal 
output, with implications for larger carbon emissions, biodiversity loss, and 
water use. A 2010 review examined the impact on global land-use change of 
crop germplasm improvements in major mandate crops of CGIAR (e.g. rice, 
wheat, maize, and several others) between 1965 and 2004 (Stevenson et al. 
2010). The study, conducted with the aid of a global multi-commodity, multi-
regional computable general equilibrium model linked to a global spatially 
explicit database on land use, supports Borlaug’s hypothesis that increases in 
cereal yields as a result of widespread adoption of green revolution technologies 
that have saved natural ecosystems from being converted to agriculture 
(although the results suggest that this effect is of a much smaller magnitude 
than hypothesized). The total agricultural area in 2004 would have been 
between 18 and 27 million hectares larger (of which 12–18 million hectares 
would have been in developing countries) if the world had not benefitted from 
crop germplasm improvements since 1965.
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impact). Although individual CGIAR centres may have an interest in impact 
assessment at a lower (farmer or intermediate) scale in order to evaluate specific 
research products or programmes, there is a clear imperative at the CGIAR system 
level to demonstrate large-scale impacts. However, the CGIAR level of impact and 
impact evaluation is either sub-national (e.g. community, watershed, regional) or 
supranational in multi-centre research programmes designed to address global or 
regional issues that could solve environment-related problems (e.g. water scarcity 
and climate change).
In addition to the issue of scale, the choice of appropriate research tools (quali-
tative and/or quantitative methods), addressing issues such as attribution, the exis-
tence of baseline data, the design of counterfactuals, and environmental valuation 
are considered as critical to adequately and meaningfully conduct an environ-
mental impact assessment. Some of these issues are elaborated on in the following 
sections.
Qualitative and quantitative methods
The choice between qualitative and survey-based (quantitative) statistical approaches 
involves trade-offs; combining both is generally recommended. In the assessment 
of sustainable livelihoods, the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods 
needs to be comprehensive and carefully planned (La Rovere and Dixon 2007; 
Walker et al. 2008). Combining approaches makes it possible to estimate the indi-
rect consequences of agricultural research and to establish a detailed and contex-
tual assessment while simultaneously identifying the quantitative patterns of impact. 
Most recent guidelines recommend CGIAR use combined research impact tools.
Baseline data
A weakness in many studies is the absence of baseline data. This is evident in natu-
ral resource management cases, which often rely on the “best” available data and 
indirect indicators. One explanation for this is that impact assessments were not 
planned for when projects were designed and launched. To mitigate this, an obvious 
recommendation is proper planning for evaluation processes in the initial phase of a 
project. Recently, donors have provided substantial funding to CGIAR, which has 
enabled the establishment of extensive baseline databases that will permit rigorous 
tracking of projects or programme impacts over time.
Counterfactuals
In the absence of baseline data, impact assessment is methodologically challenging, 
not only due to poor benchmarks but also because baseline information is neces-
sary to establish counterfactuals. The history of CGIAR ex post impact assessments 
at the project and programme levels is significant, but the use of proper before and 
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after counterfactuals (as well as with and without counterfactuals) is less frequent 
due to the noted scarcity – until recently – of properly designed baselines and com-
parison groups.
Valuation methods
The majority of impact assessments and evaluations have neglected to incorpo-
rate non-market environmental impacts (impacts that do not translate into mon-
etary costs) because estimating research impacts outside market effects is complex 
(Bennett 2009). With evaluations being established largely within the conceptual 
rigour of traditional cost–benefit analysis, the inclusion of non-marketed effects 
requires the estimation of benefits and costs in monetary terms. Hence, for evalua-
tions to include non-market benefits and costs requires not only the already chal-
lenging processes of forecasting the impacts of research outputs on various goods 
and services (marketed and non-marketed) but also the estimation of society’s values 
for all the forecast impacts.
CGIAR’s evaluations mostly draw attention to the omission of environmental 
impacts in their scope. For example, Hazell (2008: XV in a study of agricultural 
research in South Asia concludes “there are few impact studies from South Asia that 
estimate a return to a research investment corrected for environmental benefits and 
costs”. He also points to the use of indicators as a means of ranking research invest-
ments in terms of both their environmental and poverty impacts. There is also no 
real consensus as to which indicators should be used. Without a consensus, the use 
of indicators remains arbitrary and limited. Empirical studies are recommended to 
link research investments to environmental outcomes in order to assess past invest-
ments and design more effective research initiatives.
The 2011 Independent Science and Partnership Council book on CGIAR 
sheds light on the state-of-the-art methodological progress on valuation methods 
(choice modelling and contingent valuation) and ongoing work on measurement, 
modelling, and data collection for environmental impact assessment of agricultural 
research.
The rise of climate change investments and evaluation
Since 2011, the growing research efforts on climate change impacts on agricul-
ture, until then scattered in individual research activities of the various CGIAR 
centres and of the Climate Change Challenge Program, converged through the 
establishment of the Research Program on CCAFS. CCAFS built on the earlier 
CGIAR Challenge Program on Climate Change to bring together earlier centre-
based research efforts on climate-related agricultural matters. CCAFS addresses the 
challenges that global warming poses on food security and agricultural producers, 
production systems, policies, and institutions4 (from the CGIAR-IEA, 2016). One 
key concept for implementing CCAFS activities, which received increasing atten-
tion over the past decade, is climate-smart agriculture (CSA, see Box 16.2).
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Since CCAFS started, the CGIAR adopted a new Strategy and Results Framework 
(SRF) setting common goals for the CGIAR in terms of development impact, 
strategic objectives and results, and Intermediate Development Outcomes for the 
CRP portfolio and for individual CRPs. CRPs were instructed to articulate impact 
pathways and Theories of Change (ToC) and develop targets and achievement indi-
cators. In 2015, CCAFS proposed a second phase for 2017–2022 that included CSA 
in order to meet the global cross-cutting needs of climate change with compara-
tive advantage for the CGIAR, focusing on the adaptation and mitigation options 
in agriculture to contribute to resilience to climate shocks. The SRF commits the 
CGIAR to devote nearly two thirds of its research to such issues. With annual bud-
gets around USD 60–70 million, CCAFS is one of the largest CRPs, with expendi-
tures among the highest in the Research Theme on Adaptation, as well as relatively 
even among the other Research Themes.
Global context in climate change research and policy
At the 21st Paris Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2015, agreement was reached 
on Sustainable Development Goals, recognizing that UNFCCC remains paramount 
regarding climate change issues and setting high level ambitions for adaptation and 
mitigation. The agreement structures the activities on mitigation around the (vol-
untary) intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) and recognizes the 
BOX 16.2 CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE
CSA is a conceptual approach developed to advocate for changes in how agri-
culture is practised and agricultural development is understood with respect to 
climate change impacts. CSA involves the optimization of the objectives of: 
sustainably increasing agricultural productivity to support equitable increases 
in farm incomes, and better food security; adapting and building resilience of 
agricultural and food security systems to climate change at multiple levels; and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture (including crops, live-
stock, and fisheries). The term CSA was coined by FAO for the 2010 Hague 
Conference on Food Security, Agriculture and Climate Change,5 CCAFS being 
an early partner in developing the CSA. The approach asserts that addressing 
emerging climate risks while reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires new 
technologies, policies, institutions, and investment and that context-specific 
interventions are required. CSA responds to the challenges of climate change 
to optimize and balance the objectives of productivity, adaptation, and mitiga-
tion. CCAFS implements a large proportion of its work on CSA through “cli-
mate-smart villages” where CSA interventions are tested with partners, while 
seeking policy influence and direct engagement with governments.
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need for adaptation. While research on the role of agriculture in mitigating climate 
change initially concentrated on potential in developed countries, this changed in 
the past decade. The impacts of climate change on agriculture and food security, 
especially in developing countries, and the role of agriculture in increasing resil-
ience, became increasingly recognized topics of research. In the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, agriculture is treated as a cross-cutting 
issue related to food security and food production, human health, and adaptation 
options. With CCAFS, agriculture started being included as a mitigation option for 
developing countries in the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), 
and the CRP aimed at exploring synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and 
adaptation. These aspects have been gaining relevance and are now recognized 
as central for addressing climate change and contributing to achieving several 
Sustainable Development Goals.
Evaluation of climate change and CCAFS in the new 
setting of the CGIAR
The Independent Evaluation Arrangement (IEA) of the CGIAR evaluated in 2016 
the CRP on CCAFS, to improve the CRP’s performance and identify ways to 
maximize the contributions that CCAFS can make to future food security in the 
context of climate change, by informing decision-making and planning by the CRP 
management, CRP sponsors, partners, and other stakeholders on aspects of pro-
gram performance and options for the future of the Program. Performance was 
evaluated to assess the quality of science by assessing a random sample of journal 
articles by CCAFS, and the Program’s efficiency and organizational performance6 
at global Program, Flagship and Regional Program levels. The evaluation of the 
research contribution also included bibliometric analysis and H-index analysis of 
senior researchers, contributing to the CCAFS’ comparative advantage and qual-
ity of science. CCAFS engages in generating international public goods (IPGs) as 
global knowledge producer, as a provider of products and services, and as a reposi-
tory of institutional capacities for international research on climate change related 
to agriculture and food security. CCAFS outputs with clear applicability across 
national borders and high IPG potential include weather index-based insurance sys-
tems, climate information services (CIS), Web-x Evaluation of the CRP on CCAFS 
web-based Climate Portal, climate analogues and tools for measuring mitigation 
benefits in agriculture. With the growing effects of climate change on global devel-
opment agendas, the CGIAR benefitted from CCAFS integrating research across 
CGIAR centres and strengthening its presence in policy dialogues. While operating 
at the global level, CCAFS grounded its research activities in national activities and 
institutions.
CGIAR-IEA (2016) evaluation examined CCAFS research since its launch, 
irrespective of funding sources. The evaluation covered investigative activities 
by CCAFS and partners. The evaluation considered research for development 
approaches, whereby CCAFS convenes and facilitates investigative action by partners 
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and studies them. The evaluation used both summative and formative dimensions 
to the case study assessments. Since many projects originated in work started before 
the CCAFS Challenge Program, some work was assessed in summative ways, and 
current and proposed future work in formative ways. The governance and financial 
management of CCAFS was not covered in depth by the IEA as it had been exam-
ined by earlier reviews.
Other elements of CGIAR evaluation as well as of planning, monitoring, and 
learning work of the CGIAR have been subject to studies or assessments. Among 
these, CCAFS’s Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation (ML&E) system7 provides 
mechanisms to ensure the quantitative and qualitative monitoring, building on a 
set of modules in an online ML&E Support Pack. The ML&E strategy was imple-
mented during the second phase of the CCAFS program until 2025 by using a 
results-based management (RBM) approach and supports an evaluation culture of 
reflective learning, experimentation, and adaptive management. Also, by integrating 
ML&E mechanism through CCAFS in projects, it supports outcomes that include 
changes in practices, skills, and behaviour of researchers, policy makers, extension 
services, farmers, and other user groups. In terms of planning and monitoring out-
comes and learning, Schuetz et al. (2017) provide insights on the approach to theory 
of change, impact pathways, and results-based management monitoring, evaluation, 
and learning system. It describes how the CGIAR theory of change8 can be used 
to achieve impacts that balance the need to generate knowledge in agricultural 
research with the priorities of users and beneficiaries of the CGIAR.
Conclusion
CGIAR has a long history of impact assessment and evaluation, which in the last 
two decades has increasingly covered aspects of natural resource management and, 
more recently and explicitly, environmental and climate change impacts. However, 
a scarcity of methods to assess environmental impacts persists. This, rather than 
capacity, limits the proper assessment of such impacts. The conventional approach of 
focusing on quantitative tools and on attribution of impacts has evolved, as the use 
of qualitative approaches and contribution analysis has gained ground. Yet pressure 
arising from multiple sources (donors and evaluation fora) towards the perceived 
higher rigour achievable through quantitative approaches and attribution is being 
reapplied on impact assessment, and evaluation practitioners. This demand is stimu-
lated (or often enforced) by major donors insisting that a quantitative approach is 
the only credible one.
These influential donors are almost always located in the same places (i.e. coun-
tries, cities, intellectual circles) as the academic institutions where such tools are 
being promoted. It is difficult for evaluation practitioners operating in the field – 
close to the issues being evaluated but far from the main intellectual and funding 
hubs – to resist these demands and maintain the otherwise well-accepted practice of 
a wise, situation-driven choice of mixed methods.
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CGIAR covers global-scale issues, although its research outputs and impacts tend 
to be location specific. It works at two levels of impact, specifically the sub-national 
and supranational (agro-ecology or watershed), but has recently expanded to oper-
ating in more integrated ways with donors and governments at the country level. 
This is done to facilitate dissemination and uptake of research outputs by a country’s 
public and private sectors.
Scarcity of research resources has only recently been offset by the availability 
of funds driven by a sense of urgency for CGIAR’s work to address food crises 
worldwide. As a result, ex ante impact assessment studies to inform resource alloca-
tion and justify investments have been gaining ground, together with the explicit 
identification of impact pathways on livelihoods. The CGIAR’s impact assessments 
and evaluations have been typically ex post ones, focusing on impacts beyond the 
outcomes. This is in line with the nature of CGIAR’s mandate on public goods, 
which refers to achieving both direct and indirect impacts of research outputs with 
a longer-term timeframe for influencing change in people’s lives.
In the future, a more systematic common approach to impact assessment and 
evaluation that considers jointly the impacts across all dimensions – economic, 
social, and environmental – is suggested for CGIAR (Renkow 2010). Achieving 
this is constrained by the fact that, while the economic impacts are more readily 
measured in quantitative, monetary terms than social or environmental impacts, 
environmental impacts typically arise to a large degree from changes in flows of 
goods and services for which there is often no market and are thus less tangible.
The concentration of CGIAR’s evaluation policy on principles and on best 
international evaluation practice is inspired by policies by a number of interna-
tional organizations’ governing bodies as well as by several international financing 
institutions. The availability of the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidelines for 
development evaluation can become very useful to the CGIAR towards a more 
coherent, uniform evaluation practice, and hopefully can halt the proliferation of 
centre- or issue-specific guidelines. This more unified practice is expected to more 
systematically include the relevance, effectiveness, impact, and long-term sustain-
ability criteria. For example, CGIAR criteria for deciding on the coverage and fre-
quency of evaluations, including its usefulness for accountability, decision-making, 
learning, improvement, efficiency, and avoidance of duplication are well in line with 
those of the United Nations (UN). By heading in a harmonized direction, the 
evaluation practice in CGIAR can help focus on the main cross-cutting issues and 
on the big picture, especially at a time when CGIAR centres are converging into 
a larger consortium that resembles (in terms of modalities and aims) the UN sys-
tem itself. This new consortium is aimed at coherence, alignment, and a collective 
strategic effort by the various research centres. This will also respond to the Paris 
Declaration and Accra Accords through the alignment of financing by international 
donors for international agricultural research.
The IEA had since 2012 central evaluation functions, with characteristics of 
independence, and separate lines of responsibility and responsiveness to all parties 
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in the consortium. The IEA evaluation of climate change impacts of the CGIAR 
(as part of the CCAFS programme) is provided as an example of a comprehen-
sive assessment of the CGIAR increasing research efforts, particularly over the last 
decade, on climate change matters.
Notes
 1 See, for example, https://www.cgiar.org/research/publication/managing-natural-
resources-sustainable-production-systems-research-agenda-crossroads/.
 2 For example, see Renkow (2010).
 3 This assessment reviewed the impacts of past investments in natural resource manage-
ment research on land, water, and biodiversity resources management in CGIAR. It 
responded to concerns on the shortage of credible evidence that natural resource man-
agement research does contribute to realizing the CGIAR mission on poverty, food 
security, and the environment. The review covered a set of geographical regions (Asia, 
North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, global) including macro- (related to policy and institu-
tions) and micro-oriented (commodities and farm-level technology) research projects. 
Most research started 20–25 years ago, meaning that there was a good interval between 
research and evaluation. In the policy cases, it was only possible to identify – not quan-
tify – impacts. Although the returns did not reach levels often achieved for much of 
the CGIAR’s crop breeding research, returns of natural resource management research 
projects were calculated without estimating the positive spillover environmental benefits, 
which may outstrip the benefits deriving from crop germplasm improvement research.
 4 CCAFS goal is to “promote a food secure world through provision of science-based 
efforts that support sustainable agriculture, enhance livelihoods, adapt to climate change, 
conserve natural resources and environmental services”. It comprises four Flagship 
Projects: Climate-smart agricultural practices, climate information services and climate-
informed safety nets, low-emissions agricultural development, policies and institutions 
for climate-resilient food systems.
 5 http://www.fao.org/climate-smart-agriculture; https://ccafs.cgiar.org/climate-smart-
agriculture-0#.XjVAb2hKjD4.
 6 Including aspects relating to resource use; priority setting and planning; reviewing and 
reporting; learning; internal and external communication and relationships; and stake-
holder involvement.
 7 https://ccafs.cgiar.org/planning-monitoring-learning-and-evaluation#.XhzljFVKjIV.
 8 The Theory of Change of CCAFS emphasizes strategic partnerships, capacity building, 
open access data, communication, real time monitoring and evaluation, and gender and 
social inclusion.
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